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Introduction
Susan Houseman
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Machiko Osawa
Japan Women’s University
The full-time, permanent job historically has been the norm in
Japan, the United States, and European countries. Yet in virtually all of
these countries, the fraction who are in part-time, temporary, or other
nonstandard positions has increased in recent years, in some countries
dramatically so. The papers in this volume use an interdisciplinary and
cross-country comparative framework to understand why nonstandard
work has grown in so many countries and its implications for workers.
These papers were originally presented at a conference sponsored
by the Japan Foundation and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ-
ment Research in August 2000. The conference brought together lead-
ing scholars in the fields of economics, sociology, and labor law from
Japan, the United States, and Europe to address a common set of ques-
tions. All of the papers written for the volume explicitly compare the
experiences among countries or were paired with papers that address a
similar set of questions for other countries. There is considerable varia-
tion in the levels of and growth in various nonstandard work arrange-
ments among countries. Authors exploit cross-country variation in
economic conditions and institutional arrangements to better under-
stand why certain arrangements have been growing faster in some
countries than in others and what this means for workers.
In addition, the papers in this volume examine a broad set of
employment arrangements. In this way, they provide a reasonably
complete picture of how the nature of the employment relationship is
changing within and among countries. Moreover, because responses to
economic or institutional pressures may manifest themselves in differ-
ent ways in different countries, the inclusion of a broad set of arrange-
ments is important in cross-country analysis. For instance, businesses
may respond to competitive pressures to reduce labor costs and
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increase employment flexibility primarily by increasing fixed-term
contracts in one country, increasing part-time employment in another,
and subcontracting out work to self-employed individuals in a third.
Thus, the research in this volume is able to capture important cross-
country dynamics that might have been missed had we focused on just
one or a limited set of employment arrangements.
The first set of papers in the book compares the development of
nonstandard employment in selected countries, examining the causes
of different patterns and trends among countries and the implications
for workers. Hoffmann and Walwei compare the more rapid growth of
nonstandard employment, particularly part-time and fixed-term con-
tract employment, in Germany relative to Denmark. Fagan and Ward
examine the Netherlands, which experienced rapid growth in part-time
and temporary employment, and Britain, which experienced much
slower growth in nonstandard employment. Cebrián, Moreno, Samek,
Semenza, and Toharia study the situation in Italy and Spain, two coun-
tries with high unemployment and rigid labor markets but quite differ-
ent patterns of nonstandard employment. The chapters by Carré and by
Houseman and Osawa compare the rather limited growth of nonstand-
ard employment in the United States with the much more rapid devel-
opment in France and Japan, respectively. Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and
Wetzels cover the developments in four European countries with
diverse experiences: Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
Women are disproportionately represented in nonstandard employ-
ment arrangements (particularly part-time and temporary employment)
in all countries, and several papers provide a special emphasis on
women in nonstandard employment. Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels
provide an extensive discussion of the interaction of female labor force
participation, government policies affecting women—including child
care and maternity leave laws—and the development of nonstandard
employment in European countries. Nagase and Cassirer provide simi-
lar analyses for Japan and the United States, respectively.
Employment and related laws play a complex but crucial role in
the development of nonstandard employment within countries. Two
papers in this volume provide essential background and analysis of
laws pertaining to nonstandard employment. Schömann and Schömann
discuss the laws in the European countries covered in the volume and
related directives passed by the European Union, while Kojima and
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Fujikawa compare and contrast relevant employment law in Japan and
the United States. 
The volume concludes with a paper by Kalleberg and Reynolds
examining the attitudes of workers in nonstandard employment in all
of the countries represented in the book. The chapter goes beyond the
documentation of differences in the wages, benefits, and job security of
workers in nonstandard arrangements relative to those in regular full-
time positions, and considers how workers feel about these differences
and whether their attitudes affect their productivity.
NONSTANDARD WORK ARRANGEMENTS: SOME 
DEFINITIONS
Nonstandard work arrangements are perhaps most easily defined
by what they are not: full-time dependent employment with a contract
of indefinite duration, or what is generally considered the “standard”
work arrangement. Most papers in this volume focus on part-time and
various types of temporary employment. Though the precise definition
varies among countries, part-time employees typically work fewer
hours per week than full-time employees. In Japan, however, many
part-time workers work the same (or almost the same) number of hours
as their full-time counterparts (see Houseman and Osawa). Within the
category of temporary employment, the distinction is made between
direct-hire temporaries, who are hired directly by the employer for a
temporary period of time or on a fixed-term contract, and temporary
agency workers, who are employees of a temporary help agency that
subcontracts out its employees to clients on a short-term basis. Tempo-
rary agency workers may be temporary employees of the agency or, in
some countries, may have regular, permanent contracts with the
agency. Several chapters also consider the development of self-
employment, especially the dependent self-employed or independent
contractors, who perform work for a particular client and have few or
no employees of their own. 
The precise definitions of various nonstandard work arrangements
can differ among countries, and authors of the individual chapters in
this volume are careful to point out these often subtle but important dif-
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ferences. In many cases, differences in the definitions of nonstandard
arrangements reflect, as Hoffmann and Walwei point out, the fact that
the standard employment arrangement can mean quite different things
in different countries. For instance, regular, full-time employees in the
United States have far less protection against dismissal than their coun-
terparts in many European countries and Japan. Statistics specifically
on fixed-term contracts have not been collected in the United States, as
they typically are in other countries, arguably because these types of
contracts are not widely used owing to the ease of dismissing regular
workers; in turn, temporary employment is more broadly defined in
U.S. statistics than in other countries. Similarly, the fact that many of
those designated as part-time in Japan work the same hours as full-time
workers reflects a part-time/full-time distinction in Japan that denotes a
difference in status, in which regular full-time workers typically enjoy
greater job security, benefits, and wages. 
OVERVIEW OF NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN, 
THE UNITED STATES, AND EUROPE
Table 1.1 shows trends in part-time, temporary, and self-employ-
ment in the countries covered in this volume.1 Although the levels of
and trends in part-time and temporary help employment vary consider-
ably among countries, most countries experienced some growth in the
share of one or both of these forms of employment. Especially notable
is the growth of part-time employment in France, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, and Japan, and the growth of temporary employment in Spain
and France. The figures on self-employment in Table 1.1 break out
agricultural and nonagricultural self-employment. Self-employment in
many countries declined sharply because of a steep decline in agricul-
tural employment. Movements in self-employment in nonagricultural
industries are more likely to reflect shifts in the use of independent
contractors.2 The fraction in nonagricultural self-employment
increased modestly in several European countries, including Germany,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Britain. Countries with high initial lev-
els, such as Italy, Spain, and Japan, experienced declines in the share in
nonagricultural self-employment, probably reflecting the decline in
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5Table 1.1 Trends in Nonstandard Work in the 1990s in Japan, the United States, and Selected European Countries 
(percentage of total employment)
a In the European countries, self-employment excludes self-employed with employees.
b Part-time employment is defined as usual hours of work less than 35 hours per week in the United States and Sweden. In Japan and other
European countries, individuals identify themselves as part-time.
c In Japan and European countries, temporary workers are typically defined as those with fixed-term contracts. Japanese data include day
laborers; the European data include apprentices. In the United States, temporary workers are those with a job that is expected to be of
temporary duration.
d Data for Japan are for the years 1987 and 1997.
e Data for the United States are for the years 1989 and 1999.
f Figure adjusted to take into account discontinuity in U.S. data on part-time employment (see Houseman and Osawa, note 3).
N.A. = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations from the Employment Status Survey for Japan and from the Current Population Survey for the United
States. Siv Gustafsson supplied tabulations from the Swedish Labor Force Survey. Edeltraud Hoffmann and Ulrich Walwei supplied
tabulations from the European Union Labor Force Survey for the other European countries.
Total employment
 (000)
Self-employmenta
Agricultural Nonagricultural Part-timeb Temporaryc
1988 1998 1988 1998 1988 1999 1988 1998 1988 1998
Japand 60,502 67,003 3.5 2.3 11.5 9.5 10.8 15.4 9.1 9.7
United Statese 117,342 133,488 1.2 1.0 7.3 6.6 18.7f 17.4 N.A. 3.6
Denmark 2,683 2,679 2.1 1.0 2.5 3.1 23.7 22.3 5.6 5.8
Germany 26,999 35,537 1.3 0.6 3.1 4.3 13.2 18.3 5.0 5.6
France 21,503 22,469 3.6 2.0 4.6 4.2 12.0 17.3 4.6 10.3
Italy 21,085 20,357 4.7 1.8 18.9 10.2 5.6 7.4 3.3 4.2
Netherlands 5,903 7,402 1.6 1.3 4.9 5.5 30.2 38.7 7.0 11.1
Spain 11,709 13,161 6.5 3.6 12.6 11.3 5.4 8.1 15.3 24.3
Sweden 4,375 3,979 1.8 1.1 5.4 5.2 27.1 26.3 10.6 13.9
United Kingdom 25,660 26,883 0.8 0.6 7.8 8.4 21.9 24.9 5.0 5.8
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small family businesses. The employment share in temporary help
agencies (not reported) still represents a relatively small fraction of
total employment in all countries. Nevertheless, it has grown rapidly in
Japan, the United States, and most European countries in recent years
(Fagan and Ward; Houseman and Osawa). 
The importance of the growth in nonstandard work arrangements is
even more striking when viewed in terms of its contribution to job
growth. For instance, Fagan and Ward report that 70 percent of all new
jobs in European Union countries were fixed-term contracts in 1997,
up from 50 percent just five years previously. The Dutch economy of
the 1990s is often admired for its spectacular job growth and decline in
unemployment, but most of its net employment growth was accounted
for by the growth in nonstandard employment, primarily part-time
employment. Similarly, in Japan, part-time employment accounted for
77 percent of the growth in paid employment from 1992 to 1997. Even
in the United States, which experienced little growth in most forms of
nonstandard employment, the growth in temporary help employment
accounted for 10 percent of net employment growth in the 1990s.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SIZE AND GROWTH OF 
NONSTANDARD WORK ARRANGEMENTS
Many of the chapters in this volume address why nonstandard
work grew in recent years and why the levels and growth of various
arrangements are so much greater in some countries than in others. A
logical factor to explore is whether growth in nonstandard work
reflects simple shifts in the demographic or industry composition of
workers and jobs. For instance, if the composition of the workforce
shifted toward demographic groups who needed more flexible work
schedules, this might result in an increase in the supply of workers
seeking part-time and temporary positions. Similarly, if the composi-
tion of employment shifted toward industries with an above-average
use of part-time shifts or temporary positions, we would expect an
increase in employer demand for these types of arrangements. Gustafs-
son, Kenjoh, and Wetzels argue that an increase in the labor force par-
ticipation of women may explain some of the dramatic increase in part-
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time employment in the Netherlands. However, for the most part, these
simple supply and demand shifts cannot explain the growth of non-
standard employment. Hoffmann and Walwei, for instance, show that
none of the growth in part-time or temporary employment in Germany
or Denmark may be explained by changes in the demographic compo-
sition of the workforce or by industry shifts. Similarly, simple demo-
graphic and industry shifts cannot explain changes in part-time
employment in Japan and the United States. Nagase notes that there
has been some increase in the number of Japanese women desiring
part-time employment, owing to the precipitous decline of family and
self-employment opportunities there, but argues that because involun-
tary part-time employment has grown among Japanese women over
age 35, their choice of part-time employment is often a constrained
one.
Instead of simple demographic and industry shifts, a complex set
of factors related to economic conditions and to government taxes, reg-
ulations, and other policies helps explain much of the growth and
cross-country differences in growth of nonstandard work. Countries
with relatively high unemployment and low employment growth, such
as France, Japan, Germany, and Spain, generally experienced more
growth in the share in nonstandard arrangements than countries with
relatively low unemployment and high employment growth, such as
Denmark and the United States (Carré; Houseman and Osawa; Hoff-
mann and Walwei; Cebrián et al.) There are a couple of reasons why
this correlation may occur. Hoffmann and Walwei suggest that non-
standard work arrangements are less desirable for most workers, and so
such arrangements grow when the economy is weak and workers have
little choice. In addition, as Schömann and Schömann point out, gov-
ernments often promoted fixed-term employment contracts, part-time
employment, and self-employment as a solution to high unemploy-
ment. Of course, to the extent that policies promoting nonstandard
work succeeded, over time the growth in nonstandard work arrange-
ments might be associated with high employment growth and low
unemployment rates, rather than the reverse. Arguably, the Nether-
lands is a case in point, where rapid growth of part-time and temporary
employment—fostered partly by public policy—was associated with
high employment growth and low unemployment.
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Government tax policies and regulations of benefits may greatly
affect employers’ incentives to use various nonstandard arrangements.
For instance, the circumvention of taxes is an important reason for the
high and rapidly expanding levels of part-time employment in Japan
(Nagase; Houseman and Osawa; Kojima and Fujikawa). Similarly,
U.S. employers may avoid paying expensive benefits by using part-
time, temporary, or contract workers (Houseman and Osawa). By EU
mandate, European countries have passed laws to generally require
equal pay, benefits, and other protections of workers in nonstandard
arrangements, and consequently, lower wages, benefits, and taxes usu-
ally have been less important as factors underlying the growth of part-
time and temporary employment there. Nevertheless, there are still
some labor cost advantages to using nonstandard work arrangements in
European countries. For instance, Hoffmann and Walwei note that in
Germany and Denmark, the avoidance of taxes and other social protec-
tions may underlie the growth in low-hours, part-time workers, who
are not covered by laws requiring equal treatment. Moreover, as with
independent contractors in the United States, such factors likely con-
tributed to the growth in self-employment (with no employees) in cer-
tain European countries, such as Germany.
A relatively more important set of factors encouraging employers
in many European countries to use nonstandard work arrangements is
the circumvention of dismissal laws. All European countries regulate
the terms of layoff, typically requiring advance notice and some sever-
ance payment, though the stringency of the regulation varies greatly
from country to country. To inhibit employers from circumventing
these regulations by hiring employees on fixed-term contracts (which
could be terminated without consequence to the employer at the end of
the contract and which could be repeatedly renewed), governments
typically regulate their use, though, again, the stringency of regulations
governing fixed-term contracts varies greatly. Fagan and Ward point
out that European countries with the highest levels of temporary
employment tend to be the countries with strong obstacles to firing
coupled with few restrictions on the use of temporary contracts. For
instance, the huge increase in temporary employment in the 1980s in
Spain is generally credited to stringent dismissal laws and the relax-
ation of restrictions on fixed-term contracts (Cebrián et al.). Similarly,
restrictions on dismissals for economic and noneconomic reasons are
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one factor underlying France’s growth in temporary help and fixed-
term contract positions, which are used as a screening device, espe-
cially for youth and women entering the workforce, and as a buffer for
regular employees (Carré). Hoffmann and Walwei argue that the more
stringent regulation of layoff in Germany compared with Denmark is at
least partly responsible for its higher level of fixed-term contracts.
Restrictions on dismissal of regular employees in Japan, coupled with
implied commitment of lifetime employment for regular employees,
has stimulated the growth of part-time employment, especially part-
time employment on temporary contract (Houseman and Osawa). In
addition, against the backdrop of a prolonged recession and the need to
cut costs, Japanese employers successfully lobbied to liberalize laws
governing the use of temporary agency workers, spurring the recent
rapid growth in this form of employment (Kojima and Fujikawa). In
contrast to the situation in many European countries and Japan, Britain
and the United States have relatively few restrictions on dismissal, and
thus avoidance of such restrictions is relatively unimportant in spurring
the growth of nonstandard employment (Fagan and Ward; Houseman
and Osawa).
Competitive pressures on companies to increase workforce flexi-
bility coupled with the relaxation of government regulations on work
hours has been another important impetus for the growth in nonstand-
ard work in many countries. For instance, in several European coun-
tries, the relaxation of work hour regulations was associated with
widespread expansion of operating hours by businesses, allowing more
intensive use of capital and providing more responsive, flexible deliv-
ery and service times. The expansion of hours of operation has resulted
in increased demand for part-time and other nonstandard work arrange-
ments to cover irregular work hours. Companies have also sought to
use more part-time and other nonstandard arrangements to provide a
closer correspondence between actual staffing needs and staffing levels
at any point in time. In addition, employers may increase part-time
workers’ hours without incurring overtime costs (Carré; Fagan and
Ward).
Although some government policies effectively increase employer
demand for part-time workers, others effectively increase the supply of
workers desiring part-time employment. As noted above, most Euro-
pean countries have passed laws mandating equality in the pay and
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treatment of part-time and other workers in nonstandard arrangements,
thus making part-time employment more attractive to workers (Schö-
mann and Schömann; Fagan and Ward). Some European countries,
most notably the Netherlands, have given workers certain rights to
reduce their hours of employment (Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels).
Tax structures in some countries, notably Japan and Denmark, have
effectively increased the desirability of working part-time, especially
for married women (Kojima and Fujikawa; Nagase; Houseman and
Osawa; Hoffmann and Walwei). 
WOMEN IN NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT
Women in all of the countries studied are disproportionately repre-
sented in part-time and temporary employment. Several chapters
uncover interesting cross-country differences in trends in nonstandard
employment among women and the links between marriage, childbirth,
and nonstandard employment. For instance, Nagase, writing on Japa-
nese women, and Cassirer, writing on U.S. women, show that work
patterns following marriage and childbirth are quite different in these
two countries. Japanese women are much more likely than U.S. women
to drop out of the labor force following marriage or childbirth. Interest-
ingly, Japanese women do not tend to use part-time employment when
their children are young as a bridge to full-time employment when
their children are grown, as is common in the United States and other
countries. Rather, in large part because of the low wages associated
with part-time employment, it is more typically selected by Japanese
women with older children who do not need to pay for child care. 
Cross-country differences in the ways women combine marriage,
work, and family are also manifested in different trends in part-time
employment. Although the rate of part-time employment among
women was increasing rapidly in countries such as the Netherlands,
Germany, and Japan, it was declining in Sweden, Germany, and the
United States. Several chapters relate cross-country differences in the
incidence of and trends in part-time employment to differences in gov-
ernment policy and the availability of child care. For instance, Gustafs-
son, Kenjoh, and Wetzels posit that the rapid growth of part-time work
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in the 1990s in the Netherlands is partly related to the fact that only
recently have Dutch women combined work and family. In contrast,
part-time work in Sweden grew rapidly in the 1970s as many home-
makers entered the labor force on a part-time basis. Gustafsson, Ken-
joh, and Wetzels hypothesize that the fall in part-time employment
among Swedish women is related to laws that treat full-time work for
both men and women as the norm, but allow for generous leaves (so
that parents may combine work and family) and give parents the right
to shorten work hours until their child is age 8. The lack of child care in
countries such as Japan and Germany makes it difficult for women to
work full-time, and hence may have contributed to the growth of part-
time employment in these countries. In contrast, the greater access to
child care in countries such as the United States and Denmark may
have contributed to the decline in part-time employment among
women in those countries (Houseman and Osawa; Hoffmann and Wal-
wei). 
The tax structure also influences women’s choices between part-
time and full-time employment. For instance, Hoffmann and Walwei
link the growth of full-time employment among married Danish
women to the favorable treatment of second incomes in the Danish
income tax structure. In contrast, the rapid growth of part-time employ-
ment among Japanese women has been linked to a tax structure with
strong financial incentives for married women to keep their earnings
below certain thresholds (Nagase; Kojima and Fujikawa; Houseman
and Osawa).
Finally, the strength of antidiscrimination laws may influence
women’s choices between part-time and full-time jobs, with the latter
generally being better paid than the former. For instance, Nagase notes
that although Japan’s Equal Employment Opportunity Law and Child
Care Leave Law of 1986 should have promoted more full-time regular
employment among women, it has had little apparent effect thus far, a
fact she attributes to the law’s weakness.
Although most research on women in nonstandard employment
focuses on part-time work, the growth of female labor force participa-
tion has been offered as an explanation for the growth of various types
of temporary employment in a number of countries. Women will more
likely prefer temporary employment, it is reasoned, in order to accom-
modate family demands. However, evidence presented by Cassirer
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casts doubt on this hypothesis. She concludes that in the United States,
temporary agency and direct-hire temporary jobs are not particularly
attractive to women with children. Few American women use tempo-
rary or other nonstandard work for extended periods of time, and most
use it as a transition to full-time work.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
FOR WORKERS
It is commonly believed that workers in nonstandard employment
arrangements receive lower pay, fewer benefits, and less job security
than comparable workers in full-time regular positions. In principle,
any adverse effects of nonstandard employment should be less in Euro-
pean countries than in the United States and Japan. As Schömann and
Schömann note, there has been a legal movement within the European
Union to guarantee the same protections for workers in nonstandard
arrangements as in regular full-time positions. Laws often mandate
parity in wages and benefits, rights to works council or union represen-
tation, and limits on the time individuals may be in fixed-term con-
tracts. Japan and the United States, for the most part, lack such
protective legislation (Kojima and Fujikawa).
Careful statistical studies generally show that part-time and other
workers in nonstandard arrangements earn less and receive fewer bene-
fits than comparable full-time workers in Japan and the United States
(Nagase; Houseman and Osawa). Despite parity laws, the results from
studies comparing wages of workers in nonstandard arrangements to
those in regular full-time employment in European countries are
mixed. Controlling for worker characteristics, workers on fixed-term
contracts earn similar wages to those in permanent positions in Spain
(Cebrián et al.). Controlling for demographic, occupational, and indus-
try characteristics, part-time and full-time workers earn similar pay in
Sweden and the Netherlands, but part-time workers earn substantially
less in West Germany and Britain (Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels).
Fagan and Ward suggest one reason for the continued discrepancy
between the wages of workers in nonstandard arrangements and those
in regular full-time arrangements in countries such as Britain is the
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weakness of parity laws in these countries. Carré and Gustafsson, Ken-
joh, and Wetzels also point out that employers can circumvent parity
regulations by segregating part-time and full-time workers into differ-
ent occupations; for the government to enforce parity regulations, firms
must have classified nonstandard and regular full-time workers in the
same occupations. Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels note that although
part-time work is found in a broad spectrum of occupations, including
high-skilled occupations in the Netherlands and Sweden, part-time
work is concentrated in low-skilled occupations in West Germany and
Britain. They offer these patterns as an explanation for the wage parity
found in the former two countries and its absence in the latter two
countries.
By definition, workers in temporary positions have less job secu-
rity than permanent workers. Indeed, the ability to circumvent dis-
missal laws or to otherwise reduce the cost of dismissal is an important
reason employers in all countries use fixed-term contracts or temporary
help agencies. Concern that workers may become trapped in temporary
positions with little job security is greatest for countries, such as Japan
and Spain, that have strong protections against dismissing regular
workers but have little regulation of temporary contracts. Indeed, there
is little mobility between nonregular and regular positions in Japan
(Houseman and Osawa). Interestingly, however, Cebrián and col-
leagues assert that concern over job instability for temporary workers
is exaggerated in Spain, where the fraction of paid employees on fixed-
term contract is roughly one-third. They argue that previous studies
showing little movement of temporary workers to permanent positions
are based on data with a relatively short time horizon. Over longer time
frames, temporary workers typically appear to settle into permanent
jobs.
Although workers in part-time and temporary positions often are
concentrated in low-skilled, low-paying jobs and have little job secu-
rity, Kalleberg and Reynolds find little evidence that this negatively
affects their attitudes toward work. Using data from the International
Social Survey Program for the countries covered in this volume, they
find that part-time workers in most countries have attitudes that are as
positive or more positive toward their job than those of full-time work-
ers. Part-time workers also report less job stress. Kalleberg and Rey-
nolds argue that part-time workers may be generally satisfied with their
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job because the job rewards generally match the values they place on
job rewards. For instance, people who value high pay typically do not
work part-time. Sweden is a notable exception. The negative attitudes
expressed by Swedish part-time workers may reflect that country’s
poor economic conditions during the survey period, with many part-
time workers desiring full-time employment. 
Workers on fixed-term contracts also generally do not display
more negative attitudes and behaviors toward work, in spite of the fact
that those on fixed-term contracts do not seem to value job rewards less
than full-time workers. Kalleberg and Reynolds speculate that,
although those on fixed-term contracts often would prefer permanent
employment, they do not display negative work attitudes because they
are trying to gain a permanent job with the employer. In so much as
worker attitudes affect worker productivity, Kalleberg and Reynolds
uncover no adverse consequences for employers from hiring workers
on a part-time or temporary basis. 
Notes
1. Note that figures on nonstandard employment presented in Table 1.1 may differ
slightly from figures presented in subsequent chapters in this volume (for
instance, if they are derived from a different survey). Also, in Table 1.1, non-
standard employment is expressed as a percentage of total employment rather
than as a percentage of wage and salary employment, as is done in several chap-
ters.
2. Self-employment figures for European countries exclude the self-employed with
dependent employees, whereas figures for the United States and Japan include all
self-employed. Figures on nonagricultural self-employed without dependent
employees are especially likely to reflect movements in independent contract
employment. Unfortunately, it is not possible to report comparable figures for
Japan and the United States.
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The Change in Work Arrangements 
in Denmark and Germany
Erosion or Renaissance of Standards?
Edeltraud Hoffmann and Ulrich Walwei
Institute for Employment Research, Nuremburg
In all industrial countries, the composition of work arrangements is
in a state of flux (Delsen 1995; Meulders, Plasman, and Plasman 1996;
de Grip, Hoevenberg, and Willems 1997). Supply and demand in the
labor market can be managed in different ways. In addition to the typi-
cal employment relationship, work can be contracted out to (nomi-
nally) self-employed persons. The duration of employment can be
unlimited or on a fixed-term basis. Individual working hours can vary
considerably. Moreover, there can be complex contractual relations
between employer and employee, as in the case of temporary work
agencies, for example.
To assess the impact of the various work arrangements, a reference
point is needed, and in this chapter, we use the dominant work arrange-
ment in quantitative terms. The “standard work arrangement” is based
on a permanent, full-time employee-employer relationship subject to
basic social security contributions.
In many countries, the growing number of work arrangements that
diverge from the “standard work arrangement” continues to cause
fierce controversy. Depending on one’s point of view, either hopes or
fears are articulated over the mainly female part-time workforce, who
are socially protected to varying degrees; or over the many new staff
who are employed only on a fixed-term basis; or over the trend of elim-
inating employment risks by using temporary agency workers or by
contracting out work to (nominally) self-employed people. In view of
the growing variety of work arrangements and changes in workers’
preferences, it is, however, no longer easy to assess which work
arrangements are associated with which opportunities and risks for
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society and for the individual. On the one hand, nonstandard work
arrangements are considered less regulated than the typical employ-
ment relationship and, therefore, also have less protection from a legal
point of view. On the other hand, they represent transitional forms or
bridges to the standard work arrangement.
This chapter does not aim to assess the various implications of
nonstandard work arrangements for the labor market or individuals in
terms of “pros” and “cons,” or “good” and “bad.” Such issues would
preferably be analyzed using longitudinal data on career development
and processes of mobility (see, e.g., other chapters in this book).
Instead, our chapter regards such arrangements as outcomes of differ-
ent forces and looks specifically to the reasons for this ongoing devel-
opment. Unfortunately, knowledge about the determinants of change is
still rather limited. We know more about what is not the cause than of
what is the cause of the changes in the composition of work arrange-
ments. In particular, shift-share analyses have shown that, irrespective
of the sector-specific and gender-specific changes in employment, non-
standard work arrangements would have increased and to roughly the
same extent (see Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 1998; Hoffmann and Wal-
wei 1999). Furthermore, analyses suggest that behavior of employers
and employees has changed over time within certain sectors as well as
within certain demographic groups. One possible reason could be the
newly available options for employers and employees. The choice of
work arrangements for both sides of the market depends, not in the
least, on which alternatives they have at their disposal. The labor mar-
ket performance, as well as the institutional setting, particularly influ-
ences the scope of action.
The relevance of labor market performance to the composition of
work arrangements is obvious from an employee viewpoint. For the
majority of employees, nonstandard work arrangements are an inferior
good, and the least preferable if better options are available. The insti-
tutional framework may also influence costs and benefits of various
work alternatives. For example, an institutional setting that imposes
high costs for employers can make full-time arrangements less attrac-
tive for employers and reduce their prevalence. To deal with this set of
questions, it makes sense to look beyond national borders. Interna-
tional comparisons allow us to integrate the relative importance of
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labor market performance and institutional settings as possible explan-
atory factors.
This chapter begins by describing changes to the composition of
work arrangements in Western Europe. We outline in which countries
the tendency of erosion is already visible and the speed of change. In
the next section, the analysis focuses on Germany and Denmark, where
the development of work arrangements took different directions. In
Germany, nonstandard work arrangements grew in importance, while
the opposite occurred in Denmark. In Germany, the question is how far
the growth in nonstandard work arrangements can be considered a pro-
cess of catching up with other countries, such as the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and Spain, in the diversity of employment relation-
ships. In Denmark, the question is whether the decline in nonstandard
work arrangements indicates a renaissance of “normal employment.”
We conclude by asking whether the changes lead to more diversity in
work arrangements or to newly defined standards.
WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE
Overall Trends
The diversity of work arrangements is greater than official labor
market statistics suggest. There is, for example, a considerable lack of
internationally comparable data on temporary work agencies, home
work, on-call work, or freelancers. At best, only national data are avail-
able. The European Labor Force Survey (ELFS) offers at least detailed
information about self-employment, part-time employment, and tem-
porary employment.1 Table 2.1 provides an overview of such work
arrangements and their development over time.
Nonstandard work arrangements covered by the ELFS play a quite
different role in European Union (EU) countries. In 1998, the highest
share of self-employed (including family workers) could be found in
southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
In contrast, self-employment was comparatively low in Luxembourg,
Denmark, and Germany. In all countries, self-employment decreased.2
The picture is quite the opposite concerning part-time and temporary
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Total employment
(in thousands)
Self-employment
(incl. family workers) Part-time employment
Temporary 
employment a
Member states 1988 1998 1988 1998 1988 1998 1988 1998
Denmark 2,683 2,679 11.0 9.7 23.7 22.3 10.2 9.1
Germany 35,537 — 11.0 — 18.3 — 10.9
West 26,999 29,077 11.5 11.5 13.2 20.0 10.1 10.0
East 6,459 — 8.5 — 12.0 — 17.0
Austria 3,626 — 13.8 — 15.8 — 6.8
Belgium 3,483 3,857 18.0 17.4 9.8 15.7 4.5 6.4
Spain 11,709 13,161 29.1 23.0 5.4 8.1 15.8 25.3
Finland 2,179 — 14.6 — 11.7 — 15.1
France 21,503 22,469 16.2 12.5 12.0 17.3 6.6 12.2
Greece 3,651 3,967 49.5 43.4 5.5 6.0 8.8 7.4
Ireland 1,090 1,496 25.3 20.2 8.0 16.7 6.8 6.1
Italy 21,085 20,357 29.5 28.7 5.6 7.4 4.1 6.1
Luxembourg 152 171 11.2 9.4 6.6 9.4 3.3 2.4
Netherlands 5,903 7,402 12.1 11.6 30.3 38.8 7.7 11.2
Portugal 4,427 4,764 30.9 28.2 6.5 11.1 12.6 12.4
Sweden 3,946 11.4 23.9 11.4
United Kingdom 25,660 26,883 12.7 12.5 21.9 24.9 5.2 6.1
European Union 128,345 152,494 19.1 16.6 13.2 17.4 7.8 10.6
NOTE: — = data were unavailable.
a
 Temporary employees include apprentices, trainees, research assistants, etc.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
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employment. In most of the EU countries, both types of employment
grew, but at different rates. The ELFS data show high part-time
employment rates in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden,
and Denmark. Low rates are found in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Luxem-
bourg. In the case of temporary employment, Spain, Finland, Portugal,
and France ranked highest, whereas Luxembourg, Italy, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom ranked lowest.
Table 2.1 is a useful overview of the importance of different work
arrangements in EU countries. For several reasons, however, such indi-
cators offer only a superficial impression. First, nonstandard work
arrangements covered by the ELFS are not clear-cut. Double counting
is possible. For example, the self-employed can either work full-time
or part-time. In addition, part-time and temporary employment can be
arranged simultaneously. Moreover, the definitions of such types of
employment are not precise (Lemaitre, Pascal, and Bastelaer 1997).
Temporary workers in the ELFS may include apprentices, agency
workers, or even participants of active labor market measures, such as
job-creation schemes. Part-time work consists of a wide range of
employment relationships, including the extremes of marginal employ-
ment (few hours of work) and jobs with working hours just below the
full-time level. The proportion of self-employment among total
employed also varies significantly, not the least because the agricul-
tural sector plays a different role in the countries surveyed. In addition,
self-employment rates include self-employed workers with or without
employees. Even permanent, full-time working relationships may
include unique employment statuses, such as civil servants who enjoy
life-long tenure.
Although a more detailed study of work arrangements in different
countries would be helpful, the complexity and effort make such a
study difficult in many countries. Therefore, it is more practical to con-
centrate the analyses on countries with an exemplary character. Of spe-
cial interest are countries in which developments moved in different
directions, as in Denmark and Germany. 
Work Arrangements in Germany and Denmark
Figure 2.1 shows the development of work arrangements in Den-
mark and Germany. The percentages for two years, 1985 and 1998,
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represent the share of particular work arrangements as a portion of total
employment.
Germany
In Germany, the proportion of standard work arrangements (i.e.,
permanent full-time employment relationships) declined in the last
decade compared with other forms of employment.3 Although the over-
all self-employment rate (including family workers) declined slightly,
the rate of self-employment grew in the sectors outside agriculture.
Temporary employment (including apprentices) increased slightly over
time. The work arrangement showing the fastest growth was part-time
employment on a permanent basis, with an increase of 5 percentage
points.
In 1998, the composition of work arrangements in eastern Ger-
many still differed considerably from those in western Germany. This
partly reflects the ongoing process of radical structural change and
transformation of the eastern German economy (see below, Determi-
nants of Change section). In the new Länder, standard work arrange-
ments still carried greater weight. The difference in the proportion of
standard work arrangements between eastern and western Germany in
1998 was 3 percentage points. 
Figure 2.1 Change in Work Arrangements in Denmark and Germany 
(% total employment in 1985 and 1998)
a 1985 West Germany; 1998 includes the new German Länder.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey; Mikrozensus.
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Denmark
Interestingly, the proportion of standard work arrangements in
Denmark was similar to that in Germany in 1998 (see Figure 2.1). But
unlike Germany, the share of standard work arrangements increased by
5 percentage points between 1985 and 1998. In addition, the composi-
tion of work arrangements differs between Denmark and Germany. In
Denmark, the proportion (as a fraction of total employment) of part-
time employment was higher, and the shares of self-employed and tem-
porary workers were lower in 1998.
Also in Denmark, the overall self-employment rate, which in 1998
was lower than in Germany, decreased slightly. However, unlike in
Germany, the proportion of self-employed outside the agricultural sec-
tor stagnated. In the case of temporary employment and part-time
work, the picture is different, too. The decline of temporary employ-
ment is largely associated with fewer apprenticeships (with fixed-term
contracts) in Denmark. The proportion of part-time employment
decreased by 2 percentage points, which includes both permanent and
temporary work.
DETERMINANTS OF CHANGE
Labor Market Performance
With regard to nonstandard work arrangements, a lack of employ-
ment opportunities and high unemployment must be regarded as a
“push factor.” In this respect, labor markets in Denmark and Germany
reveal remarkable differences. The differences refer to the level, devel-
opment, and composition of employment as well as unemployment. 
For decades, Denmark has had one of the highest labor force par-
ticipation rates in the Western world. In 1998, the labor force participa-
tion rate reached 79 percent. The corresponding German rate stood at
71 percent. The difference is even greater if one compares employment
rates in both countries. Whereas 75 percent of the Danish working pop-
ulation was employed in 1998, in Germany, 64 percent was employed.
After a recession in the early 1990s, Denmark saw a considerable
employment boom. This positive development can be attributed to sev-
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eral factors, such as sustained economic improvement, fiscal impulses
through tax cuts, and changes in active and passive labor market poli-
cies that targeted the unemployed as well as imposed sanctions (PLS
Consult and Peter Jensen 1997; Madsen 1999).
Between 1983 and 1998, the German figures show a rather mixed
picture. For western Germany, the rate of employment growth was
almost as high as in Denmark (10.7 percent vs. 11.4 percent). Employ-
ment indexes in the early 1990s indicate much greater development
than in Denmark. The picture changes, however, if one considers
employment indexes in unified Germany. In contrast to the Danish
development, unified Germany experienced a slow economic and labor
market recovery in the 1990s (see Figure 2.2), mainly because of the
unification of West and East Germany in 1990. At first (especially
because of the emergence of new markets in East Germany), the
Figure 2.2 Employment Indexes in Denmark and Germany 1983–98 
(Index: 1991 = 100)
a 1983–90 are figures for West Germany; 1990–98 are figures for unified Germany.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force; Survey West Germany—Mikrozensus.
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former West Germany experienced a considerable economic and
employment boom. However, the recovery process in eastern Germany
took more time than most experts and politicians predicted. For this
reason, eastern Germany still depends on massive financial transfers
from western Germany. Therefore, unification has certainly made it
more difficult to find convincing solutions to the employment crisis. It
would, however, be insufficient to blame only German unification in
this context (Blau et al. 1997). Several structural deficiencies in Ger-
many are also responsible, such as the high burden of taxes and of
social security contributions, too few employment-oriented wage
agreements, and a lack of progress in increasing labor market flexibil-
ity.
In Denmark, the high employment rate gives less competitive
workers more opportunities to enter the labor market. All age groups,
all qualification levels, and both sexes have higher participation rates
than in Germany. That means that women, young people, older work-
ers, and even those with low skills were able to profit, at least in part,
from high levels of employment.
Not surprisingly, differences in the level and the development of
unemployment between Denmark and Germany are also evident. Fig-
ure 2.3 shows lower unemployment rates in Denmark than in Germany
since 1994. Whereas in Denmark, unemployment has decreased con-
tinuously since 1993, improvements in Germany began only recently.
In Germany, the very recent (since 1996) and slight reduction in the
unemployment rate can be attributed only in part to more employment;
the shrinking labor supply, owing to demographic changes, also played
a part. The positive employment development in Denmark, together
with an intensive use of active labor market policies (especially the
high number of short-term measures), has lowered the proportion of
long-term unemployed (as part of the total unemployed) from 39 per-
cent in 1985 to 29 percent in 1998, and lowered the youth (up to age
25) unemployment rate from 11 percent to 7 percent. In the same
period, the proportion of long-term unemployment in Germany rose
from 48 percent to 52 percent, and the unemployment rate of young
people ages 15–24 remained at about 10 percent.
Unemployment represents only a part of total underemployment
(Schmidt 1997; Stille 1998). Using the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) concept of “broad unemploy-
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ment” in assessing underemployment, the corresponding rate in 1996
for Germany was 22 percent (the standardized unemployment rate in
1996 was 9.6 percent) and for Denmark, 20.5 percent (the standardized
unemployment in 1996 was 6.9 percent). The definition of broad
unemployment includes registered unemployed, participants in active
labor measures (such as training, job creation schemes, and short-time
work), those in early retirement, and persons in paid leave schemes
(such as child care or training). However, recent Danish studies show
that the standardized unemployment rate, as well as the broad unem-
ployment rate, decreased in the second half of the 1990s, indicating a
“real” improvement in the labor market situation (Madsen 1999).
Institutional Setting
The choice of work arrangements depends on which options
employers and employees have at their disposal. The institutional
Figure 2.3 Unemployment Rates in Germany and Denmark, 1983–98 
(percentage share of labor force)
a 1983–90 are figures for West Germany; 1990–98 are figures for unified Germany.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
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framework defines the labor market actors’ scope of action. Regula-
tions influence costs and benefits of various alternatives. Although it is
impossible to offer a comprehensive overview of institutions in the two
countries, we focus on those regulations that are of particular impor-
tance to the composition and development of different work arrange-
ments. These include the social security systems and certain incentives
or disincentives resulting from them, the type of income taxation, the
provision of child care facilities, the level and the significance of active
labor market measures, the existence of particular institutions facilitat-
ing the school-to-work transition, and the strictness of employment
protection regulations.
The Danish social security system provides a generous social pro-
tection (e.g., in the case of unemployment). It is mainly financed by
general tax revenues (European Commission 1999). In 1997, the share
of social security contributions amounted to only 10 percent of the
labor costs (defined as gross salary plus social security contributions
paid by the employer), the lowest in the EU. The corresponding share
for Germany was much higher at 34 percent. Because of German unifi-
cation, the burden of social security contributions has risen signifi-
cantly. This has led to an increase in labor costs of employment
relationships covered by social insurance. As a consequence, the sub-
stitution of labor through capital was stimulated, and gainful activities
were at least in part pushed from the regular to the underground mar-
ket. On the supply side of the labor market, higher social security con-
tributions have increased the tax wedge between gross and net wages.
The lower the advantages of rising social security contributions for
employees, the greater the disincentives to work in jobs covered by
social insurance. As a result, work arrangements that are not subject to
social security contributions (e.g., marginal employment or work given
to nominally self-employed workers) become more attractive (Buch
1999).
In addition to financing, the design of the Danish and German
social security systems is also quite different. The pension system in
Denmark consists of a basic pension for all citizens, financed by gen-
eral revenue taxes, and a supplementary pension, financed mainly by
employer contributions. In contrast, pension insurance in Germany is
mandatory for all wage and salary earners and is (apart from taxes) pre-
dominantly financed by payroll taxes, to be paid almost equally by
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 25  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
26 Hoffmann and Walwei
employer and employee contributions. The German compulsory pen-
sion insurance scheme was introduced to ensure that all workers enjoy
an adequate old age pension. The level of old age pensions in Germany
largely depends on the range and duration of such payments. Unlike in
Denmark, this leads to a situation in Germany in which less stable
career histories bear considerable risks in terms of social insurance.
Of particular interest in this context are regulations that act as an
incentive for marginal employment. Such regulations, in particular
threshold levels, can refer to the income as well as to the number of
working hours. The new German regulation, which has been valid
since April 1999, relates to the monthly income as well as to the
weekly working hours. Monthly wages below DM 630 are subject to
restricted social insurance (normally no benefits and employer contri-
butions only) if the person is not a multiple job holder and the weekly
working time is fewer than 15 hours. The prior regulation did not
require any compulsory social insurance, whether the person was a
multiple job holder or not, but employers were obliged to pay a payroll
tax, which was nearly as high as the employer’s social security contri-
butions. Similar to Germany, regulations in Denmark also create incen-
tives for marginal employment. To claim unemployment insurance
benefits, an employee must work a minimum of 16 hours per week. For
part-time employment of no more than 39 hours per month, no contri-
butions to the supplementary pension system are due.
The type of income taxation may also influence the magnitude of
labor supply and the associated choice concerning certain wage
arrangements. Whereas Germany has joint income taxation, Denmark
taxes individuals separately (see Dingeldey 2000). Joint taxation can
discourage secondary wage earners from working. In particular, mar-
ried women who work at home are, under joint taxation, taxed at the
high marginal tax rate of their husband. Joint taxation, therefore, cre-
ates another incentive among secondary earners to find tax-free mar-
ginal employment. In contrast, individual taxation has the opposite
effect. The low wage of a part-time working spouse is taxed at a corre-
spondingly low rate.
In addition to the type of income taxation, the employment rates of
women are positively related to the provision of child care facilities.
The availability of publicly funded child care varies sharply between
countries. Denmark is one of the countries with the largest provision of
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care facilities for children up to age 3 (see Thenner 2000). Although
there are no severe limitations concerning kindergarten placements (for
children ages 3–6 years) in Germany, many are part-time placements,
and children usually return home at lunchtime. This situation may
cause a considerable obstacle to full-time work for German women, or
even regular part-time work. 
According to OECD data, Denmark spends the most on active and
passive labor market policies among countries in the western world. In
1998, the share of total expenditure on labor market policies amounted
to 5.63 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). (In Germany, it
was 3.56 percent.) Both countries spent twice as much on passive poli-
cies as on active programs. Of particular interest in this context are
schemes that enable unemployed individuals to start new businesses or,
in the case of job-creation schemes, that are associated with fixed-term
contracts. Leave programs (e.g., for training or child care) can favor
fixed-term contracts because such measures often lead to a temporary
replacement. Table 2.2 gives an overview of the quantitative impor-
tance of labor market programs in both countries in terms of full-time
equivalencies or annual averages.
Both countries changed the emphasis of labor market policies in
the 1990s. The Danish reform in 1993 initiated a considerable swing in
labor market policies. One part of the reform was additional measures
to reduce labor supply (e.g., early retirement, sabbaticals, and paid
leave arrangements). The number of participants in labor market pro-
grams and the composition of expenditure in Denmark reveal a shift in
recent years from demand-side measures (especially wage subsidies) to
supply-side measures (mostly training programs). In Germany, the
shift of labor market policies took place later. Since 1998, labor market
measures have aimed more at improving job matching by concentrat-
ing on targeted programs for hard-to-place individuals. The policies are
either implemented within firms or should, as much as possible, meet
the requirements of firms in order to build a bridge toward standard
employment.
In many countries, a close relationship exists between standard
labor market programs for youth and institutions facilitating the
school-to-work transition. The latter are particularly relevant for Den-
mark and Germany. The Danish vocational education and training pro-
grams are sandwich-type programs, in which a separate theoretical
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education at a vocational school (one-third of total duration) alternates
with practical training on a full-time or part-time basis in a business
enterprise (two-thirds of total duration). The German apprenticeship
system combines part-time education with workplace occupational
training. A characteristic feature of the two systems is fixed-term con-
tracts between the young employees and the employers offering practi-
cal or occupational training (in Denmark, excluding vocational
schools, and in Germany, including vocational schools). Nevertheless,
in both countries, the existing institutions fail to reach all school leav-
ers to whom standard labor market programs are offered.
Finally, employment protection regulations may also influence the
composition of work arrangements. The stricter the dismissal protec-
tion, the more it can act as an incentive for enterprises to select those
forms of employment with little or no dismissal protection (e.g., fixed-
term contracts, use of temporary agency workers, or contracting out
Table 2.2 Participationa in Labor Market Programs in Denmark and 
Germany, 1994 and 1998 (% of civil employment)
Denmark Germany
1994 1998 1994 1998
Subsidized employment (direct job 
creation, short-time work, job 
training, enterprise subsidies, etc.)
2.4 1.7 2.0 1.8
Training measures (adult education/
training, except educational leave)
0.9 1.0 1.4 1.1
Other activation programsb (specially 
arranged activation, experiments)
0.1 0.2
Labor market programs (except leave 
and early retirement)
3.4 2.9 3.4 2.9
Leave/job rotation of which: 
educational leave
2.0
0.5
1.6
0.9
Civil employment in thousands 2,508 2,659 35,892 35,715
a Full-time equivalents and annual averages.
b Activation programs link payment of cash benefits to the participation in active labor
market programs.
SOURCE: Denmark: Danmarks Statistisk; Germany: Amtliche Nachrichten der
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit—Arbeitmarkt 1998; Calculations of Institute for Employ-
ment Research (Section 2) Civil Employment: OECD Labor Force Statistics.
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work to self-employed workers). Based on OECD indicators of the
strictness of employment protection regulations in 26 countries in the
Western world, Denmark ranks sixth and Germany ranks twentieth
(OECD 1999). A higher ranking implies more legal restrictions. The
indicator includes regulations concerning individual and mass dis-
missal as well as temporary employment (e.g., fixed-term contracts and
the use of temporary agency workers). The OECD analysis shows a
considerable trend toward deregulation in the 1990s. Amid deregula-
tion, two trends emerged: changes in the law either provided for a
change in the protective rights of regular employment, or they
extended the possibilities of arranging nonstandard work. Regarding
the choice of work arrangements, the two reform trends must be
assessed differently. If regular employment relationships are deregu-
lated—as in the case of a change in law on protection against dis-
missal—evasive reactions (e.g., an increased use of fixed-term
employment) are less likely. If, on the other hand, deregulation is
geared toward an extended use of nonstandard work arrangements, one
must ask whether the additional flexibility is needed and whether it is
used by the parties involved. 
The already flexible Danish labor market in the 1980s was further
deregulated in the early 1990s by an almost complete liberalization of
the use of temporary workers. If one takes the relatively strict employ-
ment protection regulations into account, previous deregulation initia-
tives in Germany were quite moderate. Significant changes in the
regulation of German employment protection mainly apply to tempo-
rary employment. Since 1985, a justification for using fixed-term con-
tracts for fewer than 18 months is no longer required. The duration was
extended further in 1996, to 24 months. Within the maximum duration
of 24 months, the contract can be extended three times. Since 2001, the
use of fixed-term contracts without justification is limited to new
recruitments only, which prevents employers from using such flexible
fixed-term contracts as a means to extend other fixed-term contracts
that require justification (e.g., in the case of fixed-term contracts last-
ing more than 24 months). Similarly, the duration for which employers
can use temporary agency workers (which is still not allowed in con-
struction) was also extended in the 1990s and, since 1997, can now last
for 12 months. 
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To summarize, a comparison of the two countries reveals certain
similarities as well as considerable differences. Denmark and Germany
are both welfare states with high wages and low wage differentiation
by qualification. Apart from the size of the two countries, remarkable
differences exist in the level and development of employment, labor
market flexibility, financing and design of the social security system,
institutional incentives for female employment, and the significance of
active labor market programs. 
SPECIFIC WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN 
DETAIL: DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR CAUSES IN 
DENMARK AND GERMANY
Self-Employment
In 1998, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Germany had the lowest per-
centage of self-employed persons in the EU. The extent of self-
employment is influenced by demand-side, supply-side, and institu-
tional determinants (Noorderhaven et al. 1999; Bogai and Gotthard
1999). A first argument relates to structural change. Agrarian-domi-
nated societies are generally characterized by a high degree of self-
employment. In more developed countries, industrialization and a
higher share of services limit self-employment. Industrialization leads
to increased capital accumulation and business concentration, whereas
a higher share of services leads to business start-ups.
The level of self-employment also depends on the level of prosper-
ity. The share of self-employment is high in countries with low average
incomes, while self-employment rates are comparably lower in coun-
tries with a high living standard. Greater productivity resulting from a
growing capital stock induces relative improvements to wages com-
pared with incomes from self-employment. Higher levels of economic
development offer more alternatives to earn a living. Incentives to
become self-employed are hence reduced.
The size and composition of the labor force may also influence the
level of self-employment. If we assume the same density of self-
employed (i.e., the number of self-employed related to the working
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population) in two countries or at two points of time, the self-employ-
ment rate (as part of total employment) will decrease with a higher, or
growing, employment rate. This is because higher employment is gen-
erally accompanied by greater labor force participation of women, who
in turn are less likely to be self-employed (Blanchflower 1998; Huijgen
1999).
The labor market and labor market institutions can also play a role
in self-employment. Both aspects are considered “push factors.” High
unemployment rates induce more individuals to become self-employed
owing to a lack of jobs in dependent employment. Self-employment
programs aimed at reintegrating the unemployed can reinforce such a
development. Push factors can also come into play with strict employ-
ment protection, high social security contributions, and deregulated
product markets with low barriers to entry.
High living standards, on the one hand, and structural change dis-
favoring the agricultural sector, on the other hand, offer a plausible
explanation for the comparatively low self-employment rates in Den-
mark and Germany. The particularly low share of self-employed and
family workers in Danish employment may also be attributed to sev-
eral additional factors, such as a higher participation rate of both mar-
ried and single women, a more favorable labor market since 1994, less
emphasis on programs promoting business start-ups, and less strict
labor market regulations. The reason for the still comparatively small
proportion of self-employed and family workers in eastern Germany
(8.5 percent compared with 11.5 percent in western Germany) likely
stems from the slow adjustment process in that economy, with its
uncertain prospects and lack of capital. Similarities between Denmark
and Germany on self-employment are also obvious if one compares the
composition and patterns of development.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 reveal that self-employment rates fell in both
countries from 1983 to 1998. The development, however, is largely
influenced by the closing of small agricultural businesses, and thus
reducing the numbers of self-employed workers. Outside the agricul-
tural sector, the opposite has occurred. Self-employment rates in Ger-
many remained relatively constant in the 1980s and increased in the
1990s. The increase was interrupted shortly as a result of German uni-
fication, given that self-employment rates were and still are quite low
in the new Länder. In Denmark, the decline in self-employed (not
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 31  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
32 Hoffmann and Walwei
including agriculture) has abated since the mid 1980s (Figure 2.4). As
a consequence, in both countries, extrapolations show increasing levels
of self-employment (especially outside agriculture).
In Denmark and Germany, the share of self-employed with
employees was higher than the share of self-employed without
employees in 1998. Differences between the two rates, however,
diminished with time. In both countries, the increase of self-employ-
ment without employees was above average. A possible explanation
for the increase of one-person businesses may be that market entries
became more feasible for small enterprises because of the rapid diffu-
sion of information and communication technologies. Stronger interna-
tional competition and increasing labor cost pressure, more intensive
contracting out, and concepts of “lean management” may also have
contributed to this development. 
Among the self-employed without employees, there is also
assumed to be an increase in so-called “nominal self-employed.” In
Germany, nominal self-employment may have emerged from the con-
Figure 2.4 Denmark: Self-Employed and Family Workers, 1983–98 
(percentage share of total employment)
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
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tinuously poor labor market in the 1990s and rising social security con-
tributions that disfavored work arrangements within an employee
status. According to Dietrich (1996), the number of nominal self-
employed in 1995 was between 179,000 and 431,000, or between 0.6
percent and 1.3 percent of total employment.4 The legislature in Ger-
many responded to the increase in one-person businesses, first in 1999
and then again in 2000, by defining the demarcation line between
dependent employment and self-employment.5 The new regulation
aims to reduce the circumvention of labor and social protection laws.
However, it also hampers the initiation of new firms. Individuals start-
ing a new business often do not employ additional workers and deal
early on with one or only a few clients. 
Temporary Employment
In a European comparison, temporary employment rates in Den-
mark and Germany are ranked somewhere in the middle of the spec-
trum. In both countries, trainees and apprentices contribute to
Figure 2.5 Germanya: Self-Employed and Family Workers, 1983–98 
(percentage share of total employment)
a 1983–90 are figures for West Germany; 1990–98 are figures for unified Germany.
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temporary employment to a considerable extent, although in Denmark
with a declining tendency (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7). Temporary
employment is, in many cases, associated with part-time work. In Den-
mark, this is more often the case than in Germany. There were no sig-
nificant changes to Danish temporary employment rates during the last
decade, while Germany saw a moderate upward trend. However, tem-
porary employment rates in Denmark and Germany are similar. On the
one hand, this might stem from the fact that the noted restrictions on
the use of fixed-term contracts are only slightly lower in Denmark than
in Germany. On the other hand, dismissal protection in Germany is
much more strict, which can, therefore, cause circumvention by tempo-
rary employment. Thus, lower temporary employment rates (excluding
apprentices) would be expected in Denmark. Possible explanations for
this counterintuitive result may be identified by looking at structural
features of temporary employment, labor market performance, and
institutional issues. 
Figure 2.6 Temporary Employment in Denmark, 1984–98 (percentage of 
total employed)
a Voluntary: “did not want a permanent job.”
b Involuntary: “could not find a permanent job”; “no reason given”; “contract for a pro-
bationary period.”
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
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Temporary work arrangements are, in general, not the first choice
for the majority of workers employed on a fixed-term basis. According
to the ELFS, permanent work would be preferred if available. “Volun-
tary” temporary employment plays only a small role in Germany, with
0.2 percent of all employed, while in Denmark, this type of employ-
ment is more significant, with 2.4 percent employed in voluntary tem-
porary employment. Permanent contracts are not necessarily the first
choice for employees who are less concerned about the disadvantages
of a temporary contract (e.g., the higher risk of being jobless after the
contract expires). This group could include, for example, individuals
uninterested in a permanent job (pupils or students) or those who were
planning to leave dependent employment (e.g., because of retirement
or the start of a business). The high figures of voluntary temporary con-
tracts in Denmark correspond to the multitude of marginal work carried
out by pupils and students. 
Figure 2.7 Temporary Employment in Germany,a 1985–98 (percentage of 
total employment)
a 1983–90 are figures for West Germany; 1990–98 are figures for unified Germany.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
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The business cycle is one of the possible determinants of changes
in temporary employment rates. The relationship between unemploy-
ment and temporary employment, however, can be cyclical as well as
countercyclical. Rising unemployment may promote the diffusion of
temporary contracts; falling unemployment may reduce the number of
temporary contracts (as in Denmark, see Figure 2.6). An opposite rela-
tionship might be expected when temporary employment is used as an
employment buffer, which is expanded in cyclical upswings and
reduced in cyclical downswings (as in Germany, possibly). 
As noted above, since 1985, fixed-term employment contracts last-
ing up to 18 months (and since October 1996, up to 24 months) no
longer required justification. Firms have made wide use of the new reg-
ulation (see Bielenski 1997). However, neither the high hopes (e.g.,
encouraging additional hiring due to a substitution of overtime work)
nor the fears (e.g., the replacement of permanent employment by fixed-
term employment) has been confirmed. The relatively constant rates of
temporary employment in Germany during the last decade suggest that
the new options offered by deregulation and the actual use of such
options are two different things. The reality in German firms is obvi-
ously not yet characterized by a regime of “hiring and firing,” and the
advantages of stable employment relationships (internal flexibility,
willingness to invest in human capital) obviously still prevail. This is
true even in eastern Germany. The greater proportion of temporary
employment there can be almost fully attributed to active labor market
programs (especially large-scale job creation schemes).
In Denmark, neither employment protection regulations nor tem-
porary employment rates has changed significantly. The relatively high
temporary employment rate in Denmark—even though employment
protection regulations are less strict than in Germany—can likely be
attributed to two factors: the comparatively high volume of voluntary
temporary employment and the still considerable level of active labor
market policy programs (e.g., subsidized employment and paid leave
arrangements).
Finally, regulations on temporary work agencies may also influ-
ence the use of temporary employment. Agency workers are a potential
alternative to permanent or fixed-term employees. Contracts for tem-
porary agency workers are also often signed for a fixed duration only.
Until 1995 in Germany, fixed-term contracts with agency workers were
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allowed only on the request of the employee. Since then, at least the
first deployment of a temporary agency worker can be on a fixed-term
basis. In Denmark, all regulations on temporary work agencies were
abolished in 1990. Therefore, the duration of the employment contract
depends on the individual agreement between agency and temporary
agency worker. Consistent information about the extent of agency
work in the EU countries is unavailable. Estimates by the World Feder-
ation of Temporary Work show that the importance of temporary work
agencies is relatively low in Denmark (0.3 percent of dependent
employment) and in Germany (0.7 percent of dependent employment)
compared, for example, with the Netherlands (4.6 percent) and France
(2.2 percent) (see Klös 2000; de Koning et al. 1999). Despite substan-
tial deregulation, the spread of agency work is still limited in Denmark.
However, in Germany, agency work has gained in importance even
though regulations are relatively strict. Nevertheless, the development
of temporary agency work in both countries must again be seen in the
context of different labor market performances and the availability of
other flexibility options. 
Recent studies illustrate that temporary work arrangements are
used as a complement to the core workforce as a way to reduce adjust-
ment costs (e.g., to business fluctuations) through more flexibility (see
Rudolph and Schröder 1997). Furthermore, using temporary employ-
ment during a probationary period (without any obligation) is attractive
to employers because it allows them to improve staff selection (see
Farber 1999; Rogowski and Schömann 1996). From this point of view,
relatively constant rates of temporary employment are compatible with
high levels of fluctuation in temporary work arrangements.
Part-Time Employment
The Netherlands has the highest percentage of part-time workers in
the EU, at 40 percent in 1998. Beyond the Netherlands, three countries
report percentages over 20 percent: the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
Denmark. In Germany, the share of part-time employment is less than
20 percent. However, as a percentage of the workforce, only Denmark
has seen a decline whereas an upward trend can be observed in Ger-
many and in the majority of EU countries (Figures 2.8 and 2.9).
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A comparison of part-time work in Denmark and Germany by
demographic characteristics reveals remarkable differences. Figures
2.8 and 2.9 show that the differences in the percentage of part-time
workers can largely be attributed to the higher share of Danish men
who work part-time. The share of women in part-time work is nearly
identical in both countries.
There are also considerable differences by age. Danes between the
ages of 15 and 24 are more likely to work part-time than their German
counterparts. Further, this trend does not hold for those age 25 and
older, highlighting the importance of this difference. Part-time employ-
ment rates in Germany for those age 25 and older were 19 percent (4
percent for men and 39 percent for women) and 17 percent in Denmark
(6 percent for men and 31 percent for women). The comparatively high
share of young part-time workers may be surprising for a country such
as Denmark, with high participation rates in education.6 There are two
reasons for this situation. First, part-time work (or, alternatively, full-
time work) may be an integral part of the Danish vocational system,
where young persons alternate between education and learning at a
workplace. Second, part-time work is often done by pupils or students
to improve their standard of living with marginal employment.7
The ELFS and a recent survey by Infratest provide information
about the reasons why workers choose to work only part-time. The
ELFS data show that the number of female part-time workers in Den-
mark decreased mainly because fewer women work part-time on a vol-
untary basis. In contrast, voluntary, and to some extent involuntary,
part-time work has increased in Germany. The Infratest survey sug-
gests that a considerable proportion of German female part-time work-
ers choose this type of employment because they want or need more
time with their children (which reflects the low provision of child care
facilities in Germany). This motive is obviously less relevant in Den-
mark, where young people more often combine part-time work with
education (see Table 2.3).
Data on the demand for part-time work are available from the IAB
Establishment Panel (see Düll and Ellguth 1999). Until 1996, part-time
work had been growing in western Germany, independent of firm size.
Since then, more differentiation between companies has taken place.
Large companies used part-time work to a lesser degree than did small
firms. Compared with western Germany, there is still a part-time work
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 38  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
The Change in Work Arrangements in Denmark and Germany 39
Figure 2.8 Part-Time Rates by Gender in Denmark, 1983–98
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
Figure 2.9 Part-Time Rates by Gender in Germany,a 1983–98
a 1983–90 are figures for West Germany; 1990–98 are figures for unified Germany.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
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“gap” in the new Länder, although part-time work has expanded within
firms of all sizes. Multivariate analyses also show that in the old
Länder, in particular, the extensive use of part-time work is associated
with a certain segment of small and young enterprises. Innovation in
these firms is less developed than in firms with a lower share of part-
time work. Marginal part-time work (fewer than 14 hours a week) can
be found in firms with lower qualification levels and those without
works councils. Comparable data do not exist for Denmark. A study by
Bielenski and colleagues (1994) shows that Danish and German firms
share similar views on the advantages of part-time work. In both coun-
tries, flexibility and increased competitiveness were the main reasons
for using part-time work. In contrast, lower wage costs or lower social
security contributions played only a minor role.
In Denmark and Germany, there are certain institutional incentives
for part-time work, and, as noted, the incentives apply to part-time
work with few hours. Therefore, it is not surprising that marginal part-
time work plays a significant role in both countries. In Denmark, 8.1
percent of the employed (9.9 percent of women; 6.5 percent of men)
worked fewer than 15 hours per week in 1998. In Germany, 5.9 percent
(10.7 percent of women and 2.2 percent of men) worked fewer than 15
hours a week. Data from the ELFS also show an increase of marginal
part-time work in both countries. Whereas in Germany, part-time work
with low as well as long hours contributed to the expansion of part-
time work, this is not the case in Denmark, where part-time work with
long hours (more than 14 hours a week) declined. 
The decline of part-time work during the last decade in Denmark
was mainly driven by declines among women and is concentrated
among voluntary employment contracts with an average work week of
between 15 and 35 hours. However, the decline in female part-time
employment in Denmark is not a new phenomenon. The development
was already evident in the 1980s, albeit more hidden. At that time, the
downward trend was compensated for by an increase in part-time work
among men. However, in the 1990s, the increase flattened out, with
male part-time work remaining relatively constant. The continued
decline of part-time work among Danish women seems to be largely
associated with an institutional setting that favors female employment,
with such benefits as comprehensive child care facilities and separate
income taxation. The reduction of involuntary part-time employment
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Table 2.3 Reasons for Working Part-Time in Denmark and Germany, 
1998
Denmark Germany
All part-time workers N = 186 N = 371
Involuntary part-time work (could not find full-time job) 11% 2%
Is student 31% 14%
Is ill/disabled 5% 3%
Wants/needs enough time for children 25% 44%
Wants/needs enough time to care for elderly, ill, or 
disabled persons in the family
3% 4%
Other domestic commitments 1% 3%
Wants enough time for own activities (e.g., hobbies, 
political or cultural activities)
12% 3%
Earns enough working part-time, no need to earn money 3% 1%
Other reasons for voluntary part-time 3% 1%
No answer 6% 7%
Total 100% 100%
Female part-time workers N = 148 N = 291
Involuntary part-time work (could not find full-time job) 13% 19%
Is student 22% 8%
Is ill/disabled 5% 2%
Wants/needs enough time for children 28% 51%
Wants/needs enough time to care for elderly, ill, or 
disabled persons in the family
4% 4%
Other domestic commitments 1% 3%
Wants enough time for own activities (e.g., hobbies, 
political or cultural activities)
14% 3%
 Earns enough working part-time, no need to earn money 3% 2%
 Other reasons for voluntary part-time 2% 1%
 No answer 7% 8%
Total (base: employed persons who declare themselves 
part-time)
100% 100%
NOTE: Answers to survey questions, “I would like to ask you why you work part-time
rather than full-time. Is it because”; and “Why don’t you want a full-time job? Is it
because”. . . were recoded and multiple responses were eliminated (rank order as
above; i.e., respondents were only counted in the first of the categories listed above
that applied).
SOURCE: Employment Options of the Future Survey, carried out by Infratest Burke
Sozialforschung, Munich, on behalf of the European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin.
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during the upswing in Denmark contributed to the general decline in
part-time work and is associated with improving labor market condi-
tions.
In Germany, part-time employment took a different direction. Vol-
untary and involuntary part-time work increased continuously in the
1980s and 1990s. This increase occurred amid high unemployment,
low labor force participation (not the least due to a lack of child care
facilities), and measures to improve work flexibility at the beginning
and the end of working life (e.g., policies to promote partial retire-
ment). The fact that part-time employment has gained relatively little
acceptance in eastern Germany can largely be attributed to, among
other things, the lower income associated with it. The share of part-
time employment may expand further in the future, given new regula-
tions in 2001 concerning this part-time employment. Full-time employ-
ees now have a legal right to opt for part-time employment.8 
CONCLUSION: MORE DIVERSITY OR NEW STANDARDS?
Analyses on the basis of the ELFS have shown that during 1985–
1998, the proportion of standard work arrangements declined in Ger-
many and increased in Denmark. In Germany, work arrangements have
shifted toward part-time dependent employment and self-employment.
Moreover, differentiation is more visible among nonstandard work
arrangements (e.g., more sole proprietorships or marginal part-time
employment). The renaissance of standard work arrangements in Den-
mark results from a decline in part-time employment, a small decline in
self-employment, and a nearly stagnant level of temporary employ-
ment.
Despite diverging trends in Denmark and Germany, the two coun-
tries both find that young employees are more affected by these forms
of employment (see Table 2.4). In Germany, the increase of nonstand-
ard work arrangements was more pronounced among young employees
than all employees. In Denmark, and counter to the nationwide trend,
nonstandard work arrangements are increasing among young employ-
ees. Nonstandard work arrangements obviously play an increasing role
as a bridge to standard work, mainly because they can reduce hurdles
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to subsequent integration into the labor market. In addition, this trend
of increasing levels of nonstandard work among young employees
reflects their frequent combination of education and work (e.g.,
apprenticeships and other types of learning at the workplace, as well as
marginal employment, which acts as a supplement to study grants).
Overall, there are no hints in Denmark or Germany that young employ-
ees may be socially excluded because of the growing number of non-
standard work arrangements.
Trends suggest that the decline in standard work arrangements in
Germany and the increase in Denmark may continue because of the
important role of part-time employment trends (see Figures 2.8 and
2.9). However, a warning against determinism in the development of
work arrangements is warranted. Two factors—normally not explicitly
considered in trend extrapolations—are relevant to the direction and
even strength of certain changes in the composition of work arrange-
ments: labor market performance and institutional incentives.
The change in work arrangements, particularly the diverging trends
in Denmark and Germany, reflects different labor market performances
in each country. Whereas in Denmark—a country with traditionally
high labor market participation—unemployment has declined since
1994, in Germany—a country with significantly lower labor market
participation—there was a severe labor market crisis between 1993 and
1998. The continuing decline in female part-time employment among
those working 15 to 35 hours a week in Denmark can, at least in part,
be seen as an exploitation of already scarce human resources. Supply-
side restrictions did not exist to a large extent because of comprehen-
sive child care facilities and significant incentives to work inherent in
the system of separate income taxation. Moreover, there was almost no
increase in self-employment (especially outside the agricultural sector)
since 1995 because of the high and increasing employment rate (espe-
cially for women with less tendency to become self-employed). Nearly
the opposite is the case in Germany, where self-employment is a state-
sponsored option for leaving the unemployment rolls. In addition, high
unemployment must be regarded as a “push factor” toward nonstand-
ard work arrangements. Nevertheless, compared with unemployment,
temporary employment and even involuntary part-time employment
are better alternatives than no job at all. 
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Denmark Germany
Work arrangements 1985 1990 1991 1998 1985 1990 1991 1998
Population age 15 to 24 yearsb 780 755 748 643 9,575 8,345 9,911 8,733
Total employmentb 521 491 484 428 5,039 4,831 5,661 3,939
Total employed in % of population 66.8 65.0 64.7 66.6 52.6 57.9 57.1 45.1
Self-employed and family workers 
(% of total employment)
1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.0
Family workers 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.7
Self-employed 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.2
With employees 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3
Without employees 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.9
Self-employed and family 
workers working part-time
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.9
Total dependent employment
(% of total employment)
98.8 98.8 99.2 98.8 94.6 98.1 98.0 98.1
Employees working full time 68.9 59.5 60.3 50.7 94.6 93.5 93.6 88.5
Permanent employment 42.2 36.7 35.7 29.0 64.8 60.4 63.3 39.5
Standard work arrangements
Temporary employment 26.7 22.8 24.6 21.7 28.7 31.4 28.6 48.6
Apprentices, trainees, etc. 18.6 18.1 19.0 16.1 24.6 23.2 20.9 39.9
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Other persons on fixed-term 
contracts
8.1 4.7 5.6 5.6 4.1 8.2 7.8 8.7
No response 1.1 1.7 1.7 0.4
Employees working part-time 
(% of total employment)
29.9 39.3 38.8 47.9 3.0 4.5 44.4 9.6
Permanent employment 20.9 32.6 30.8 42.8 2.2 2.8 2.9 7.1
Temporary employment 6.5 6.7 8.1 5.4 0.7 1.3 1.1 2.2
Apprentices, trainees, etc. 0.2
Other persons on fixed-term 
contracts
6.5 6.7 8.1 5.1 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.8
No response 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.3
a Data from 1985 and 1990 represent West Germany, while 1991 and 1998 represent unified Germany.
SOURCE: Eurostat Labor Force Survey.
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The institutional setting seems to be at least an equally important
explanation for the diverging trends in the two countries. However, we
must emphasize that standard work arrangements in Denmark and Ger-
many are not comparable in qualitative terms; standard work arrange-
ments are different types of employment in the two countries. The
standard work arrangement in Denmark is not as burdened by social
security contributions and strict regulations as in Germany. Therefore,
the present erosion of standard work arrangements in Germany need
not necessarily lead to future diversity in work arrangements. The ero-
sion may also indicate the need for reforms of the standard work
arrangement. 
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employees as well as civil servants and career military personnel. In this respect,
one must take into account that, e.g., in Germany, civil servants do actually have a
permanent tenure and cannot easily be dismissed. 
4. The figure is based on a survey from 1994. The ELFS does not include any crite-
ria on the distinction in labor law terms between worker status and self-employed
status and therefore on the definition of nominally self-employed workers. 
5. A self-employed person is regarded as dependent employed if the following char-
acteristics are fulfilled: he or she mainly depends on a single client, does not have
his or her own business premises and tools, does not employ regular employees,
and his or her activities are not typical for an entrepreneur.
6. In Denmark, 71.9 percent of persons between ages 15 and 25 were in education in
1998 (in Germany, 68.4 percent).
7. Youth account for 74 percent of marginal employment in Denmark (part-time
employment between 1 and 9 hours per week). This is also due to the fact that stu-
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dents at a higher educational level are allowed to earn only a certain amount of
money every year. Full-time work would definitely cause a loss of their study
grant. However, the grant itself makes some supplementary income necessary for
most students.
8. The right cannot be enforced in companies with fewer than 15 workers or in larger
companies if proven reasons prevent the use of (more) part-time workers.
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Appendix
The Eurostat Labor Force Survey (ELFS)
The Eurostat Labor Force Survey is carried out annually in the spring (in
Germany within the scope of the sample survey Mikrozensus). The survey
gathers information on labor force characteristics of individuals during a par-
ticular reference week. (Germany uses a fixed reference week; Denmark uses
evenly distributed reference weeks.) The survey covers the resident population
living in private households. Persons living in collective households (homes,
boarding schools, hospitals, etc.), and persons performing compulsory military
service are excluded. 
Definitions and Explanatory Notes 
Standard work arrangements are based on a permanent, full-time relation-
ship in an employee status that is subject to basic social security. Included are
manual and nonmanual employees and civil servants, including career military
personnel. In this respect, employment relationships of German civil servants
and those of other employees are not completely comparable. Special labor
laws apply to civil servants; for example, they have permanent tenure and can-
not easily be dismissed.
Permanency of the job. This question is addressed only to employees. The
termination of a fixed-term job or work contract is determined by objective
conditions (e.g., reaching a certain date, completion of an assignment, return of
another employee who has been temporarily replaced). Included are persons
with a contract covering a period of training, such as apprentices, trainees, re-
search assistants, and so forth, or for a probationary period, and persons with a
seasonal job. 
Active labor market programs (e.g., job creation in eastern Germany, job
rotation in Denmark) influence the number of temporary employees. ELFS
data do not allow for distinguishing the participants in these programs from
other temporary employees. Also, temporary agency workers are not defined
in the ELFS. In addition, individuals engaged by an employment agency may
have a work contract of unlimited duration.
Full-time versus part-time. The determination of full-time and part-time
work is made based on a spontaneous answer given by the respondent. Com-
paring the answers with the number of “hours usually worked” reveals that, in
both Denmark and Germany, “part-time” rarely exceeds 35 hours, while “full-
time” usually begins at about 35 hours.
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Self-employed are subdivided between employers who employ at least one
other person, and those without other employees. 
Comparability between the Results of Successive Surveys
The unification of West and East Germany in 1990 caused a break in the
time series. Data prior to 1991 refer to West Germany before unification; from
1991, data refer to a unified Germany, including the new German Länder. De-
velopments before and after unification are not comparable. The subdivision of
all German data into western and eastern Germany for 1998 is based on the na-
tional survey, Mikrozensus.
Comparability over time may also be affected by changes in the question-
naire. In Germany, the increase in part-time employment is due, in part, to ad-
ditional questions referring to employment status (1990 and 1996).
Nevertheless, the number of “marginal part-time jobs” (fewer than 15 hours per
week) in Germany is still assumed to be underestimated. Because of the design
of the ELFS, persons who regularly do marginal part-time work are more likely
to be registered, whereas persons who do such an activity only occasionally are
underrecorded. 
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Regulatory Convergence?
Nonstandard Work in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands
Colette Fagan and Kevin Ward
University of Manchester
Nonstandard work in Europe is not a new phenomenon (see, e.g.,
Ricca 1982).1 Neither are attempts to measure and to regulate the
employment conditions attached to it. For example, over 30 years have
passed since the European Commission issued a draft directive on tem-
porary work. Although this issue was revisited during the 1980s and
1990s, when directives regulating the working conditions of part-time
and fixed-contract work were introduced, workers placed through a
temporary work agency remain unregulated at the European level
(Income Data Services 2000; EIROline 2000a).
This regulatory situation has evolved in the context of a series of
changes in the employment structure of the European Union (EU) and,
in particular, the efforts of nation states to re-regulate their labor mar-
kets in the face of a series of economic, social, and political changes.
On one hand, the last three decades have witnessed the increased use of
nonstandard employment contracts across the EU, as the move toward
ever more “flexible” labor markets has become a political objective of
all governments. On the other hand, the extent and quality of nonstand-
ard work that has developed differs across countries owing to the struc-
turing influence of the specific national institutional context. Thus, it is
necessary to examine the national regulatory structures that operate
within the EU framework regulations. This chapter does this by
answering two questions. First, why is nonstandard employment
increasing in the EU, and where is this growth concentrated? Second,
what are the implications of this growth for workers in nonstandard
employment? Our argument is developed through an analytical focus
on the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
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The second section of this chapter defines the different types of
nonstandard employment, focusing specifically on two types of tempo-
rary employment—fixed-term contract and temporary agency work—
and part-time employment. It summarizes the reasons for the emer-
gence of nonstandard work arrangements and reviews the trends in the
rates of part-time and temporary employment. In the third section we
discuss the differences in the recent evolution of the national regulatory
frameworks and the discourses within which employment and labor
market policy reforms are currently situated in the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands. Although the United Kingdom has moved closer
to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “liberal” welfare regime, with labor mar-
ket deregulation and a “residual” welfare state, the Netherlands has
kept in place a “Janus-headed welfare regime, combining both social
democratic and conservative attributes” (Esping-Andersen 1999, p.
86). This comparison illustrates the different ways that EU employ-
ment and labor regulatory reform are developed at the national level,
depending on the political and societal context of individual nation
states. In the fourth and fifth sections of the chapter, we compare the
economic profile of nonstandard employment, the segments of the
economy in which nonstandard work is increasing, and the characteris-
tics of the workforce who occupy these jobs in both countries. In con-
clusion, we consider the development trajectory of the regulation of
nonstandard employment in both countries and the EU more broadly. 
DEFINING AND MAPPING NONSTANDARD WORK 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE NETHERLANDS
Nonstandard work arrangements deviate from the full-time, open-
ended “standard” employee contract. Part-time work is one form of
nonstandard work, and is broadly defined as less than full-time hours,
although in a few European countries, a specified hour threshold is
used in some official definitions.2 The average hours worked by part-
timers vary between countries, but then so do average hours for full-
timers (Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1998).
Temporary work is the other main type of nonstandard work. There
are a variety of forms of temporary work, and different categories are
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used among countries to refer to the same sets of workers (Income
Data Services 2000, pp. 16–17). Temporary contracts include employ-
ees hired directly by the company and those hired through the interme-
diary of temporary work agencies.3 In this chapter, we use the term
“temporary work agency” to mean an organization that “provides client
firms with workers on an as-needed basis” (Segal and Sullivan 1999, p.
117).4 We examine the trends in fixed-term contracts and temporary
agency work (see Figure 3.1 for a glossary of terms) to explore the
dynamics of change within the temporary employment sector. 
In this chapter, we focus on part-time work and temporary con-
tracts, but a third type of nonstandard work should also be noted—the
emergence of new forms of self-employment associated with employ-
ers’ use of subcontracting. This includes the independent self-
employed plus other forms of self-employment that can be considered
to be more akin to temporary employee contractual relationships, such
as contract workers, dependent self-employed, and freelance workers.5
Employers’ labor use practices in any area of production are
shaped by the market conditions, labor regulations, industrial relations,
and other institutional factors. In Europe, the expansion of nonstandard
work arrangements has largely been driven by employers’ demands for
greater workforce flexibility in the context of heightened international
competition and product market uncertainty. Their ability to pursue this
restructuring has been facilitated by their increased bargaining muscle
Figure 3.1 Definitions of Different Terms Related to Temporary 
Employment
• Temporary work agency (TWA): An organization whose employees
work at a range of client organizations for an often unspecified period of
time.
• Temporary agency worker: An employee of a TWA who works at a cli-
ent organization.
• Directly employed temporary worker: An employee employed directly
by the organization at which he or she works.
• Fixed-term contract: A delimited contract under which an employee is
either directly employed or employed through a TWA. 
• Temporary worker: An employee in one of a range of nonpermanent
contracts.
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in industrial relations from the mid-1970s as high unemployment rates
emerged and trade union density declined. 
Bosch (1995) identifies three related pressures behind the growth
of nonstandard work arrangements and working-time restructuring that
are found in varying degrees in companies across all sectors and mem-
ber states in the EU. First, operating and opening hours are being
extended to make more intensive use of capital equipment and to pro-
vide more responsive and flexible delivery and service times. Often
this has been stimulated by statutory deregulation of limits on operat-
ing hours. Second, working-time schedules and employment contracts
are being reorganized to achieve a closer match between staff levels
and both predictable and unpredictable variations in labor demand at
different times of the day, week, and year to reduce the volume of labor
purchased. Third, the reorganization of schedules and contracts is also
about reducing the unit cost of labor by minimizing overtime or “unso-
cial hours” premia (weekend and night work). This reorganization may
also permit cheaper pools of workers to be recruited, further reducing
unit labor costs. The result is a reorganization of work for standard
employees and increased deployment of part-time and temporary
employees. There is mounting evidence that this flexibility drive has
intensified work during the 1990s in Europe (European Foundation
1998; Green 2000).6 
Additional reasons related to labor supply issues lie behind the
expansion of part-time work. Employers began to create this form of
employment in some countries with labor market shortages in the
1960s as a specific tool to recruit married women with domestic
responsibilities. Subsequently, part-time work has also been encour-
aged by “work-family” public policy in some countries to increase
women’s labor market participation rates. State policy to facilitate a
market-led expansion of part-time work, for example by removing fis-
cal disincentives or labor law restrictions, is one element of this, but
the work-family public policy has a wider agenda. This includes
improving the quality of part-time work through equal treatment in
terms and conditions and, in some countries, legislation or collective
agreements also provide employees with certain entitlements to reduce
their hours to part-time in their existing job. This is an established part
of the Swedish parental leave system, for example, and the public sec-
tor working-time policy in France, and the policy has recently been
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introduced into Dutch labor law (see below). Thus, in many European
countries, the origins of part-time work are rooted in a modification of
the “male breadwinner” arrangement of the gender division of labor, in
response to either labor shortages or equal opportunity policies. Rather
than women withdrawing from the labor market upon marriage or
childbirth, part-time work offered one means of combining paid and
unpaid work, particularly where alternative sources of child care were
scarce, costly, or socially unacceptable (O’Reilly and Fagan 1998). 
In a recent review of European research, the main company-level
factors that contribute to the use of part-time contracts in Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries were
identified (Delsen 1998). The research shows that workload variations
over the day, week, or year are important, but they do not determine
whether companies use part-time contracts because alternative solu-
tions, such as full-time shifts, can be used. This is the usual solution in
manufacturing and transportation, where the workforce is largely male.
Workload variations are influential, but part-time jobs are the most
prevalent in companies that operate in the service sector and that rely
on women to fill jobs that have few or no formal human capital entry
requirements. An additional incentive for the use of part-time work is
when the cost structure of production is dominated by labor costs and
employers perceive that the fixed costs and hourly labor costs of part-
time employees are cheaper than hiring full-time staff (hourly wages,
fringe benefits, social security costs, and recruitment and training
costs). However, direct cost savings are not a major consideration in all
companies or sectors. For example, a European survey of companies
that used part-time contracts found that the main reasons employers
gave for using part-time contracts were to enhance the competitiveness
and quality of the service or product by extending opening hours or
covering workload peaks, improving recruitment and retention to over-
come labor or skill shortages, and higher productivity. These reasons
were mentioned more often than direct savings on hourly labor costs
(European Foundation 1994).
A range of factors lies behind the use of temporary workers by
companies (see Atkinson, Morris, and Williams 1999; Davis-Blake and
Uzzi 1993). In some contexts, the recruitment of temporary workers is
believed to offer various advantages. These include lower labor costs
because of the flexibility to cover variable staffing requirements and
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fewer, if any, entitlements to fringe benefits and occupational pensions;
a buffer to protect the employment security of the core workforce; a
source of rapid recruitment or access to specialist skills; or a screening
period prior to appointment on an open-ended contract. The potential
disadvantages are often the flip side of many of these advantages, such
as the costs of recruitment and training; high turnover; the administra-
tive burden; lower levels of skill, reliability, and commitment; and a
negative effect on the morale of the core workforce. Temporary work
agencies operating as “intermediaries” offer the potential to overcome
some of the recruitment, training, and administrative costs, but compa-
nies are still faced with problems of lower organizational commitment
among their temporary workforce and the effects on morale of their
core workforce (Allen and Henry 1996, 1997; Ward et al. 2001). 
Table 3.1 presents data on the prevalence of part-time and fixed-
term work in the EU. By 1999, 18 percent of all employed persons in
the EU-15 were in part-time jobs, and 13 percent of employees had a
fixed-term contract. Part-time work has been increasing for a number
of years in most member states, and since the early 1980s, most of the
net job growth in the EU has been in part-time work for both women
and men (Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1998, pp. 29–39; European Com-
mission 1996, p. 17; European Commission 1999a, p. 20). The expan-
sion in the rate of temporary work contracts has been more recent.
Most of the additional jobs created in the economic recovery in the
early 1990s were both part-time and temporary, and the increasing rate
of fixed-term contracts has continued subsequently.7 There is a degree
of overlap between these two categories because the rate of part-time
work is higher for those in fixed-term contracts than those in open-
ended contracts in most member states (Rubery, Fagan, and Smith
1995, pp. 185–188). Further expansion in both forms of nonstandard
work can be expected in many countries based on these trends.
Within the broad category of temporary workers, the particular
issue of temporary agency work is the subject of current policy and
academic debate in Europe (Michon 2000), mirroring concern about
this form of employment restructuring in the United States (Barker and
Christensen 1998; Peck and Theodore 2001). A recent European-wide
overview of temporary agency work found rapid growth over the last
10 years across Europe, although this form of engagement still repre-
sents a small proportion of total employment (Michon 2000).
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Shift-share analysis (Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 1998; Walwei
1998) shows that there is a diffusion occurring in the use of part-time
work across economic sectors in the EU. Temporary employment also
appears to be spreading owing to a change in employers’ practices and
not simply to the expansion of industrial sectors or occupations with
existing high levels of usage or as a cautious response to economic
recovery in the business cycle. For example, shift-share analysis has
shown diffusion across sectors to be the dominant component of the
expansion in temporary employment in the United Kingdom during the
1990s (Casey, Metcalf, and Willwards 1997, Table 2.6). However, the
bulk of nonstandard jobs remains concentrated in a narrow range of
low-status, low-paid service jobs, as we will see below.
Table 3.1 Trends in Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment in the 
European Union, 1985–99
1985 1990 1995 1999
Employed: % who work part-time
Netherlands 23 32 37 39
United Kingsom 21 22 24 25
EU-15 11 14 16 18
Employees: % with fixed-term contracts
Netherlands 8 8 11 12
UK 7 5 7 7
EU-15 9 10 12 13
NOTE: Part-time work is based on the individual’s self-assessment of his or her full- or
part-time status. Employees with fixed-term contracts include the following catego-
ries in the European Labor Force Survey: employee hired for a job that ends on a spe-
cific date, completion of a task, or the return of another employee who has been
temporarily replaced; persons engaged by an agency or employment exchange and
hired to a third party to perform a specific task (note that persons with a written work
contract of unlimited duration with the agency or employment exchange are not
counted as temporary employees); seasonal employees; and persons with specific
training contracts.
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey. Data for 1985–96 extracted from European
Commission Employment in Europe, 1996 and 1997 editions. Data for 1999 is from
the European Labor Force Survey published results, Tables 28 and 34.
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As a result of these trends, both part-time and temporary employ-
ment have become a more common route into employment in Europe
as economies restructure following the 1990s recession. For example,
in 1997, 70 percent of the men and women who entered employment
did so via fixed-term contracts, up from 50 percent in 1994. Forty per-
cent of the women who found employment took part-time jobs, as did
almost 14 percent of men (European Commission, 1999a, pp. 44–48).
The growing significance of temporary contracts as a route into
employment is evident even in countries with relatively low overall
rates of fixed-term contracts, such as the United Kingdom (Sly and
Stillwell 1997).
These trends in the expansion of nonstandard work have occurred
across both peaks and troughs in the business cycle, and signal ongoing
structural changes in European labor markets and employers’ recruit-
ment practices (European Commission 1999a, p. 47). Yet within the
EU, there are national differences in the rates of nonstandard work
arrangements. The highest rate of part-time work in the EU is in the
Netherlands, and part-time work is also particularly common in the
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark. Taken together, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom account for just over one-third of all
part-time workers in the EU-15. There are also national differences in
the incidence of temporary work contracts, but to a lesser degree than
in the case of part-time work. The highest levels of temporary employ-
ment tend to exist in countries where labor laws permit (and even
encourage) this form of contract and where regulations make it difficult
and costly to dismiss employees with open-ended contracts (Rogowski
and Schömann 1996). This form of employment is particularly preva-
lent in Spain (for further discussion see Cebrián et al., this volume).
The rate of fixed-term contracts in the Netherlands is close to the EU
average, while the rate is notably lower in the United Kingdom, given
the weak regulatory governance of the labor market that offers only
limited employment protection for any employee with less than one
year’s tenure with the company.
National studies in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom—the
two countries that are the focus of this chapter—show that the use of
part-time workers and, at a lower incidence, temporary workers, is
spreading at the company level. By 1998, 84 percent of all U.K. work-
places with 25 or more employees used part-time employees, and 58
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percent had at least 10 percent of their workforce on part-time con-
tracts (Cully et al. 1999, p. 32). In the Netherlands, more than 70 per-
cent of all companies use part-time contracts (Hesselink et al. 1999,
Table 2.3). Despite the relatively low rate of temporary work in the
United Kingdom, fixed-term contracts are now used in 44 percent of
workplaces, temporary agency workers in one-quarter of workplaces,
and freelancers in 13 percent of workplaces.8 Indeed, although in the
last two years the size of the United Kingdom temporary employment
sector as a whole has remained stable, temporary agency work has con-
tinued to increase (Forde and Slater 2001). Comparative research
shows that managers use these contracts for similar reasons in both
countries, although with some difference in emphasis in relation to
part-time work. In both countries, managers explain that part-time
work offers competitive gains, work scheduling, and recruitment
advantages, but those in the United Kingdom place more emphasis on
direct labor cost savings than in the Netherlands (European Foundation
1994). With regard to the use of fixed-term and temporary agency
workers, managers in both countries point to similar benefits; namely,
short-term coverage (e.g., maternity leave), coping with seasonal fluc-
tuations, obtaining specialist skills needed on a short-term basis or
which are only obtainable on a short-term basis, or screening staff for
permanent jobs (Casey, Metcalf, and Willwards 1997; Cully et al.
1999; Hesselink et al. 1999; Sly and Stillwell 1997). In the next sec-
tion, we discuss the regulatory frameworks guiding nonstandard work
contracts in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR NONSTANDARD 
EMPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM
The expansion of nonstandard work arrangements has occurred
among all EU member states. However, each nation’s regulatory
framework and the policy context out of which the regulations emerge
have produced differences in the extent, the form, and the relative qual-
ity of nonstandard employment in each country. These national differ-
ences persist even when comparisons are made at the sector level to
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allow for contrasting industrial structures within national economies.
This diversity between countries emerges from a number of different
institutional arrangements. In this section, we set out the recent devel-
opments in the EU regulatory framework and then explore how, in both
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, these wider regulatory
changes combine with those introduced by each nation-state to produce
quite different terms and conditions of employment.
Within the EU, a developing body of framework legislation (EU
directives) and economic policy circumscribe the actions of member
states. EU directives set the minimum regulatory requirement, and any
related national regulations must be compatible with this European-
level law. In the last 30 years, a number of directives have been
adopted that have established a regulatory floor for the working condi-
tions in nonstandard employment. In the 1970s, a series of directives
introduced equal treatment for women and men in matters of equal pay
for work of equal value, recruitment, training, and social security.
These directives were also used successfully in litigation to extend
some elements of equal treatment to part-time employees using the
principal of indirect discrimination on the basis that most part-time
employees are women. In the 1990s, directives were also introduced to
guarantee minimum maternity leave and parental leave entitlements.
Three other directives introduced in the 1990s deal directly with the
regulation of working time and the use of nonstandard workers: the
1993 Working Time Directive, the 1997 Equal Treatment of Part-Time
Workers Directive, and the 1999 directive on Fixed-Term Work (Euro-
pean Commission 1999b). The latter has yet to be introduced into all
member states. See Figure 3.2 for the main revisions of the directives.
And an EU Directive on Temporary Agency Work is due to be
announced in early 2003. 
As these directives were being drawn up, individual nations were
also reforming their own employment systems in the context of rising
unemployment and economic stagnation, which had become a feature
of most European labor markets since the late 1970s. The Netherlands
and the United Kingdom are good examples of regulatory divergence
within the EU in response to these problems. 
Figure 3.2 Main Provisions of the EU Directives Regulating Working 
Time and Nonstandard Work Conditions
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1993 Working Time Directive
A maximum average 48-hour week
Limits on the number of hours worked at night
Daily and weekly rest periods
Four weeks annual paid leave
Encourages the social partners (employers’ associations and trade unions) to
negotiate working-time arrangements that promote the reconciliation of
work and family life
Certain sectors and occupations are exempt (this is currently under review at
the European level).
1997 Equal Treatment for Part-Time Workers
Equal hourly pay to comparable full-timers, including overtime pay for hours
in excess of normal full-time hours
Pro rata entitlements to sick pay and maternity pay
Equal treatment for holidays, maternity leave, parental leave, career breaks,
redundancy provisions, pension schemes, and training
Encourages the social partners to remove obstacles that limit opportunities for
the expansion of part-time work
1999 Fixed-Contract Work
Equal treatment: Fixed-term contract workers should be treated no less favor-
ably than equivalent permanent colleagues within the same undertaking,
or similar jobs elsewhere
Prevention of abuse: Employers should be prohibited from abusing this form
of employment by concluding a series of contracts without justification,
thereby denying workers their rights
SOURCE: Author’s compilation of legislation listed at The Portal to Euro-
pean Union Law which is available at: <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/
index.html>. 
In the United Kingdom, under the successive conservative govern-
ments of the 1980s and 1990s, labor market deregulation was actively
pursued as a means of job creation and economic growth through the
reduction of workers’ rights, marginalization of the trade unions, and
the creation of “neoliberal” labor market institutions (Beatson 1995;
Jones 1999; Peck 1996). United Kingdom governments pursued labor
market policies akin to those introduced in the United States, and gen-
erally sought to circumvent European directives on employment regu-
lation. During this period trade union power to negotiate working
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conditions was undermined by the combination of new legal restric-
tions and falling membership, particularly outside the public sector and
in private service-sector companies. Less than half of the United King-
dom’s workforce is now covered by collective agreements (Cully et al.
1999). Although overt hostility to progressive employment reform has
dissipated since the election of two labor governments in 1997 and
2001, the U.K. labor market remains one of the most deregulated in the
EU.
In contrast to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands has a social
democratic political tradition of more regulated employment condi-
tions. This is achieved through statute and comprehensive collective
agreements that encompass the majority of the workforce.9 In this con-
text, a different path was taken to stimulate economic growth and job
creation, the linchpin of which was a social pact between the trade
unions and employers—the 1982 Wassenaar Agreement—supple-
mented by a number of government measures. This introduced wage
constraint, partly compensated by tax reductions introduced by the
state, and a commitment from employers to introduce working-time
reductions that were “cost neutral” (reductions in full-time hours were
to be paid for either by productivity gains or by a proportionate reduc-
tion in the weekly wage so that hourly rates of pay did not rise). This
social pact was reaffirmed and extended in 1993. In parallel, the Dutch
government actively promoted the expansion of part-time work as a
means to job-intensive growth beginning in the 1980s through a com-
bination of subsidies and public employment policies, information
campaigns, and legislation to extend equal treatment to part-time
employees. Support for part-time work with treatment equal to full-
time employees also came from three other constituencies: employers,
trade unions, and women workers. The employers saw part-time work
as a means of diluting pressures for collective reductions in full-time
hours. The trade unions were adapting their policies to represent the
growing constituency of women who were demanding more opportuni-
ties for quality part-time work. A major influence in the growing
demand for part-time work among women in the Netherlands was their
relatively recent entry into the labor force compared with international
standards and the still influential traditional “housewife” model of gen-
der relations (Visser 1999; Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
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Initially, marginal part-time employees working short hours (12
hours or fewer) received less favorable treatment than other part-time
workers in the Netherlands. This was redressed in a series of reforms in
the early 1990s, that extended the statutory minimum wage to all part-
timers (1993), mandated equal treatment in labor law (1996), and out-
lawed hours thresholds for membership in company pension schemes
(Delsen 1998). The latest development, the Part-Time Employment
Act (2000), awards employees the right to request a reduction in their
hours to part-time work, or an increase to full-time work, as part of a
broader drive to facilitate the reconciliation of employment and family
care responsibilities. Employers are only allowed to refuse these
requests on the grounds of specific conflicting business interests
(EIROline 2000c). This builds on earlier developments in collective
bargaining agreements (Van den Burg and Passchier 1999). In compar-
ison with other employees in collective agreements, part-time employ-
ees with short hours still fare worse. However, the general regulatory
trend in the Netherlands is extending equal treatment and developing
part-time work as an integrated, rather than marginal, form of employ-
ment (Plantenga 1997; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). 
Part-time employees in the United Kingdom, on the other hand,
have relied on cases by individual employees and trade unions under
European Community law for improvements in their terms and condi-
tions. Following a series of legal rulings in the mid-1990s over the
equal treatment of part-time employees in company pension schemes,
equal treatment in statutory employment protection was implemented
in 1995 (Dickens 1995). Since 1997, regulatory reforms have helped to
improve the terms and conditions of part-time employment. In 1999, a
statutory hourly minimum wage for all workers was introduced, and
the qualifying period for employment protection was reduced from two
years to a single year’s service for all employees working eight or more
hours per week.10 Maternity and parental leave entitlements have also
been extended to all workers, again driven by EU regulatory reforms.
The latest extension of these parental rights, which came into effect in
April 2003, includes giving parents of children under 6 and children
with disabilities under 18 the right to apply to work flexibly, which
might be interpreted to include working part-time instead of full-time
hours. Earlier proposals that would have given parents the right to
request part-time hours, similar to the entitlement introduced into
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Dutch law discussed above, were dropped in response to lobbying from
employers’ associations. Under this new law employers have a duty to
consider such requests for flexible working, although they do not have
to justify their opposition in the same detail as is required in the Dutch
law. The Trades Union Congress and other critics argue that this new
right will have little effect in Britain, particularly since there is no
union representation in many private-sector companies (Ward 2003).
Finally, the Equal Treatment Directive became effective in July 2000
and will further improve conditions for some part-time workers.
Despite these gains, however, the criteria set by the government for the
full-time comparator for equal treatment is someone employed by the
same employer under the same type of contract and doing broadly sim-
ilar work. It is estimated that only one million of the six million part-
time workers in the United Kingdom have a comparator based on these
criteria and will therefore gain from the equal treatment regulation
(EIROline, 2000d). To date, the government has rejected trade union
calls for this limitation to be redressed.
Regulatory divergence is also evident in how each nation deals
with those in temporary employment. Dutch labor law was reassessed
in 1997 in light of concern over the increased flexibility and fragmen-
tation of its labor market. Building on an agreement reached in 1996
between the employers and trade unions at the bipartite Labor Founda-
tion (Stichting van de Arbeid), the aim was to uphold both corporate
flexibility and employee security by relaxing dismissal laws and gener-
ating a minimum level of security for employees in flexible jobs, so-
called “flexicurity.” It was proposed that if an employee had worked
for his or her employer for three months (weekly, or at least 20 hours a
month), the law would assume a contract of employment (EIROline
1997a). Where the hours were unspecified, the hours worked by the
employee over the previous three months would be taken as the con-
tracted hours. The responsibility lies with the employer to provide evi-
dence that the hours worked during the period are either longer or
shorter than the hours normally worked by the employee. This contract
has the same terms and conditions as a permanent one. The probation-
ary period—during which time both the employer and the employee
are free to terminate the contract—remained at two months for fixed-
term contracts. It was, however, shortened for “short-term contracts”
that specify a term of employment. The aim was to encourage the use
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of longer-term fixed-term contracts and end the use by companies of
the “revolving door” (EIROline 1997b). Where three of these contracts
were run together, prior notification of termination was required. If the
total length of time of the contracts extended beyond three years, the
contract automatically became a contract for an indefinite period.
As the flexicurity11 bill was being debated in the Netherlands, there
was also an attempt to reform legislation on temporary work agencies.
Temporary workers employed by a temporary work agency for more
than a year received a three-month contract. The agency was required
to pay the employee wages during this period even if he or she did not
work, so long as the employee remained available for work (EIROline
1997a). There was originally no transitional period. After protracted
negotiations, the General Union of Temporary Employment Agencies
(Algemene Bond van Uitzendbureaus) and the unions agreed to a tran-
sitional framework, which allowed the concerns of both parties to be
met. The Flexicurity Act (Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid) took effect
January 1, 1999, while the new act governing temporary work agencies
went into effect six months earlier. The combined effect of these two
acts has substantially modified Dutch labor law (see Figure 3.3)
(EIROline 1999a, 1999b), with both employers’ organizations and
unions at pains to point to the combined successes of the acts. 
In contrast, the United Kingdom has seen more limited improve-
ments in the conditions of fixed-term work. Workers have gained equal
Figure 3.3 Reform of Dutch Labor Law: The “Flexicurity” Act
Companies can use temporary employment contracts more than they could in
the past;
A series of temporary employment contracts will, under certain conditions,
lead to a permanent contract;
Agreements between employees and temporary work agencies will now be
considered as employment contracts;
Notice periods are shortened and simplified;
Procedures for dismissal on economic, technical, and organizational grounds
are shortened;
Unemployment benefits are reduced if the employer awards severance pay.
SOURCE: EIROline (1999a).
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rights to statutory holidays, sick pay, and maternity leave as part of the
general reform of labor law, and these rights to equal treatment were
strengthened by the adoption of the directive on fixed-contract work
into national law in April 2001. Now, after four years of “consecutive”
fixed-term contracts workers became permanent employees. Moves to
regulate temporary agency work have been slower. In 1999, the gov-
ernment proposed the first substantial change in the regulation of tem-
porary agency work since the early 1970s (Department of Trade and
Industry, 1999). The precise nature of this re-regulation is still subject
to consultation. Existing regulation has been in place since 1976, with
the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses
Regulations Act. This act only allowed temporary employment agen-
cies to be established under license from the Secretary of State. In
1994, this act was repealed by the then-Conservative government and
replaced in 1995 with the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act,
designed to facilitate subcontracting, including the use of temporary
agency work. No attempt was made to connect the regulation of this
type of nonstandard employment to the rest of the labor market, as had
occurred in the Netherlands. More specifically, the U.K. reforms of
temporary agency work shy away from offering workers a permanent
contract under any circumstances, again in contrast to the Dutch
reforms.
Given these differences in the regulatory frameworks in the Neth-
erlands and the United Kingdom, we explore in the next section how
the quality of nonstandard work in both countries compares. 
NONSTANDARD WORKERS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
In both countries, the age and gender profile of nonstandard work-
ers is similar and mirrors the picture found in other EU member states.
The majority of part-time workers are women (Table 3.2), a pattern that
is replicated in every member state. The gender composition of fixed-
term contract work is more even, but women are overrepresented in
this form of employment relative to their share of all employment.
Women hold just under half of the fixed-term contracts in the EU-15,
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and more than half of these contracts in some member states, including
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
The rate of fixed-term contracts and part-time work is higher for
women than men in every age group (Table 3.3). Fixed-term contracts
tend to be concentrated among young workers because of probation
and training periods and the shortage of open-ended vacancies for new
entrants. The higher rates of fixed-term work among women suggest
that they are less able to secure open-ended contracts than are men.
Perhaps this is because they are segregated into more insecure seg-
ments of the labor market, or are reentering the labor market after an
absence for child-rearing and may only be able to obtain temporary
employment. Women may also opt for temporary employment owing
to child care constraints. 
Male part-time employment is largely confined to students and
other young labor market entrants or older workers nearing retirement
age (Table 3.3). In recent years, men’s involvement in part-time work
has increased sharply, and it appears to be dispersing somewhat into
the middle-age range (Delsen 1998). The Netherlands leads the way in
the growth of part-time work among men in EU countries. Nonethe-
less, part-time work remains rare for men in their core working years.
In contrast, large proportions of employed women work part-time at
this stage in their life, often associated with the onset of motherhood
when part-time jobs provide a means for women to combine employ-
ment with domestic responsibilities. 
There are significant national differences in the extent to which
mothers of young children are employed on a full-time or part-time
basis in the different member states, and these international compari-
sons reinforce the similarity observed between the Netherlands and the
Table 3.2 Gender Composition of Part-Time and Fixed-Term 
Employment, 1999
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey, Tables 30 and 36.
Part-time
% women
Fixed-term contracts
% women
Netherlands 74 56
United Kingdom 80 52
EU-15 80 49
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United Kingdom, 1999
Employed men, by age Employed women, by age
15–24 25–49 50–64 65+ All 15–24 25–49 50–64 65+ All
Percent who work part-time
Netherlands 54 10 17 72 18 67 68 75 91 69
United Kingdom 25 4 10 67 9 41 42 51 88 44
EU-15 16 4 6 42 6 30 33 38 60 34
Percent with fixed-term contracts
Netherlands 5 3 1 * 9 6 7 2 — 15
United Kingdom 2 3 1 * 6 2 4 1 * 7
EU-15 5 6 1 * 12 5 8 1 * 14
NOTE: Fixed-term is determined by asking employees whether their contract has a fixed rather than open-ended duration due to either a
specified date, the completion of a task or assignment, or the return of another employee.
— indicates data unreliable due to sample size. * indicates less than 0.5%. 
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey 1999, Tables 28 and 34.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 70  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
Regulatory Convergence? 71
United Kingdom. In both countries, maternal employment is predomi-
nantly part-time, in contrast to most other member states (Rubery,
Smith, and Fagan 1998). In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,
labor market participation increased for mothers beginning in the
1970s, largely through part-time employment. This occurred in the
context of limited public provision of child care services (in contrast to
a number of the other member states, such as the Nordic countries or
France) and in cultural climates that did not favor full-time employ-
ment for mothers (O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998). These institutional con-
texts have played an important role in shaping women’s labor supply,
and it is only in recent years that the Dutch and U.K. governments have
begun to increase the public resources allocated to child care services.
Overall, in the EU-15, 11 percent of part-time employees are stu-
dents or trainees, 17 percent work part-time because they were unable
to find full-time work, and 60 percent had chosen part-time work over
full-time work (Table 3.4). Among those who work part-time, women
are more likely than men to have selected this in preference to full-time
work, and are less likely to be working part-time on an involuntary
basis or because they are in education or training. This tendency is
even more pronounced among women in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. As we discussed above, this reflects the fact that
part-time employment has become the established practice for mothers
with young children in both countries. The main difference between
part-time employees in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is
found among men. In the Netherlands, nearly half of the men
employed part-time have selected this arrangement in preference to
full-time work, and only 7 percent are working part-time because they
could not find full-time employment. In contrast, 21 percent of the men
employed part-time in the United Kingdom are doing so on an involun-
tary basis, mirroring the wider pattern in the EU-15.
Not surprisingly, a higher proportion of fixed-term contracts are
involuntary compared with part-time contracts. Nearly two in five
employees with fixed-term contracts in the EU-15 are in this situation
because they could not find permanent employment, and one quarter
are on training or probation contracts. Only 9 percent said that they did
not want a permanent job. There is little difference by gender in the
reasons for holding fixed-term contracts at the EU-15 level. The profile
of fixed-term contract workers in the Netherlands and the United King-
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EU-15 NL UK
All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
Reason for working part-time (%)
Could not find full-time job 17 24 15 4 7 4 10 21 8
Did not want full-time job 60 36 65 72 50 80 73 42 80
Education/training 11 25 8 19 35 13 15 33 10
Illness/disability 2 5 2 4 8 3 2 3 1
Other or no reason 10 9 10 — — — — — —
Reason for having a fixed-term 
contract (%)
Training or probation 25 27 25 3 2 1 6 6 5
Could not find permanent job 39 40 37 46 49 44 38 45 33
Did not want permanent job 9 7 11 47 44 51 29 22 35
No reason 27 26 27 4 5 4 27 27 27
NOTE: Columns may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
— indicates data unreliable due to sample size.
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey 1999, derived from Tables 29, 32, and 38. 
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dom diverges somewhat from that of the EU-15 as a whole because it
is comparatively rare for this type of contract to be used as a formal
means of training or probation in either country. Instead, those with
fixed-term contracts fall fairly evenly between two categories: those
who could not find permanent employment and those who are not
looking for permanent employment. In both countries, women were
notably more likely than men to say that they did not want a permanent
job. This may be because they have selected temporary employment
because it affords them some flexibility to schedule their time around
domestic commitments. For example, in a recent U.K. study, 70 per-
cent of temporary workers said that there were certain advantages to
this type of employment. Of this group, men were more likely to list
pay and benefits while women were more likely to list the convenience
of working-time arrangements (Tremlett and Collins 1999). 
Overall, the age and gender profile of part-time and temporary
workers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is similar; how-
ever, there are two differences of note. First, nonstandard work is even
more widespread in the Netherlands than in the United Kingdom, par-
ticularly part-time work. The rate of part-time work in the Netherlands
is such that it is the only member state in which the majority of
employed women and a sizable minority of men are now working part-
time in their core working years, and with relatively few doing so on an
involuntary basis. Furthermore, there is widespread support among the
Dutch workforce for a further expansion of part-time working, with a
higher share of both men and women stating that their preferred work-
ing hours are part-time than in any other member state (Fagan and
European Foundation 2001). The Dutch workforce has negotiated a
sustained reduction in full-time working hours since the mid 1980s,
from a norm of 40 hours a week to the current 36-hour week for more
than half of the workforce. Second, compared with the United King-
dom, a larger proportion of temporary workers in the Netherlands have
selected this work option over permanent employment, again suggest-
ing a greater degree of employee choice. In the following section, we
review in which sectors part-time and temporary work is being per-
formed in both countries.
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NONSTANDARD JOBS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
The industrial and occupational structure of employment in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands is very similar, and is dominated
by service-sector activities (Table 3.5). The main difference between
the two countries is that a higher proportion of employment in the
Netherlands is concentrated in professional and related occupations.
There are also similarities between both countries in the patterns of
nonstandard work. The highest rates of part-time work in both coun-
tries are in the service sectors, particularly in hotels and catering, retail,
and “other services” (see table note for definition), and exceed the use
of temporary work contracts in each sector. Another similarity is the
contractual composition of temporary employment (Table 3.6). Tempo-
rary agency work accounts for a similarly small proportion of all tem-
porary work in both countries, but it is this category that has seen the
greatest growth over the last decade. For example, in the United King-
dom, temporary agency workers as a proportion of total temporary
employment doubled between 1992 and 1996 (Forde and Slater 2001;
Sly and Stillwell 1997).
There are also some salient differences in the economic profile of
nonstandard work in both countries as shown in Table 3.5. First, there
are several indications that nonstandard work contracts are more dis-
persed across the economy in the Netherlands than in the United King-
dom, which suggests relatively more integration with standard
contracts rather than being segregated into particular activities. The
rate of temporary employment is broadly similar in many service sec-
tors in the Netherlands, at between 8 and 10 percent, dipping to lower
rates in construction, hotels, and public administration. In contrast,
temporary employment is a particularly common feature of hotels and
“other services” in the United Kingdom. Rates of part-time work are
disproportionately high in “other services” and hotels and catering in
both countries, but part-time work is dispersed across the other sectors
to a greater extent in the Netherlands, and is quite prevalent in trans-
portation and manufacturing, for example. Occupational comparisons
show that in both countries, part-time workers are disproportionately
found in service, sales, clerical, and elementary jobs—a pattern that
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Table 3. 5 The Industrial and Occupational Structure of Employment 
and Rates of Part-Time and Temporary Work in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 1999
% of nonstandard work 
in each sector and 
occupational group
Structure of 
employment (%)
Part-time
 work
Temporary 
work
NL UK NL UK NL UK
Industrial structure
Agriculture 3 2 30 18 10 5
Manufacturing and extraction 15 19 20 8 8 4
Construction 6 7 11 6 4 4
Transport and 
communications 6 7 27 1 8 5
Financial/business services 15 15 30 19 8 6
Hotels and restaurants 3 4 60 50 5 9
Wholesale and retail 16 16 42 38 10 3
Other services 24 25 60 40 9 10
Public administration 7 6 25 15 6 6
No response 5 * — — — —
Occupational structure
Legislators and managers 12 15 17 9 2 2
Professionals and associates 36 25 38 19 7 8
Clerks 12 17 52 33 14 7
Service and sales 12 15 66 56 17 7
Agriculture and fisheries 2 1 42 14 19 3
Craft and related trades 11 12 13 5 7 3
Plant/machine operatives 7 7 21 8 10 5
Elementary occupations 8 8 61 48 24 9
Overall incidence — — 39 25 12 7
NOTE: NACE industrial classification is the NACE one-digit level. “Other services”
include education, health, and social work; other private-sector and public-sector
social services such as sanitation and leisure, and personal services (domestic clean-
ers, child care assistants outside education, hairdressing, laundry, etc.). ISCO occupa-
tional classification. Civilian workforce only. The percentages may not sum to 100%
due to rounding. 
* indicates figure less than 0.5%; — indicates not applicable.
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exists in the EU as a whole (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development 1994; Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 1998). However,
part-time contracts are better represented among the higher-level man-
agerial and professional occupations in the Netherlands than in the
United Kingdom, both in absolute terms and relative to the overall
rates of part-time work in each economy. Finally, fixed-term contracts
are most prevalent in elementary, clerical, and service jobs (and skilled
agricultural jobs in the Netherlands), but the relative use in profes-
sional areas differs although the absolute rate is similar. The rate of
temporary work among professionals is lower than the overall rate in
the Netherlands but is on a par with the overall rate in the United King-
dom. In the United Kingdom, 60 percent of professionals with tempo-
rary contracts are teachers and contract researchers in the education
sector, where public-sector collective agreements provide a higher
degree of job security for those on open-ended contracts than exists in
many other sectors (Sly and Stillwell 1997). 
A second important difference between the two countries is in the
relative treatment of standard and nonstandard workers in statutory
regulations on employment conditions and the social protection offered
by welfare state policies (Esping-Andersen 1990). As discussed in the
previous section, the Dutch system provides more extensive protection
Table 3.6 Type of Temporary Employment in the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands
United Kingdom (%)
Fixed-term contracts
Casual or seasonal
Agency temping
Other (includes home and zero-hour contracted workers)
46
33
16
5
Netherlands (%)
Fixed-term contracts
Demand, and on-call contracts
Temporary agency contracts
Other contracts
48
37
11
4
NOTE: Demand/call contracts in the Netherlands include permanent labor contracts
that include this element of variability.
SOURCE: For the United Kingdom, Income Data Services (2000) derived from Table 1;
for the Netherlands, Hesselink et al. (1999), Table 2.1.
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and a greater degree of equal treatment between standard and non-
standard workers. There are few labor cost differentials for employers
between standard and nonstandard workers as a result. The implica-
tions for the quality of nonstandard work have been demonstrated in a
number of studies using the example of part-time work. In the Nether-
lands, there is little difference in the average hourly pay of full-time
and part-time workers (Tijdens 1997; Plantenga 1997). Legislation and
collective agreements have largely established pro rata treatment,
combined with statutory minimum wage protection for all workers.
The expansion of part-time employment in some of the higher-paying
jobs, underwritten by the recently introduced rights of employees to
request part-time hours, has also helped to prevent part-time work from
becoming entirely segregated into the low-paid sectors of the economy.
In contrast, part-time workers in the United Kingdom have lower aver-
age hourly rates of pay than full-time workers. In 1999, female part-
time workers earned 61 percent of the average hourly pay of full-time
male employees (excluding overtime); the comparable ratio was 69
percent for male part-time workers (National Statistics 2001, derived
from tables F33, F34, and A13). The introduction of a minimum wage
has raised the wage rates in low-paid jobs, where part-time employees
are disproportionately represented, and thus helped to reduce—but not
eliminate—the pay penalty of working part-time. This is because
although pro rata pay is largely established in company practices, part-
time jobs are heavily concentrated in the lowest-paid sectors of the
economy. In addition, many part-time workers in the United Kingdom
are still excluded from pension and sick pay arrangements in some
companies (despite labor laws); have fewer opportunities for promo-
tion or training; may be more vulnerable to redundancy; and have more
limited paid leave entitlements (House of Commons 1999; Neathey
and Hurstfield 1995). Employers gain further cost advantages in social
security payments if they use short-hour, part-time arrangements to
maintain the employee’s earnings below a low earnings threshold
(which equates to approximately 15 hours of work per week).
The Dutch social security and pension systems are also more com-
patible with periods of part-time work or interrupted service associated
with temporary contracts than in the United Kingdom. In the Dutch
social security system, pro rata contributions are made by employer
and employee for pro rata benefits. Pension entitlements are based on
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citizenship rather than the amount of lifetime employment and earn-
ings, and thus workers with periods of employment on nonstandard
contracts fare better (Ginn and Arber 1998). 
CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE OF NONSTANDARD 
WORK IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
THE NETHERLANDS
The incidence of part-time and temporary employment continues
to increase across the EU. Temporary work, with the exception of a
few countries, remains relatively rare across the EU-15. Nonetheless,
temporary agency work is growing, creating a new line of emphasis in
the restructuring of particular parts of the labor market. In particular,
the complex nature of the “triangular” employment relationship
between the worker, the agency, and the firm in which the worker is
placed has caught the attention of national and EU unions (EIROline
2000a). 
As this chapter has charted, EU labor law has gradually extended
equal treatment to part-time and fixed-term contract workers. Tempo-
rary agency work reform is on the horizon as well (EIROline 2000a,
2000b), although the form that this will take remains unclear and is still
subject to negotiation between the social partners. This common
framework of EU legislation creates some pressures of convergence
across the member states, but these reforms are played out in national
arenas with different regulatory systems, political alliances, and eco-
nomic conditions. In part, these societal contexts are products of previ-
ous rounds of national and EU regulation. The articulation between EU
and national-level policies produces persistent differences in outcomes
between countries, including the quality of nonstandard work.
The path taken in the Netherlands was the result of the political
dominance of social democratic values and institutions. These pro-
duced legislation and collective agreements that encouraged the expan-
sion of nonstandard work—particularly part-time work—with a
concurrent commitment to regulating equal treatment among standard
and nonstandard work contracts. By comparison, the United Kingdom
has been driven by a neoliberal regime of limited regulation, shifting
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 78  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
Regulatory Convergence? 79
only moderately in emphasis under “New Labor” when they succeeded
in ejecting the Conservative party from government. Thus, for exam-
ple, the narrow definition of a comparator for equal treatment of part-
time and full-time workers has been retained despite lobbying by trade
unions, while the proposed re-regulation of the temporary industry has
been watered down after months of lobbying by the Recruitment and
Employment Confederation.
The example of the Netherlands demonstrates how nonstandard
work conditions need not be “contingent” in the sense of precarious
contracts and uncertain volumes of work. Most part-time work in the
Netherlands involves a permanent contract with a fixed number of
hours, and the recent flexicurity reforms extend the contractual obliga-
tions between employers and workers hired through temporary work
agencies. Statute and widespread coverage of collective agreements
place effective regulations on employment conditions and equal treat-
ment, curtailing the penalties associated with nonstandard work, in
contrast to those of the less-regulated U.K. context. Even more favor-
able integrated forms of part-time work develop in “reduced hour”
arrangements, in which workers have switched from full-time to part-
time hours in their current job. Greater employee rights to obtain this
form of part-time work have been introduced in the Netherlands, and
established examples can also be found in some of the other member
states, for example the Swedish parental leave system and the French
public sector.
The expansion of nonstandard work in the Netherlands has contrib-
uted to the so-called “Dutch Miracle,” a 20-year period of job-intensive
employment growth (even when expressed as full-time equivalents)
and nearly full employment, albeit with low participation rates among
the older workforce (Visser and Hemerijck 1997, Visser 1999). How-
ever, this model of labor market reform was dependent on a number of
specific and favorable economic and political conditions, including an
inclusive welfare state regime, centrally institutionalized collective
bargaining mechanisms involving a powerful trade union movement,
high wage and productivity levels, and a large pool of available women
outside the labor market. The Dutch model cannot be simply uprooted
from these conditions and exported wholesale to other countries, but it
provides useful policy lessons that can be adapted to other societal con-
texts.
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Furthermore, although the situation for nonstandard workers is
much rosier in the Netherlands relative to the United Kingdom and
many other countries, it is not perfect. For example, the extension of
equal treatment to marginal part-time workers (fewer than 12 hours per
week) has been slower than that for other part-time workers, and part-
time work is still mainly a female undertaking, thus reinforcing gender
segregation of the labor market and men’s lower involvement in
parenting and other time-consuming care work (Plantenga 1997). Poli-
cies are needed to develop part-time work as a gender-neutral option
for the work-life balance rather than a female-dominated segment of
employment. Temporary contract work is still an inferior and involun-
tary option for a large proportion of this segment of the workforce, and
better trend data are required to monitor the impact of different forms
of nonstandard work on employment trajectories and advancement
over different periods, particularly in the projected future downturns in
the business cycle (Walker 2001).
Thus, there is now a substantial framework of EU law to normalize
nonstandard work through the principle of equal treatment and other
protective measures. However, there is still much work to be done to
effectively implement and develop this form of work in many member
states. Furthermore, these regulatory developments in labor law coexist
with welfare state regimes that still remain for the most part organized
around the norm of full-time standard employment, penalizing those
with periods of nonstandard work in their employment histories (Grim-
shaw and Rubery 1997; Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1998). As the EU
plays an ever-greater role in setting the parameters for individual
nations’ regulation of their own labor markets as part of the wider eco-
nomic agenda then the political pressures toward convergence will
continue. However, this is likely to coexist with a continued divergence
between those countries such as the Netherlands whose employment
law reform often prefigures that at the EU level, and the United King-
dom, whose government, at best, seeks to manage the effects of EU
reform, and at worse, seeks to oppose it. 
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Notes
1. To give a sense of the circularity of some current debates, over two decades ago
Sergio Ricca wrote about temporary work: “[It] has been one of the most hotly
debated topics of recent years. So spectacular has been its development that politi-
cians and legislators have been forced to come to grips with it even before econo-
mists and sociologists have had time to explain the phenomenon” (1982, p. 141).
2. For example, a 30-hour threshold is used in official statistics in the United King-
dom, while a 35-hour threshold is used in Sweden.
3. In the case of temporary work, there is no standard European definition (Michon
2000; Goudswaard and de Nanteuil 2000). Instead, each member country has its
own categorization method for work arrangements that fall under the definition of
“temporary work” (see the third section of this chapter). In an analysis of tempo-
rary employment in Britain, Casey (1988, p. 3) provides 11 definitions. (1) con-
sultants or freelancers; (2) labor-only subcontractors; (3) casual workers; (4)
seasonal workers; (5) fixed-term contract workers; (6) workers with a contract
dischargeable by performance; (7) workers on training contracts; (8) temporary
workers on indefinite contracts; (9) agency workers; (10) employees of works
contractors; and (11) participants in special programs for the unemployed. 
4. This, however, is only one term used. For example, in referring to the industry
Mangum, Mayell, and Nelson (1985) refer to the “temporary help industry”; Peck
and Theodore (2001) prefer “temp industry,” while Segal and Sullivan (1999) use
the term “temporary services industry.” The organization is variously referred to
as: “temporary work agency” (Michon 2000); “temporary employment agency”
(Forde 1997); “labor market intermediaries” (Mangum, Mayell, and Nelson
1985); “temporary work organization” (Ricca 1982); and “private employment
services” (Walwei 1998). 
5. The self-employed use their own tools and capital to supply goods and services. A
distinction can be made between the genuine and the “dependent,” “notional,” or
“controlled self-employed.” This latter group of “dependent self-employment”
has no employees and largely relies on selling their own labor, perhaps with some
limited capital input in the form of tools. Often, this group regularly works for a
limited number of companies in relationships that are similar to that of employees
but that avoid many of the regulations on employers. This form of self-employ-
ment is common for construction workers and hairdressers in the United King-
dom, for example. Another, similar term commonly used in the United States is
“independent contract work,” in which the workers supply their labor but no tools
or capital. “Freelance workers” have a contract to provide services to a firm rather
than an employment contract, and the term is largely associated with professional
services. In the EU-15, self-employment in services accounted for 9 percent of all
employment in 1998, and self-employment in industry accounted for another 3
percent of all employment. Some proportion of this will be in new forms of self-
employment, but it is difficult to identify different forms of self-employment in
most existing survey series.
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6. Employers’ interests in the extension of working-time flexibility to meet produc-
tion requirements are quite distinct from employees’ interests in obtaining more
flexibility in how they organize their working time through “time sovereignty” or
“time autonomy.”
7. The question about open-ended, fixed-term contracts is only asked of the
employed who state that they are employees. It will fail to pick up people who are
regularly employed on short fixed-term contracts (either with the same or differ-
ent employers) but who were not employed in the reference week.
8. In addition, 90 percent of U.K. workplaces subcontract one or more services,
mainly for building maintenance, cleaning, security, transport, and training (Cully
et al. 1999).
9. The Dutch “polder” model of economic and civic life encourages tripartite ways
of negotiation. Policy and legislation are developed in discussion between gov-
ernment, national employers’ associations, and trade unions. These regulations
are then worked out in more detail at the sector level and in specific detail at the
enterprise level.
10. It is estimated that the 11 percent of part-time employees (2–3 percent of all
employees) that are excluded by the eight-hour threshold are mostly students
(Hepple and Hakim 1997, p. 670).
11. For a review of the term, see Wilthagen (1998).
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Italy and Spain are two countries with very rigid labor markets, as
defined by various indicators, such as direct firing costs, procedural
restrictions to workforce adjustment, and other employment protection
features (see, e.g., Grubb and Welles 1993; Barnard, Clark, and Lewis
1995; OECD 1999). They also share the “Mediterranean” lifestyle,
with its extended families and low female work participation rates, as
well as significant regional differences between the more developed
northern regions and the more underdeveloped southern ones (although
this duality is more striking in Italy). These two countries have also
recently undergone deregulation, although to varying degrees and tim-
ing (for an earlier analysis, see Adam and Canziani 1998). In both
countries, the pressing force for changes has been unemployment. It is
doubtful, however, that this deregulation has ameliorated unemploy-
ment problems in these countries. Rather, dual labor market structures
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have tended to develop, most notably in Spain, although it is unclear
that what drives their current stability is institutional. 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the development of
“nonstandard” work in Italy and Spain. Section 2 describes the main
features of the Italian and Spanish labor markets. Section 3 discusses
the notion of nonstandard work, while section 4 briefly describes the
move toward nonstandard work in both countries. Section 5 begins the
empirical part of the chapter by quantifying the size and evolution of
nonstandard work, and section 6 analyzes the key characteristics of the
main groups of nonstandard workers. Section 7 turns to the welfare of
these workers, in terms of income, poverty, and job satisfaction.
Finally, section 8 reflects on the role of nonstandard work as a weapon
against unemployment.
BASIC FEATURES OF THE ITALIAN 
AND SPANISH LABOR MARKETS
Figure 4.1 plots the evolution of employment in Italy and Spain
since 19771 (all numbers are expressed as indices of the 1977 labor
force to facilitate the comparisons). Labor force participation increased
by 14 percent between 1977 and 2000 in Italy, and by 20 percent in
Spain, with the main divergence between the two countries occurring
in the 1990s. This faster growth in Spain, however, is deceptive, given
the greater unemployment in Spain depicted in Figure 4.2. Of more
importance is the way in which employment evolved in both countries.
Thus, while in Italy, employment has increased more or less steadily
(although it suffered a crisis in the early 1990s), in Spain, employment
has experienced significant shifts. The first shift was a sharp downturn
between 1977 and 1985, which reflects an adjustment from a pre-
democratic, autarchic economy to the new competition within the
European community. The second shift (1985–1991) occurred when
the economy recovered at an unprecedented pace, helped by various
factors, including entry into the European Union, lower oil prices, high
profits achieved in the previous recession, and labor market reform that
eased the use of fixed-term contracts. In the early 1990s, the European-
wide crisis also affected Spain significantly. Finally, since 1994, and
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more strongly since 1997, employment in Spain rose again at very high
rates. Therefore, although in relative terms, employment has always
been lower in Spain than in Italy throughout the period considered, by
1999, the two countries had reached similar levels.
Figure 4.2 plots unemployment, the flip side of Figure 4.1.
Although the story in Italy is one of a slowly rising unemployment,
driven by the inability of employment to expand as fast as the labor
supply, in Spain, the labor supply has tended to be absorbed by the
strong employment surges of the late 1980s and late 1990s. Thus,
while unemployment in Spain was twice as great as in Italy in 1985
and again in 1994, the unemployment and employment data in the two
figures both tend to converge in the 1990s.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 also include the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) projected evolution of labor
force, which sees employment and unemployment rising until 2001.
This is of interest for two reasons. First, the data more clearly reveal
Figure 4.1 Employment and the Labor Force in Italy and Spain, 
1977–2001
SOURCE: OECD and European Labor Force Survey data.
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the process of employment recovery that has begun in Italy, suggesting
an upsurge for the first time in ten years, similar to that observed in
1989–1991. Second, they pinpoint the strength of the Spanish employ-
ment growth, which despite the continuing rise in labor supply drives
down unemployment to 13 percent, thus getting closer to Italy.
It is also worth considering the degree of labor mobility in both
countries, given that this is an important element of labor market insta-
bility. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of male and female employees
in Italy and Spain in 1992, 1995, and 2000 by tenure in their current
job.2 The Spanish labor market has substantially higher mobility. In
1992 and 1995, the proportion of those with job tenure less than a year
was more than 20 percent.3 In Italy, it was roughly 5 percent in 1991
and 1994. The gap narrowed between the two countries in 2000, but
Spain continued to have more workers with short tenures. 
Figure 4.2 Unemployment Rate in Italy and Spain, 1977–2001 (% of 
labor force)
SOURCE: OECD and European Labor Force Survey data.
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INSTITUTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF STANDARD 
WORK ARRANGEMENTS 
Before moving on to the analysis of nonstandard work in the two
countries, it is useful to analyze how standard work is defined. As in
most countries, the “standard” work arrangement in Italy and Spain is a
dependent, full-time, permanent (or “open-ended”) labor contract.
Appendix A details the regulation of labor contracts in both countries.
In Italy, the standard contract was progressively expanded during
the twentieth century with trade union action, the development of large
industrial firms, and the rise of the welfare state. Both the 1947 Italian
Constitution and the 1970 Workers’ Statute provide special rights only
to permanent employees, then considered the weakest segment of over-
all employment in terms of social protection and working conditions.
During the 1970s, both labor legislation and collective bargaining
Figure 4.3 Distribution of Employed Population by Tenure with the 
Current Employer, Spain and Italy, 1992, 1995, and 2000
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey.
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focused specifically on “job security” (workplace stability), considered
a public good under the “male bread-winner model” (Fagan and
Rubery 1996), which characterizes the Italian social system. This polit-
ical and social strategy led to a fairly strict limitation of employers’
power and practices, especially concerning firing and hiring in large
firms, and provided several measures of employment protection. From
a legislative and contractual point of view, “job security” became much
more relevant than in the past.
More specifically, individual dismissals had to be justified, either
as misconduct by the employee or an objective reason relating to the
enterprise (Boeri 1997; Samek Lodovici 2000). An employee can chal-
lenge a dismissal by filing a written statement within 60 days. The case
is heard by a special judge (pretore del lavoro) who decides whether
the employer has demonstrated a justified motive. If the judge rules
against the employer, the dismissal is void and the employer must com-
pensate the worker for damage and reinstate him or her.4 
In addition, standard workers also enjoy greater access to fringe
benefits and unemployment benefits, although these tend to be more
related to tenure than to the contract itself. For example, access to
mobility benefits,5 which are much more generous than unemployment
benefits, requires two years of consecutive employment. Needless to
say, self-employed workers are ineligible for any form of unemploy-
ment insurance and benefits (Dell’Aringa and Samek Lodovici 1997).
In Spain, 40 years of political dictatorship, with fairly paternalistic
labor laws and rigid employment regulations (compensated for by a
highly flexible wage system), was followed by a short experience of
democracy in the late 1970s with sharp economic turmoil6 and down-
turns. On the heels of this period, the 1980 Workers’ Statute created
the main labor market regulations that currently exist and clearly estab-
lished a preference for the open-ended contract as the “normal” labor
contract.7 Dismissals were severely restricted, and in many instances
required prior administrative approval. Economic difficulties, for
example, were not considered a fair cause for individual dismissal.8
Nevertheless, the new regulations made it possible for firms to fire at
will, provided they resorted to a more expensive, but easier and more
certain, unfair dismissal procedure.9 The situation changed in 1994,
when the dismissal procedures were eased somewhat,10 and again in
1997 when a special open-ended contract, with somewhat lower sever-
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ance pay, was introduced. On the whole, however, it is still fair to say
that employers can fire Spanish employees with an open-ended con-
tract at will, but with a cost, which is generally deemed “high” by
European standards.11
Other benefits, for example fringe benefits or unemployment
insurance, are related more to seniority than to the contract itself.
Needless to say, nonstandard dependent workers are bound to experi-
ence shorter employment spells and hence to have less access to those
benefits, to the extent that these are not vested (which they are in many
instances, especially when publicly provided); however, this lack of
access is fundamentally unrelated to their contract status. For example,
workers under fixed-term contracts in Spain may, on the surface, have
no access to unemployment benefits. However, if they work six
months under six different one-month contracts for six different
employers, they will become eligible for benefits, regardless of
whether the six months of work were consecutive or interspersed with
spells of unemployment. 
Thus, both in Italy and Spain, standard workers enjoy substantial
protection from arbitrary action by firms. By most international com-
parisons (albeit with the inherent difficulties in such comparisons), the
two countries rank high in terms of legal employment protection. This
is the most significant difference, and it is against this that the situation
of nonstandard workers must be judged.
THE MOVE TOWARD NONSTANDARD WORK
Despite the preference for standard work arrangements in both
Italy and Spain, both countries, urged on by unemployment, have tried
to circumvent the rigidities in open-ended labor contracts. In both
cases, the changes have not attempted to alter the nature of the core
labor market, but rather have aimed at creating fringes in the labor mar-
ket with less restrictive hiring and firing conditions. One of the early
responses of the economy to the initial restrictive regulation was a
flourishing underground economy and independent work, especially in
Italy, and one of the side effects of the move toward nonstandard work
has been the emergence of such activities, especially in Spain.
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In Italy, the strict regulation of the labor market has been undergo-
ing a transformation for some years (De Luca and Bruni 1993; Paci
1998). It is not an overall coherent reform, but rather, a series of incre-
mental interventions and decrees that have modified the system as a
whole. One of the most important changes in Italy in recent years is the
diversification of employment contracts, leading to an expansion of
temporary employment (including seasonal employment contracts,
youth work-training, and apprenticeship contracts) and of “indepen-
dent contractors,” those workers midway between dependent and inde-
pendent work, and defined in the sociological literature as “second
generation” self-employment (Bologna and Fumagalli 1997). 
In recent years, this new form of self-employment (including
freelance work, independent contractors,12 “co-workers,” etc.) has
increased rapidly, especially in northern Italy and in certain sectors
(Semenza 2000). Much of the flexibility provided by work relations
that depart from the standard model in Italy is to be attributed to these
middle positions between wage work and self-employment. These new
forms of employment are the result of both outsourcing on the demand
side and a different way of conceiving work on the supply side, where
work choices may be functionally linked to the workers’ life cycle
(Bassanini and Donati 2001). Recent reforms, although with stricter
eligibility rules, are substantially changing the working status of the
new independent workers (e.g., they receive the same tax treatment as
the dependent workers, a gradual increase of the pension contributions
rate, and extension of some social assistance benefits such as coverage
for hospitalization, family allowances, maternity leave). Although for
dependent, nonstandard workers, there is a mild shift toward less regu-
lation, the opposite is true for independent contractors. For this group,
greater regulation offers some employment protection. 
Dependent work has seen changes as well, although none are radi-
cal departures from recent policies. Changes have included the intro-
duction of mobility procedures and benefits in collective layoffs; the
abolition of the obligation to employ from official employment office
waiting lists (1991); the introduction of various youth temporary
employment contracts and the relaunching of apprenticeship schemes
(1984, 1997); new rules and incentives for fixed-term and part-time
work (1997, 2000); the introduction of temporary agency employment
and the end of the public monopoly on job placement (1997); the intro-
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duction of “graduality contracts” between companies and unions to
encourage undeclared and irregular work;13 and the decentralization of
employment services at the local level (1997). An important element
also introduced in 1997 (in the Treu package) was the substitution of a
monetary penalty for automatically converting fixed-term workers into
permanent ones when work extended (up to 30 days) beyond the offi-
cial expiry date with the possibility to renew the contract once. 
In Spain, the 1980 Workers’ Statute left the door open to excep-
tions to the normal, open-ended labor contract. These were established
for clearly temporary activities, for which temporary contracts were
allowed, as well as for initial contracts for youth (accepting what was
already set up since 1978). In addition, the law allowed government to
introduce other instances for using temporary contracts, even for per-
forming the normal activities of firms (which would break the so-
called “causality principle” for temporary hiring), as an “employment
promotion measure.” This possibility was used for the first time in
1982, although the new contract was subject to various restrictions.
The situation changed quite dramatically when the Socialist govern-
ment, elected in late 1982, reformed the Workers’ Statute in 1984 by
expanding the possibilities for using temporary contracts (mostly
through the so-called “new line of business” contract) as well as main-
taining the noncausal, fixed-term contract as a measure of employment
promotion. This latter measure was made permanent, whereas in the
past, it was removed when the employment situation improved.14 In
principle, the 1984 reform established two types of contracts: tempo-
rary contracts, to be used for temporary tasks, and fixed-term contracts,
which could also be used to perform the “normal” activities of firms.
This amendment to the Workers’ Statute, which also included other
measures such as the regulation of part-time work, has been the corner-
stone of labor market reform in Spain in the last 20 years (see, e.g.,
Malo and Toharia 2000). 
Further reforms were introduced throughout the 1990s. In 1992,
the fixed-term contract was restricted and unemployment benefits cur-
tailed, and then again in 1994, amid a wholesale refurbishing of the
statute, further efforts were made to foster part-time work, and the
fixed-term contract was further restricted (limiting its use to specific
groups). In 1995, temporary help agencies were legalized, and the
monopoly of the public employment services was suspended. In 1997,
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the fixed-term contract was altogether abolished, and a new open-
ended contract was introduced. In 1998, part-time work was again
reformed, and finally, in 2001, the 1998 reform of the part-time con-
tract was reversed (in a move to make it more flexible), and the cover-
age of the new open-ended contract was expanded. These changes
throughout the 1990s did not reduce the number of contracts signed; in
fact, they increased. Firms, forced to move away from fixed-term con-
tracts (as they were simply being eliminated), resorted to temporary
contracts, thus somewhat paradoxically gaining flexibility given that
the temporary contracts were less regulated and allowed much more
flexible time spans.
Thus, in Italy, moves toward dependent, nonstandard work have
been much milder than in Spain and have been introduced just recently
(Samek Lodovici and Semenza 2001). For example, fixed-term work
has been restricted to clearly temporary tasks and to youth labor market
integration policies, and part-time work has been regulated based on
the proportionality principle. The flip side of the situation is the growth
of very flexible independent contractors, for whom some regulation
has been introduced in recent years. The impression is that further
moves could be undertaken should the labor market situation worsen in
the next few years (something that at present does not seem plausible,
at least in the short term). In Spain, on the other hand, the situation is
inverse. Social agents believe that the move toward nonstandard work,
especially regarding temporary or fixed-term work, has gone too far.
However, the successive measures adopted to reduce the extent of tem-
porary work (most notably in 1997 )15 have met with failure generally,
and the issue remains alive. 
QUANTIFYING NONSTANDARD WORK 
IN ITALY AND SPAIN
We now present data on nonstandard work arrangements in Italy
and Spain. The data come mainly from the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) and correspond to 1996.16 This source offers
the ability to make comparisons across categories, defined on a com-
mon statistical basis, and will also be the source for the welfare analysis
below. 
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Table 4.1 presents data for the following categories: full-time per-
manent employees; part-time permanent employees; full-time tempo-
rary employees; part-time temporary employees; paid apprentices and
trainees under special schemes; self-employed; and unpaid family
workers.
It could be argued that all but full-time permanent employees rep-
resent the extent of nonstandard work, given that they depart from the
standard defined above. However, it could be argued that, for various
reasons, part-time permanent employees, paid apprentices and trainees,
self-employed, and unpaid family workers could also be considered
special categories. Part-time permanent employees fall very near the
standard, apprentices and trainees are, by definition, in transitory posi-
tions, and self-employed and unpaid family workers depart from the
usual “labor market,” especially in Italy and Spain, where they tend to
represent the past rather than the future, linked, as they are, to such tra-
ditional activities as agriculture and trade and hotels and restaurants.
Table 4.1 The Extent of Nonstandard Work in Italy and Spain (%), 1996 
All Males Females
Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy
Permanent full-time 
employees 44.6 56.4 47.5 57.0 39.3 55.1
Permanent part-time 
employees 1.6 4.3 0.5 1.4 3.7 10.0
Temporary full-time 
employees 23.6 6.8 23.7 6.5 23.4 7.3
Temporary part-time 
employees 3.0 1.6 1.1 0.9 6.7 2.8
Paid apprentices and 
trainees 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.5
Self-employed 21.0 25.0 23.2 29.1 16.7 1.3
Unpaid family workers 2.4 2.7 1.8 2.3 3.6 3.6
Unknown 2.5 1.8 0.9 1.6 5.6 2.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel, third wave.
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However, as already noted, there has been a growing trend in Italy for a
specific category of self-employed workers. Despite these caveats, the
following analysis will focus on full-time temporary, part-time tempo-
rary, and self-employed workers (including in some instances family
workers). 
It should be stressed that this classification derives from standard
statistical classification criteria; that is, it is based on the respondents’
own description of their contract situation. Thus, temporary work is a
general expression that refers to any kind of contract that is of limited
duration,17 even though its precise limits may not be known (this occurs
when the contract is signed for the duration of a certain task, which
may be uncertain). On the other hand, part-time work is not defined by
any legal arrangement; rather, the ECHP considers work fewer than 30
hours a week to be part-time, unless workers claim they work full-time
when asked the reason for working less than this threshold.18 This
method and definition follows the usual Eurostat criterion generally
used in the European Labor Force Survey.
It should also be mentioned that other forms of nonstandard work
are emerging in both countries, mainly “independent” workers,
freelancers, and other forms that generally fall outside the realm of
labor law. This is especially true in Italy, where the “second genera-
tion” self-employed, who make up an estimated one-third of the mea-
sured self-employed, have become the second most common form of
employment after the standard open-ended contract (Bologna and
Fumagalli 1997). This group of self-employed is mainly professional,
skilled workers.19 In Spain, the trend applies to the construction and
personal and business services sectors, but no detailed information
exists on its evolution and significance within the labor market.
The data in Table 4.1 show significantly more nonstandard work in
Spain than in Italy. Under its broad definition, 55.4 percent of all
employed individuals in Spain work under nonstandard arrangements,
a proportion that could challenge the qualifier “standard.” In Italy, 41.7
work in nonstandard arrangements, clearly below the 50 percent cutoff.
Under the narrower criterion noted above that limits nonstandard work
to temporary, full-, and part-time workers, however, 26.6 percent of
Spain’s employed population would be considered nonstandard, while
only 8.4 percent of Italian workers fall in this category. 
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There are two main differences between the two countries: the
share of full-time temporary workers in Spain is much larger than in
Italy: 24 percent versus 7 percent, while self-employment is more com-
mon in Italy than in Spain. Part-time work composes a relatively small
share of nonstandard work, although somewhat higher in Italy than in
Spain owing mainly to the number of permanent part-time workers.
The picture changes slightly by gender. Female part-time workers rep-
resent nearly 13 percent of total female employment in Italy and
approximately 10 percent in Spain, the main difference again stem-
ming from the number of permanent part-time workers. In any case,
these numbers are far lower than those observed in other European
countries.
Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of nonstandard work in Italy and
Spain, as indicated by changing trends in part-time and temporary
work among total employed. Figure 4.4 is based on ELFS data, which
differ somewhat from those presented above. The series dates from the
early 1990s, with the exception of temporary work in Spain, which
dates from 1987 (the first year for which information is available). 
Figure 4.4 The Share of Part-Time and Temporary Employees in Italy 
and Spain, 1987–99
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey.
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There are three striking trends in Figure 4.4. The first is the rapidly
rising share of temporary work in Spain in the late 1980s and early
1990s. However, since 1992, the proportion has remained stable; it
would seem that the Spanish economy had reached some “steady state”
in terms of the proportion of temporary work.
The second clear trend is the rise, albeit more modest, in temporary
work in Italy, with clear seasonal patterns. The more recent data show
some acceleration in the rise of temporary work, as well as a diminish-
ment in seasonal patterns, which may result from the 1997 Treu Act (see
above). Nevertheless, the rate of variation is modest compared with
Spain in the late 1980s (the two scales used for both series are the same).
The third trend is the modest rise in the share of part-time work in
both countries, from roughly 6 percent in the early 1990s to approxi-
mately 8 percent in the late 1990s. It appears that both firms and work-
ers have preferred different ways of achieving flexibility, involving
higher, albeit maybe more unstable, hours and earnings. Still, the share
of part-time work in female employment is close to 20 percent in
Spain. Very little information is available on the other forms of non-
standard work, including the underground economy, probably because
they are still a new, and small, part of the economy. 
We now present the characteristics of the three main groups of
nonstandard workers: temporary workers, part-time workers, and self-
employed. Table 4.2 compares the main characteristics of temporary
workers and permanent workers in both countries as of April–May
1999. More women than men both in Italy20 and in Spain work in tem-
porary employment, although the differences are slightly higher in
Italy. Temporary workers tend to be younger in both countries (but
more so in Spain) than permanent workers.21 It is striking that, despite
being younger, temporary workers have lower educational attainment
levels, especially in Spain and also for Italian males. This trend toward
relatively unskilled work is confirmed by the data on occupations.
Thus, temporary workers tend to be concentrated in elementary occu-
pations, as well as service and sales occupations.
In any case, the differences are larger in Spain. On average, there is
a 7 percentage point difference between Spanish male temporary and
permanent workers across the various occupations, and only a 4.3 per-
centage point difference among Italian men. For females, the differ-
ences are also somewhat higher in Spain: 4.6 percentage points on
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Table 4.2 Characteristics of Temporary and Permanent Employees, Italy and Spain, 1999 (%)
ITALY SPAIN
Men (60.1) Women (39.9) Men (62.1) Women (37.9)
Permanent
(90.5)
Temp
(9.5)
Permanent
(86.8)
Temp
(13.2)
Permanent
(68.6)
Temp
(31.4)
Permanent
(65.1)
Temp
(34.9)
Age group
15–29 years 19.9 47.3 22.9 46.7 16.7 52.3 21.3 55.7
30–39 years 32.0 27.5 33.8 31.3 28.7 24.5 32.3  25.5
40–49 years 29.1 13.6 28.6 14.7 29.2 14.3 28.7  12.8
50–64 years 19.0 11.6 14.8 7.4 25.4 8.9 17.6 6.0
Level of education
No education/primary school 12.0 16.4 8.0 10.9 28.3 30.4 20.9  18.9
Lower secondary level 40.8 41.4 28.3 28.4 30.8 43.2 27.9  37.8
Upper secondary level 37.1 34.1 48.9 44.1 22.5 16.9 22.3  21.3
University 10.1 8.1 14.8 16.6 18.4 9.5 29.0  22.0
Occupational groups (1 digit
ISCO-88)
Managers 2.8 1.1 0.9 0.3 3.8 0.6 1.2 0.2
Professionals 6.2 5.9 9.1 9.6 11.7 6.0 19.9  12.6
Technicians 18.0 12.3 31.1 23.0 11.7 5.2 11.8 7.4
Clerks 12.6 9.1 21.0 16.8 9.7 3.7 20.6  14.8
Services and sales workers 9.8 10.1 14.4 17.1 11.9 8.7 19.8  27.1
Crafts/skilled blue collars 24.4 28.2 7.5 7.8 24.4 35.4 3.1 5.4
(continued)
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ITALY SPAIN
Men (60.1) Women (39.9) Men (62.1) Women (37.9)
Permanent
(90.5)
Temp
(9.5)
Permanent
(86.8)
Temp
(13.2)
Permanent
(68.6)
Temp
(31.4)
Permanent
(65.1)
Temp
(34.9)
Plant and machine operators 15.2 10.0 6.6 4.1 16.1 12.8 4.2 5.9
Elementary occupations 8.5 22.3 9.5 21.4 9.5 27.0 19.4  26.6
Industries
Agriculture 2.4 11.8 1.3 9.6 2.9 8.4 0.9 4.9
Mining and energy 2.2 1.0 0.5 0.2 2.4 1.0 0.5 0.3
Manufacturing 31.9 20.3 22.7 14.3 28.7 21.4 12.4 14.2
Construction 9.5 16.5 1.1 1.2 8.9 32.3 1.1 1.2
Wholesale and retail, repairs 9.4 10.2 11.0 10.6 12.9 10.2 14.5 18.3
Hotels and restaurants 2.1 4.5 2.9 6.3 3.7 5.2 5.1 9.9
Transportation, communications 8.4 5.4 3.6 2.5 7.8 4.9 3.6 2.8
Financial services 4.4 0.8 4.1 2.3 4.5 0.6 3.3 1.9
Business services 3.5 4.8 6.4 7.6 5.4 4.8 9.5 8.6
Public administration 13.5 11.1 10.4 11.7 10.2 3.8 10.2 4.5
Education, health 9.4 8.4 29.8 23.0 8.4 4.6 26.7 18.8
Other services 3.3 5.19 6.2 10.8 4.1 2.7 12.3 14.6
Work status
Full-time 98.7 76.1 87.5 59.8 99.0 93.2 87.4 72.4
Part-time 1.3 23.9 12.5 40.2 1.0 6.8 12.6 27.6
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey.
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average versus 3.8 percentage points for Italy. Temporary work tends
to be concentrated in more volatile sectors, such as agriculture, con-
struction, and tourism. Again, the differences are larger in Spain,
although only for males, a result attributable to the differences in the
construction sector.
On the whole, temporary workers tend to be concentrated, both in
Spain and in Italy, in relatively less-skilled occupations; in addition,
individuals who hold these jobs are relatively young. This is interest-
ing, especially given the rather high proportion of temporary workers
in Spain, because it implies that rather than opening the labor market as
a whole, the move toward nonstandard work has catered to special seg-
ments of labor demand, where transitory work needs are more preva-
lent. Despite the large hole created by temporary work in Spain, it
appears to have remained concentrated in activities and occupations
where it might not pay to offer the worker a permanent status. In Italy,
the thrust of the legislation has always been to allow temporary con-
tracts for temporary tasks; it is quite interesting that in Spain, despite
the much wider extent of legislation, the actual reach has not been, in
general, different. 
Of course, the question that arises is whether temporary tasks war-
rant that one-third of the workforce have a temporary status, especially
when comparing the situation in Italy, with presumably similar sea-
sonal peaks of activity. This is a difficult question to answer. One ele-
ment to be taken into account is the resilience of the share of temporary
workers in the face of the various reforms introduced in the 1990s
aimed at curbing such work. This resilience might support the argu-
ment that the roughly one-third of temporary employees represents a
collective choice by firms based on their economic situation. On the
other hand, there is a general belief that the proportion is too high given
the temporary needs of firms. This view is evident in the 1997 agree-
ment, whose aim was to foster employment stability by reducing the
proportion of temporary workers. Thus, there seems to be a conflict
between the microeconomic behavior of firms and the aggregate view
of the social partners (and society at large). We shall return to this point
in our concluding remarks. 
Turning to part-time work, Table 4.3 presents the main characteris-
tics of part-time and full-time workers in both countries as of April–
May 1999. Not surprisingly given the large proportion of temporary
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106Table 4.3 Characteristics of Full-Time and Part-Time Workers, Italy and Spain, 1999 (%)
ITALY SPAIN
Men (60.1) Women (39.9) Men (62.1) Women (37.9)
Full-time
(96.8)
Part-time
(3.2)
Full-time
(84.2)
Part-time
(15.8)
Full-time
(97.2)
Part-time
(2.8)
Full-time
(82.2)
Part-time
(17.8)
Age groups
15–29 years 21.7 37.0 25.5 26.6 26.9 61.4 32.9 35.2
30–39 years 31.7 28.4 32.3 39.7 27.6 19.9 30.3 28.3
40–49 years 28.3 16.3 27.8 22.6 25.0 9.6 23.9 19.7
50–64 years 18.4 18.2 14.4 11.1 20.5 9.1 12.9 16.8
Level of education
No education/primary school 12.1 19.2 7.5 13.3 29.3 15.8 17.5 32.6
Lower secondary level 41.0 38.3 27.1 34.5 34.8 31.7 30.5 35.4
Upper secondary level 36.9 34.7 49.2 44.1 20.5 28.4 23.2 16.3
University 10.0 7.9 16.3 8.1 15.4 24.1 28.9 15.8
Occupational groups (1 digit 
ISCO-88)
Managers 2.8 0.6 0.9 0.2 2.8 0.8 1.0 0.1
Professionals 6.1 6.4 10.1 3.9 9.7 18.5 19.1 9.3
Technicians 17.7 14.0 31.9 20.9 9.7 10.4 11.3 5.8
Clerks 12.3 11.1 20.9 18.0 7.8 8.7 20.4 9.9
Services and sales workers 9.8 12.2 13.0 24.1 10.6 21.5 21.6 25.9
Crafts/skilled blue collars 24.8 22.7 7.9 5.79 28.3 11.6 4.2 2.2
Plant and machine operators 15.1 7.2 6.7 3.69 15.2 8.8 5.4 2.1
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Elementary occupations 9.1 25.8 8.6 23.4 14.9 19.7 17.0 44.7
Armed forces 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Industries
Agriculture 3.0 10.7 1.9 4.3 4.6 6.1 2.6 0.9
Mining and energy 2.2 1.2 0.5 0.3 2.0 0.9 0.5 0.2
Manufacturing 31.6 12.4 22.9 15.0 26.8 13.0 14.7 5.4
Construction 10.0 11.0 1.0 1.4 16.6 4.7 1.3 0.6
Wholesale and retail, repairs 9.4 11.9 9.9 16.6 12.0 14.2 16.1 14.4
Hotels and restaurants 2.2 4.3 2.8 6.3 3.9 14.5 6.3 9.0
Transportation, 
communications 8.3 5.0 3.7 2.2 6.9 5.9 3.5 2.5
Financial services 4.2 1.2 4.0 3.8 3.4 1.1 3.1 1.2
Business services 3.5 5.4 5.6 11.3 5.1 10.5 8.2 13.4
Public administration 13.2 18.1 11.0 8.0 8.3 3.2 9.3 3.0
Education, health 9.2 10.8 31.5 15.9 6.9 16.2 25.9 15.2
Other services 3.3 8.0 5.2 15.1 3.5 9.5 8.5 34.2
Type of labor contract
Permanent 93.4 36.8 91.6 69.8 69.9 24.5 69.2 45.9
Temporary 6.7 63.2 8.4 30.2 30.1 75.5 30.8 54.1
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey. 
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workers among part-time employees, the latter tend to share some of
the features of temporary workers. However, there are also significant
differences. First, male part-time workers are, to a large extent, tempo-
rary workers in Italy and Spain, and also quite young, especially in
Spain; however, their share in part-time work is quite small (around 25
percent). Spanish female part-time workers tend to be younger than
full-time workers, although this is not the case in Italy, where the
modal group among part-time workers is 30–39 years. Female part-
time workers also tend to be more unskilled, as suggested by their
lower level of education and, above all, by their strong concentration in
the elementary occupations (mostly in Spain) and in the sales and ser-
vices occupations (mostly in Italy), these being the two least skill-
demanding occupational groups. Personal services as well as tourism
concentrate the largest shares of part-time females in both countries.
On the whole, part-time work does not seem to have made strong
inroads in either Italy or Spain. Despite the efforts to promote it, espe-
cially among women, young Italian and Spanish women are more
inclined to work full-time, and are moving away from the traditional
role of child-rearing that the cultural values have tended to assign their
mothers (Comi 2001). The low fertility rates and the rapidly increasing
female labor force participation rates are evidence of these trends. The
existence of other forms of nonstandard, flexible arrangements, such as
independent work and the underground economy in Italy and tempo-
rary work in Spain, seem to be the main factor behind these trends.
Finally, Table 4.4 presents the characteristics of self-employed
using the same variables included in the preceding two tables. To avoid
possible biases, the agricultural sector has been omitted from the analy-
sis. The most striking feature of Table 4.4 is that self-employed work-
ers are significantly older than employees. Thus, 70 percent of both
Italian male and female self-employed are age 40 or over, whereas the
corresponding figures for employees are 46 percent (males) and 40
percent (females). In Spain, the self-employed are somewhat younger
(60 percent of men and 58 percent of women are age 40 or older), but
they are still, on average, older than employees. Correspondingly, their
level of education is also lower. 
The occupational breakdown is not very significant, given that the
classification bears in part on the position of the worker in the produc-
tion process. Thus, the concentration in services and craftsmen (and
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 108  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
109
Table 4.4 Characteristics of Nonagricultural Self-Employed and Dependent Workers, Italy and Spain, 1999 (%)
ITALY SPAIN
Men (59.6) Women (40.4) Men (62.9) Women (37.1)
Self-
employed 
(25.2)
Employee 
(74.8)
Self-
employed 
(28.0)
Employee 
(72.0)
Self-
employed 
(20.5)
Employee 
(79.5)
Self-
employed 
(15.7)
Employee 
(84.3)
Age groups
15–29 years 14.8 22.2 4.7 25.9 14.1 27.9 15.2 33.1
30–39 years 15.7 31.7 24.4 33.6 25.5 27.2 27.1 29.9
40–49 years 20.5 27.9 41.2 26.9 29.0 24.6 28.0 23.3
50–64 years 49.1 18.2 29.8 13.7 31.3 20.3 29.7 13.8
Level of education
No education/primary school 34.2 11.5 25.1 7.7 37.3 27.5 37.0 19.6
Lower secondary level 32.9 40.7 38.2 27.9 31.7 34.7 32.8 31.2
Upper secondary level 25.3 37.5 17.4 49.2 17.1 21.4 15.5 22.2
University 7.6 10.3 19.3 15.3 13.8 16.3 14.7 27.0
Occupational groups (1 digit
 ISCO-88)
Managers 4.9 2.8 1.2 0.8 34.7 2.9 42.5 0.8
Professionals 6.4 6.5 11.7 9.4 8.3 10.5 9.7 17.7
Technicians 9.1 17.9 3.9 30.7 7.2 10.0 5.7 10.4
Clerks 0.4 12.6 8.3 20.8 1.4 8.1 3.8 18.9
Services and sales workers 31.8 10.1 65.7 15.0 5.0 11.7 25.6 23.0
Crafts/skilled blue collars 28.6 24.5 13.0 7.4 27.0 26.9 5.3 3.5
Plant and machine
operators
3.2 15.0 0.6 6.4 13.7 15.3 3.6 4.9
(continued)
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ITALY SPAIN
Men (59.6) Women (40.4) Men (62.9) Women (37.1)
Self-
employed 
(25.2)
Employee 
(74.8)
Self-
employed 
(28.0)
Employee 
(72.0)
Self-
employed 
(20.5)
Employee 
(79.5)
Self-
employed 
(15.7)
Employee 
(84.3)
Elementary occupations 15.7 8.3 6.8 9.5 2.7 13.5 3.8 20.7
Armed forces 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
Industries
Mining and energy 0.1 2.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 2.1 0.1 0.4
Manufacturing 17.1 31.9 21.8 22.1 15.6 27.6 9.4 13.4
Construction 18.1 10.4 0.6 1.1 18.1 17.0 1.4 1.2
Wholesale and retail, repairs 37.9 9.8 55.2 11.2 28.0 12.6 46.5 16.1
Hotels and restaurants 6.5 2.4 2.9 3.4 10.9 4.4 16.1 6.9
Transportation, 
communications
2.8 8.4 0.4 3.5 11.5 7.2 1.6 3.4
Financial services 1.5 4.2 0.7 4.0 2.2 3.9 2.0 3.6
Business services 6.9 3.7 4.2 6.7 7.9 4.9 6.7 8.5
Public administration 0.1 13.8 0.1 10.8 0.0 8.6 0.1 8.4
Education, health 2.2 9.7 10.6 29.7 2.5 7.7 6.0 24.7
Other services 6.8 3.6 3.6 6.9 3.1 3.9 10.1 13.4
Work status
Part-time 87.0 96.8 88.6 84.2 97.0 97.2 84.1 81.8
Full-time 13.0 3.2 11.4 15.8 3.0 2.8 15.9 18.2
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey.
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also “managers” in Spain) is related to the fact that these people work
on their own. Construction, trade, and tourism are more prevalent
among self-employed. General industrial concentration is higher in
Italy, where the mean between the distribution of employees and self-
employed is 8.4 for males (compared with 5.5 in Spain) and 8.0 for
females (7.2 in Spain). This suggests a more concentrated distribution
of self-employment in Italy.
On the whole, self-employment in Italy and Spain is hardly a new
development. Although the proportion of self-employed workers is rel-
atively stable over time, these are workers who, in general, are in tradi-
tional activities in the construction, trade, and hotels/restaurants
sectors. New trends in nonstandard work may be found, especially in
Italy, in the externalization of work that is quite common in construc-
tion and services. These workers are formally self-employed, but they
depend on a single provider for work. The frontier between “labor” and
“mercantile” exchanges is rather thin in cases such as these. 
THE WELFARE OF NONSTANDARD WORKERS
The final element in our analysis is the consequences for workers
of their status as nonstandard workers. We present data from the ECHP
covering the period 1994–1996. On the basis of the classification used
in Table 4.1, we review nonstandard workers’ wages (only available
for employees), poverty levels, job and general satisfaction, and transi-
tions from nonstandard work.
Table 4.5 presents information on wage and poverty of the differ-
ent work categories defined in Table 4.1. Wage data suggest that tem-
porary workers earn less per hour than permanent workers, the
differences being somewhat larger in Spain than in Italy. However,
before concluding that there is discrimination against workers in Spain,
one should remember that wage differences are explained by many
other factors beyond the contract type. For example, temporary work-
ers tend to be much younger and less skilled, two factors likely to
affect wages between temporary and permanent workers. Econometric
evidence is inconclusive on this point, and even the methods for deter-
mining whether the differences are discriminatory are subject to
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Hourly wage
(PPP Ecu)a
% below poverty
Line 1
% below poverty
Line 2
% in 
persistent poverty
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
Permanent full-time employees 6.5 7.6 6.2 4.5 5.4 5.0 2.0 1.8
Permanent part-time employees 6.7 7.8 2.4 5.6 4.4 6.1 1.1 3.4
Fixed-term full-time employees 4.5 4.5 28.0 13.5 22.4 19.6 12.9 7.3
Fixed-term part-time employees 5.3 4.6 28.3 21.6 30.0 19.7 15.7 8.5
Paid apprentices and trainees 4.6 3.9 21.1 23.5 21.3 30.1 13.2 22.1
Self-employed
—
—
14.9 22.6 19.1 20.5 10.3 9.6
Unpaid family workers
—
—
19.5 27.2 20.8 24.9 11.6 11.2
NOTE: “Poverty line 1” refers to current (1996) monthly household income (in adult equivalent per capita terms). “Poverty line 2”
refers to total household income in previous (1995) year (in adult equivalent per capita terms). Persistent poverty is living below
poverty line 2 in the three waves for which data exist (data refer to the years 1993, 1994, and 1995).
a Purchasing Power Parity based on the value of the European currency unit.
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel.
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debate. Recent estimates for Spain (Davia and Hernanz 2000) suggest
that, once the characteristics of the jobs and the workers themselves are
controlled, the difference would be favorable to temporary workers.
Part-time workers, when taken together, have lower hourly wages
(not shown in the table). However, once the duration of the contract is
controlled, as in Table 4.5, they appear to earn more. This is a result
that is fairly general, as suggested in previous work (Cebrián, Moreno,
and Toharia 2001; Villosio and Garrone 2001), which also suggests
that the dichotomy between part-time and full-time is far from clear for
all countries, and that a more disaggregated breakdown in terms of the
working week would be more sensible in most cases.
On the whole, the wage information does not clearly indicate that
nonstandard workers are “worse off.” Those under temporary contracts
do earn less per hour, but this is, to a large extent, a consequence of
their characteristics: younger and less skilled. In the case of part-time
workers, when controlling for the duration of their contract, their
hourly wage is higher.
Table 4.5 also includes three poverty indicators. The first two are
the percentage of people in each group whose household income
(defined in terms of monthly total earnings and of yearly total income)
is below a “poverty line,” defined as 50 percent of the average house-
hold income for each country, defined in adult-equivalent terms.22 The
third measure attempts to address the likely—and correct—criticism
that the two previous indicators may capture situations of transitory
low income. Thus, rather than considering those in poverty for any one
year, this last indicator measures “persistent poverty,” defined as being
in poverty (according to the indicator based on yearly income) in each
of the three observations available.
The analysis of these poverty indicators suggests several conclu-
sions. First, permanent part-time workers have poverty levels similar to
those of permanent full-time workers. Similarly, there are no signifi-
cant differences between temporary part-time and full-time workers. In
other words, the main differences among employees refer to the dura-
tion of the contract rather than the duration of the working week.
The second conclusion is that differences between temporary and
permanent workers are larger in Italy than in Spain, especially in the
case of persistent poverty. Third, paid apprentices and trainees show
the highest poverty indicators, especially in Spain.
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Of more interest, however, is the situation of the self-employed.
They are clearly worse off than permanent employees; however, their
relative position vis-à-vis temporary workers varies in both countries.
Although in Italy, they tend to be better off, in Spain, they are worse
off. This should be interpreted in terms of the gap between temporary
and permanent workers, which is clearly higher in Italy than in Spain.
A comparison of the various indices—lower persistent poverty and
their higher cross-section indicator—also suggests more variability in
income for the Spanish self-employed. Finally, unpaid family workers
tend to be in a worse position than self-employed workers; the specific
concentration of these workers in terms of industries and occupations
is probably behind this result.
Additional elements needed to assess the relative well-being of
nonstandard workers are provided by the information on job satisfac-
tion included in Table 4.6. The index used is the proportion of people
whose satisfaction score is five or six on a scale of one to six.23 The
most striking differences are found for job security, type of work, and
number of working hours. Nonstandard work provides, by definition,
less job security, which might explain why temporary workers are less
satisfied on this measure. One interesting aspect is the difference
between permanent workers in Spain and Italy. In Spain, the propor-
tion of those satisfied with their job security is significantly higher than
in Italy. One interpretation is that the wedge between permanent and
temporary work is considered wider by Spanish permanent workers,
who may perceive less threat to their position owing to the large seg-
ment of temporary workers. Self-employed worker satisfaction is simi-
lar to that of permanent employees in Italy, but it is clearly lower in
Spain, although it tends to be higher than it is for temporary workers.
Temporary and permanent workers in Italy, but not in Spain, have
different levels of satisfaction, probably owing to the larger reach of
temporary work in Spain. In both countries, unpaid family workers
report lower satisfaction levels.
In terms of the number of working hours, nonstandard workers are
less satisfied than permanent workers in both Italy and Spain. This is
interesting because the specific working time dimension included in
the classification (namely, part-time versus full-time) does not appear
to be significant, implying that part-time workers are not particularly
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Table 4.6 Satisfaction with Various Aspects of Work, Italy and Spain, 1996 (%)
SATISF-1 SATISF-2 SATISF-3 SATISF-4 SATISF-5 SATISF-6 SATISF-7
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
Permanent full-
time employees
18.8 19.4 53.4 70.6 50.1 59.9 40.0 48.3 42.3 56.0 41.1 54.6 49.7 57.7
Permanent part-
time employees
10.0 20.1 44.8 69.4 41.6 46.3 50.9 62.2 53.9 61.1 47.2 64.5 52.2 67.2
Fixed-term full-
time employees
13.9 15.5 16.1 25.1 35.8 50.2 26.2 39.5 29.4 46.4 36.3 50.3 39.3 46.3
Fixed-term part-
time employees
3.4 13.2 15.5 30.4 33.1 41.8 27.6 37.0 37.3 56.5 42.2 59.3 45.7 52.0
Paid apprentices 
and trainees
12.2 22.2 17.7 36.7 39.5 58.4 27.1 52.6 28.0 61.2 34.7 62.2 43.7 69.9
Self-employed 15.4 13.1 43.1 39.3 53.4 57.4 21.9 26.2 31.3 43.3 47.9 55.7 58.0 67.7
Unpaid family 
workers
1.5 12.8 48.5 29.1 35.3 31.2 19.5 22.4 28.0 29.4 46.2 51.0 68.6 77.9
SATISF-1: satisfaction with earnings in present job
SATISF-2: satisfaction with job security in present job
SATISF-3: satisfaction with type of work in present job
SATISF-4: satisfaction with number of working hours in present job
SATISF-5: satisfaction with working times (daytime, nighttime, shifts, etc.) in present job
SATISF-6: satisfaction with working conditions/environment in present job
SATISF-7: satisfaction with distance to work/commuting in present job
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel (percentage of workers whose satisfaction score is 5 or 6 on a 1–6 scale).
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unhappy (vis-à-vis their full-time counterparts) with their working
time.
Table 4.7 presents information on more general indicators of satis-
faction not specifically related to the job currently held. The first indi-
cator refers to satisfaction with “work or main activity” and may be
considered a summary indicator of overall job satisfaction (as opposed
to its various aspects, as considered in Table 4.6). In Italy, there are
clear differences between permanent full-time employees and the self-
employed, on the one hand, and the remaining categories, on the other.
In Spain, although these differences are evident, they are much less
pronounced, indicating once again that nonstandard workers seem to
fare more poorly in Italy. The other significant indicator reported in
Table 4.7 refers to satisfaction with their financial situation. In this
case, a clear difference exists between permanent workers (only full-
time for Italy) and the other nonstandard categories. The findings tend
to mirror those based on the poverty indicators included in Table 4.5.
In this case, however, the differences appear to be larger in Spain than
in Italy, probably owing to the general lower satisfaction of permanent
employees in Spain.
Finally, Table 4.8 addresses work transition between 1995 and
1996. Three transitions are included: an improvement (labeled “bet-
ter”), that is, achieving a permanent status (or a full-time status for per-
manent part-timers); deterioration (“worse”), including a transition to
all other employment statuses; and joblessness, both searching for
work or not. Permanent full-time employees and self-employed work-
ers have the most stable situations. Approximately 80 percent to 85
percent remained in the same situation for the two years observed. For
all other categories, the probability of remaining in the same job situa-
tion is generally less than 50 percent, although improving the situation
is not always the most prevalent destination. 
The time span of this information is too limited to extract substan-
tial conclusions. However, the information does suggest that being a
nonstandard worker is, for many, a relatively transitory situation. Of
course, it could be that workers in nonstandard contracts rotate
between work and unemployment, as the data in Table 4.8 suggest.
However, longer-term data are needed to better assess this hypothesis. 
In Italy, permanence in a work contract is relatively common for
part-time women, and the percentage of conversion from part-time to
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Table 4.7 Satisfaction with Various Aspects of Life, Italy and Spain, 1996 (%) 
SATISF-1 SATISF-2 SATISF-3 SATISF-4
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
Permanent full-time employees 40.5 57.6 19.9 24.7 49.1 56.5 25.2 27.5
Permanent part-time employees 24.5 58.6 13.0 27.9 57.9 58.4 31.6 34.8
Fixed-term full-time employees 29.3 45.9 11.5 16.4 43.4 53.1 28.6 24.9
Fixed-term part-time employees 19.2 38.6 13.3 9.3 50.5 47.1 33.2 35.0
Paid apprentices and trainees 29.3 56.9 9.5 21.3 38.6 55.3 26.8 31.4
Self-employed 42.7 49.8 17.8 16.1 51.0 54.5 16.0 16.8
Unpaid family workers 24.3 33.1 13.5 14.4 50.2 56.1 24.6 28.8
SATISF-1: satisfaction with work or main activity 
SATISF-2: satisfaction with financial situation
SATISF-3: satisfaction with housing situation
SATISF-4: satisfaction with amount of leisure time
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel (percentage of workers whose satisfaction score is 5 or 6 on a 1–6 scale).
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ITALY SPAIN
Same Worse Better Jobless Same Worse Better Jobless
Permanent full-time employees 83.9 10.7 5.4 86.9 8.2 4.9
Permanent part-time employees 45.5 10.7 27.7 16.1 44.6 13.0 28.3 14.1
Fixed-term full-time employees 41.4 12.4 29.2 16.9 54.9 7.3 15.3 22.5
Fixed-term part-time employees 28.8 32.7 13.5 25.0 25.4 27.1 17.0 30.5
Paid apprentices and trainees 20.8 18.2 31.2 29.9 13.0 29.6 16.7 40.7
Self-employed 83.9 3.5 2.8 9.8 78.4 7.0 2.9 11.7
Unpaid family workers 43.5 15.8 1.8 38.8 27.1 25.2 1.2 46.5
NOTE: “Same”: refers to the situation being the same in both years. “Better”: refers to a worker who moved to a permanent status (for
permanent part-time: the worker achieves a full-time status). “Worse”: refers to all other employment situations. “Jobless”: means the
person is no longer working (for whatever reason).
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 118  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
Nonstandard Work in Italy and Spain 119
full-time drops with increasing age (Isfol 1998). As for temporary
workers, recent data24 show that temporary contracts were the mode of
entry into dependent employment for 30 percent of young people who
found a job in 1995 and in 1997, while 20 percent became self-
employed. Of those entering with a temporary contract, only 21 per-
cent went on to a permanent employment contract within three years
(36 percent within five years), while 38 percent (27 percent within five
years) were still employed with a temporary contract, and 38 percent
(30 percent within five years) were either unemployed or out of the
labor force. Moving into stable employment from temporary work is
more common for men in the northern regions, and for those with
higher education in all regions.
In Spain, where the proportion of temporary workers has remained
stable for the past eight years, the characteristics of temporary workers
remain basically the same over time, especially in terms of age.25 This
implies that as they grow older, temporary workers cease to be tempo-
rary. A cohort approach, based on the age of birth, suggests that inte-
gration into permanent work is still the dominant feature of labor
market careers in Spain, although at a lower pace than in the past. 
On the whole, nonstandard workers appear to be poorer and less
satisfied than standard employees. However, and this is a key point,
nonstandard workers do not appear to get trapped in their situation. On
the contrary, many end up in a permanent, “standard” situation. If this
is the case, and this is probably more so in Spain than in Italy, social
policy should be more concerned with situations that may trap workers
(given that exceptions may exist to the general rule) than with non-
standard work itself, the causes of which may be more structural and
less institutional. A further point relates to the length of time it takes
nonstandard workers, especially younger individuals, to attain a stan-
dard status, given that this could also be deemed too long (although,
obviously, this is a value judgment). In addition, the possible ineffi-
ciencies involved in the current Spanish situation should not be over-
looked. We shall return to these in our conclusion.
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have compared nonstandard work in Italy and
Spain, which share various institutional features in the labor market,
particularly their presumed rigidity vis-à-vis workers who hold a per-
manent status, as well as other social and cultural values. However,
although current unemployment rates appear to be converging, the
Spanish experience over the last 20 years has been plagued with higher
joblessness. This has meant a more aggressive response by policymak-
ers, who have tried to fight this problem through a variety of measures,
including various labor market reforms aimed at breaking the dominant
standard model, and then subsequently restoring it.
What are the lessons to be learned from these experiences? First,
nonstandard work does not appear to be increasing, at least not signifi-
cantly. The upward trend is clearer in Italy, but the share of nonstand-
ard work arrangements is not high, although newer forms of
independent work are expanding quickly. In Spain, on the other hand,
the declared objective is to reduce the extent of nonstandard work,
mostly temporary work. 
Is nonstandard work a solution to unemployment? In both coun-
tries, a period of high employment followed the introduction of more
nonstandard forms of work—in Spain after the 1984 reforms, and in
Italy after the 1997 reforms. However, it is far from clear that one
could relate the two phenomena (no matter what policymakers might
have claimed, especially in Spain).
Is nonstandard work creating different categories, strata, or
“classes” of workers? The Spanish case would suggest that jobs are
segmented. In addition, income and mobility data suggest that non-
standard workers are in no worse a position in terms of welfare and are
not permanently trapped in their situation. 
Is nonstandard work a response to the need for flexibility in uncer-
tain market conditions, including seasonal variations? Very likely this
is so. In Italy, this needed flexibility has been channeled mainly
through the underground economy and, more recently, through new
forms of self-employment, although more recently the expanded possi-
bilities for using fixed-term contracts and temporary work have also
enlarged the share of this flexible employment form.
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The question remains why the Spanish economy appears to need
one-third of its employees in a temporary status, while Italy does well
with only a 10 percent to 15 percent temporary workforce. It is true
that, in Italy, more than 60 percent of new hires are nonstandard work
contracts and other forms of nonstandard work, mainly independent
work, as well as the underground economy, and these forms of
employment may fill, at least in part, the gap between the figures pre-
sented. However, labor mobility figures, as represented by the propor-
tion of employed workers with tenure of less than a year (see Figure
4.4), suggest much greater labor mobility in Spain.
There are, then, two basic questions in the case of Spain. First, why
do firms appear to have such a strong preference for temporary (or
fixed-term) contracts? Second, does the current rate of temporary work
imply some level of social inefficiency? The first question may be
answered rather straightforwardly: temporary contracts are simply
cheaper; conversely, firing costs are too high. This answer, dear to
some Spanish economists (see, e.g., Dolado, García, and Jimeno 2002)
is not fully satisfactory. As mentioned, the recent experiments to
reduce the costs of permanent contracts have not met with the expected
success. The number of permanent contracts did increase substantially,
but many of the contracts were likely a “deadweight” effect (contracts
now registered in search of the bonuses, which would have been signed
in any case. See Malo and Toharia 1999). Are firms being myopic?
Probably not, given that there are other, “psychological” costs; firms
have become accustomed to these contracts over the past 15 years and
are reluctant to hire employees under a permanent status because of
their greater uncertainty. Therefore, an initial cost calculation (in favor
of temporary work) has become so embedded in firms’ behavior (espe-
cially smaller ones) that its reversal is not as simple as a mere cost
reversal.
This naturally leads to the second question. Is the proportion of
temporary workers inefficiently high? First, the proportion of tempo-
rary workers sharply increased until 1992 and has remained stable
since, suggesting that firms had reached a “steady state” in their needs
for temporary workers (rooted in the inherent uncertainties of market
economies, as well as on seasonal patterns, which may be more pro-
nounced in Spain). This implies that firms do not want to have all their
workers under temporary contracts: permanent contracts do have
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advantages, as all personnel experts have known at least since Henry
Ford’s $5 wage.26 This seems to imply that there is some “optimal”
level of temporary workers. Is the current Spanish level an optimal
level? At the social level, probably not, as the usual declarations by the
various social partners suggest. If not, does it follow that firms are
being inefficient? It could be, but an alternative, more appealing inter-
pretation, in our view, is a gap between private efficiency and social
efficiency. In other words, temporary work would be generating nega-
tive externalities (not taken into account in a firm’s behavior). Such
externalities could include an inadequate level of training, the possible
side effects on the wage formation process,27 problems with the unem-
ployment compensation system, and more generally with social protec-
tion,28 or a delay in family formation and the related low fertility rates
(although these are certainly due to other factors as well). In addition,
and most important, firms may be hiring too many temporary workers
because other firms are doing the same. In other words, there is a
“coordination failure” similar to that involved, for example, in adopt-
ing inefficient QWERTY keyboards in typewriters and computers.29
Firms might meet their needs to use temporary work differently, but
only if all other firms did the same. 
Of course, this is only our interpretation of the Spanish situation,
and further research is needed, but it appears to be consistent with the
views expressed by the social partners in Spain. It suggests, though,
that the search for labor market flexibility, if taken too far, may create
unexpected inefficiencies along with some, albeit small, social distress.
The Italian labor market appears to be more diversified than that in
Spain. The increase in nonstandard work arrangements is the result of
different factors, some common to all western countries, others pecu-
liar to the Italian tradition and regulatory system. The recent easing of
the regulation of nonstandard work contracts in Italy has also contrib-
uted to the growth of these employment contracts.
Common factors on the demand side can be attributed to the
increasing role and greater diversification of the private service sector,
together with the quest for more flexible organizational patterns in the
industrial sector (owing to the increased volatility of final demand and
greater global competition). Other features include the fragmentation
of the production processes and the outsourcing of services and activi-
ties, which are facilitated by technological innovations. Supply-side
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factors are linked to the increased labor participation of new segments
of the labor force who have a lower attachment to the labor market:
women, youth, and older people. In addition, the supply of labor is
more stratified than in the past and, on average, presents higher educa-
tional and professional levels and a stronger individual capacity to bar-
gain for working conditions.
The peculiar composition of nonstandard work arrangements in
Italy is, on the other hand, linked to the specific institutional and regu-
latory position of labor contracts. The low use of temporary and part-
time contracts and the large share of self-employment and of employ-
ment in the shadow economy is the result of specific economic, social,
and cultural factors (De Luca and Bruni 1993; Reyneri 1996; Bologna
and Fumagalli 1997).
A specific feature of the Italian labor market is its low mobility.
Even within employment, the flow from one type of contract to another
is limited. Workers tend to remain employed in the same contractual
arrangement during their careers. This is especially true in the case of
part-time work. The entry pattern into employment is very important.
Remaining in a nonstandard contract may generate a vicious cycle of
precariousness, which is reflected in lower levels of social security pro-
tection (Rostagno and Utili 1998), training, and professional upgrad-
ing. 
Permanence in part-time and temporary work is greater for women
than for men, who have higher probabilities of changing to full-time
and permanent contracts. The possibility of going from nonstandard to
standard employment depends also on the economic conditions of the
various areas. In the strongest areas, the probability of shifting to stan-
dard contracts is much higher than in other, less-developed areas.30
In Italy, nonstandard work contracts usually imply less favorable
working, training, and earning conditions compared with permanent
full-time jobs, even if nonstandard dependent work is subject to the
same regulatory framework as standard dependent work (Istat 2000;
Isfol 1998). This could be one reason for low levels of satisfaction
among nonstandard Italian workers. The concentration of nonstandard
work among women, youth, and low-skilled workers calls for specific
policies to support their permanence in the labor market as well as their
professional upgrading. 
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Notes
1. The numbers implicit in these figures have been reconstructed by the authors from
various sources to solve the methodological breaks in the series.
2. These figures are from the European Labor Force Survey (ELFS). We would like
to thank Terry Ward, of Alphametrics Ltd. (United Kingdom), and Dominique
Gaudron, of Algoé (Paris), for making these data available to us.
3. It should be noted that the 2000 figure is not strictly comparable to those for pre-
vious years given that questions about tenure in the LFS changed in 1999. Since
1999, a distinction is made between tenure with the employer and tenure with the
current contract, whereas before the question referred to tenure in the current job,
which was generally interpreted as tenure with the current contract. However, the
numbers for 2000 in Figure 4.4 refer to tenure with the current employer, which is
higher to the extent that people may be hired several times by the same employer.
4. Reinstatement is compulsory only in establishments with more than 15 employ-
ees. Should the worker not wish to be reinstated, she or he receives additional
compensation amounting to 15 months’ pay. Smaller firms may choose between
rehiring or paying compensation, which depends on length of service and size of
the firm (the average compensation is equal to 2.5 to 6 months’ wages, reaching
10 months’ wages for workers with at least 10 years of tenure and 14 months for
workers with a tenure of at least 20 years).
5. Mobility benefits are more generous than the ordinary unemployment benefits.
Eligible workers must have been employed for at least 12 months and been laid
off within collective dismissals due to restructuring, economic crisis, or bank-
ruptcy of industrial companies with more than 15 employees or commercial com-
panies with more than 200 employees. The mobility benefit is 80 percent of gross
remuneration during the first year of unemployment, with a maximum threshold
equivalent to about 65 percent of the remuneration of the average worker. 
6. Inflation reached 25 percent in 1977.
7. For an early analysis of these changes, see Fina, Meixide, and Toharia (1989),
originally written in 1983.
8. This does not imply that economic dismissals were illegal; they just had to follow
a more complicated procedure involving negotiations with workers and the inter-
vention of administrative authorities.
9. Because such dismissal does not involve labor courts, a simple administrative
meeting between the parties, where the actual severance to be paid is agreed, is
enough; this happens in 70 percent of the dismissals undertaken by firms. The
most significant point here is that firms could avoid reinstatement of the worker in
almost all situations, with the only exception being those involving the violation
of basic union or human rights.
10. By restricting even more the possibilities of reinstatement and trying to clarify the
economic situations under which the dismissal was to be considered fair. Still, the
proportion of dismissals agreed before going to courts remained unchanged and
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 124  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
Nonstandard Work in Italy and Spain 125
the amounts agreed did not show any turnaround, thus suggesting that firms, and
workers, did not perceive any significant change.
11. The severance pay of unfair dismissal is 45 days’ wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages. The new contract introduced in 1997 reduced
this to 33 days, wages with a maximum of 24 months’ wages. Theoretically, fair
dismissals carry a cost of 20 days’ wages with a maximum of 12 months’ wages.
Although no precise information exists, the presumption of most analysts is that
actual dismissal costs are closer to the 45 days’ wages limits. See, for example,
Malo and Toharia (1999).
12. According to the civil code (art. 409) independent contracts are defined as “a
coordinate and continuous service, mainly individual even if not subordinate.”
13. This contractual arrangement implies that the firms have to gradually formalize
the irregular work position of their employees. At the same time, the “emerging
process” of the black market work can be carried out in a period of time agreed on
with the unions without any economic sanctions. Moreover, firms receive from
the state fiscal deductions and benefits, as if they were creating new employment
(Meldolesi 1998; Reyneri 1998). 
14. The regulation of these contracts established a minimum contract period of six
months, and the possibility of renewals up to a maximum of three years. Also,
these contracts carried severance pay at a rate of 12 days of wages per year of
seniority. The worker could not sue the employer for unfair dismissal at the expiry
of the contract.
15. Interestingly, the new open-ended contract not only carried lower severance pay
but also enjoyed substantial reductions of social charges to the point that, for up to
a two-year time horizon, hiring a worker under a permanent new contract was
marginally cheaper (including the costs of dismissals at the unfair rate) than carry-
ing out such a contract under a temporary status. The question is why the new
contract has not been used more extensively.
16. The ECHP is a European-wide project, the first wave of which was carried out in
1994. Six waves of interviews have been conducted, although only data from the
first three were available at the time of writing (May 2001). The ECHP is a panel
study, which follows households and individuals over time, and contains substan-
tial information on individuals and their households, including all sources of
income. The main drawback of the ECHP is its relatively small sample size,
which prevents detailed analysis in some countries and for some variables. Italy
and Spain do not pose particular problems in this respect. Our use of this data is
under contract no. ECHP/15/00 between Eurostat and the University of Alcalá.
17. That is, it includes workers under fixed-term as well as all kinds of purely tempo-
rary contracts.
18. This is important for Italy: if a strict 30-hour threshold is adopted as criterion, the
number of part-time workers would actually increase. This is due to the fact that
the formal work week of many full-time workers, mostly in education, is less than
30 hours.
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19. In fact, it only emerged when, in 1996, the government introduced a special pen-
sion fund for the self-employed excluded from the public pension system (includ-
ing those with VAT numbers).
20. These average national data are a bit misleading in the Italian case, due to the sig-
nificant territorial differences in economic and social development. For example,
although part-time work in northern Italy is mainly female, in southern Italy it is
more diffused among men; and in the case of fixed-term contracts, in the North
are mainly concentrated among young people, and in the South, they are mainly
diffused among adult men.
21. In Italy, work training contracts and apprenticeship contracts are included in
fixed-term contracts.
22. The equivalence scale (generally known as the OECD scale) attributes a weight of
1 to the first adult, 0.7 to the successive ones, and 0.5 to children under age 14.
23. Alternative indicators, such as the average score or the proportion of those unsat-
isfied (scores 1 or 2), could have been used; however, they all tend to provide a
similar picture.
24. Data are from answers to a specific question on the labor market situation three
and five years after the first temporary job; questions were introduced in the Octo-
ber 1999 Labor Force Survey (Istat 2000).
25. See Toharia et al. (1997) and Malo and Toharia (2000). These analyses take a
longer view than those based on Labor Force Survey data, which only follows
people for 15 months. For analyses based on this latter data, see Toharia (1996),
Alba-Ramirez (1997), Güell and Petrongolo (2000), and Amuedo-Dorantes
(2000).
26. See also Sumner Slichter’s 1919 Ph.D. dissertation on the turnover of factory
labor. This point should not be overemphasized, though. It is only meant to
remind that permanent contracts are advantageous to employers. It does not imply
that this is the only force behind such contracts. Industrial relations is a much
more two-sided matter.
27. This was a popular consequence mentioned in the early 1990s because it was
thought that the existence of a large pool of temporary workers would allow per-
manent workers to bargain for higher wages, thus imparting an inflationary bias to
the collective bargaining system. See Bentolila and Dolado (1994), and Jimeno
and Toharia (1993). Later wage developments seem to have disproved these argu-
ments.
28. In the sense that unemployment compensation provided to temporary workers is
much more costly, given their high turnover rates; in terms of pensions, one could
think of the lower contribution period in the long run, which might create prob-
lems far in the future.
29. See, for example, Ray (1998), chapter 5. The idea of a “coordination failure” goes
back to the work of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in the1940s.
30. Part-time employment appears slightly higher in the north compared to the central
and the southern regions, owing to the sectoral composition of the regional econo-
mies. On the other hand, the spread of fixed-term employment is more varied
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from a territorial point of view, its rate being particularly high in the southern area
of the country, with peaks of 17 percent of female occupation. Here, too, the
growth rates of contractual fixed-term employment are higher than the national
average. The intense use in the south of temporary work contracts, where the offi-
cial unemployment rate is around 22 percent (compared to the national average of
12 percent and the average in the north of 6 percent) with high peaks of youth
unemployment, is an expression of a greater job precariousness; however, it also
indicates a greater fluidity of entry in a job market in a traditionally closed and
selective Italian market.
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Nonstandard Work Arrangements 
in France and the United States
Institutional Contexts, Labor Market 
Conditions, and Patterns of Use
Françoise Carré
University of Massachusetts–Boston
Over the past 25 years, nonstandard work arrangements have
become a notable feature of labor markets in France and the United
States. This chapter compares patterns of nonstandard work in the two
countries and examines explanations for the growth of these arrange-
ments. Differences in institutional and macroeconomic contexts in
France and the United States are fruitful areas for exploring the factors
that shape nonstandard arrangements and their implications for work-
ers and policy.
The two countries invite a comparison because of shared experi-
ences as well as differences. They both have experienced the growth of
nonstandard arrangements. Also, both have witnessed an increase in
female labor market activity, particularly that of mothers with young
children. In contrast, the two countries differ in their institutional set-
tings of employment relationships and social protection policies, as
well as in policy on nonstandard work arrangements. Also, the coun-
tries differ in their macroeconomic experiences over the past 15 years.
France experienced little or no aggregate job growth and high levels of
unemployment, while the United States experienced comparatively
high job growth and low unemployment. The average unemployment
rate between 1986 and 1996 was 10.6 percent in France and 6.2 percent
in the United States (OECD 1999). Unemployment in both countries is
unevenly distributed across age and race/ethnicity. Gender differences
in unemployment are greater in France than in the United States. Thus,
a comparison of nonstandard arrangements in these two settings should
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 131  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
132 Carré
enable us to examine how patterns of use, workforce characteristics,
and implications for workers are affected by conditions of labor
demand and by the institutional setting.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section outlines differ-
ences in context across the two countries. We then review trends in
short-term, temporary agency, and part-time employment, followed by
implications for workers. The final section reviews explanations for
trends and their implications. We review workforce characteristics and
preferences, as well as employer motivations and the role of each coun-
try’s institutional context in shaping these.
CONTEXTS
Different Macroeconomic Contexts
In France, low job growth and high unemployment in the 1980s
and 1990s has meant particularly high unemployment rates for young
workers and higher unemployment rates for women than for men. The
male unemployment rate was 7 percent in 1990 and 10 percent in 1998,
and the female rate was 12 percent in 1990 and 14 percent in 1998. The
corresponding U.S. figures were 6 percent in 1990 and 5 percent in
1998 for men as well as women.1 In France, employment rates
(employment to population ratio) were lower overall than in the United
States: 60 percent in 1990 and 59 percent in 1998, compared with 72
percent and 74 percent, respectively, in the United States (OECD 1999,
p. 225). Employment rates in France, however, were much lower for
younger workers (age 15 or 16 to age 24) and older workers (ages 55 to
64). For example, in 1998, the employment rate for young workers was
21 percent in France and 59 percent in the United States. The same
year, the employment rate for older workers was 33 percent in France
and 58 percent in the United States (OECD 1999, pp. 228–230).
Different Institutional Contexts
On the face of it, the two countries have strikingly different institu-
tional employment contexts. The common law contract for standard
employment in France is a contract of indeterminate duration (Contrat
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à Durée Indéterminée, CDI); the Labor Code states that a contract of
employment is “made without limit of time.” This is a standard shared
with other Western European countries. Nonstandard employment con-
tracts are defined in contrast to this contract of indeterminate duration.
The package of worker rights and benefits in France has been con-
structed over time around the norm of the CDI. A worker under a CDI
is entitled to socially provided benefits, the right to organize and bar-
gain, and specific conditions governing discharge and layoffs. Thus,
the growth of nonstandard employment has warranted close policy
attention because workers in these arrangements initially stood in a
regulatory vacuum. This situation was remedied with legislation gov-
erning specific nonstandard contracts during the 1970s and 1980s.
In contrast, the U.S. common law standard for employment is
“employment-at-will,” meaning that dismissal is at the employer’s
will. There are no due process or “just cause” restrictions on dis-
charges. In addition, the extent of government involvement in setting
terms of employment is less extensive than in France. One should not
equate legal standards with practice, however. In the United States,
employment conditions have also been shaped by personnel policies of
large employers and by collective bargaining agreements in the union-
ized sector. In these settings, the employment-at-will standard has been
tempered with due process clauses on discharge and other policies
meant to imply some attachment between worker and employer. In
addition, several grounds for exception to the employment-at-will legal
standard have been upheld in court decisions.
Therefore, policy and practice have resulted in basic employment
terms in the two countries that are more comparable than the respective
legal standard in each country would suggest. This is particularly true
for workers in firms with internal labor markets, most often large com-
panies, but often medium-sized ones as well. Nevertheless, there
remain significant differences in terms of employment and institutional
settings between the two countries. Most salient, France relies on more
formal, explicit, and specific employment regulation than the United
States. France also provides key social protection benefits through
national systems for health and national or industry-wide pension cov-
erage. In contrast, the United States relies on tax deductible, employer-
sponsored health plans and pension plans (providing retirement income
that is expected to complement the federal Social Security minimum);
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most of these plans generate benefits that are rarely portable and, when
they are, only under specific conditions.
Other elements of the French institutional setting, to which we will
return later, are in seeming contrast with the United States and have
bearing on use of nonstandard work arrangements. First, during the
1970s, France implemented administrative oversight of economic lay-
offs, a policy that was revoked in 1986. The U.S. layoff notification
legislation enacted in 1988 (WARN Act)2 is less restrictive. Second,
beginning in the early 1980s, France explicitly regulated nonstandard
work arrangements. Key to this discussion is that, since 1982, France
has mandated wage and benefit parity between workers in nonstandard
work arrangements and those with regular arrangements in the same
jobs, whereas the United States has not.
The different macroeconomic and institutional contexts in France
and the United States have several implications, which will be
addressed in this chapter. On the one hand, the different contexts may
be the source of the differing patterns of nonstandard work arrange-
ments in the two countries. On the other hand, the different contexts
shape the implications of nonstandard work arrangements for workers
and, to some extent, their degree of choice and satisfaction. The weak
employment picture in France has meant that nonstandard work
arrangements are mainly studied and understood in terms of their rela-
tion to unemployment and underemployment and, more generally, to
employment flux. Nonstandard work arrangements tend to be seen as a
way station to regular employment, particularly for young workers and
women. In contrast, in the United States, nonstandard work arrange-
ments have been examined mainly in terms of their relation to wages
and benefits.
TRENDS AND WORKERS AFFECTED
Two main categories of nonstandard work arrangements can be
compared: short-term, or fixed-term arrangements, and employment
arranged through a temporary work agency. Short-term arrangements
seem to be more common in France than in the United States. In both
countries, women are more affected than men. Temporary agency help,
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or “temp” employment, is more common in France and displays a dif-
ferent industrial distribution of user firms than in the United States.
French temporary employment is concentrated in manufacturing and
construction, which results in a much higher representation of men in
temporary employment in France than in the United States.
Definitions for nonstandard work arrangements differ somewhat
across the two countries. Therefore, comparisons of aggregated catego-
ries are not possible. Fixed-term employment in France is a specific
employment contract of “determinate duration” (Contrat à Durée
Déterminée, or CDD); these are employment contracts that must
explicitly state a duration of employment. In the United States, short-
term arrangements entail cases where workers are hired directly by
firms to work for a specified period of time. Direct hire temporary
work is a category estimated rather than directly reported in federal sta-
tistics (see below). On-call workers, defined as those who work only
on an as-needed basis, are compared here with the French category of
fixed-term contracts. Temporary agency work, an assignment through
an intermediary temp/staffing service or agency, is categorized as a
separate “employment status” with a specific “temp contract” (Contrat
d’Interim) in France. In the United States, temporary agency employ-
ment is documented by a specific category in federal statistics.
Throughout this chapter, we refer to temporary agency workers as
“temp contracts” or “temps.” 
Short-Term Employment in France and the United States
Fixed-term employment (CDD) in France is slightly greater than
direct-hire temporaries and on-call workers combined in the United
States. According to the French annual national labor force survey, the
share of CDDs in private wage and salary employment has grown
steadily, from 2.2 percent in 1982 to 6.1 percent in 1999 (INSEE 1982–
1999).3 In the United States, data on nonstandard work arrangements
have only been recorded systematically since 1995, in the Alternative
Employment Arrangements Supplement to the February Current Popu-
lation (household) Survey (CPS).4 On-call workers represented 1.5 per-
cent of U.S. employment in 1999 (2,180,000 workers), a slight
decrease from 1.7 percent in 1995 (Table 5.1). Direct hire temporaries
were estimated at 2.1 to 2.7 percent of employment in the 1995 CPS
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Table 5.1 Percentage of Workers with Alternative Employment 
Arrangements, United States
1995 1997 1999
Independent contractors 6.7 6.7 6.3
On-call workers 1.7 1.6 1.5
Temporary help agency 
workers
0.1 0.1 0.9
Workers provided by
contract firms
0.5 0.6 0.6
Total 9.9 9.9 9.3
Distribution of workers with alternative arrangements by gender
Men Women Men Women Men Women
% of independent 
contractors
67.3 32.7 66.6 33.4 66.2 33.8
On-call workers: 48.4 51.6 49.0 51.0 48.8 51.2
Temporary help agency
workers:
47.2 52.8 44.7 55.3 42.2 57.8
Workers provided by 
contract firms
71.5 28.5 69.8 30.2 70.5 29.5
Workers with traditional 
arrangements:
52.8 47.2 52.7 47.3 52.4 47.6
Male and female workers with alternative arrangements
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Independent contractors 8.4 4.8 8.3 4.8 7.8 4.5
On-call workers 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.7
Temporary help agency 
workers
0.8 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.7 1.1
Workers provided by 
contract firms
0.7 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4
Workers with traditional 
arrangements
88.5 92.0 88.6 91.9 89.2 92.2
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, various years.
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(Houseman and Polivka 2000)5 and 2.6 percent in the 1997 survey
(Houseman 1999).
These types of short-term arrangements concentrate in both coun-
tries in similar industries (services, trade, and construction), with one
exception; in France, the incidence of CDDs is particularly high in
manufacturing (food processing and consumer goods manufacturing)
(Table 5.2). These industry patterns are mirrored in the occupational
concentrations of short-term employment in the two countries. From
1982 to 1999, the incidence of CDDs increased across all major occu-
pation groups in France (Table 5.3). It is particularly high for the
“employees” category, which includes office clerical, retail clerks, and
direct service workers. In the United States as well, direct hires cluster
in administrative support and services (Houseman 1999, Hudson
1999). A major difference is that, in France, the incidence of CDDs is
also high for manual workers, while in the United States, professionals
account for one cluster of on-call workers.
Evidence from the United States indicates distinct gender and race/
ethnicity occupational patterns. Female on-call workers cluster in ele-
mentary and secondary schools, hospitals, and restaurant and bar ser-
vices, while male on-call workers cluster in construction. The most
common occupation for Hispanic male on-call workers is farm worker,
while for white males, it is truck driver. For Hispanic females, the most
common on-call occupation is domestic worker in a private household,
while for white females, it is elementary school teacher (Hudson
1999).
In France, women are overrepresented in the CDD workforce rela-
tive to their share in the total workforce (Table 5.4). For example, in
1989, women accounted for 49.8 percent of CDDs and 38.9 percent of
total employment. Although men accounted for the majority of work-
ers on CDDs through the 1980s, they were underrepresented relative to
their share of the total workforce. In 1989, men accounted for 50.2 per-
cent of CDDs but 61.1 percent of the workforce. When the entire
period 1982–1999 is considered, however, men’s share of CDDs and of
total private employment both decline so that, by 1999, women are the
majority of CDDs (53.1 percent). The incidence of CDDs among
employed women rose steadily throughout the period, while for men,
albeit consistently lower, it increased as well. Thus, over the past two
decades, as the incidence of CDDs increased overall in the economy,
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Table 5.2 Incidence and Distribution of CDDsa (Fixed-Term Contracts), 
by Industry, France
Incidenceb Distributionc
CDD – Both sexes 1982 1989 1999 1982 1989 1999
Unspecified sector 4.13 8.17 17.59 1.28 0.91 0.11
Agriculture 3.88 8.00 14.75 4.03 3.45 4.59
Manufacturing
Food processing 3.26 5.27 6.54 5.43 4.46 4.10
Energy 0.70 0.84 0.93 0.59 0.34 0.21
Intermediate goods mfg. 1.57 4.15 3.88 7.20 8.23 6.25
Production goods mfg. 1.55 3.85 3.86 8.98 9.34 3.35
Consumer goods mfg. 2.34 5.14 5.79 9.93 9.46 4.66
Automotive industry — — 2.59 — — 0.84
ALL MANUFACTURING 1.87 4.25 4.35 32.13 31.83 19.42
Construction and public works 2.57 3.57 4.73 11.88 7.60 5.75
Trade 2.55 5.14 6.00 16.41 16.92 16.60
Transportation and 
communications
1.20 3.05 6.03 3.05 3.92 5.82
Market services 2.98 5.67 22.72 25.63
Services to business 5.25 12.36
Services to individuals/
households
9.23 14.76
Financial institutions 0.99 3.31 2.04 3.61
Financial activities 3.54 2.66
Real estate activities 4.71 1.12
Nonmarket services 2.22 4.37 6.46 6.14
Education, health, social services 9.29 12.49
Administration 9.05 4.33
Tertiary sector 2.35 4.85 6.68 50.68 56.22 70.14
ALL ACTIVITIES OR TOTAL 2.24 4.60 6.08 100 100 100
a
 CDD = Contrat à Durée Déterminée (contract of determinate duration).
b
 Figures represent the percentage of workers within the industry in CDDs.
c
 Figures represent the percentage of all CDD workers in the particular industry.
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA09.
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and as women’s share of total employment increased, CDDs dispropor-
tionately affected women workers, and CDDs had come to represent a
significant share of female employment by the turn of the century. In
the United States as well, women are overrepresented among on-call
workers relative to their share of the workforce. They are also overrep-
resented among direct hire temporaries (Houseman 1999).
Temporary Help Employment
In both countries, temporary employment has two “poles” of activ-
ity: manual labor in manufacturing or construction and clerical and
administrative support in trade and services (broadly defined). How-
ever, the incidence of temporary work is from two to three times
greater in France than in the United States, depending on definitions
used. Manual labor assignments in manufacturing and construction
have come to dominate temporary employment in France and, as such,
it has become an overwhelmingly male work arrangement. This situa-
tion differs dramatically from that in the United States, where female
workers, while in declining preponderance over time, continue to pre-
dominate in temporary employment.
Table 5.3 CDDsa in Total Private Wage and Salary Employment, by 
Major Occupation, France (%)
Incidence Distribution
1982 1989 1999 1982 1989 1999
Executive and intellectual 
professions
1.39 2.26 3.84 4.81 4.77 7.83
Middle-level occupations 1.63 3.25 4.63 13.01 13.83 15.82
Employees 2.68 5.40 7.79 32.45 32.95 38.03
Manual workers 2.35 5.21 6.26 49.74 48.45 38.32
Total 2.24 4.60 6.08 100 100 100
NOTE: This table includes workers in nationalized companies. Public-sector workers
are excluded, as are artisans and business owners (CDDs do not apply to them).
“Employees” include clerical, retail clerks, and direct service workers. 
a CDD = Contrat à Durée Déterminée (contract of determinate duration).
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA05.
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In France, temporary employment tripled, from 0.9 percent of pri-
vate wage and salary employment in 1982 to 3 percent in 1999, and it
grew particularly rapidly during the 1990s (Table 5.5). In the United
States, temporary help workers accounted for about 1 percent of
employment from 1995 to 1999 according to the CPS. Although tem-
porary workers are overwhelmingly white, the incidence of temporary
employment is twice as high among black workers (2 percent) and
slightly higher for Hispanics (1.4 percent) (Houseman 1999, Hudson
1999). The U.S. temporary help service industry has also been tracked
with national time series data. Although these data are not comparable
to household data (the number of jobs is greater than the number of
workers), they provide useful trend information. From 1986 to 1996,
temporary help service employment grew from 0.5 percent to 1.9 per-
Table 5.4 Incidence of CDDsa (Fixed-Term Contracts) and Agency 
Temporary Help Contracts, by Gender in Private 
Employment, France
1982 1989 1999
Total private employment 13,335,750 13,299,435 14,683,276
Male (%) 63.2 61.1 57.9
Female (%) 36.8 38.9 42.1
CDD in all sectors 298,391 611,137 892,207
Male (%) 55.3 50.2 46.9
Female (%) 44.7 49.8 53.1
Temporary help in all sectors 124,651 233,719 446,959
Male (%) 61.2 70.0 71.5
Female (%) 38.8 30.0 28.5
Share of total CDD (%) 2.2 4.6 6.1
Share of employed males (%) 2.0 3.8 4.9
Share of employed females (%) 2.7 5.9 7.7
Share of total temporary help (%) 0.9 1.8 3.0
Share of employed males (%) 0.9 2.0 3.8
Share of employed females (%) 1.0 1.4 2.1
NOTE: Temporary and CDD employment affect private wage and salary employment
only. 
a CDD = Contrat à Durée Déterminée (contract of determinate duration).
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA09.
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cent of employment. For comparison, over the same period, estimates
derived from the CPS indicate growth from 0.5 percent to 0.8 percent
of employment (Blank 1998).6
In France, between 1982 and 1989, the sectors that rely relatively
heavily on temporary help are manufacturing (particularly production
goods and intermediate goods) and construction and public works
(Table 5.5).7 In the United States, temporary workers cluster in ser-
Table 5.5 Incidence and Distribution of Agency Temps, by Industry, 
France
Incidencea Distributionb
1982 1989 1999c 1982 1989 1999c
Unspecified sector 3.73 0.85 — 2.77 0.25 —
Agriculture 0.00 0.24 — 0.00 0.27 —
Manufacturing
Food processing 0.82 2.69 — 3.25 5.97 —
Energy 1.18 1.75 — 2.36 1.84 —
Intermediate goods mfg. 0.95 3.14 — 10.49 16.29 —
Production goods mfg. 1.64 3.37 — 22.75 21.37 —
Consumer goods mfg. 0.59 1.56 — 5.96 7.49 —
ALL MANUFACTURING 1.09 2.70 — 44.81 52.95 —
Construction and public works 1.07 2.39 — 11.84 13.30 —
Trade 0.57 0.55 — 8.84 4.70 —
Transportation and 
communications 0.47 1.25 — 2.83 4.20 —
Market services 1.35 1.78 — 24.57 20.99 —
Services to business — — 21.28 — — 100
Financial institutions 0.34 0.93 — 1.68 2.64 —
Nonmarket services 0.38 0.19 — 2.67 0.71 —
Tertiary sector 0.79 1.10 4.77 40.59 33.23 100
ALL ACTIVITIES OR TOTAL 0.93 1.76 3.04 100 100 100
a Figures represent the percentage of workers within the industry who are agency tem-
poraries.
b Figures represent the percentage of all agency temporaries who are in that particular
industry.
c Starting in 1990, all temp employment is reported under “Market Services.”
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA09.
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vices, trade, and manufacturing, but in the latter sector to a lesser
degree than in France. However, manufacturing assignments have been
growing in recent years. There is also a distinct gender pattern to indus-
trial concentration.8 
From 1982 to 1989, the incidence of temporary contracts in France
grew for all major occupation groups except executives, for whom it
declined (Table 5.6). The group with the highest incidence of tempo-
rary employment is manual workers (6.6 percent in 1999); it accounted
for 81.8 percent of temporary workers in 1999. In the United States,
temporary workers cluster in administrative support and operator (fab-
ricators, laborers) occupations. Female workers cluster in secretarial,
nursing, data entry, and office clerks, while males cluster in assembly
and laborers outside of construction. Occupational characteristics vary
across racial and ethnic groups. For example, the most common occu-
pation for black women in temporary positions is a secretary and for
Hispanic women, it is a nursing aide (Hudson 1999).9
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, temporary employment
remained a male phenomenon in France (Table 5.4). Men began the
Table 5.6 Incidence and Distribution of Agency Temps in Total Private 
Wage and Salary Employment, by Major Occupation, Francea
Incidenceb Distributionc
1982 1989 1999 1982 1989 1999
Executive and intellectual 
professionals
0.34 0.16 0.24 2.80 0.91 0.98
Middle level occupations 0.56 0.68 0.88 10.76 7.55 6.01
Employees 1.05 1.09 1.26 30.39 17.46 12.26
Manual workers 1.11 3.05 6.61 56.05 74.08 80.75
TOTAL 0.93 1.76 3.04 100 100 100
a This table includes workers in nationalized companies. Public-sector workers are
excluded, as are artisans and business owners (CDDs do not apply to them).
“Employees” include clerical, retail clerks, and direct service workers.
b Figures represent the percentage of workers within the occupational category who are
agency temporaries.
c Figures represent percentage of all agency temps in the occupational category.
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA05.
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period slightly underrepresented in temp employment relative to their
share of the workforce, but by the end of the period, they were overrep-
resented—71.5 percent in 1999. As temp employment grew, particu-
larly in the 1990s, and men’s share of total employment declined, temp
employment became an increasing factor in male employment. In con-
trast, although the incidence of temporary employment also grew
steadily for women over the period, their share of temp employment
declined steadily.
The shifting gender composition in temporary employment in both
countries points to the role that demand plays in the composition and
characteristics of the temp workforce. In France, temp workers were
not always predominantly male; women were the majority in 1962
(Huet and Schmitz 1984). They were slightly overrepresented in 1968,
accounting for 40 percent of the temp industry’s workforce compared
with 34 percent of the total wage and salary workforce. As unskilled
jobs in manufacturing fueled the temp industry’s growth, the female
share of employment declined, from 38 percent in1970 to 28 percent in
1981. Huet and Schmitz (1984) attribute this growing underrepresenta-
tion to the fact that three-fourths of women concentrate outside blue-
collar jobs and, when they are employed in manufacturing, they work
in sectors that are light users of temporary workers (Huet and Schmitz
1984, p. 45).10 The Enquête Emploi confirms the relative concentration
of temp assignments in manufacturing and construction during the
1980s as well.
In the United States, women were the majority of temp workers
prior to 1985 (Plewes 1988). Since then, the gender and occupational
compositions of industry employment have evolved, but women
remain the majority of temps. As the temporary agency industry grew
rapidly and steadily over the 1980s and 1990s, the share of clerical and
service occupations within it declined (and blue-collar occupations
grew), and with it, the prevalence of women workers declined as well.
The share of women in temporary employment declined from 76.7 per-
cent in 1984–1985 to 60.4 percent in 1994–1995, while the share of
clerical and service jobs in temporary employment declined from 59
percent in 1984–1985 to 45 percent in 1994–1995.11 Should the share
of blue-collar assignments continue to grow, it is possible that the gen-
der pattern may reverse. 
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In summary, the evolving characteristics of temp employment in
France and the United States point to the role of demand by user firms
and their industry distribution, and to the history and market strategy of
the temp industry in each country.
Other Forms of Alternative Work Arrangements 
Other nonstandard arrangements are not discussed here due to the
lack of readily comparable data across the two countries. United States
independent contractors are usually self-employed. French indepen-
dent workers, a broader group, account for 7.9 percent of private
employment (INSEE 1999).12 Contract company workers are employed
by a company that provides their services to other firms and usually are
on the worksite of the client.13 They are not a separate category in
French statistics. 
Part-Time Work
Because jobs with part-time hours are often associated with terms
of employment that are different from those for full-time work, they
warrant separate consideration. Part-time work has followed different
paths in the two countries. It expanded in the United States earlier than
in France and represented a higher share of employment for much of
the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1990s, however, its share of total
employment grew rapidly in France while it remained level in the
United States.
Comparable Data on France and the United States
Based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) definition of part-time work as fewer than 30 hours
per week, the gender difference in incidence is greater in France than in
the United States.14 In 1997, part-time work in France accounted for 5.9
percent of total male (wage and salary) employment and 25.2 percent
of total female employment. In the United States, it accounted for 8.3
percent of male and 19.5 percent of female employment (OECD 1999,
p. 39). The incidence of part-time work of fewer than 20 hours per
week (short part-time) is lower in France than in the United States. In
1997, it constituted 2 percent of male employment and 8.9 percent of
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female employment in France, and 3.5 percent and 8 percent of male
and female employment, respectively, in the United States (OECD
1999, p. 39).15
Over the past decade, the contexts for part-time work have con-
trasted sharply in the two countries. In France, the number of part-time
jobs grew, while full-time employment declined. Between 1987 and
1997, the change in total employment was 0.26 percent, the growth of
part-time work as percentage of total 1987 employment was 0.29 per-
cent, while the change in full-time employment was –0.03 percent.
During the same period in the United States, total employment grew by
1.42 percent; part-time employment growth was 0.12 percent, and full-
time growth was 1.30 percent (OECD 1999, p. 36).
National Data on Part-Time Work
To build a reliable time series from published INSEE data, we
define part-time work as at least 30 hours per week, yet considered
below the prevailing full-time norm in each workplace.16 Thus defined,
the incidence of part-time work in France has risen economy-wide
from 8.5 percent in 1982 to 18 percent in 1999. Further, it had risen in
all industrial sectors and occupations over the period (Table 5.7). (The
employment base includes private and public wage and salary work-
ers.)
In the United States, according to national statistics, part-time
work grew from 13 percent of nonagricultural employment in 1958 to
18 percent in 1989 (Tilly 1992, reporting from Employment and Earn-
ings, with part-time work defined as fewer than 35 hours per week).
Data from recent years are not strictly comparable to those of historical
trends owing to a survey change. In 1997, the share of the workforce in
part-time work was 17.8 percent (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt
1999). Regular part-time work—which corresponds to part-time jobs
less those with nonstandard arrangements—amounted to 13.6 percent
of employment in 1997 and 13.7 percent in 1995 (Hudson 1999).
In both countries, the incidence of part-time jobs is high in similar
industries and occupations. In France, incidence is particularly high in
trade (retail, wholesale) and market and nonmarket services (Table
5.7). In 1999, several subsectors had particularly high incidence: ser-
vices to household or individuals, education and other social services,
and real estate. In the United States, industries with high incidence of
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Table 5.7 Incidence and Distribution of Part-Time in Public and Private 
Wage and Salary Employment, by Industry, France
Incidencea Distributionb
1982 1989 1999 1999
Unspecified sector 11.6 28.5 34.8 0.1
Agriculture 15.5 13.8 16.5 1.3
Manufacturing
Food processing 4.7 7.4 11.6 1.8
Energy 1.9 3.2 6.3 0.4
Intermediate goods mfg. 2.0 3.0 4.4 1.7
Production goods mfg. 1.6 3.2 5.4 1.2
Consumer goods mfg. 4.8 6.6 8.2 1.7
Automotive industry 3.9 0.3
Total Manufacturing 2.8 5.1
Construction and public 
works
2.8 2.7 4.7 1.4
Trade 11.3 14.0 19.8 13.7
Transportation and 
communications
4.4 5.2 6.6 1.6
Market services 11.5 16.4
Services to business 16.4 11.3
Services to individuals/
households
42.6 18.4
Financial institutions 7.3 9.1
Financial activities 13.8 2.6
Real estate activities 21.9 1.6
Nonmarket services 8.6 16.2
Education, health, social 
services
26.4 28.1
Administration 18.8 13.0
Tertiary sector 11.8 16.2 22.2 41.1
All activities 8.5 12.2 18.0 100.00
a Figures represent the percentage of workers within the industry working part-time.
b Figures represent the percentage of all part-time workers in the particular industry.
SOURCE: INSEE (1989–99), Table PA07.
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part-time work in 1997 were retail trade, services, and finance (includ-
ing insurance and real estate).17 
Correspondingly, the occupational patterns are parallel. In France,
in 1999, part-time work clustered broadly in employees (e.g., clerical,
retail), and mid-level occupations (e.g., paraprofessionals, technicians,
and forepersons) (Table 5.8).18 In the United States, part-time work is
clustered in occupations such as cashiers, waitresses, secretaries,
nurses, and sales clerks for women, and cooks, cashiers, stock han-
dlers, janitors, and truck drivers for men (Hudson 1999).
In both countries, women constitute the bulk of part-time workers,
a pattern consistent with the occupational distribution of these jobs.
This pattern holds in France even though part-time work has grown
faster among men in recent years. In France, part-time work has grown
from 17.8 percent of women’s wage and salary employment in 1982 to
31.7 percent in 1999. The corresponding figures for men are 2 percent
in 1982 and 5.5 percent in 1999 (Table 5.9). In the United States, in
1998, the incidence of part-time work was 28.6 percent for women and
11.4 percent for men (Employment and Earnings definition). Regular
Table 5.8 Incidence and Distribution of Part-Time, by Broad 
Occupation in Total Employment, France (Wage, Salary, 
Independent Workers)a
Incidenceb Distributionc
1993 1999 1999
Farm operators 15.8 16.7 2.83
Artisans, shopkeepers, and 
business operators 7.8 8.1 3.25
Executives and intellectual 
professions 8.1 9.6 7.56
Middle-level occupations 10.1 13.7 16.81
Employeesd 26.2 31.8 53.52
Manual workers 8.1 10.8 16.01
Total 13.7 17.2 99.99
a This table includes all employment (wage employment and independents). 
b
 Figures represent percentage of workers in the occupation who are part-time.
c
 Figures represent the percentage of all part-time workers who are in the occupation.
d
 “Employees” include clerical, retail clerks, and direct service workers.
SOURCE: INSEE (1989–99), Table PA03.
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part-time work accounts for 21.3 percent of female employment and
6.9 percent of male employment (Hudson 1999). 
Recent French research points to clear distinctions by gender and
household characteristics. There are those who use it for “complemen-
tary” income, and those with limited time because they are female sin-
gle heads of households. A 1995 Enquête Emploi study of private-
sector part-time workers found that workers in couples in which one
partner works full-time have a part-time rate of 20 percent compared
with rates at or under 10 percent for those whose partner works part-
time, is unemployed, or is out of the labor force. The rate of part-time
work for single women is 20 percent and 24 percent for female heads
of households (Galtier 1999b, 1999c).
Part-time work in the United States varies notably by race and eth-
nicity. In 1997, the incidence of regular part-time work was lower for
non-Hispanic black women (15.7 percent) and for Hispanic women
(20.2 percent) than for white women (22.6 percent). It is, however,
slightly higher among black males (7.1 percent) and Hispanic males
(7.1 percent) than for white males (6.7 percent) (Hudson 1999).
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS
In both countries, there is an association between fixed-term and
temporary employment, on the one hand, and employment flux or
Table 5.9 Part-Time Work, by Gender, in Public and Private 
Employment, Francea
1982 1989 1999
Part-time in all sectors 1,515,535 2,241,015 3,935,529
Male total (%) 13.9 15.6 15.6
Female total (%) 86.1 84.4 84.4
Part-time share of total employed 8.5 11.7 17.2
Part-time share of employed males 2.0 3.4 5.5
Part-time share of employed 
females 17.8 23.6 31.7
a Self-reported; up to 30+ weekly hours.
SOURCE: INSEE (1982–99), Table PA07.
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instability and short part-time work hours, on the other. Instability is a
significant issue in France, while lack of access to benefits and differ-
ential treatment in pay are much greater issues in the United States.
Employment Flux
Fixed-term contracts (CDDs) have been strongly associated with
employment flux and with having a role in hiring and in unemploy-
ment (Audibert 1980; Audier 1985; Corbel, Guergoat, and Laulhé
1986; INSEE 1980; Voisin 1989). For example, from 1977 to 1985, the
share of CDDs among new unemployment claims rose from 19.1 per-
cent to 37.4 percent (Henriet 1988). Conversely, in a 1985 national sur-
vey, CDDs accounted for 64 percent of employment entries in firms of
50 or more workers and 46 percent of employment exits (Corbel, Guer-
goat, and Laulhé 1986).19 A later study reports that, in 1992, 67.5 per-
cent of those hired in establishments with 50 or more workers were for
CDDs (DARES 1993).
A study of registered unemployment insurance cases from 1993 to
1996 noted a growth in the incidence of intermittent employment (with
partial benefits) among the unemployed who were formerly working in
CDDs. The authors conclude that these workers expect difficulty in
their job search and are more willing to accept intermittent work during
the first four months of unemployment. They are likely to not use the
full duration of unemployment benefits to look for work (Granier and
Joutard 1999).20 
Also, the French temp industry sees its mission primarily as facili-
tating access to (any) job and, secondarily, as meeting the needs of seg-
ments of the workforce for intermittent employment. Temp services do
not apply a penalty when a user firm recruits a temp worker. In some
sectors, the industry generates a recruiting pool for user firms.
In France, worker experience in part-time work during the 1990s
was colored by a climate of high unemployment. When part-time work
is not chosen (or “constrained,” that is, workers report wanting more
hours), it is more likely to be associated with short-term employment
(CDD, temp, or short-term internship). In the 1995 Enquête Emploi,
21.5 percent of women in constrained part-time jobs worked in a tem-
porary arrangement, compared with 8 percent of full-time women and
7 percent of women in “chosen part-time”; the corresponding numbers
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for men are 11 percent, 6.5 percent, and 37 percent, respectively (Galt-
ier 1999c).
Part-time work, particularly when constrained, appears to be asso-
ciated with flux in employment status and work arrangement. In a
cohort of part-time workers from 1994 to 1996, one-third of those in
constrained part-time work in 1994 (42 percent of all part-time work)
had not been in part-time work in 1993 (Galtier 1999a).21 By 1996, 37
percent of those in constrained part-time work in 1994 were in the
same situation; 25 percent worked full-time, 10 percent were unem-
ployed, 7 percent were out of the labor force, and 20 percent reported
working in “chosen” part-time jobs.22 
In the United States, workers in nonstandard arrangements, except
independent contractors, also appear to experience more job instability
than regular full-time workers. Examining CPS data from 1995 to
1996, Houseman and Polivka (2000) found that on-call workers,
temps, direct hire temporaries, contract company workers, and regular
part-time workers were more likely to be with a different employer, be
unemployed, or be voluntarily out of the labor force one year later than
were regular full-time workers.23
Access to Benefits
Since the early 1980s, French law mandates parity of wage and
benefits between workers in CDD, temporary agency assignments, and
part-time arrangements, on the one hand, and regular workers holding
similar positions with equivalent skills, on the other. The parity of
socially provided health benefits, in particular, is comparatively easy to
implement. The context for parity enforcement is fairly strong. The
Ministry of Labor has a well-developed cadre of labor inspectors who
have strong powers of investigation, mediation, and enforcement.
Their investigative role is enhanced in workplaces with labor unions.
Nevertheless, parity is most easily enforced when workers are in virtu-
ally identical positions. Disparities in socially provided benefits are
possible in practice, particularly for part-time workers. Hour thresholds
for key benefits exclude workers with very short hours from benefits
(fewer than 507 hours in the previous 12 months, or fewer than 200
hours in the previous three months). Eligibility for old age insurance
(pension) is also based on hours and earnings. In addition, those hold-
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ing several part-time jobs are ineligible for unemployment insurance if
they lose one of these jobs (Gauvin 1988).
In the United States, there is a strong association between non-
standard arrangements and the lack of employer-sponsored benefits
(Hudson 1999; Kalleberg et al. 1997; Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson
2000). Access to employer-sponsored health insurance is particularly
low for temporary workers (8.5 percent) and on-call workers (21.1 per-
cent) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1999). Part-time jobs have a sim-
ilar liability; 18 percent of workers in regular part-time jobs have
insurance compared with 87 percent in regular full-time jobs (Hudson
1999). Eligibility to enroll in an employer-provided pension plan is
limited. In 1999, 11.8 percent of temp workers and 29 percent of on-
call workers were eligible to enroll compared with 54.1 percent of
workers in standard arrangements (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
1999). Similarly, 19 percent of regular part-time workers have
employer-provided pension coverage compared with 60 percent of reg-
ular full-time workers (Hudson 1999). Participation in employer-pro-
vided pension plans is lower still because workers must choose to
contribute a portion of their earnings: 5.8 percent of temp workers and
22.5 percent of on-call workers are included in their employer plan
compared with 48.3 percent of workers in standard arrangements (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000). Over time, this reduced access to
benefits may create difficulties for workers. Ferber and Waldfogel
(2000) find that past experience in part-time employment reduces the
probability of a worker having health insurance and pension coverage.
Wage Parity Issues 
Although in France, mandated wage parity is not always simple to
enforce, wage disparity has not been the subject of comprehensive
national research. In the United States, wage differentials have been
documented. On-call workers, temp workers, and direct hire temporar-
ies earn lower wages than workers in regular full-time arrangements.
This difference holds true even after controlling for worker and job
characteristics (industry, union status, occupation) (Houseman 1999,
using 1995 CPS results). Hudson (1999), using 1997 CPS data, finds
that, after controlling for individual worker characteristics, women in
on-call positions earn 20 percent less and those in temp arrangements
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earn 18 percent less in hourly wages than women in regular full-time
employment. The corresponding figures for men are 15 percent lower
in temp employment and 10 percent lower in on-call employment.24
The author finds that after adding controls for job characteristics
(including health and pension coverage), the negative wage effects for
both groups are statistically insignificant. In other words, the job char-
acteristics of on-call and temp arrangements account for virtually all
the pay differential, a result that departs from those obtained in other
research based on earlier surveys. However, a negative hourly pay dif-
ferential—6 percent for women and 8 percent for men—between regu-
lar part-time and regular full-time workers remains (Hudson 1999).
EXPLANATIONS FOR TRENDS
The macroeconomic context of nonstandard employment has
shaped the questions raised by researchers in each country. There is
broad agreement that both regular, long-term relationships and others
are in transition (Cappelli 1999; Freyssinet 1982; Michon 1982; Oster-
man 1999; Piore 1980; Ramaux 1993), and the growth of nonstandard
arrangements is a manifestation of these changes.
Three labor demand factors have shaped the use of nonstandard
work arrangements. First, employment structures within large firms
have changed. Job ladders have become truncated; some jobs, particu-
larly entry-level ones, are severed from internal paths of promotion and
their tasks are designed to be performed by workers on short-term or
contract arrangements. Second, and as a corollary to the first change,
outsourcing and contracting out for specialized skills and products
have increased. Third, primarily in the United States, state and local
governments have contracted out the public service delivery to private
operators.
Labor supply factors shaping nonstandard work can be conceived
in two ways. Workforces with characteristics suited to nonstandard
arrangements are “found” (Piore 1980); for example, employers will
recruit workforces with limited labor market attachment, or restricted
time availability, in short-term arrangements. Alternatively, workforce
preferences for nonstandard arrangements are considered the driving
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force. To determine the relative weight of labor supply and labor
demand factors, one must consider the evidence on both workforce
characteristics and worker preferences. It is also necessary to examine
employer motivations by looking at patterns of use. Finally, informa-
tion on how institutional factors affect both labor demand and supply
rounds out the picture.
To assign relatively less weight to labor supply factors, and corre-
spondingly more weight to labor demand factors, one only need argue
that workers in nonstandard arrangements do not differ from others.
Unobserved differences are considered by some researchers. Reported
preferences—degree of satisfaction with current arrangement or desire
for another arrangement—also help weigh relative effects. Reported
preferences are context dependent, however, given that they are also
shaped by the availability of alternatives and the extent of worker
knowledge about these. This context varies in the two countries.
Fixed-Term and Temporary Work in France and the United States
Workforce Characteristics
The shared pattern of female overrepresentation in fixed-term,
direct hire temporary, and on-call employment, and the contrasting pat-
tern of male overrepresentation in temp employment in France and
female overrepresentation (though declining) in the United States pre-
clude explanations based primarily on labor supply characteristics. In
particular, comparisons point to characteristics of labor demand in the
two countries as the driving factor in the composition of temporary
agency employment. 
Young workers in both countries are more likely than other
employees to choose nonstandard work; the pattern is very marked for
very young workers (under age 25) in France (Houseman 1999; Voisin
1989). Whether these arrangements lead to regular employment is
unclear. In France, young unemployed workers are more likely to leave
unemployment than are older workers, but they are also more likely,
when hired, to be in a nonstandard arrangement (Voisin 1989).25
Worker Preferences
In the French context of high unemployment, temp work is seen as
a means to regular employment. In a 1989 survey commissioned by the
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leading temp business association, approximately three-fourths (73
percent) of people who worked as temps in January 1989 responded
they had taken a temp assignment “in hopes of finding permanent
employment during an assignment” or because they “could not find
anything else” (77 percent). Another 39 percent reported wanting the
work experience. Only 18 percent reported they wanted intermittent
employment (PROMATT 1989).26 A 1980 supplement to Enquête
Emploi found that 60 percent of temp workers declared that they were
looking for stable employment, while 17 percent reported that tempo-
rary work suited them (Huet and Schmitz 1984).
Workers in fixed-term, temporary, and part-time work have com-
paratively high rates of job search, and more frequently report looking
for less precarious employment. A study based on the 1986 Enquête
Emploi finds that 28.2 percent of those in CDDs and 44.8 percent of
those in temp employment were looking for a permanent job, com-
pared with 5.9 percent of those in the total workforce. Rates of job
search are higher for young workers (under age 25); 32 percent of
young workers in CDD and 49 percent of those in temp work reported
looking for a permanent job.27 In 1986, 72 percent of job searchers in
CDDs, 76 percent in temp assignments, and 41 percent of searchers
working part-time reported wanting a “less precarious” job as their rea-
son for job search (Heller 1986, p. 33).
In the United States, a majority of workers in short-term and tem-
porary arrangements also report that they would rather have a regular
full-time job. In 1997, 57.6 percent of female temporary workers and
64.1 percent of male temporary workers reported they would rather
have a full-time job, and 52.6 percent of female and 56 percent of male
on-call workers preferred full-time work (Hudson 1999). About 50 per-
cent of direct hire temporaries reported that they would take a job that
is permanent or lasts more than a year (Houseman 1999).
Part-Time Work in France and the United States
Women and Part-Time Work 
Because part-time work affects primarily women, cross-country
differences in female labor force participation are a logical area to
explore in accounting for different trends. However, differences are
insufficient to account for lower part-time work in France in the 1970s
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and 1980s. Female labor force participation rates were about equal in
the two countries in the mid-1970s, but employed French women
tended to have full-time schedules (OECD 1993). Since then, the
United States has outpaced rates in France so that, by 1998, the average
(all ages) female labor force participation rate was 71 percent in the
United States and 61 percent in France. This difference is owing to
much lower rates for young women (under age 25) and older women
(55+). Prime-age French female labor force participation rates were
about as high as those in the United States (more than 76 percent) dur-
ing the 1990s (OECD 1999). It is during this period that part-time work
increased rapidly in France.
Involuntary Part-Time Work 
Involuntary part-time work is both higher and more divergent by
gender in France than in the United States. In 1997, OECD data show
that involuntary part-time work was a higher share of total part-time
work in France (41.3 percent) than in the United States (7.8 percent)
(OECD 1999).28 The share of involuntary part-time work among total
part-time work was 52.9 percent for men and 38.8 percent for women.
The corresponding numbers for the United States were 7.4 for men and
8 percent for women (OECD 1999, p. 33). Based on U.S. data, invol-
untary part-time work (those reporting being unable to find full-time
work) grew from 3 percent in 1973 to 4 percent in 1989.29 It had
declined to 3 percent by 1997 (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 1999).
Part-Time Work and “Underemployment” in France
Underemployment—those wanting to work more (both available
or searching for another job)—grew during the 1990s in France. The
rate of underemployment in the part-time workforce grew from 3.6
percent in 1990 to 6.2 percent in 1999. Women and young part-time
workers—two groups with high unemployment—are more likely to
report underemployment than other workers. Women’s rates of under-
employment were 7 percent in 1990 and 10.7 percent in 1999. The rate
of underemployment among female single heads of households was 13
percent in 1999. The corresponding numbers for men were 1.1 percent
in 1990 and 2.6 percent in 1999. Underemployment rates for young
workers (ages 15 to 24) were 10 percent in 1990 and 13.9 percent in
1999 (Kontchou and Brunet 2000, Table 5.1). Workers who combine
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part-time and CDD or temporary work are overrepresented in under-
employment relative to the share of other employed workers.30
Employer Motivations
Employers in the two countries share similar motivations for using
nonstandard work arrangements as well as similar institutional factors
that shape employer behavior. They also, however, exhibit differences.
The search for quantitative (workforce composition and volume) and
qualitative (skill content) flexibility motivates U.S. and French
employers, albeit in different ways across industrial sectors, and with
somewhat different results in patterns of use. Institutional factors—the
regulations, rules, and customs that shape internal labor markets and
partially protect workers in regular arrangements from fluctuation—
motivate some use of short-term and temporary work in both countries.
The ability to save on benefits and wages, however, is distinct to the
United States.
Shared Motivations and Production Conditions
During the 1970s, when the growth of fixed-term and temporary
contracts as well as contracting out was first noted in France, research-
ers pointed to increased flux and uncertainty in markets as the source
of changing practices. For example, Germe and Michon (1980) exam-
ined whether nonstandard arrangements in manufacturing were associ-
ated with market conditions, firm size, and employment conditions, but
found no straightforward relationships between patterns of use and
product characteristics, demand uncertainty, or employment fluctua-
tion. Instead, nonstandard arrangements were best understood either as
a tool that allowed firms to avoid work reorganization and a change in
workforce management, or as a tool in implementing new production
and management practices. In other words, nonstandard arrangements
could be put to seemingly contradictory uses and were a polyvalent
tool for workforce management. 
More proximate motivations fell into three categories. The first
entailed the need to achieve qualitative as well as quantitative variability
in labor use. Some firms contracted out for specialized labor while oth-
ers rendered a layer of jobs unstable, thus externalizing labor costs, to
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handle uncertainty. The second category achieved cost savings by
closely adjusting workforce size to balance actual work time and com-
pensated work time (also found by Ramaux 1993). The third motivation
was to intensify workforce discipline, for example, by conveying that
regular jobs were “rationed.” As Michon (1982, p. 94) concluded, “vari-
ability and flexibility are broader requirements than uncertainty . . .
irregular forms of employment are neither the only instrument of flexi-
bility, nor an instrument used to this sole end.”31
Researchers have since placed nonstandard arrangements in the
context of work reorganization within firms. Large manufacturing
firms couple internal flexibility (new scheduling practices, multitask-
ing, broad job definitions) with reliance on subcontracting chains, and
with the systematic use of nonstandard arrangements. Most recently, a
study of 36 automobile manufacturing plants and supplier chains
depicts practices of lean staffing for regular production jobs coupled
with a high and systematic use of temp contracts, as well as CDDs. The
use of these practices ranges from 10 percent of total employment
among automobile manufacturers to 50 percent among first- and sec-
ond-level suppliers. Temporary contracts are used to renew the pool of
potential recruits should regular positions open, with the same screen-
ing criteria and education requirements applied.32 Due to legal restric-
tions on the successive renewal of temporary contracts for the same
worker, auto manufacturers and suppliers in France intersperse tempo-
rary assignments with a lengthy CDD (18 months). Temporary assign-
ments offer certain advantages relative to CDDs. Temporary workers
are not counted in workforce productivity measures, and their relative
cost is lowered owing to volume discounts on the markup obtained
from the agency (Gorgeu and Matthieu 2000).33
Case studies of firms outside of manufacturing have connected the
reorganization of production and changes in employment structures
with the systematic use of CDD and temp contracts, although at levels
not as high. Findings are consistent with those reached by Germe and
Michon (1980), which depict nonstandard work arrangements as a tool
facilitating work reorganization and a change in management practices.
In finance and insurance, the nature and size of markets and the refor-
mulation of market strategies have mattered more than fluctuation and
uncertainty in product demand per se. A study of major banks and
insurance companies conducted in the early 1990s found that these
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large organizations used CDD, temporary contracts, and part-time
arrangements to make the transition to a new workforce composition
that would enable firms to successfully compete in an evolving indus-
try (Carré 1993). Banks and insurance companies used nonstandard
arrangements primarily in low and mid-level job categories to 1) con-
trol the volume of hiring, 2) accelerate flux at the margins of employ-
ment systems that they considered stagnant, and 3) provide leeway to
reconsider and modify the career paths of certain workforce categories.
Changes entailed replacing one workforce (high-seniority clericals per-
forming account or contract administration in central offices) with
another (higher-skilled workers for commercial and customer activi-
ties). The shift was to occur in a national context and industry tradition
of few layoffs, near zero job growth (or even decline), and for jobs that
had not changed sufficiently to attract and retain a workforce with the
desired education levels for the future job structure. Nonstandard
arrangements were used along with early retirement and other job
departure incentives. For example, CDDs were used for extended
screening periods, for the replacement of workers on maternity leave
(to permit job reduction if the job holder did not return), and for main-
taining work productivity while planning for job elimination and rede-
sign. 
A 1993 in-depth case study of 24 French manufacturing and ser-
vice establishments mapped key determinants of the pattern and extent
of CDDs and temporary contracts (Ramaux 1993).34 The first determi-
nant shaping patterns of use was the legal and institutional context (see
section below). Second, the variation in the activities of the establish-
ment, whether seasonal, related to product cycles, or tied to market
uncertainty and business cycles, also shaped patterns of use. Third, the
history of employment structures within firms—whether a mature firm
having restructured and downsized (and weathered recessions) or a
new company increasing regular rolls sparingly—affects the use of
nonstandard work. Both result in lean staffing. Fourth, jobs with low
skill requirements are more amenable to CDD and temporary contracts.
Fifth, organizational characteristics play a role. For example, the per-
centage of user firms is higher among large firms, but the use intensity
is higher among smaller firms (also confirmed in national statistics).
Belonging to a conglomerate affects whether internal mobility is an
alternative, the degree of local control over workforce management,
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and the possibility of negotiating volume discounts on agency fees
with temporary services. Sixth, CDDs and temporary contracts are
used in jobs slated for elimination once a new technological process is
fully installed or to facilitate the installation of new equipment. Sev-
enth, labor relations do not seem to have significant impact on use of
CDDs and temp contracts. Finally, local labor market conditions such
as skill bottlenecks or the market penetration of temp agencies affect
patterns of use (Ramaux 1993).
In the United States, employer surveys also reveal the desire to
achieve control of quantitative and qualitative flexibility in staffing and
other motivations parallel to those identified in France (Conference
Board 1995; Houseman 2001; Kalleberg and Reynolds 2000). Results
from the Upjohn Institute nationally representative survey of employ-
ers underscore that “fluctuations in staffing needs” is the most cited
reason for using temps, on-call workers, and direct hire temporaries
(Houseman 2001).35 These fluctuations include unexpected increases in
business; filling a vacancy until a hiring decision is made; absences or
leaves among regular employees; cyclical fluctuations (for temp use);
or industry-specific fluctuations (particularly when coupled with “just-
in-time” staffing). Houseman (1999) further reports that the degree of
seasonal fluctuation is an important determinant of whether an organi-
zation uses temps, direct hire temporaries, or on-call workers. The use
of nonstandard work arrangements, particularly temporary agency
workers, for screening candidates is cited by 21 percent of firms in the
Upjohn study. Also, Kalleberg and Reynolds (2000) find that smaller
firms tend to use nonstandard work arrangements to obtain special
skills and reduce their administration costs, while larger firms tend to
use them to screen workers. The desire to cut benefit costs is reported
by 12 percent of employers in a survey of large firms (Conference
Board 1995). Another survey of large employers finds that saving on
total labor costs, and health insurance costs in particular, is a frequently
cited reason for their use (Christensen 1995). In the Upjohn study, 59
percent of companies using direct hire temporaries and 73 percent of
those using on-call workers report the hourly wage and benefit cost of
these workers is lower than for regular workers (Houseman 1999).
The use of part-time work in both countries has been associated
with the service sector, particularly those jobs with variation in demand
and extended hours of operation. The increase in the use of part-time
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work in France during the 1980s and 1990s has been primarily related
to the growth of personal services, the expansion of hours of operation
of retail trade and other similar activities, the change in the nature of
food service (fast food chains), and, to a small extent, the development
of nonstandard hour shifts in manufacturing. These changes have taken
place later relative to the United States. Case studies of retail trade
have documented employers’ greater use of part-time work schedules
relative to previous decades (Maruani and Nicole 1989), bringing the
practices of this sector on a par with those of U.S. retailers (Tilly
1996).
Shared Institutional Factors 
Despite rather divergent legal standards, the two countries share a
set of institutional factors affecting regular employment that have a
bearing on employer motivation. Over time, in both countries, regular
employment has assumed features that have rendered some nonstand-
ard arrangements appealing to employers. With the growth of worker
rights in regular employment during the 1970s, CDDs and temporary
contracts grew in appeal to French firms. In 1975, faced with layoffs
prompted by the economic crisis, France established an administrative
oversight of collective and individual layoffs for economic reasons.
Employers were mandated to obtain a preauthorization by Ministry of
Labor inspectors, to provide prior notification to workers36 and sever-
ance pay, as well as to formulate a “social plan” (redeployment,
retraining, job search assistance, early retirement) for review by labor
inspectors and discussion with worker representatives.37 The impact of
the legislation has been much debated. In practice, the mandate
included clauses already in effect in national collective bargaining
agreements in major sectors, and thus did not introduce significant
changes in those sectors. Large firms were more likely to have elabo-
rate oversight procedures than smaller ones. Also, layoffs were most
often approved. However, labor inspectors’ discretion and their ability
to raise questions, require revisions, and introduce lags in the proce-
dure have been seen as having a dampening effect on some layoff deci-
sions and singling out regular employment as a protected arrangement
(Caire and Kerschen 1999, Piore 1980).38 
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However, the use of nonstandard contracts has since become wide-
spread and sustained despite the weakening of layoff protections for
workers in regular contracts. For example, the administrative preautho-
rization of layoffs of regular workers was removed in 1986 owing to
employer opposition and implementation difficulties. Prior notification
(with a worker interview), severance pay,39 and the requirement to con-
sult with worker representatives about the social plan and to “present”
the latter to a labor inspector remain following legal changes in 1993
and 1995. Also, disputes arising about the social plan or about the eco-
nomic reasons for an individual layoff are handled through a system of
individual and collective (union, works committee) recourse to the
court system—both peer representation labor courts and courts of
appeal (Caire and Kerschen 1999). Layoff avoidance remains fairly
common in large employers, particularly in white-collar employment.
It is also more common among similar employers in the United States
(compared to manufacturing), although to a lesser degree.
Increasingly, the use of nonstandard work arrangements has been
understood as motivated by a complex set of decisions shaped only in
part by regulations. Employers in 24 firms report a number of costs
related to layoffs that are conducive to their circumscribing regular
employment contracts only to positions unlikely to be cut. These rea-
sons relate only indirectly to the institutional framework. Employers
wish to avoid costs related to prenotification and severance pay as well
as those (staff time) associated with mandates for individual meetings
or consultation with worker representatives. They also aim to avoid
costs related to employee relation problems created by a layoff
(Ramaux 1993).
In the United States, laws and executive orders enforcing equal
employment opportunity by protecting workers from discrimination in
hiring, promotion, and discharge have also entailed some oversight of
employer behavior. Factors that have altered termination costs and pos-
sibly encouraged the use of temporary work, in particular, include
restrictions on the employment-at-will common law standard. Tempo-
rary employment entails no firing costs. Autor (2003) finds that states
that recognized exceptions to the employment-at-will legal standard,
particularly those recognizing “implied contracts,” experienced higher
growth in temporary agency employment between 1979 and 1995.
These exceptions recognize that workers with an implied contractual
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right to continued employment (for example, language in personnel
policies) may successfully challenge a discharge in court. Autor finds
that “implied contracts” led to 14 percent to 22 percent excess tempo-
rary agency employment in adopting states (46 out of 50) compared
with nonadopting states. He concludes that the adoption of exceptions
to the employment-at-will standard explains as much as 20 percent of
the temporary employment growth over the period.40
Differing Institutional Factors 
France has undergone several waves of regulation and deregulation
of nonstandard contracts. Temporary contracts first became subject to
regulation in 1972 and CDDs in 1979. Regulations became more strin-
gent in 1982 and attempted to achieve two things at once: 1) to restrict
the use of fixed-term and temporary contracts to nonpermanent jobs
and, concurrently, 2) to provide guarantees to workers in nonstandard
work arrangements that were equivalent to those for regular workers.
In the end, they partially succeeded on the second goal but not the first.
From 1982 to 1986, regulations explicitly spelled out the economic sit-
uations in which short-term and temporary contracts could be used. In
1986, and later in 1989, the government abandoned this close monitor-
ing. In the environment of virtually stagnant job growth during the
1980s, government policy came to reflect the view that removing barri-
ers to the use of nonstandard work arrangements would facilitate job
creation even if only nonstandard jobs (Carré 1993). Quarterly data on
temporary contract use indicate that the 1982 restrictions indeed had a
dampening effect on temporary agency employment. However, the
temporary agency trend turned up again in 1984. The laws of 1985 and
1986, designed to favor the growth of temporary employment, did not
have a significant impact on this upward trend (Charraud 1993). The
reintroduction of a list of allowed reasons for using CDDs and tempo-
rary contracts in 1990, coupled with penalties, has compelled employ-
ers to monitor the reasons they report to the Labor Ministry but does
not appear to have affected patterns of use. The easing of restrictions
on successive contract renewals seems to have encouraged the longer-
term use of CDDs (Ramaux 1993).
Several key regulations remain that distinguish the situation in
short-term and temporary work in France from that in the United
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States. First, the regulations mandated parity of wages and benefits
between workers in nonstandard work arrangements and those in regu-
lar employment in similar positions, with equivalent skills, and not on
probation. Laws, collective bargaining agreements, and policies (pay,
benefits) that apply to regular workers apply to workers on short-term,
temporary, and part-time contracts. In addition, workers in CDDs and
temporary contracts receive notice of the exact duration of their con-
tract and a lump-sum payment at the end of it. Second, the operations
of temporary agencies are closely regulated. Since 1972, temporary
agencies must purchase a form of insurance that guarantees payment of
back wages and social benefits to workers in case of bankruptcy. The
Ministry of Labor also publishes a list of dangerous activities for which
temporary work is illegal. Marginal temporary agencies have been
weeded out by the inability to sustain higher costs or by penalties (Puel
1989). It is illegal to use workers on temporary contracts (as well as
CDDs) during a labor strike. Also, the government compelled industry-
wide collective bargaining for the temporary agency industry as a
whole as an alternative to regulation. Since 1985, all temp workers are
covered by sectoral collective bargaining agreements that have defined
principles for industry-wide seniority, and established peer-representa-
tion structures to administer benefits such as sick pay, or supplemen-
tary retirement benefits, or the extension of some job-related benefits
beyond the duration of a temporary work assignment. In the 1980s,
these provisions made temp contracts relatively more expensive than
CDDs. The latter were more likely to be used for a large volume of
short-term workers while temporary contracts were used for limited
and very short-term needs. Since 1990, legislation has brought terms of
employment under the two types of contract nearly on a par.41 The
agency markup that makes temporary contracts costlier per hour is
often reduced by large firms, which are able to negotiate a significant
volume discount with temporary agencies (Ramaux 1993).42 
Mandated parity of wages and benefits does not wholly eliminate
cost incentives because nonstandard workers, for example, may be in
different jobs than regular workers and do not benefit from seniority-
based wage premiums and other aspects of nonwage compensation
(seniority-based profit sharing, productivity premium). In addition,
employers may alter the notion of “equivalent skills” or assign non-
standard workers to a job while requiring tasks be performed at a
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higher level of skill (Ramaux 1993). Nevertheless, mandated parity
greatly diminishes the incentive to differentiate worker pay levels and
access to benefits, a sharp contrast to the U.S. situation.
The regulation of work hours and hours of operation for retail busi-
nesses has differed significantly over time in the two countries, a situa-
tion that may account for the contrasting part-time trends. French
legislation on work hours was revised in the 1990s, allowing more non-
standard schedules and shift work. In addition, part-time work has been
used as a policy tool, albeit one with multiple, some would even say
contradictory, purposes—flexible work options, unemployment allevi-
ation, easing labor market entry, or contributing to internal flexibility
(Favennec-Henry 1998). Beginning in 1973, it was fostered with
employer incentives to meet worker requests to switch from full-time
to part-time schedules.43 In the 1980s, part-time work was seen as a
means to job creation and the sharing of work. Its use was fostered for
the progressive retirement of high-seniority workers in industries
undergoing restructuring such as banking, insurance, and automotive
industries (Carré 1993). In these industries, high-seniority workers
could convert to part-time at half pay and receive a government sub-
sidy toward their full pay if the company agreed to keep them for two
years. Since the 1980s, mandated social security contributions have
remained “neutral” with regard to work hours, whereas they had previ-
ously penalized part-time work (Marimbert 1992). In the 1990s, to ease
labor market entry and provide employers with flexibility, the govern-
ment facilitated employer use of part-time work. Eligibility for govern-
ment supports was expanded from 19–30 weekly hours to 16–32
weekly hours averaged on a yearly, as well as monthly or weekly,
basis. The count of part-time workers was prorated for all regulations
dependent on workforce levels (e.g., works committee representation),
and employers could introduce part-time schedules without prior con-
sultation with work committees and unions. In addition, employers
benefit from reductions (25 percent in 1992 and 30 percent after 1992)
in their social security (health, pension) tax contribution for creating
new part-time jobs. The reductions correspond to an 18 percent decline
in the wage bill for a given amount of work (Caire and Kerschen 1999). 
In the 1990s, part-time work has also been used to trim costs. It has
become fairly common practice in retail trade to hire some workers on
part-time contracts while also having them work “complementary”
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hours up to an additional 10 percent of their scheduled hours (as high
as 33 percent in 1986). These complementary hours are paid at straight,
rather than at overtime, rates.44 The threshold of allowable complemen-
tary hours is subject to policy change according to the priorities of suc-
cessive governments.
It is difficult to sort out the relative effects of successive policies,
changing employer practices, and the high unemployment context on
part-time trends in the 1980s and 1990s in France. The concentration of
women in part-time employment, coupled with high reports of under-
employment by young women in part-time work, seem to indicate that
newly created part-time positions are behind much of the growth, as
opposed to workers converting full-time schedules to part-time by
choice. As part-time work has grown in France, its gender composition
and occupational distribution have come to resemble that in the United
States, suggesting similarities in patterns of use by firms. The remain-
ing differences are in pay and benefits, suggesting that cost savings
play a part in U.S. employer motivations.
CONCLUSION
Despite rather different policy environments of employment rela-
tions as a whole and for nonstandard work arrangements in particular,
both countries now face policy challenges created by the sustained
presence of nonstandard work arrangements in their economies. First,
in both countries, key social protection programs are tied to employ-
ment experience. For example, the degree to which workers benefit
from unemployment insurance and pension is related to steady
employment. This issue is much more acute in the United States, where
these programs offer less generous benefits and less extensive coverage
for workers in both regular and nonstandard work arrangements. Sec-
ond, the employment regulation problem created by triangular relation-
ships in temporary agency work has been addressed in France with
industry-level agreements (as well as specific regulations) for the temp
industry. It remains an unsolved problem in the United States, however,
although recent court decisions have found an employment “relation-
ship” between the temporary worker and the user firm for representa-
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tion purposes. Because triangular relationships entail a mix of business
contracts (client-intermediary), employment contract (intermediary-
worker), and a supervisory relationship (client-worker) with little legal
definition, they are a challenge for the existing policy apparatus. Both
countries have little experience with regulating business contracts to
protect individual employees and have yet to grapple with the supervi-
sory relationship (Triomphe 1999). Third, in both countries, the issue
of skill maintenance and upgrading for nonstandard workers over the
course of lengthy careers is salient. Neither country has found ways to
substitute for employer-sponsored, on-the-job training and skill
enhancement in the absence of a regular work arrangement and steady
employment.
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1. For young workers (age 15 to 24), the male unemployment rate was 15 percent in
1990 and 22 percent in 1998.
2. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.
3. INSEE Enquête Emploi is conducted yearly in April–May for 1982, in March for
1983 to 1997, and in January for 1999. Information on “employment status/
arrangements” is available for wage and salary workers, except those employed
by the national and local governments (and those in national military service). All
computations reported here are for “private wage and salary workers.” Starting
with the 1990 survey, one category of workers previously counted in the private
sector, “interns,” is redefined and moved outside of the private sector. It now com-
bines “interns and government subsidized contracts,” a group of arrangements
created to favor access to the labor market for youths; it is in an ambiguous “pub-
lic-private” position. For consistency with prior years, these workers are not
included in the base for total private-sector employment in this chapter. As a
result, the incidence of CDD and temporary workers may be higher beginning in
1990 than in previous years because the base no longer counts “interns”; actually,
incidence for CDDs and temporary workers declined from 1989 to 1990–1991,
making it difficult to discern the impact of this small change in the base number.
Also, beginning in 1995, several broad industry categories are broken down more
finely.
4. The CPS is conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; see Table 5.1. All
employed persons except unpaid family workers are included in the March sup-
plement, and the base for figures is civilian employment.
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5. Based on an employer survey, Houseman (2001) reports an estimate of 3.4 per-
cent for direct hires.
6. Establishment level numbers from the Current Employment Statistics are for SIC
736, Personnel Supply Services, in which over 75 percent of workers are esti-
mated to be in the temp industry (see Carré 1992).
7. Unfortunately, reporting of the incidence of temporary contracts across industrial
sectors of assignment in the national labor force survey was discontinued in 1990.
Workers with temporary contracts were counted as working in market services
from 1990 to 1993, after which they were counted in the subcategory of business
services, where they accounted for 21.3 percent of employment in 1999.
8. In addition to personnel supply services (they report the temporary agency as their
employer), female temporary workers cluster in telephone and communications,
and electrical machinery. Male temp workers cluster in motor vehicles (and equip-
ment) as well as in construction, telephone and communications, and engineering/
architectural and surveying industries, in addition to personnel supply.
9. For black male temporary workers, the most common occupation is assembler
and for Hispanic males it is truck driver.
10. The authors use the establishment file from the UNEDIC, the unemployment
insurance fund run jointly by employer and union representatives. Earlier studies
also confirmed the concentrated use of temporary workers in manufacturing and
construction.
11. The author reports tabulations based on the March Current Population Survey for
1985, 1986, 1995, and 1996 using information on main job in previous year (see
Table 8.3 in Blank 1999).
12. In the United States, a nonnegligible number of survey respondents report that
they are wage and salary workers, which seems to contradict their “independent
contractor” status. In France, private-sector employment excludes government-
sponsored internships. Independent contractors who also include self-employed
business owners account for 9.5 percent of male employment and 5.7 percent of
female employment. The share of “independents” in public and private employ-
ment is 8.6 percent for the total, 7.7 percent for males, and 3.9 percent for females
(INSEE 1999, Table PA05).
13. Broader definitions yield estimates ranging from 0.6 percent to 1.2 percent of
employment (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000; Houseman and Polivka 2000;
Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000).
14. Although different hour thresholds yield significant differences in part-time lev-
els, the relative rankings of countries in terms of the incidence of part-time work
vary little by definition (OECD 1999, p. 22).
15. Between 1987 and 1997, the share of short hours among total part-time hours in
France declined from 37.4 percent to 33.7 percent for males, and from 38.9 per-
cent to 35.5 percent for females. This share declined as well in the United States,
although it remained higher than in France throughout the period; it declined from
45.4 percent to 42.3 percent of total part-time work for males, and from 44.8 per-
cent to 40.8 percent for females.
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16. Definitions of part-time work have changed over time. The Enquête Emploi
reports as part-time workers anyone declaring a part-time job, usually up to 32
weekly hours. For policy purposes, a part-time job is defined as working at least
one-fifth fewer than the statutory, or conventional (bargained), weekly, monthly,
or yearly hours (Caire and Kerschen 1999). Those working between 32 and 40
hours may self-report as full-time or part-time, depending on the prevailing
schedule in their workplace. With the full implementation of the 35-hour work
week, the definition for part-time may change. 
17. The particular subsectors with high incidence are eating and drinking establish-
ments, grocery and department stores, and in colleges and universities.
18. Published data on occupations do not separate wage and salary from independent
workers.
19. The study uses the monthly Déclaration des Mouvements de Main d’Oeuvre and
compiles employer reports on regular contracts and CDDs that have either started
or expired during the survey month. Public administration, local governments,
public health services, and national defense establishments are excluded.
20. The study used a sample of files for those who registered between September and
November 1993 with the unemployment agency, ANPE. A sample of 23,882 reg-
istered unemployed was followed monthly until July 1996.
21. The study includes private wage and salary workers in the Enquête Emploi, hav-
ing participated in all three labor force surveys (1994, 1995, and 1996). As sur-
veys provide retrospective information, the period covered by the study is 1993–
1996. 716,000 reported working in “constrained” part-time work in 1994, and
970,000 reported working in chosen part-time work (Galtier 1999a).
22. Those in short part-time hours (fewer than 15 hours per week) in 1994 were likely
to have been unemployed in 1993. By 1996, those with short part-time hours in
1994 were less likely to work full-time; only 14 percent worked full-time com-
pared with 43 percent of those working in long hours in part-time work (30 or
more weekly hours).
23. They are also more likely to have part-time hours than workers in standard
arrangements. In 1997, 54 percent of on-call workers, and 21 percent of tempo-
rary agency employees worked part-time (Houseman 1999).
24. The hourly wage of independent contractors, however, does not differ markedly
from that of regular full-time workers.
25. In a 1986 sample of the registered unemployed, 58 percent of males under age 25
and 48 percent of females were employed 18 months later. Corresponding figures
for those ages 25–49 were 51 percent and 35 percent, respectively. Of those under
age 25 who had found employment, only 45 percent of males and 33 percent of
females had found a regular job; 23 percent of males and 33 percent of females
had found jobs with a CDD or temporary contract.
26. Of those workers in the survey who were still temps six months later (July)—57
percent of the January sample—most (66 percent) reported they were still temps
because they had not found other employment, and 32 percent reported that tem-
porary employment suited their needs. The survey was conducted in July 1989 by
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Institut Français de l’Opinion Publique (IFOP) for PROMATT and included a rep-
resentative sample of 1,000 persons who were temporary workers in January
1989.
27. Job search to find a standard arrangement is also higher for part-time workers
with fewer than 30 hours per week; their rate is twice as high as that for the total
workforce and six times as high in the case of young women in short part-time
hours.
28. The numbers for France exclude the self-employed and family workers. The defi-
nition for involuntary part-time is “workers who say they are working [part-time]
because they could not find [full-time] work” (OECD 1999, p. 33).
29. Tilly (1992) reports that two-thirds of the growth of total part-time work between
1969 and 1988 was accounted for by the growth of involuntary part-time work.
30. In 1999, workers on CDDs accounted for 12.4 percent of the underemployed
compared with 3.4 percent of other workers (public and private sectors com-
bined); 14 percent of underemployed women worked under CDDs compared with
4 percent of other workers. Workers in temporary assignments represent 2.3 per-
cent of the underemployed compared with 1.9 percent of the total employed
(Kontchou and Brunet 2000, Table 3). Study based on Enquête Emploi, 1990–
1999. Differences noted are significant; logit model controlled for sex, age,
diploma, nationality, and broad region of residence.
31. Translation by author.
32. Sometimes the auto plant selects the workers and sends them to the temporary ser-
vice for processing. Tests used for all production workers are administered during
the first three-month temp assignment, which is renewed if the tests are passed.
33. The two main auto manufacturers are experimenting with a partnership with temp
companies to generate an industry-wide pool of temp workers trained within auto
plants and whose skills are “vetted” by the industry so they can readily shuttle
among plants.
34. The establishments include 14 from manufacturing, two in construction and pub-
lic works, and eight in service-producing activities (e.g., FIRE, and services
proper).
35. This section relies extensively on Houseman 1999.
36. One month for those with at least six months seniority and two months for those
with more than two years of seniority.
37. The procedure created an opening for forging public-private agreements to draw
on government aid to dislocated workers.
38. The legislation provided additional grounds for clerical and professional workers,
categories of workers previously immune from layoffs, to challenge their layoffs
due to restructuring in peer representation labor courts, an action which many
took. Labor courts thus became backlogged. In construction, with its frequently
recurrent layoffs, the legislation prompted the rapid adoption of temporary con-
tracts simply to avoid the oversight and the lags it entailed.
39. This amounts to about 17 weeks of pay (Caire and Kerschen 1999, p. 309).
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40. States in which union density declined less slowly (unions were stronger) had
more rapid temporary agency employment growth than those with rapidly declin-
ing union density (Autor 2003). In contrast, earlier research on temporary agency
trends (1982–1988) concluded that the decline in union power enabled firms to
increase their use of temporary workers (Golden and Appelbaum 1992).
41. For example, the lump sum payment is set at 10 percent of total compensation for
temps and 6 percent for CDDs.
42. Although the average factor is estimated to be 2.2 in 1993 for the entire temp
industry (i.e., for an hourly pay of 100, the temp cost is 220), some large employ-
ers were able to negotiate it down to 2.05 or lower (Ramaux 1993, p. 95).
43. One principle remains from this era. Within a workplace, those working part-time
and preferring full-time work, and those working full-time but preferring part-
time have priority in bidding for jobs with equivalent skill levels to their own.
44. This practice was facilitated by 1986 legislation that revoked a 1982 provision
mandating the conversion of part-time contracts to full-time contracts when the
worker had effectively worked full-time for a period of 12 weeks.
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The Growth of Nonstandard 
Employment in 
Japan and the United States
A Comparison of Causes
 and Consequences
Susan Houseman
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Machiko Osawa
Japan Women’s University
Employment in nonstandard work arrangements, especially part-
time employment, grew dramatically in Japan over the last two
decades, and in recent years, nonstandard jobs have accounted for the
overwhelming majority of new jobs in Japan. Although growth in non-
standard employment was not as great in the United States, evidence
suggests that the share in certain nonstandard arrangements, especially
temporary agency employment, expanded rapidly in the 1980s and
1990s.
In this chapter, we examine whether the growth in nonstandard
employment in these two countries reflects similar or unrelated forces,
and, as a corollary, why the growth in nonstandard employment was so
much greater in Japan than in the United States. In particular, we look
at potential causes of this growth: a shift in employer demand toward
arrangements that increase productivity and reduce labor costs; a shift
in the supply of workers seeking more flexible staffing arrangements;
and government policies promoting the expansion of nonstandard
employment. Finally, we examine the implications of the growth in
nonstandard employment for workers.
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DEFINITIONS OF NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS
Comparison of the magnitude of and trends in nonstandard work
arrangements in Japan and the United States is complicated by the fact
that the definitions of arrangements differ between the countries. For
instance, in U.S. statistics on part-time employment, which come from
the Current Population Survey (CPS), individuals are classified as part-
time if they usually work fewer than 35 hours per week. In Japanese
surveys, workers are classified as part-time if they work fewer hours
per day or days per week than regular workers (e.g., the Survey on the
Diversification of Employment) or if they are termed part-time in their
place of employment (e.g., the Employment Status Survey). The Japa-
nese definition of part-time, therefore, includes some individuals who
work more than 35 hours per week, and this difference between the
U.S. and Japanese statistics should be borne in mind.
In 1999, about 30 percent of Japanese workers classified as part-
time by their employers worked almost the same number of hours per
week as full-time workers (Ministry of Labor 1997a). In cases where
Japanese part-time and full-time employees work similar hours, part-
time refers to a lower status of employment within the firm. Tradition-
ally, part-time workers were hired to do relatively simple tasks requir-
ing little training and were not expected to work overtime. In contrast,
regular full-time workers would be asked to perform a wide variety of
tasks beyond their normal work duties, would be expected to work
overtime, often for no additional compensation, and might be trans-
ferred to distant offices (Sato et al. 1999). These differences, some
argued, justified the better pay, promotion opportunities, training, ben-
efits, and job security received by full-time workers compared with
part-time workers. However, since the 1980s, part-time workers have
been given more responsibility and training by companies, and differ-
ences in the scope of tasks performed by part-time and regular full-
time workers are narrowing (Miyama 1991; Ministry of Labor 1997b,
1999).1
Temporary workers in Japan are hired on a contract for a limited
duration. Often the distinction between temporary workers and day
laborers is made. The former are hired for one month or longer, while
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the latter are hired for less than one month. In addition, some Japanese
surveys make the distinction between temporary and contract workers;
the latter have professional skills and are hired on fixed-term contracts.
The data on temporary workers in the United States are not comparable
to the Japanese data. In the figures reported below, temporary workers
in the United States are defined as workers who indicate their job is
temporary for economic, rather than personal, reasons, as reported in
recent supplements to the CPS, and thus the definition of temporary
worker is somewhat broader in the United States than in Japan. Both
Japanese and U.S. surveys report employment in temporary help agen-
cies.2 
TRENDS IN NONSTANDARD ARRANGEMENTS
Table 6.1 shows the levels of and trends in part-time, temporary,
and temporary agency employment in Japan and the United States in
the 1980s and 1990s. The fraction of the workforce that is part-time has
been similar in Japan and the United States in recent years, although
the part-time statistics in Japan include some employees who work
more than 35 hours per week. The proportion of the workforce that is
temporary is much higher in Japan than in the United States, although
the share of employees who work for temporary help agencies is
smaller. 
The most striking trend in Japan has been the dramatic rise in the
share of part-time employment. Part-time employment grew from 11.0
percent to 18.8 percent of paid employment and accounted for 45 per-
cent of the net growth in paid employment from 1982 to 1997. It
accounted for 77 percent of the net growth in paid employment from
1992 to 1997. Published statistics on part-time employment in the
United States would suggest that the share of paid employment that is
part-time rose modestly in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the CPS,
from which part-time statistics are derived, was redesigned in 1994 and
part-time statistics before and after the redesign are not comparable.
Adjusting for the redesign, the share in part-time employment rose
slightly in the 1980s but fell in the 1990s.3
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Table 6.1 Trends in Nonstandard Employment (as percentage of paid 
employment)
United States
The share of Japanese employment in temporary help agencies
rose steadily in recent years, albeit from a very small base. Regulation
of the temporary help industry was relaxed in 1999, and further growth
is expected. In the United States, temporary help employment
expanded rapidly, increasing its share of nonfarm payroll employment
from 0.5 percent in 1982 to 2.5 percent in 1999 and accounting for
Japan
Part-time
Temporary Agency 
temporaryDay laborers Other
1982 11.0 3.7 7.9 NA
1987 14.2 3.1 8.9 0.2
1992 16.1 2.8 8.4 0.3
1997 18.8 2.6 9.2 0.5
∆1982–97 7.8 –1.1 1.3 0.3a
Part-time
(published)
Part-time
(adjusted) Temporary
Agency 
temporary
1979 16.4 18.0
1982 18.2 20.0 0.5
1989 17.0 18.7 1.1
1999 17.4 17.4 4.1 2.5
∆1979–99 –0.6 NA NA
∆1982–99 –2.6 NA 2.0
a Change from 1987–97.
SOURCE: Figures on U.S. part-time employment were derived from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) and are expressed as a percentage of total employment. Figures
for the years 1979, 1982, and 1989 were adjusted to account for the redesign of the
CPS and to make them comparable to the 1999 figures. The figure on U.S. temporar-
ies comes from the February 1999 supplement to the CPS. The figures for agency
temporaries represent the percentage of nonfarm payroll employment in the Help
Supply Services Industry, which is primarily composed of temporary help agencies.
These data come from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) series. Japanese data
come from Bureau of Statistics Management Coordination Agency, Employment Sta-
tus Survey.
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about 10 percent of net employment growth in the 1990s, according to
the U.S. Bureau of Statistics establishment survey (Current Employ-
ment Statistics). 
Although the share of day laborers in Japan fell over the period, the
share in other temporary contracts rose.4 It appears that most of the
growth in temporary contracts is accounted for by the growth in tempo-
rary part-time contracts. According to the Ministry of Labor, the frac-
tion of part-time workers reporting that they were on a temporary
contract grew from 30.4 percent in 1990 to 40.6 percent in 1996.
Among workers in other nonstandard arrangements, such as temporary
agencies, the fraction who were in temporary contracts also grew dra-
matically over the period.5 The survey from which we computed tem-
porary employment in the United States was first conducted in 1995.
Between 1995 and 1999, there was little change in the fraction of tem-
porary workers in the United States.
The employment categories reported in Table 6.1 overlap. To gain
a better sense of the overall size of the workforce in nonstandard
employment arrangements, we constructed mutually exclusive catego-
ries of employment for the most recent years of data available for
Japan and the United States (Table 6.2).6 If one defines standard work-
ers as those who work full-time and who are not temporary, and non-
standard as everyone else, then the levels of nonstandard employment
are similar in the two countries. In Japan, 76.5 percent of wage and sal-
ary workers are in regular, full-time jobs compared with 78.5 percent in
the United States. However, within nonstandard employment arrange-
ments, the fraction that is temporary is much higher in Japan than in the
United States. 
It is also noteworthy that at least half of temporary agency workers
in both countries do not report themselves as holding temporary jobs.
In Japan, many temporary agency workers still have a regular employ-
ment contract with the agency. In the United States, this finding is a bit
puzzling, but suggests that many temporary agency workers believe
that their employment with the temporary agency is relatively secure,
even if their assignments with clients change.7
Overall, these data suggest that the growth in nonstandard employ-
ment arrangements has been much stronger in Japan than in the United
States. Although temporary agency employment has grown rapidly in
the United States, at least in percentage terms, nothing comparable to
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the dramatic Japanese rise in part-time employment has been recorded
in the United States. This conclusion is subject to the caveat that data
for some types of nonstandard employment arrangements have only
recently been collected in the United States and, thus, direct evidence
on trends in these arrangements is not available. Evidence from several
employer surveys suggests that U.S. companies increased their use of
direct-hire temporaries, contract company workers, and independent
Table 6.2 Distribution of Employment by Employment Arrangement and 
Temporary Status, Japan and the United States (% of paid 
employment)
Japan 1997
(1)
Not temporary
(2)
Temporary Sum 1 + 2
Full-time 76.5 0.6 77.1
Part-time 9.6 9.2 18.8
Shokukakua 1.2 0.6 1.8
Temporary agency 0.3 0.2 0.5
Other 0.7 1.2 1.9
Total 88.2 11.8 100
United States 1999
(1)
Not temporary
(2)
Temporary Sum 1 + 2
Full-time 78.5 1.4 79.9
Part-time 14.8 1.4 16.2
On-call or day 
laborer
1.3 0.6 1.9
Temporary agency 0.5 0.5 1.0
Contract company/
independent 
contractor
0.9 0.1 1.0
Total 95.9 4.1 100
a Shokukaku are employees who do not have a formal labor contract and are asked to
perform a specific task for the company.
SOURCE: Data for Japan come from special tabulations of the Bureau of Statistics
Employment Status Survey. Figures for the United States were tabulated by the
authors from the February 1999 supplement to the Current Population Survey.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 180  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
The Growth of Nonstandard Employment in Japan and the United States 181
contractors in the 1980s and 1990s (Conference Board 1995; Abraham
and Taylor 1996; Abraham 1990; Houseman 2001). 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKERS IN NONSTANDARD 
ARRANGEMENTS
Table 6.3 shows the distribution of part-time, temporary, and tem-
porary agency workers in Japan and the United States by gender and
age and the incidence of each nonstandard arrangement within age-
gender cells. Although women in both countries are more likely than
men to hold part-time or temporary jobs, the male-female differentials
are much less in the United States than in Japan. The incidence of tem-
porary employment and temporary agency employment is only slightly
higher among women than men in the United States. 
Although there is a higher incidence of part-time employment
among American than Japanese men, temporary employment is more
common among Japanese men. This reflects a difference in the type of
employment found among the youngest and oldest working men in the
two countries. Younger and older American working men are more
likely to be employed part-time, while in Japan, those age groups dis-
play a greater incidence of temporary employment. Among women,
older (65 and over) and teenage American women have higher rates of
part-time employment compared with Japan, whereas rates of part-time
employment are higher among prime-age women in Japan. Temporary
employment is much higher among Japanese women than American
women in all age brackets.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
FOR WORKERS
The growing number of workers in nonstandard arrangements has
raised concern primarily because these jobs are often associated with
low wages, few benefits, and little job security. Below, we study evi-
dence on the extent to which these stereotypes are, in fact, true. Fur-
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Table 6.3 Distribution and Incidence of Nonstandard Employment by 
Gender and Age in Japan and the United States (%)
Age and 
gender 
Part-time Temporary Temporary agency
U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan
Male 31.1
(10.5)
20.2
(6.3)
48.6
(3.8)
34.1
(6.7)
42.2
(0.8)
20.6
(0.2)
16–19 11.1
(68.3)
3.1
(46.6)
6.1
(8.9)
3.6
(33.9)
3.2
(1.2)
0.4
(0.0)
20–24 6.5
(22.8)
6.7
(20.8)
10.6
(8.1)
7.4
(14.5)
9.6
(1.8)
4.7
(0.4)
25–29 2.0
(5.8)
1.9
(4.8)
6.4
(4.1)
2.9
(4.5)
4.6
(0.7)
3.9
(0.2)
30–39 2.6
(3.6)
1.4
(2.0)
10.3
(3.0)
2.7
(2.5)
12.1
(0.9)
5.1
(0.2)
40–49 2.0
(2.9)
1.1
(1.4)
7.9
(2.5)
3.1
(2.5)
6.2
(0.5)
1.9
(0.1)
50–64 3.3
(5.9)
3.3
(4.0)
5.4
(2.3)
8.6
(6.6)
4.9
(0.5)
3.1
(0.0)
65+ 3.5
(48.9)
2.8
(18.7)
2.0
(4.1)
5.8
(24.3)
1.6
(1.4)
1.9
(0.3)
Female 68.9
(25.3)
79.8
(37.8)
51.4
(4.3)
66.0
(19.6)
57.8
(1.2)
79.4
(1.0)
16–19 12.7
(81.2)
3.5
(59.1)
7.3
(10.6)
3.8
(40.6)
2.5
(0.9)
0.4
(0.2)
20–24 9.6
(35.5)
7.6
(24.3)
10.1
(8.3)
7.8
(15.7)
11.3
(2.3)
13.2
(1.0)
25–29 5.3
(18.2)
5.7
(20.8)
6.9
(4.9)
5.5
(12.6)
9.2
(1.6)
25.3
(2.3)
30–39 13.9
(19.9)
14.2
(37.5)
10.0
(3.3)
11.0
(17.9)
14.3
(1.2)
26.5
(1.7)
40–49 12.7
(17.8)
24.8
(46.2)
8.6
(2.8)
17.8
(20.8)
12.1
(1.0)
9.3
(0.4)
50–64 10.7
(20.2)
21.4
(44.0)
6.4
(2.9)
17.1
(22.1)
7.2
(0.8)
5.1
(0.3)
65+ 4.0
(57.5)
2.6
(39.3)
2.2
(7.5)
3.0
(28.2)
1.3
(1.1)
0.0
(0.0)
Total 100
(17.4)
100
(18.8)
100
(4.1)
100
(11.8)
100
(1.0)
100
(0.5)
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are the percentage within the group that are part-time, tempo-
rary, or temporary agency workers.
SOURCE: Figures for Japan come from the 1997 Employment Status Survey, Bureau of
Statistics. Figures for part-time employment in the United States are authors’ tabulations
from the outgoing rotation groups of the 1999 Current Population Survey. Figures for tem-
porary and temporary agency employment in the United States come from the authors’
tabulations of the February 1999 supplement to the CPS. 
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ther, where differentials between workers in regular and nonstandard
arrangements exist, we examine why they exist.
Wages
In the United States, the average wages of part-time, direct-hire
temporary, on-call, and temporary agency workers are much lower than
those of regular full-time workers. Using a variety of methodologies
and data sets, a number of studies have attempted to carefully control
for differences in measured and unmeasured human capital between
workers in nonstandard and regular jobs. These studies generally have
found that workers in nonstandard arrangements still earn significantly
less than those in regular jobs.8 Low wages in nonstandard arrange-
ments would be of little concern if the workers in these jobs were sec-
ondary earners from middle-income or wealthy families. However,
workers in all nonstandard work arrangements are much more likely to
come from families living below or near the poverty line (100 to 125
percent of the poverty line). In 1995, 6 percent of regular full-time
workers lived at or near the poverty level compared with 22 percent of
temporary agency workers, 16 percent of on-call and day laborers, 12
percent of contract company workers, 15 percent of direct-hire tempo-
raries, and 14 percent of regular part-time workers.9 
As in the United States, the average hourly wage of Japanese work-
ers in nonstandard arrangements is considerably less than that of work-
ers in regular full-time positions. Using cross-section microdata from
the 1989 Survey on the Status of Part-Time Workers conducted by the
Japan Institute of Labor, we estimated wage models for full-time and
part-time women.10 One interesting result from these estimates is that
variables measuring human capital, such as education and tenure, have
a much smaller effect on part-time workers’ wages than on those of
full-time workers. The very low return on tenure experienced by part-
time workers is consistent with the fact that part-time workers are not
covered by the nenko wage system prevalent in Japan, in which
employees’ wages are closely tied to their age and tenure.11 
Figure 6.1 shows the results of a simulation, based on estimates
from these wage models, of a wage-tenure profile for a part-time and a
full-time worker with the same characteristics. Initially, the wages of
the full-time and part-time worker are virtually identical. As the tenure
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of the two workers increases, however, the wage gap grows.12 This sim-
ulation illustrates the problem faced by Japanese companies, which are
saddled with older workers receiving high wages; the incentive is to
hire part-time workers to reduce wage costs, given that the workforce
is expected to continue to age. 
One might argue that the steeper wage-tenure profile of full-time
workers reflects greater growth in productivity, perhaps because full-
time workers receive more training. However, this explanation is
unlikely to completely account for the wage differential between part-
time and full-time workers. Wage-tenure profiles are much steeper in
Japan than in the United States. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) note
that if the steeper wage-tenure profile reflected greater growth in firm-
specific human capital, then the age of retirement should be later in
Figure 6.1 Wage-Tenure Profiles of Part-Time and Full-Time Workers, 
Japan
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis using data from the Survey on the Status of Part-Time
Workers, Japan Institute of Labor, 1989.
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Japan than in the United States. In fact, the average age of mandatory
retirement is considerably lower in Japan than in the United States. In
addition, 68 percent of Japanese firms report having a system called
saikoyoseido, in which retired workers are rehired at a much lower sal-
ary (Ministry of Labor 1999). This practice also indicates wages of
older regular workers are often above their revenue marginal product.13
Benefits
In both Japan and the United States, laws governing benefits often
do not apply to those in nonstandard arrangements. In Japan, employ-
ers are not obligated to pay social security, disability, and unemploy-
ment insurance taxes for many part-time and temporary workers.14 In
addition, if the worker earns less than 1.3 million yen in a year, he or
she may be regarded as a dependent of the household head, and the
employer need not pay the social security premium. As a dependent,
however, the worker is still entitled to a basic pension. Everyone in
Japan is required to be enrolled in some form of health insurance, and
paid employees generally are enrolled in company-provided health
insurance plans. Payment of the health insurance premium is financed
through a payroll tax, the cost of which is shared by the employer and
the employee. However, employers are not required to provide health
insurance to those working less than three-fourths the hours of regular
workers. If the worker earns less than 1.3 million yen per year, then he
or she is entitled to coverage as a dependent under the household
head’s policy.15 Thus, this tax structure, in which many part-time and
temporary workers receive benefits as dependents, lowers the tax costs
to these workers and their employers and promotes nonstandard
employment.
In the United States, employers must pay social security and unem-
ployment insurance taxes on all workers whose earnings are above
some minimal amount, although workers in nonstandard arrangements
who then become unemployed often do not meet threshold earnings or
hours requirements to qualify for unemployment insurance. State
workers’ compensation laws often exempt domestic, farm, and other
casual labor, but otherwise cover most workers.
U.S. law does not require that companies provide workers with
benefits, such as a private pension plan and health insurance, but it
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does provide substantial tax incentives for employers to provide these
benefits. If employers choose to provide their employees with these
benefits (and they and their employees take advantage of the tax bene-
fits), the provision of the benefit is subject to regulation. The regula-
tions seek, among other things, to ensure that benefit plans and
associated tax breaks broadly benefit employees in the company, not
just highly compensated employees. However, many part-time, on-call,
and direct-hire temporary employees are not covered by these regula-
tions. Moreover, because independent contractors, contract company
workers, and temporary agency workers are not employees of the
establishment for which they perform work, they are not covered by a
client company’s benefit plans. One concern is that benefit regulations
in the United States provide incentives for companies to use nonstand-
ard work arrangements to avoid paying benefits to certain groups of
workers.
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 provide information on the percentage of work-
ers in nonstandard and regular full-time arrangements receiving
selected benefits in Japan and the United States. In the Japanese data,
workers were asked whether or not they were enrolled in a particular
program. Regular full-time workers were not asked if they were cov-
ered by employment insurance, health insurance, or the employee’s
pension insurance program because, by law, all regular full-time
employees must be enrolled in these programs. With the exception of
transferred employees, workers in all nonstandard arrangements are far
less likely than regular full-time workers to receive all types of bene-
fits. Receipt of benefits is especially low among part-time and tempo-
rary workers in Japan, although if workers in nonstandard
arrangements are married and earn less than 1.3 million yen per year,
they are entitled to basic pension and health insurance coverage
through their spouse.
U.S. workers in all nonstandard arrangements are much less likely
than regular full-time employees to have health insurance or a retire-
ment plan through their employer. Moreover, they are much less likely
to be eligible to receive these benefits from their employer.16 Unlike the
situation in Japan, there is no universal health insurance program in the
United States. The low levels of employer-provided health insurance
among workers in nonstandard arrangements would be of little concern
if these workers generally had health insurance from another source.
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Table 6.4 Benefits Received, by Employment Arrangement, Japan (%)
Workers in nonstandard arrangements
Regular
employees Total
Transferred
employees
Temporary
agency
workers
Part-time 
workers
Temporary
workers
Contract
workers Others
Employment insurance — 50.1 65.1 69.9 45.7 31.3 80.9 63.0
Health insurance — 40.3 67.9 65.7 33.3 29.9 80.8 58.9
Employee’s pension 
insurance
— 38.1 67.1 61.4 31.9 12.2 78.1 54.1
Private enterprise annuity 55.5 8.3 63.2 9.6 4.4 1.9 14.2 11.6
Lump sum retirement 
payment
90.5 16.1 84.2 15.4 10.9 8.4 26.8 25.3
Provision of bonus 
payment
95.9 49.1 88.6 28.8 45.9 51.1 66.6 45.1
Recreation facility 70.0 35.3 82.9 46.2 30.2 15.8 58.8 40.7
NOTE: The statistics are based on individuals’ responses to questions about their benefits. Employee’s pension insurance is a compul-
sory pension plan enrolled by the company.
SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Survey on the Diversification of Employment, 1999.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 187  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
188Table 6.5 The Incidence of Health Insurance and Retirement Plans, by Employment Arrangement, United States 
(%)
Health insurance Retirement plan
Health
 insurance from 
any source
Health 
insurance 
through 
employer
Eligible for 
health insurance 
from employer
Covered by 
employer 
pension plan or 
has tax deferred 
retirement 
account
Participates 
in employer 
pension plan
Eligible to 
participate in 
employer 
pension plan
Temporary agency 
workers
43.0 9.0 27.9 20.1 4.3 9.5
On-call or day 
laborers
68.5 21.2 30.1 38.0 22.2 25.9
Contract company 
workers
84.2 59.5 76.4 55.4 39.2 46.3
Direct-hire 
temporaries
74.9 26.3 34.6 26.7 19.8 23.3
Regular part-time 
employees
76.3 17.2 31.6 33.0 21.3 25.9
Regular full-time 
employees
88.2 73.4 84.2 70.4 64.2 69.4
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations from February 1999 CPS Supplement on Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements.
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Although many workers in nonstandard arrangements do have health
insurance coverage outside their place of employment, temporary
agency workers, on-call workers, direct-hire temporaries, and regular
part-time workers are still much less likely than regular full-time work-
ers to have health insurance coverage. Health insurance coverage is
especially low among temporary agency workers; only 43 percent have
any health insurance. Workers in the United States are allowed to save
money in tax-deferred retirement accounts if they do not participate in
an employer-sponsored pension plan. However, the fraction of workers
who have some private retirement plan is still dramatically less among
workers in all nonstandard arrangements compared with workers in
regular full-time jobs. 
One might suspect that workers in nonstandard arrangements
receive fewer benefits than regular full-time workers because they
have less human capital or are concentrated in occupations and indus-
tries in which the incidence of benefits is lower. Yet, even controlling
for demographic and job characteristics, workers in nonstandard
arrangements are significantly less likely than regular full-time work-
ers to be eligible to participate in an employer-sponsored health insur-
ance or pension plan or to have health insurance or a retirement plan
from any source (Houseman 1997).
Job Security
Part-time and temporary workers in Japan enjoy less job security,
legally and in practice, than regular full-time workers. In addition to
the fact that regular full-time workers receive implied commitments of
lifetime employment at large- and medium-sized companies, the
employer must provide advance notice and have some compelling rea-
son for dismissing workers (Matsuda 1992; Schregle 1993). In con-
trast, companies may easily dismiss temporary workers by not
renewing their contract. Court rulings regarding job protection
afforded regular part-time workers have been contradictory. However,
about half of part-time workers are on temporary contract. The hiring
of part-time workers on temporary contract is especially common at
large companies, which offer strong job security to their regular full-
time employees. By placing part-time workers on temporary contract,
companies clarify that part-time workers do not have implicit guaran-
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tees of lifetime employment. Studies of fluctuations in part-time and
temporary employment support the view that workers in these posi-
tions have less job security and help buffer workers in regular full-time
jobs (Houseman and Osawa 1994, 1998).
There is little basis for believing a priori that U.S. workers in non-
standard employment arrangements have less job security than those in
regular full-time jobs. Although many U.S. companies avoid laying off
core workers during downturns, an implied commitment of lifetime
employment is rare in the United States, and the employment-at-will
doctrine, in which employers have the right to hire and fire workers at
will, still largely operates. Nevertheless, employment-at-will has been
weakened by laws that prohibit employers from discriminating against
workers because of their race, sex, religion, ethnicity, age, or disability
and by court rulings that afford employees certain protections against
dismissal when their employer has given them an implied commitment
of employment. In addition, research suggests workers in certain non-
standard arrangements have less job security than those in regular jobs.
Based on administrative data from the State of Washington, Segal and
Sullivan (1997a) find that the average duration of employment for
workers in the temporary help industry is substantially less than that
for workers in other industries. In a study of labor market transitions,
temporary agency workers, on-call workers, direct-hire temporaries,
contract company workers, and regular part-time workers were more
likely than comparable regular full-time workers to be with a different
employer, be unemployed, or be involuntarily out of the labor force
one month and one year later. In addition, the study found that a sub-
stantial share of the modest decline in job stability over the last decade
can be attributed to the growth in temporary agency employment
(Houseman and Polivka 2000).
WHY HAS NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT GROWN SO 
MUCH FASTER IN JAPAN THAN IN THE UNITED STATES?
There are many basic similarities in the phenomenon of nonstand-
ard employment in Japan and the United States. For example, the over-
all levels of nonstandard employment are similar in the two countries
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(though the incidence of temporary employment is much higher in
Japan); young and old workers and women are disproportionately rep-
resented in nonstandard employment arrangements; and workers in
nonstandard arrangements tend to earn lower wages, receive fewer
benefits, and have less job security than those in regular full-time posi-
tions, even controlling for differences in worker and job characteristics. 
However, what differ between the two countries are recent trends
in nonstandard employment. The share in nonstandard employment
arrangements has increased dramatically in Japan, largely because of
the growth in part-time employment. In contrast, the share in part-time
employment has declined in the United States over the last decade, and
although the share in temporary agency employment has risen rapidly,
it still represents a relatively small share of total employment. In ana-
lyzing and comparing trends in nonstandard employment in Japan and
the United States, we seek to answer two fundamental questions. First,
why has part-time employment, including temporary part-time
employment, grown so dramatically in Japan while falling in the
United States? Second, are the forces underlying the growth in tempo-
rary agency employment and other nonstandard arrangements in the
United States similar to those underlying the growth in nonstandard
arrangements in Japan? In other words, are we observing similar phe-
nomena, albeit on different scales and in different mixes of nonstand-
ard arrangements, in the United States and Japan, or do the trends in
nonstandard arrangements signal a divergence in the industrial rela-
tions practices in the two countries?
Why Has Part-Time Employment Grown in Japan?
No simple demand- or supply-side story can account for the rapid
growth in part-time employment in Japan. Decompositions show that
the growth in part-time employment cannot be attributed to a shift in
the industrial composition of employment toward industries that inten-
sively use part-time workers. Nor can it be attributed to a shift in the
demographic composition of the workforce toward groups that desire
more part-time work. Rather, the growth in part-time employment is
attributable almost entirely to an increase in the incidence of part-time
employment within industries and within demographic groups. In fact,
what is quite striking about the growth of part-time employment in
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Japan is how widespread the phenomenon is. The incidence of part-
time employment has increased dramatically among both men and
women and in almost all age groups and industries (Houseman and
Osawa 1998). In addition, the growth in part-time employment cannot
simply be attributed to the long recession that has plagued the Japanese
economy since the 1990s. Although the recession may have acceler-
ated the growth of part-time employment, the share in part-time
employment began increasing rapidly well before the recession of the
1990s. 
We argue that the rapid increase in part-time employment is driven,
in large part, by demand-side forces and reflects strains in the Japanese
industrial relations system. Increased demand by firms for part-time
workers has been accommodated, to some degree, by an increased sup-
ply of women workers, who have sought part-time employment
because of the decline in opportunities for self- and family employ-
ment. Finally, public policy has encouraged the growth of part-time
employment by providing substantial tax incentives for firms to hire
part-time workers and for workers to take part-time jobs. 
Strains in the Japanese industrial relations system
Two prominent features of Japanese industrial relations are life-
time employment and nenko (seniority-based) wages. This industrial
relations system, which first emerged prior to World War II, became
the norm in large firms after the war. It also strongly influenced work-
ing conditions in medium- and small-sized firms. Under the nenko
wage system, in theory, workers are initially paid wages below their
marginal revenue product, but as tenure rises they eventually are paid
more than their marginal revenue product. For war-devastated Japan,
nenko wages depressed initial wage outlays, thereby freeing up funds
for capital investment. The system was sustainable because the work-
force was young and the economy rapidly growing, thus ensuring that
the age structure of a firm’s workforce would be pyramid shaped.
Workers favored this system because wages rapidly rose just as work-
ers’ family-related expenditures increased (Nakatani 1987). 
Providing job security facilitated the introduction of new technolo-
gies on the factory floor. With the widespread adoption of new technol-
ogies after the war, firms were compelled to provide continuous in-
house training. Knowing that jobs would not be lost as a result of inno-
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vation, workers did not oppose its introduction. Knowing that their
own interests were tied to the fate of their firms, workers also became
more committed to their companies, an inclination reinforced by pater-
nalistic employment practices. In this way, the lifetime employment
and turnover-depressing nenko wage system represented a long-term
social contract between companies and workers. 
The structure of financial markets also supported these post-war
industrial relations practices. Given the prevalence of cross-share hold-
ing arrangements (related keiretsu firms, or friendly firms, would con-
trol large blocks of a firm’s shares) and access to bank loans at low
rates, firms could focus on expanding market share and long-term prof-
its without worrying about pressures to boost quarterly earnings. Thus,
financial markets exerted little pressure on companies to trim the labor
force during business cycle downturns.
Some of the forces that made the Japanese employment system
logical for much of the post–World War II period have changed, creat-
ing pressures on businesses to adopt new practices. One is the changing
demographic composition of the workforce. The birth rate in Japan has
been steadily falling since World War II, and accompanying the decline
has been a graying workforce with higher job tenure. The increase in
tenure increases companies’ wage costs because, under the nenko sys-
tem, wages rise sharply with tenure and this rise is not matched by
increases in productivity. Because the number of people in their twen-
ties is declining dramatically, the problem of an aging workforce will
not be alleviated in the near future. 
At the same time that employers’ wage costs have been rising, Jap-
anese businesses have come under tremendous pressure to lower labor
costs in the face of decelerating economic growth, massive debt bur-
dens—especially in manufacturing—and increased international com-
petition with the opening of Japanese markets. Trade liberalization has
resulted not only in the growth of imports, but also in a surge of foreign
direct investment, with leading banks, insurance companies, and auto
companies coming under foreign control. Although in the past, the
close relationship between Japanese companies and banks allowed
them to focus on long-term growth and market share, Japanese busi-
nesses now face foreign shareholders and banks who expect short-run
profitability (Alexander 2000).
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In sum, firms currently have workforces that are top-heavy with
older, highly paid, but less productive workers at a time when cutting
costs and raising productivity are necessary in the face of heightened
global competition. Japanese firms have responded by trimming
bonuses, cutting overtime, dispatching workers to subsidiaries, and
forcing older workers into early retirement. To make wages more
responsive to performance, some companies have begun determining
wages on an annual basis (nenposei). However, the implicit social con-
tract that has developed over the years makes it difficult for companies
to introduce sweeping changes to their industrial relations practices in
rapid fashion without causing loss of morale and risking productivity
declines among regular workers. As a result, we argue, many compa-
nies have continued to protect their core workforce, while expanding
the size of their nonstandard workforce, especially part-time workers,
who do not receive nenko wages and implied commitments of job
security.17
Increase in employers’ demand for part-time workers
The evidence on the growth of part-time employment in Japan is
generally consistent with our demand-side explanation. Figure 6.2
depicts the natural logarithm of the number of job vacancies and appli-
cants for full-time and part-time workers over the 1975–2000 period.18
If the growth in the stock of part-time workers over the period were
driven by a growth in employer demand, we would expect the growth
in job vacancies for part-time workers to exceed the growth in part-
time job applicants. This is the pattern observed during the 1980s,
which was a period of economic expansion in Japan. During the 1980s,
job vacancies for part-time workers also grew rapidly relative to the
growth of job vacancies for full-time positions.
During the early 1990s, when the economy first went into reces-
sion, job vacancies for both full-time and part-time positions fell. Since
the early 1990s, job vacancies for part-time positions have soared,
more than doubling between 1993 and the second quarter of 2000,
while vacancies for full-time positions have continued to decline.
Applicants for part-time and full-time positions have risen steadily dur-
ing the 1990s. By 2000, there was a large gap between job applicants
and vacancies for full-time positions, indicating an excess supply of
workers for full-time regular jobs at existing wage levels. It is widely
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presumed that the rapid growth of part-time workers in the 1990s dur-
ing Japan’s severe recession was demand driven, and the data in Figure
6.2 are consistent with this analysis. However, the vacancy data in Fig-
ure 6.2 suggest that the growth in the expansionary years was also led
by demand forces. 
The patterns of growth in part-time employment by age and gender
also are consistent with a theory of demand-driven growth. If busi-
nesses have been substituting part-time workers for full-time workers
on the margin when they hire, we would expect that increases in the
incidence of part-time employment would be most dramatic among
demographic groups with a high share of new entrants or reentrants to
the workforce. Indeed, this is precisely the pattern observed. The inci-
dence of part-time employment grew dramatically among young men
and women. For instance, between 1982 and 1997 the incidence of
Figure 6.2 Logarithm of Job Vacancies and Job Applicants for Full-Time 
and Part-Time Jobs, Japan
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations using data from the Ministry of Labor.
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part-time employment grew from 19 percent to 47 percent among
working men ages 15 to 19, and from 15 percent to 59 percent among
working women ages 15 to 19. The rise in part-time employment was
also dramatic for working women over 40, who are likely to be reenter-
ing the workforce after rearing children, and among men age 65 and
over, who are likely to be taking on a bridge job to retirement.
Finally, evidence from employer surveys is consistent with an
increase in employer demand for part-time workers. Table 6.6 reports
results from the 1994 and 1999 Ministry of Labor Survey on the Diver-
sification of Employment on the principal reasons businesses hired
additional part-time workers. By far, the most common reason busi-
nesses cite for increasing the number of part-time workers is to save
personnel costs. In addition, the fraction of businesses citing labor cost
savings grew between 1994 and 1999. There is also evidence that busi-
nesses are increasingly hiring part-time workers to facilitate employ-
ment adjustment. The latter finding is consistent with the fact that the
fraction of part-time workers on temporary contract, and hence who are
easier to dismiss, has grown dramatically. The notion that businesses
are increasingly hiring part-time workers because of supply-side con-
straints is not supported by these data. Whereas 20 percent of busi-
nesses cited difficulty in hiring full-time workers as a reason for hiring
part-time workers in 1994, about half that percentage cited this factor
in 1999. 
Supply-side and public policy factors
Although structural changes in Japan’s economy have placed
strains on the current industrial relations system and resulted in an
increased demand for part-time workers by firms, structural economic
changes also may have increased the supply of workers seeking part-
time positions. Nitta (1999) and Nagase (1997; this volume) note that
the growth in part-time employment has paralleled the decline in fam-
ily- and self-employment. Nagase argues that part-time jobs, like fam-
ily- and self-employment, are much more flexible than regular jobs and
enable women to accommodate family demands. She posits that the
decline in opportunities in family- and self-employment in recent
decades led to an increase in the supply of women seeking part-time
jobs. Thus, an increase in women seeking these jobs likely helped to
accommodate the increase in demand for part-time workers.
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Table 6.6 Principal Reasons for Increasing Nonstandard Employment among Japanese Businesses Expecting to 
Hire More Workers in Nonstandard Arrangements (%)
Part-time workers
Temporary agency 
workers
Temporary/day 
laborersd Contract/on-calle
1994a 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999
Reasons
Short-
time 
workerb Othersc
Difficult to hire full-time 
workers
20.3 9.3 10.9 16.0 8.5 20.6 10.2 14.3 7.5
Specialize core workers in 
more important task
— 14.6 12.2 — 14.2 — 9.1 — 11.5
Respond to increase in 
professional task
9.5 11.5 11.6 37.8 23.8 14.7 11.8 57.1 42.4
Want to hire person with 
experience and skill
6.5 10.6 14.2 22.9 31.0 8.5 13.3 19.8 34.6
Respond to economic 
fluctuation (facilitate 
employment adjustment)
20.7 26.9 24.8 18.6 26.2 20.7 34.3 8.8 19.0
Respond to long operation 
time
19.7 23.9 17.3 3.1 6.0 9.8 11.6 5.8 6.2
Respond to fluctuating 
workload over a day or 
week
34.4 36.2 21.9 15.7 8.1 15.1 15.9 7.7 4.0
(continued)
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Part-time workers
Temporary agency 
workers
Temporary/day 
laborersd Contract/on-calle
1994a 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999
Reasons
Short-
time 
workerb Othersc
Respond to seasonal or 
temporary business 
fluctuation
15.8 19.1 18.2 12.1 22.8 36.2 36.3 10.0 6.5
Save personnel costs 52.3 61.5 59.1 35.9 40.3 28.7 45.3 19.6 33.8
Hire retirees 5.2 5.5 7.0 2.0 0.9 11.6 7.6 13.6 18.0
Replacement of workers for 
taking child care leave, or 
care for aged parent
— 4.7 4.0 — 7.5 — 4.9 — 4.6
Other 7.4 6.1 6.4 5.7 5.8 9.1 3.2 7.1 7.0
a
 Work fewer hours per day or days per week than regular employees.
b
 Work fewer hours per day or days per week than regular workers, and employed on a contract lasting more than one month or no spe-
cific period.
c
 Work much the same hours per day or days per week as regular workers, employed on a contract lasting more than one month or no spe-
cific period, and classified as part-time in workplace.
d
 Day laborers are not included in the 1999 data.
e On-call workers are not included in the 1999 data.
SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Survey on the Diversification of Employment, 1994, 1999.
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Public policies have also encouraged the growth in part-time
employment in Japan by providing significant tax incentives to busi-
nesses to hire part-time workers and to workers to accept part-time
positions. As noted above, if the part-time worker is married and earns
less than 1.3 million yen in a year, he or she can be regarded as a
dependent and thus need not pay the social security or health insurance
premium, but remains entitled to receive the health insurance or basic
pension on retirement.19 
Similarly, workers earning up to 1,030,000 yen per year do not pay
taxes on their income, and, if they are married, their spouse may claim
a dependent deduction from his or her income taxes (currently 380,000
yen) and may receive a dependent allowance from his or her employer.
If a worker’s income exceeds this level, not only must he or she pay
taxes on income, but, if married, the spouse will lose his or her depen-
dent tax deduction and may forfeit (in about 40 percent of the cases)
the family allowance paid by the employer. This tax and compensation
structure creates a significant financial incentive for married women to
work part-time and earn less than this income threshold. Many part-
time women in Japan, especially the highly educated, reduce their
hours of work specifically to avoid exceeding the annual income
threshold (Nagase 1998). According to the Ministry of Labor’s Survey
on Part-Time Workers, the fraction reporting that they adjusted their
working hours so that their earnings would fall below the threshold
level increased from 26 percent in 1990 to 32 percent in 1995.
The tax thresholds should also have the effect of depressing hourly
earnings of part-time workers relative to full-time workers. Interest-
ingly, although we have argued above that the employer demand for
part-time workers has increased relative to supply, contrary to what one
would expect under this scenario, the wages of part-time workers have
actually fallen relative to those of full-time workers. Nagase (this vol-
ume) argues that these tax incentives and their depressing effect on
part-time wages may help explain this paradox.20
Why Has the Share in Part-Time Employment Fallen 
in the United States?
While the share of the Japanese workforce in part-time employ-
ment rose sharply in both the 1980s and 1990s, the share of the U.S.
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workforce in part-time employment rose modestly in the 1980s and fell
in the 1990s (Table 6.1). These divergent trends reflect differences in
both supply- and demand-side forces in the two countries.
Table 6.7 provides a decomposition of changes in the part-time
employment share across demographic groups from 1979 to 1989 and
from 1989 to 1999 in the United States.21 The change in the rate of part-
time employment may be decomposed as follows:
(1) )P = G)PiWi + GPi)Wi + G)Pi)Wi                                    
where i indexes the demographic group; Pi is group i’s rate of part-time
employment, and Wi is group i’s share of paid employment. Thus, the
Table 6.7 Decomposition of the Change in Part-Time Employment in the 
United States
1979–1989
(1)
Share in 
part-time
(%)
(2)
Employment 
share
(%) (3)
∆PW
(4)
P∆W
(5)
∆P∆W
Sum
(3) – (5)1979 1989 1979 1989
Teens 54.0 64.0 8.2 5.8 0.8 –1.3 –0.2 –0.7
Men 6.3 7.8 53.5 51.4 0.8 –0.1 –0.0 0.7
Women 26.5 25.6 38.3 42.8 –0.3 1.2 –0.0 0.8
Column 
sum
1.3 –0.2 –0.3 0.8
1989–1999
1989 1999 1989 1999 ∆PW P∆W ∆P∆W
Sum
(3) – (5)
Teens 64.0 66.7 5.8 5.4 0.2 –0.2 –0.0 –0.1
Men 7.8 7.7 51.4 50.8 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 –0.1
Women 25.6 22.5 42.8 43.9 –1.4 0.3 –0.0 –1.1
Column 
sum
–1.3 –0.0 –0.0 –1.3
NOTE: Data on part-time and employment shares for 1979 and 1989 were adjusted to
account for changes to the CPS in 1994. We used the adjustment factors provided in
Polivka and Miller (1998). Numbers are in percentages. See text for explanation of
decomposition.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from Current Population Survey, U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1979, 1989, 1999.
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change in the aggregate rate of part-time employment may be decom-
posed into three terms: the part owing to changes in the employment
shares across groups, the part owing to changes in the rates of part-time
employment within groups, and the interaction of these two effects.
The 1979 and 1989 employment shares and rates of part-time employ-
ment were adjusted for the redesign of the CPS.22 
None of the increase in the rate of part-time employment between
1979 and 1989 may be attributed to a shift in the composition of
employment toward workers who supply more part-time employment.
Both women and teens have a high rate of part-time employment, and
the increase in the share of employment accounted for by women was
offset by the fall in the employment share of teens. The rise in the share
of part-time employment, instead, is accounted for entirely by an
increase in the incidence of part-time employment among teens and
adult men; the incidence of part-time employment actually fell among
adult women.
Decompositions not reported here show that the decline in the rate
of part-time employment among adult women in the 1980s is entirely
attributable to a decline among married women. Interestingly, the
decline in the rate of part-time employment among married women
occurred at a time when their labor force participation soared. Using
data on the gross flows of women across labor force states, Williams
(1995) finds that the reason part-time employment declined among
women was because they were more likely to stay in full-time jobs and
were less likely to exit from the labor force or into part-time jobs. 
Why did full-time employment among married women increase in
the 1980s? Several facts are inconsistent with a demand-side explana-
tion (i.e., that firms were increasing their demand for full-time jobs):
part-time employment actually increased among adult men and teens;
the transitions from unemployment into full-time employment did not
grow; and although women’s wages were rising relative to men’s over
the period, this increase began before the 1980s, when the incidence of
part-time employment among women was growing. Williams (1995)
suggests that the rise in full-time employment among working women
may be attributed to an increase in the availability of child care over
the period, making the opportunity costs of full-time employment rela-
tive to part-time employment lower. This theory is consistent with find-
ings that the rise in full-time employment occurred because married
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women (who are more likely to have children at home) with full-time
jobs were less likely to drop out of the labor force or switch to part-
time jobs. Nevertheless, the availability of child care is not exogenous,
and presumably the increased availability was a response to an increase
in the demand for these services by women, who faced greater opportu-
nities and social acceptance in the workplace. Changing job opportuni-
ties and societal attitudes, in turn, are related to a complex set of
factors, including equal employment laws passed in the United States
in the 1960s.
In contrast to the situation in the United States, many married Japa-
nese women prefer part-time positions because of the declining avail-
ability of family- and self-employment. Because of the costs and
restrictions (e.g., drop off and pick up times) of child care, the declin-
ing number of multigenerational households (i.e., the availability of in-
house day care), and rising elder care responsibilities, many women
prefer part-time to full-time employment to accommodate family
responsibilities (Osawa 1998; Sato 1998). The reason the supply of
child care services in Japan has not expanded to meet working
women’s needs, as it has in the United States, may be related to the fact
that equal employment opportunity laws are much weaker and were
introduced much later in Japan than in the United States, and the
opportunities for full-time employment for Japanese women have
lagged behind those for American women.
The share in part-time employment fell between 1989 and 1999 in
the United States. This decline may be attributed entirely to a decline in
the incidence of part-time employment among women. The incidence
of part-time employment among teens actually rose, while the inci-
dence of part-time employment among adult men remained about the
same. Changes in the demographic composition of the workforce by
themselves would have led to no change in the share of part-time
employment in the economy. Although one might argue that tighter
labor markets in 1999 compared with 1989 were responsible for the
decline in part-time employment, this demand-side story is inconsistent
with the fact that part-time employment rose among teens and
remained stable among adult men. The trend in the 1990s is consistent
with a supply-side story that women continued to shift to full-time
work, possibly owing to greater availability of child care, rising rela-
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tive wages, and changing expectations about women’s roles in the
workforce and in the family.
GROWTH IN OTHER NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
The divergent trends in part-time employment in the United States
and Japan reflect quite different demand, supply, and institutional
forces in the two countries. Nevertheless, the share in other types of
nonstandard employment has risen in both the United States and Japan.
Here, we examine the causes of the growth in other nonstandard
employment arrangements in the United States and ask whether there
are similarities between these developments and the growth of part-
time employment and other nonstandard arrangements in Japan. 
The growth in temporary agency employment has received the
most attention in the United States. Given that the majority of tempo-
rary agency workers say they would prefer a regular job, it is generally
argued that the rapid growth in temporary agency employment is
largely driven by employer demand. Existing studies suggest several
reasons for the rapid growth in temporary employment in the United
States. 
American companies, like Japanese companies, arguably sought to
increase productivity and cut costs in recent years in response to
domestic and international competitive pressures. One way American
companies have done this is by more closely tailoring staffing levels to
actual workload, thereby reducing average staffing levels and using
temporary agency workers only when necessary. In this way, compa-
nies use temporaries to increase workforce flexibility in response to
fluctuations in workload. In a survey of American businesses con-
ducted by the Upjohn Institute, 37 percent of those reporting a recent
increase in temporary agency workers stated the need to respond to
fluctuations in workload as a reason for the increase (Houseman 1997).
Another 37 percent of surveyed employers cited difficulty in find-
ing qualified workers on their own, and 24 percent cited screening
workers as reasons for increasing their use of temporary agency work-
ers. The tight labor markets prevailing in the United States in the 1990s
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made it difficult for companies to recruit adequate staff without signifi-
cantly increasing wages. The growth of temporary agency employment
may have reduced pressure on companies to raise wages during the
prolonged expansion and facilitated the use of more risky, less-quali-
fied workers. As a practical matter, if employers raise wages for new
hires, they must also raise the wages for their existing workforce. How-
ever, if existing workers face significant costs in changing jobs,
employers may exercise wage discrimination between marginal and
inframarginal workers by using new workers through temporary help
agencies. The temporary help agency is the official employer of the
new hires and pays them the higher wages. There is some case study
evidence to suggest that this is occurring in the United States, particu-
larly in higher-paid, skilled occupations in short supply (Houseman,
Kalleberg, and Erickcek 2003).
Especially in low-skill jobs, employers may be willing to use less-
qualified candidates through temporary help agencies until they are
able to recruit qualified candidates on their own. Alternatively, they
may be willing to try out less-qualified candidates through a temporary
help agency and then hire them as permanent employees if they prove
themselves during a trial period. Temporary agency workers often
receive lower wages and typically receive fewer benefits than they
would as a regular employee. Particularly if a company offers generous
benefits to its regular workers, using temporary agencies during a pro-
bationary period may be cheaper than hiring workers directly (House-
man 2001), and these lower costs may make it more attractive for
companies to try out riskier workers.23 Many companies also believe
they can more effectively screen workers through temporary agencies.
Using temporary agencies obviates the need for managers to fire work-
ers on probation. Because these workers are not employees of the com-
pany, managers simply choose not to hire them into the company; the
temporary agency staff will reassign workers not selected to another
client or handle the unpleasant task of terminating them. Arguably,
then, by using a temporary agency to screen workers, managers are less
likely to keep workers who display poor or mediocre performance dur-
ing their probationary period. 
The growing threat of legal action by dismissed employees is
another potential reason that employers are increasingly using tempo-
rary agencies to screen workers for permanent positions. Court rulings
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granting workers implied contracts to their jobs, coupled with a growth
in legal action by dismissed employees, arguably have made compa-
nies more cautious about whom they hire. Autor (2003) finds that up to
20 percent of the growth in temporary agency employment in the
United States may be attributed to the growth of implied contract law. 
The growth in temporary agency employment in Japan is largely
related to the deregulation of this sector in recent years. Prior to 1986,
temporary staffing agencies were prohibited by the Employment Secu-
rity Act of 1947, with an exception for those run by trade unions.
Union-run agencies were not allowed to charge for their services. In
1986, the government passed legislation to permit temporary staffing
agencies to supply workers to perform 11 specified tasks. In 1995, this
law was amended to cover 26 job categories. The Labor Dispatching
Law of December 1, 1999, greatly expanded the jobs in which tempo-
rary agency workers could be employed. The current law no longer
specifies the job categories in which temporary agency workers are
permitted, but rather provides a short list of occupations in which they
are prohibited. Temporary agency employment is expected to grow
rapidly in the coming years as a result of this deregulation. 
Among Japanese employers who in 1999 expected to increase their
use of temporary agencies, the most common reason given was to save
on personnel costs, as was the case with part-time workers (Table 6.6).
The percentage citing personnel cost savings increased slightly from
1994 to 1999. The percentage citing the need to hire someone with
experience and skill also increased. Moreover, a growing number of
employers appear to be using temporary agency workers to respond to
seasonal or cyclical fluctuations in workload, thereby buffering core
workers from such demand fluctuations. Unlike the situation in the
United States, the difficulty of finding full-time workers has never
been an important reason why Japanese employers use temporary
agency workers and has become even less important over time. 
Evidence points to some growth in the share of Japanese workers
in temporary and contract jobs.24 As noted, the growth in temporary
contracts stems from an increase in the fraction of part-time and other
nonstandard workers who are on temporary contract. And as is the case
for these other employment arrangements, there has been a large
increase in the fraction of employers who cite personnel cost savings
and the ability to facilitate employment adjustment or respond to sea-
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sonal or temporary business fluctuations as a reason for using more
temporary workers. With respect to the latter, Japanese companies, like
American companies, have reduced staffing levels in response to com-
petitive pressure to increase productivity and reduce costs. These lower
staffing levels, in turn, give rise to a greater demand for nonstandard
employment arrangements to accommodate workload fluctuations. The
economic slowdown plaguing the Japanese economy in the 1990s con-
tributed to economic uncertainty and fueled demand for a more flexible
workforce. In addition, a large fraction of Japanese employers are
using contract employees because of their experience and skill.
Available evidence points to a growth in contracting out in the
United States as well, for reasons that are similar to those given by Jap-
anese companies. Like Japanese companies, American companies
often contract out work to tap the special skills of contract workers, to
accommodate demand fluctuations, and to lower labor costs, especially
by avoiding fringe benefits costs (Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden
2003). Contracting out to lower labor costs has been an especially con-
tentious issue between American unions and management.
Thus, if we set aside the decline in part-time employment in the
United States, there are broad similarities in the development of non-
standard employment in the two countries. Where nonstandard
employment arrangements have increased, employer demand has
played an important role in their growth. Companies in both countries
are under competitive pressures to increase productivity and reduce
labor costs, and they have used nonstandard employment arrangements
to this end. In some respects, the growth of temporary agency employ-
ment and contracting out in the United States is similar to the growth in
part-time and other nonstandard employment in Japan.
Nevertheless, the overall growth of nonstandard employment in
Japan dwarfs that of the United States, and this fact reflects fundamen-
tally different conditions facing employers in the two countries. The
economic slowdown, the aging of the workforce, and an industrial rela-
tions system characterized by steep wage profiles and strong job secu-
rity for regular full-time employees were important drivers of growth
in nonstandard employment arrangements in Japan. These pressures
were largely absent in the U.S. economy.
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CONCLUSION
About a quarter of wage and salary workers are in some type of
nonstandard employment in the two countries. Although the share in
part-time and temporary agency employment is similar in Japan and
the United States, a much higher fraction of Japanese part-time work-
ers are on temporary contract. This probably reflects the fact that regu-
lar full-time workers in Japan have greater job security than do regular
full-time employees in the United States, and hence firms have a
greater need for temporary workers to absorb fluctuations in workload.
Each country has experienced growth in at least certain types of
nonstandard employment, although the magnitude of that growth has
been much greater in Japan than in the United States. Concern in each
country over this growth arises primarily because workers in nonstand-
ard employment arrangements, on average, receive lower wages, fewer
benefits, and less job security than regular full-time workers. In both
countries, lower benefits and job security are at least partly the conse-
quence of labor laws and regulations designed to protect workers.
Because these laws often do not apply to workers in part-time, tempo-
rary, or other nonstandard arrangements, government policy creates an
incentive for firms to use these arrangements to circumvent the costs of
such regulation. 
According to economic theory, if labor markets are perfectly com-
petitive, workers will pay for the mandated benefits through lower
wages or other compensation.25 However, if minimum wage laws limit
a drop in wages or if labor markets are not perfectly competitive and
government regulations increase labor’s bargaining power, workers
covered by the mandate will earn higher total compensation. Evidence
in the United States and Japan supports the latter interpretation. Work-
ers in nonstandard arrangements, who often are not covered by these
mandates, receive lower wages and benefits than regular full-time
workers, who are typically covered by these mandates. One caveat for
Japan is that married workers in nonstandard arrangements who qual-
ify as dependents enjoy significant tax breaks and still are entitled to
the basic pension and health insurance benefits. To our knowledge, no
research has explicitly compared the after-tax incomes or benefit enti-
tlements (whether through an employer or as a dependent) of regular
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full-time and nonstandard workers in Japan. It is likely, however, that
comparisons of pretax wages overstate the differential between regular
and nonstandard workers in total after-tax compensation.
Where nonstandard employment arrangements are growing,
demand-side forces play an important role in both countries. Japanese
and U.S. firms, under pressure to lower labor costs by increasing labor
productivity and reducing wage and benefits costs, have increased their
use of nonstandard employment arrangements. Although companies in
both countries face similar competitive pressures, the pressures on Jap-
anese firms are greater. An industrial relations system in which labor
costs of regular full-time workers are much less flexible than in the
United States, coupled with a rapidly aging workforce and an opening
of trade and financial markets to international competition, have cre-
ated tremendous pressures on Japanese firms to hire nonstandard work-
ers to increase workforce flexibility and lower labor costs.
Moreover, labor supply and government policies have accommo-
dated increased demand to a greater extent in Japan than in the United
States. The decline in family- and self-employment, the lack of child
care alternatives outside the home, and tax incentives have increased
the supply of married women seeking part-time jobs in Japan. In the
United States, in contrast, the incidence of part-time employment
among married women has declined, probably reflecting a combination
of factors, including government policies to end employment discrimi-
nation against women, rising relative wages of women, and a greater
availability of child care services outside the home. This decline in the
rate of part-time employment among married women mitigated the
growth in the aggregate rate of part-time employment in the 1980s and
led to a decline in the aggregate rate of part-time employment in the
1990s. 
There is some evidence that Japanese firms are moving away from
the nenko wage system and lifetime employment for regular, full-time
workers in response to current demographic and economic pressures.
Such changes in the Japanese industrial relations system would reduce
the differential treatment of regular full-time and nonstandard workers.
However, Japanese firms’ primary response has been to dramatically
increase the number of nonstandard workers who are not covered by
these industrial relations practices. Arguably, this has led to an
increase—rather than a decline—in labor market segmentation that is
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fundamentally different in scope from that occurring in the United
States. 
Notes
1. Some government surveys recently began distinguishing between part-time and
“arubaito” jobs, though they are similar. Most part-time workers are housewives
and most arubaito are students, although in recent years the arubaito category
increasingly has included nonregular, nonstudent employees. Below, we group
part-time and arubaito workers together in the statistics we report. It is possible to
use data from the Labor Force Survey, which includes information on hours
worked, to construct a Japanese part-time statistic more comparable to that for the
U.S. However, because so many Japanese part-time workers work almost the
same hours as full-time workers, we chose to use Japanese definitions when
reporting part-time statistics for Japan.
2. The Japanese word haken is often translated as dispatched worker. To make it
comparable to the U.S. terminology, we translate haken as temporary agency
worker.
3. The adjustments we make in Table 6.1 to the U.S. part-time statistics are based on
Polivka and Miller (1998).
4. Figures reported in this chapter from the Bureau of Statistics’ Employment Status
Survey are consistent with those from another commonly cited source, the Minis-
try of Labor’s Labor Force Survey, although the latter shows a smaller decline in
the day laborer employment share and greater growth in the temporary employ-
ment share. While the Employment Status Survey questions individuals on their
usual labor market status, the Labor Force Survey collects data on individuals’
actual status in the last week of the survey month. 
5. These figures come from the Ministry of Labor, Status of Part-Time Workers
(Paato Taimaa no Jitsujo), 1996. The fraction of workers in nonstandard arrange-
ments besides part-time who reported being on temporary contract rose from 44.6
percent in 1990 to 66.6 percent in 1996. Because part-time workers account for
the overwhelming percentage of workers in nonstandard employment and a negli-
gible percentage classified as regular full-time workers are on temporary contract,
part-time employment accounts for most of the growth in temporary contracts
(see Table 6.2).
6. Part-time workers and temporary agency workers may also be temporary workers
in both countries. In the United States, part-time workers may also be temporary
agency workers. In the Japanese data, temporary agency and part-time workers
are mutually exclusive categories. The data sources and calculations done for this
special tabulation are available from the authors.
7. Data on temporary agency workers in Table 6.2 come from the CPS, not the CES,
as reported in Table 6.1. The percentage of workers classified as agency temporar-
ies is smaller in the CPS than in the CES, and it is generally believed that the CPS
undercounts the number of workers in temporary help agencies. For a discussion
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of the discrepancy between the CPS and CES figures, see Polivka (1996). Only
CPS data allow the distinction between temporary agency workers who consider
their job temporary and those who do not. 
8. Hotchkiss (1991) finds that correcting for sample selection bias slightly increases
the estimated wage differentials between part-time and full-time workers. Com-
paring the wages of part-time and full-time workers within occupations within
establishments, Lettau (1997) finds that hourly wages of part-time workers are, on
average, 16 percent lower, and total hourly compensation for part-time workers is,
on average, 48 percent lower. The main exception in the literature to the finding
that part-time workers earn less than full-time workers is Blank (1990), who
reports that after controlling for sample selection, part-time women earn more
than full-time women, though part-time men still earn significantly less than full-
time men. Segal and Sullivan (1997b; 1998) use longitudinal data to control for
individual fixed effects in studies of wage differentials between temporary agency
workers and other workers. They find that temporary agency workers earn signif-
icantly less than other workers, though their estimates of this wage differential
range from 3 to 20 percent.
9. These figures are based on the authors’ calculations using matched data from the
March and February 1995 CPS.
10. These estimates are described in greater detail in Houseman and Osawa (1998).
11. The lower wages of Japanese part-time workers may result, in part, from the fact
that many have a strong preference for working close to home. To the extent that
employers enjoy some monopsony power with part-time workers, but not with
full-time workers who are willing to accept employment with a larger, geographi-
cally dispersed group of employers, part-time workers’ wages will be depressed
relative to full-time workers’ wages. From the part-time workers’ perspective, the
lower wage level is compensated for by the proximity of their job to home. 
12. We also estimated models with a Heckman selection correction to take into
account the possibility that unmeasured variables are correlated with the decision
to work part-time and bias ordinary least squares estimates. These models suggest
that, in the absence of sample selection bias, the wage gap between full-time and
part-time workers would be even greater.
13. As discussed below, steep wage-tenure profiles may be a profit-maximizing strat-
egy even if the wage increases do not match increases in worker productivity. 
14. Specifically, employers are not required to pay social security taxes on the wages
of workers who work less than three-fourths of regular workers’ hours and dis-
ability and unemployment insurance taxes on workers who work fewer than 20
hours per week or who are expected to work less than one year.
15. If employees work less than three-fourths the hours of regular employees but earn
more than 1.3 million yen, they are required to take out their own health insurance
policy and pay the premium.
16. We report the percentage who are eligible to participate because many American
workers choose not to participate in these benefit programs. 
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17. Although we do not provide a formal model of the increase in demand for part-
time workers, this growth is consistent with two theoretical explanations. One is
that employers, seeking to maximize profits, adopt efficient industrial relations
systems. Here, changing demographics, slower growth, and more volatile eco-
nomic conditions in the face of liquidity constraints would cause managers to
optimally hire relatively more part-time workers in recent years. Alternatively,
firms, shielded from international competition and subsidized by the government,
have not been maximizing profits or adopting efficient industrial relations prac-
tices, at least in recent years. Changing demographics and the opening of markets
are forcing firms to become efficient. 
18. Distances on a logarithmic scale, multiplied by 100, approximate percentage dif-
ferences. 
19. See Abe (2000) for an analysis of the impact of the social security system on mar-
ried women’s labor supply.
20. The increase in tenure associated with the aging workforce also implies that the
wages of regular full-time workers, who receive tenure-based wage increases
under the nenko system, will rise relative to the wages of part-time workers, who
typically do not receive nenko wage increases.
21. These years all represent business cycle peaks, and therefore rates of part-time
employment should be minimally affected by cyclical factors.
22. We apply the adjustment factors in Polivka and Miller (1998) to our data. They
provide adjustment factors for teens, adult men, and adult women, and so we are
limited to these three demographic groups in our analysis for the 1989–1999
period.
23. Hiring temporary agency workers on a quasi-permanent basis may also be
cheaper, and allegedly many companies use “perma-temps” to avoid paying bene-
fits to certain groups of workers. However, hiring workers on a permanent basis
through temporary agencies in order to avoid paying workers benefits is illegal
under U.S. law, and this practice has been challenged in the courts in recent years.
24. See Table 6.1 for figures on temporary contracts. The Survey on the Diversifica-
tion of Employment provides figures on contract workers, who are defined as
workers with professional skills on fixed-term contract. (The contracts of these
workers are often renewed.) Employment in this category increased from 1.7 per-
cent to 2.3 percent of paid employment between 1994 and 1999, even though the
1994 figure included on-call workers not included in the 1999 survey.
25. An exception occurs when workers do not fully value the benefits. See Gruber
(2000) for a theoretical discussion of this issue.
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Employment Choices 
and Pay Differences between 
Nonstandard and Standard Work 
in Britain, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden
Siv Gustafsson
Eiko Kenjoh
Cécile Wetzels
University of Amsterdam
In this paper, we analyze two questions. First, how do otherwise
similar people in four countries—Britain, Germany, the Netherlands,
and Sweden—end up in four different employment states: 1) full-time
with a regular contract, 2) part-time with a regular contract, 3) fixed-
term contract, either full-time or part-time, and 4) self-employed? Sec-
ond, how do wages differ between otherwise similar people in these
different work arrangements in each of the four countries? Our analysis
is carried out using the 1998 wave of four household panel data sets:
namely, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (Taylor 1992);
the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) (Wagner, Schupp, and
Rendtel 1991); the Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonder-
zoek (OSA) in the Netherlands (Allaart et al. 1987); and the HushDllens
Ekonomiska Levnadsf`rhDllanden (HUS) in Sweden (Flood, Klev-
marken, and Olovsson 1993; Klevmarken and Olovsson 1993).
Because we are specifically interested in the effects of policy on
employment choices and opportunities across the four countries, we
begin by focusing on policies that may result in different choices for
otherwise similar people. We focus especially on the Netherlands and
to some extent Sweden. We make use of other chapters of this volume,
particularly those of Fagan and Ward and of Schömann and Schömann.
In our empirical analysis, the Netherlands is the reference country,
which corresponds with the more detailed policy analysis for this coun-
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try. To compare otherwise similar people across countries, we use
demographic variables, such as gender, age, whether a person has
young children, and childrens’ ages. Further, we use information on the
person's education and his or her industry and occupation. The analyses
are carried out separately for men and women because the distribution
of employment across standard and nonstandard work is very gen-
dered. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In section two, we posi-
tion the four countries within a European perspective. The four coun-
tries have the highest percentage of part-time workers (i.e., fewer than
35 hours per week) among European Union (EU) countries. Fixed-term
work is not as common in these four countries as is part-time work.
The percentage of fixed-term workers among those employed in Swe-
den, the Netherlands, and Germany ranks in the middle, with Britain at
the lower end.
Section three compares recent policy on balancing worker rights
and introducing flexibility into the labor market in the four countries.
We focus particularly on measures that may explain different outcomes
for the employment distribution across standard and nonstandard work
for otherwise similar people. 
Section four traces policy in the Netherlands that has transformed
part-time work from an inferior position to a general right to shorten or
lengthen work hours in any job. Among the four countries, the Nether-
lands has come closest to the intentions of the EU’s so-called Part-
Time Directive of 1997, with Sweden and Germany following, and
Britain the farthest from meeting the directive.
Section five discusses legislation on self-employment in the coun-
tries under review. Section six discusses our microdata and presents
descriptive statistics on nonstandard work by gender. In section seven,
we discuss results from our multinomial logit models and wage regres-
sions, interpreting the results in light of policy differences and evi-
dence from other chapters in this volume. Section eight offers
conclusions.
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NONSTANDARD WORK IN BRITAIN, GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS, AND SWEDEN IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
There is a simple reason that we examine these four countries:
between us, we have accumulated knowledge about institutions and
labor markets in our own countries (Gustafsson in Sweden, and Wet-
zels in the Netherlands), we have knowledge of languages involved,
and we have done prior work using the household panel data sets
involved (see, e.g., Gustafsson et al. 1996; Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and
Wetzels 2001a,b; Gustafsson and Wetzels 2000; Wetzels 2001). The
countries involved in this study do not fall at the extremes on a scale of
the importance of nonstandard work in the labor market, and they dif-
fer sufficiently from each other in an international comparison of the
nonstandard work dimensions studied in this chapter. 
Fagan and Ward (in this volume) present data on the percentage of
part-time workers among employed men and women in the 15 EU
member states (EU-15). The Netherlands ranks first, followed by Brit-
ain, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. One could even claim that it is
debatable to call part-time work “nonstandard” work in the Nether-
lands, where 69 percent of employed women work part-time (Fagan
and Ward, Table 3.3, in this volume). Although Germany ranks fifth in
percentage of part-time workers among the EU-15, only a little more
than one-third of German women (36.4 percent) work part-time com-
pared with two-thirds of women in the Netherlands. Fagan and Ward
also show that, since 1985, the proportion of part-time employment
among women in the Netherlands and Germany has risen, while in
Britain, the proportion remained steady, and in Sweden, the proportion
declined. A decreasing proportion of part-time female workers is also
observed in the United States (Houseman and Osawa, in this volume)
and in Denmark (Hoffman and Walwei, in this volume). Although
part-time work among men is much less common than among women,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Britain still rank first, third, and fourth,
respectively. In the Netherlands, 18 percent of men are considered
part-time workers; in Sweden and Britain, 9 percent of men work part-
time. Only Denmark, ranked second, has more men working part-time
than these countries. Germany, in contrast, has relatively little part-
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time work among men (4.7 percent) and ranks eighth among the 15 EU
member states.1
For fixed-term contract work, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ger-
many rank more in the middle among EU member states. Britain is
ranked 12th for men, with 6 percent of employed men working under a
fixed-term contract, and 13th for women, with 8 percent working under
a fixed-term contract. In the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany, the
percentage on fixed-term contract ranges between 12 percent and 16
percent for women and between 10 percent and 12 percent for men.
Fagan and Ward report that an employer in Britain has no reason to
offer a fixed-term contract of less than a year because all employment-
related benefits require more than 12 months employment with one
firm. For shorter periods of employment, the employer has exclusive
right to hire and fire, similar to the “employment-at-will” doctrine of
the United States. Labor markets in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ger-
many are much more regulated to protect workers’ rights. Schömann
and Schömann (in this volume) characterize EU member states by the
degree of legislation covering nonstandard work. Countries with the
most legislation include France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Countries
with less restrictive regulation include Denmark, Sweden, and the
Netherlands, whereas Britain has hardly any regulations at all.
Fagan and Ward (in this volume) also present figures on the per-
centage of employed persons in temporary agency work within 11 EU
member states. In 1997, 2.5 percent of employed people in the Nether-
lands were performing temporary agency work, and in Britain, 1 per-
cent were. The Netherlands ranks second after Luxembourg, and
Britain ranks fifth in the percentage of workers in temporary jobs. Ger-
many and Sweden have relatively few workers in temporary agency
work: 0.6 percent in Germany and 0.4 percent in Sweden, which places
these two countries at rank 8 and 9, respectively, out of 11. 
FLEXIBILITY OF THE LABOR MARKET AND PROTECTION 
OF WORKERS
The growth of nonstandard work arrangements can be seen as a
response to firms’ demands for a flexible labor force to meet customer
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demands and “just in time” production. A flexible labor force is often
in conflict with workers’ justified wishes to have a stable and secure
income. Various rules that condition employers’ rights to deviate from
the general rule that an employment contract is full-time and of indefi-
nite length have been introduced in European countries. Generally,
there have been periods of increasing regulations in the 1970s and
1980s, followed by periods of deregulation in the 1990s. Britain devi-
ates from this pattern in that there was regulation in the 1970s, deregu-
lation under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, and some reregulation
during the Tony Blair government beginning in 1997. The 1980s were
characterized by slow economic growth and high unemployment rates
in most of the EU-15 countries, whereas the United States experienced
employment and economic growth. Various observers ascribed the
high European unemployment rates to the regulated labor markets.
Blank and Freeman (1994) in a volume devoted to the question of
whether there is a trade-off between economic flexibility and regula-
tions in the labor market, find no clear case that protection of workers
necessarily leads to a less flexible labor market. It depends to a very
large extent on how worker protection is organized. 
European Union countries have deregulated their labor markets in
the 1990s to different extents and with different effects on job protec-
tion rights of workers. The Netherlands can be described as a “happy
deregulator.” Introducing flexibility into the labor market is seen as
one of the important steps, together with wage restraint and a decreas-
ing government sector, that turned the situation from the “Dutch Dis-
ease” to the “Dutch Miracle” (Hartog 1998; Visser and Hemerijck
1997). After the 1973 oil crisis, the “golden era” of strong economic
growth and low unemployment ended and was followed by a period
with double-digit unemployment and low economic growth (Hartog
1998). The labor unions in the Netherlands were defensive and pro-
moted work-sharing as a remedy for unemployment. Early retirement
and propaganda to keep women at home as full-time housewives were
used to decrease labor supply. In 1982, the Wassenaar Agreement was
concluded on a national level between employers and union represen-
tatives. In retrospect, this agreement was the turning point for the
Dutch economy. A key feature of the agreement was that unions agreed
to lower wage demands in exchange for shorter work weeks.
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Tijdens (1998) observed that, in the Netherlands, flexibility in the
labor market has been internal; firms have gained increased rights to
use their regular labor force during times of increased demand for labor
without having to pay overtime premiums. Such a bargaining agree-
ment was attractive for the unions because it was accompanied by a
shorter regular full-time work week. Van den Toren (1998) observed
that half of those whose work conditions are determined by collective
bargaining agreements have a 36-hour work week. About 30 percent of
employed persons are members of a union in the Netherlands, and col-
lective bargaining agreements regulate working conditions for 80 to 90
percent of the Dutch labor force. This comes through the “erga omnes”
clauses, which stipulate that a bargaining agreement for an industry is
extended to nonmembers working in the same industry.
Although there is extensive job protection, flexible work increased
beginning in the early 1990s in the Netherlands. Temporary help agen-
cies are a big business, and Dutch agencies such as the Randstad have
become multinationals. Randstad is market leader in the Netherlands,
Belgium, Germany, and in the southeast United States. At the end of
1992, Randstad employed 6,450 individuals in the Netherlands, 1,400
in Germany, and 259 in Britain. In the same year, Randstad staffed
117,000 people in the Netherlands, 16,000 in Germany, and 3,500 in
Britain (Randstad 2001). 
Temporary help agencies sell flexible labor to the user companies,
but they are obliged to offer job security to their employees, according
to the Flexicurity Act of January 1999. When a temporary agency
worker has been employed for 18 months with one user company, or
36 months for several user companies, he or she receives a permanent
contract with the agency. Workers with fewer than 18 (or 36) months
also receive job protection; during the first 26 weeks of a temporary
contract (phase 1), there is no special regulation, but in the following
six months (phase 2), the temporary agency worker begins accumulat-
ing pension benefits and receives career advice. After 26 weeks, the
temporary agency worker receives a renewable three-month contract
until the 18 months or 36 months condition is fulfilled (Van den Toren,
Evers, and Commissaris 2002). There is a special union for temporary
agency workers as well. Thus, temporary agency workers in the Neth-
erlands often have regular contracts, which differs from the situation in
Britain (Fagan and Ward in this volume). Also on-call workers are cov-
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ered by the Flexicurity Act. However, if the firm has collective labor
agreements of its own, the on-call worker is covered by that agreement,
which might differ from the Flexicurity Act (Van den Toren, Evers,
and Commissaris 2002).
Hartog (1998) cites a study that shows that, in the early 1990s,
about 25 percent of temporary agency workers preferred temporary
work because they were students working during holidays, and another
25 percent preferred such work because it gave them, for example, the
opportunity to work in new environments. The other 50 percent of tem-
porary agency workers were looking for a permanent job. Firms hired
temporary workers for specific fixed-term tasks (44 percent), as substi-
tutes for personnel on leave (31 percent), and as a way to screen work-
ers (16 percent).
By the mid 1990s, the Netherlands was a booming economy with
stable employment growth, while Sweden and Germany were in deep
depressions, with substantial employment losses in Sweden and practi-
cally no job growth in Germany. Foreign observers traveled to the
Netherlands to admire the Dutch Miracle (Visser and Hemerijck 1997).
This Dutch Miracle had occurred with the introduction of substantial
flexibility into the labor force. The volume of full-time regular jobs in
1996 was the same as in 1970—about 3.7 million people—and the
steady job growth in the early 1990s consisted entirely of part-time
jobs, which amounted to 1.8 million in 1996, and flexible jobs
amounted to 0.7 million in 1996 (Hartog 1998).
If the Netherlands can be characterized as a “happy deregulator” in
the 1990s, Sweden can be characterized as a reluctant deregulator. Pri-
vate job mediation firms were allowed in Sweden and in Germany in
1993, which was only two years after the state monopoly in job media-
tion was officially lifted in the Netherlands. However, in Sweden in the
1990s, demands by firms for more flexibility came during an economic
depression with employment losses. It was not until 1998–1999 that
Sweden experienced an economic boom, with renewed employment
growth. The 1974 Employment Protection Act in effect prohibited hir-
ing on a fixed-term basis. Because fixed-term employment contracts
had already existed for seasonal jobs and jobs to complete a certain
task, it became immediately necessary to make exceptions to the rule.
Employers are allowed to employ workers on a fixed-term basis for
certain reasons, including 1) seasonal work, 2) work to perform one
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well-defined task, 3) to substitute for someone who is on leave, 4) to
augment the workforce if there are temporary increases in the work-
load, or 5) to employ students during summer breaks (SOU 1999).
Beginning in 1997, a new form of temporary employment was
introduced, called Temporary Employment for an Agreed Period.
Under this agreement, restrictions on reasons for the temporary
employment were relaxed. A person could only be hired for a fixed-
term contract for a maximum of 12 months over three years. Other-
wise, the contract became a regular one. Also, employers could place
new employees under a probation period of six months. 
The discussions of changes in the 1974 Employment Protection
Act have aroused strong political opposition. Flexibility was intro-
duced in January 1994 by the Carl Bildt coalition government (1991–
1994). In 1994, the social democratic Göran Persson government came
into power and “restored” the rules of probation and “temporary
employment.” The extension to 12 months by the Bildt government
was thus cut back again to six months by the Persson government.
In Germany, an employment contract is meant to be of indefinite
length. However, since 1985, the Employment Promotion Act viewed
the fixed-term contract as an instrument to reduce unemployment, and
was meant to temporarily relax the demands on firms to specifically
justify the use of fixed-term contracts. This act has been extended
twice and is valid until the end of 2000. As of 1996, employment last-
ing fewer than 24 months need not to be justified explicitly (Hoffman
and Walwei, in this volume). Further, for people over age 60, there is
no time limit on the length of fixed-term contracts.
In Britain, firms have no incentive to offer fixed-term contracts of
durations less than one year because employment benefits only apply
to workers who have been employed for 12 months at a firm (Fagan
and Ward in this volume). British legislation does not view the
arrangement as an employment contract; rather, the role of the agency
is more that of a labor market mediator. Therefore, British employment
data may include those who work for durations less than a year but do
not classify their contract as a fixed-term contract. Fagan and Ward
observe that Britain remains a neoliberal welfare state and does not
guarantee pay for temporary agency workers. The agency is not
responsible for how its client, the “user firm,” treats the worker. 
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THE CHANGING STATUS OF PART-TIME WORK 
The Netherlands has been called “the first part-time economy in
the world” (Visser 1999). With 39 percent of its workforce in part-time
jobs, the Netherlands ranks first among the EU-15 before Britain, Swe-
den, and Denmark, with 22 to 25 percent of their workforces in part-
time work. Visser (1999) also asked, Does it work? His answer: yes.
Not only is the Netherlands a happy deregulator, but also a happy part-
time economy. The 1997 European Union Directive on Part-Time
Work states: “Member states and social partners should identify and
review obstacles which may limit the opportunities for part-time work”
(EU 1998, p. 14). Furthermore, “employers should give consideration
to requests by workers to transfer from full-time to part-time work and
the reverse when such work becomes available” (p. 14).
The Netherlands has gone much farther than demanding that
employers should “give consideration” to employees who wish to
transfer between full-time and part-time work. The Act on Adjustment
of Working Hours (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur), which went into
effect July 1, 2000, gives those employed by firms with more than 10
employees the right to shorten or increase work hours on request if
they have been employed for at least one year and have not asked for a
change in working hours within the past two years. Within four months
prior to changing work hours, the employee should indicate the date
that the new working hours take effect, the number of working hours,
and the preferred distribution of working hours during the week. The
employer should, in principle, agree to the request and is obliged to
indicate any reason for disagreement. The hourly wage remains the
same. Because this applies only to workers employed for at least one
year, this right excludes temporary workers with a contract of less than
one year. 
What was the reason that the right to shorten or lengthen work
hours was accepted first in the Netherlands? Usually, in the Nether-
lands when a law is accepted, it codifies already existing practice,
which is included in most collective labor agreements at the time the
act passes. This has meant that many feminist demands have been late
to materialize in the Netherlands (Gustafsson 1994). In the Swedish
social democratic tradition of “social engineering,” in contrast, legisla-
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tive changes are meant to change behavior. However, as of 1993, the
advisory council on Dutch Labor Market Issues had proposed that col-
lective bargaining agreements give “social partners”—representatives
of employers and employees—the right to arrange part-time work.
Between 1990 and 1996, the percentage of firms covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with the right to demand part-time work
increased from 23 percent to 70 percent (DeVries and van Hoorn
1997). Most requests were granted between January and June 1996. By
2000, two-thirds of employed women worked part-time and one-fifth
of employed men worked part-time. There is also a high structural
demand for part-time workers in the Netherlands.
In the Dutch “consensus” economy, if two university departments,
for example, are competing to install a chair, they may each be given
half of a professor’s chair. Therefore, it is not uncommon in the aca-
demic world for a person to combine two part-time jobs. Another
example is that rather than the local community government starting
and running an activity such as child care, as it would do in Sweden,
the Dutch economy relies on private initiatives, and the government
subsidizes a portion of those activities, allowing entrepreneurs to com-
pete with other entrepreneurs in the field. Often there are funds to
employ someone part-time rather than full-time. Therefore, there is a
demand for part-time workers in the public or nonprofit sectors.
In the private sector, using part-time employees can increase flexi-
bility; the firm can often adjust hours to meet business demands. Also,
two part-time workers who share a job can substitute for each other in
case of sickness and vacation by occasionally working full-time. Fur-
ther, employers consider part-time workers to be as committed as full-
time workers (Tijdens 1998). Also, Kalleberg and Reynolds (in this
volume) find that Dutch part-time workers are as committed as full-
time workers.
This shift to part-time work in the Netherlands would not have
occurred had it not been for the large supply of workers who prefer a
part-time job. Since the mid-1980s, unions in the Netherlands have
been raising demands for doing all work on a part-time basis and for
equalizing the employment conditions between full-time workers and
part-time workers. Earlier, the women's movement had demanded
shorter work days, but realizing that travel time would not be reduced,
interest in part-time work has grown. Women wanted to stay in the
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labor market after marriage or after giving birth to children. Skilled
women increasingly wanted to combine part-time work with family
responsibilities. Women’s increasing skills made the costs of replacing
these employees higher. Also, with unemployment high, women's
incomes were needed in the family. Toward the end of the 1980s, 40 to
45 percent of potential female reentrants were looking for a job. By the
early 1990s, there were 100,000 female reentrants per year (OSA
1995). Many of these women preferred to work part-time. Employers
began to recognize the benefits of part-time work in optimizing person-
nel strategies, for example, in the banking sector (Tijdens 1997). In the
tight labor market of the 1990s, fear of labor shortages encouraged
employers who otherwise were reluctant to accept part-time workers
(Tijdens 1998).
The situation in Sweden in the late 1990s was opposite that in the
Netherlands. In Sweden, women’s demand for part-time jobs was
declining from a peak in the 1970s. Swedish legislation views full-
time, regular contracts as the norm for both men and women, and spe-
cial leaves are allowed to make it possible to combine a regular full-
time job with family responsibilities. Since 1974, parental leave covers
both fathers and mothers, and they can choose to split the 12 months of
leave, with benefits of 75 to 90 percent of previous earnings. A couple
can choose between a mother staying home full-time, father full-time
at home, both part-time at home, or any combination. They can also
change the mix as many times as they wish, with advance employer
notice. When the child is 18 months old, the job protection period
expires, but the mother or the father has the right to shorten work hours
in her or his regular job to 30 hours a week until the youngest child is
eight years old (Gustafsson 1994). Mostly it is the mother who makes
use of this right.
Sweden adopted a variant of the EU 1997 part-time directive in
1997, which allows a part-time employee to request full-time work,
and the employer must give priority to the part-time worker should a
full-time job become available. This obligation, however, is only valid
if 1) the part-time employee has given notice, 2) the part-time
employee is qualified for the job, and 3) the employer's work needs
will be satisfied by this transfer (SOU 1999).
In Sweden in 1997, the proportion unemployed among part-time
female workers was 30 percent, and 25 percent among part-time work-
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ing men (SOU 1999, p. 153). This was up from 12 percent of part-time
working women in 1990 and 10 percent of part-time working men. The
economic recession deepened during this timespan, with unemploy-
ment peaking in 1997. The Swedish unemployment benefits are avail-
able to part-time workers for a maximum of 300 days.
The typical part-time unemployed individual is a married or cohab-
iting woman with a short (two-year) secondary education (i.e., com-
pleted school by age 18), who works in health care or the retail trade.
Many of these women have children and do not wish to work evenings
and nights, where the demand for extra workers is greater (SOU 1999).
The large proportion who wish to work full-time among Swedish
part-time workers scores with the findings of Kalleberg and Reynolds
(in this volume) that Swedish part-time workers are significantly less
happy than full-time employees; this differs from other countries in the
Kalleberg and Reynolds study. Swedish part-time workers have less
job satisfaction, less organizational commitment, more absenteeism,
and are less willing to spend extra effort if it is temporarily needed by
the employer. 
Germany has adopted a version of the EU part-time directive that
is similar to Sweden’s. If an individual employee wishes to switch
from full-time to part-time work, the employer must inform the worker
of any part-time vacancies (see Schömann and Schömann in this vol-
ume). However, there is no guarantee of the transfer. Part-time jobs are
usually not available in high-skilled professions, and therefore, a gen-
eral right to shorten work hours in any job is far from being realized in
Germany. Furthermore, the introduction of part-time work is subject to
co-determination by the works councils (see Schömann and Schö-
mann), which may consist solely of men, who are eager to protect their
full-time jobs. However, new German legislation is under way that will
mirror that in the Netherlands, with an almost full right of the
employed to work the desired number of hours in any job (Evans, Lip-
poldt, and Marianna 2001). 
The Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany have legislated that part-
time workers be treated the same as full-time workers in hourly wages
and in work-related benefits (proportional to hours worked). Such leg-
islation has, until recently, been absent in Britain. British part-time
workers, who are mainly women, can appeal to the Labor Courts under
sex and race discrimination legislation (see Schömann and Schömann
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in this volume), a situation similar to that in the United States (see
Houseman and Osawa in this volume). A government proposal for the
“Prevention of Less Favorable Treatment” was introduced in 2000.
The proposal, however, does not cover temporary agency workers (see
Schömann and Schömann).
SELF-EMPLOYMENT: ENTREPRENEURIAL 
INVENTIVENESS OR HIDDEN DEPENDENT 
EMPLOYMENT?
The German legislature has expressed concern that certain self-
employment is a hidden form of dependent employment. In January
1999, the “Correction Law of Social Provision” was introduced to pre-
vent individuals from being relabeled as self-employed by their
employer, and thus losing all rights under their employment contract. If
a worker meets two of four of the following criteria, employment is
deemed dependent and he or she is given a labor contract. The criteria
are: 1) the self-employed has no employees except family, 2) the busi-
ness serves only one customer, 3) the business operates under no spe-
cial qualifications or tasks, and 4) there is no professional contact with
clients (see Schömann and Schömann, in this volume). To our knowl-
edge, no similar legislation exists in Sweden, the Netherlands, or Brit-
ain.
In Sweden, activities previously performed by employed individu-
als are now performed by self-employed contractors. A forestry com-
pany, for example, that once had people on its payroll to collect and
deliver wood now would hire an independent contractor who owns a
tree cutting and processing machine (skogsmaskin). In construction,
home repair, and restoration independent contractors are now more
common, a development facilitated by the mobile telephone, which
makes the self-employed available for potential customers while work-
ing. Such independent contractors also often work together in net-
works, which allows them by cooperation to take on bigger tasks.
There is probably also a gendered distribution over industries and
occupations. Carré (in this volume) notes that, in the United States,
independent contractors among men are executives, professionals, and
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salespersons whereas female independent contractors often offer
domestic help, child care, real estate services, and sales.
In Sweden, entrepreneurship has been seen as a way to lower
unemployment. Individuals can receive start-up grants that cover living
costs for six months. The size of the benefit equals the unemployment
benefit. Schömann and Schömann (in this volume) report that 78 per-
cent of persons receiving the start-up grant were employed after four
years. 
In Sweden, the industry principle in labor market relations also
applies to workers in nonstandard work arrangements. Both self-
employed and temporary workers are welcome in the respective indus-
try labor unions. Some unions in the Netherlands also welcome self-
employed. Sometimes there is little difference between a network of
self-employed and a temporary work agency catering to a specific
industry. An example is a company called Industrikompetens (SOU
1999).
Industrikompetens operates like a temporary help agency in that
workers perform in different companies according to the workload.
However, Industrikompetens is owned by 20 firms in the Swedish
region of Östergötland that deliver to the car and truck manufacturer
SAAB. Before forming Industrikompetens, the different companies
had periods when they could not take orders because they lacked quali-
fied personnel and periods when they had to pay employees for whom
there was no work. The 20 competitors now own Industrikompetens,
and its personnel are trained and accustomed to the work in a number
of the owner firms so that extra work needs can be performed. 
Similar to Swedish policies, Dutch policies also aim to stimulate
entrepreneurship. In 1996, the number of entrepreneurs as a percentage
of the Dutch workforce was the same as in 1972, and was low com-
pared with the mean in the European Union and the United States
(Ministry of Economic Affairs 2001). The growth within these new
businesses is also less than in other countries. Deregulation and lower-
ing administrative costs to start and develop firms are important policy
objectives. For example, because the industry is overregulated, the ini-
tial administrative costs for a firm installing electrotechnical equip-
ment requires an investment of fl 6.000 and two months’ work. The
administrative costs incurred in hiring an employee are estimated to be
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fl 3.300, with at least 17 hours needed to deal with the administrative
tasks (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2001). 
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs aims in addition to
increase “intrapreneurship,” that is, small businesses within big firms,
to compete in highly specialized markets. Individuals starting their
own business in the Netherlands receive a tax deduction in the first
year if the number of business hours exceed 1,225. This means that
starting a firm on a part-time basis is not stimulated by this regulation
(Gustafsson, Wetzels, and Tijdens 2000). Despite this, the percentage
of women among all persons starting a business has increased to 31
percent in 1999 (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2001). By contrast,
starting a business on a part-time basis while keeping a part-time job is
widespread in Sweden, as will be evident from our data analysis below.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON NONSTANDARD WORK 
USING MICRODATA SETS
The previous sections have identified characteristics in institutions
and policies in the four countries that may explain differences between
the countries in their approaches to nonstandard work. In the following
section, we turn to microdata analysis using the 1998 wave of the
household panel data BHPS for Britain, GSOEP for Germany, OSA for
the Netherlands, and HUS for Sweden. We use the German data for
western and eastern Germany separately as they are made available
rather than aggregating the data. One important reason for not aggre-
gating the data is that, in many respects, the eastern half of Germany is
different from the western half.
We restrict the analysis to employed persons for three reasons.
First, all other chapters of this book refer to nonstandard work among
employed people. Second, including those who have chosen to remain
out of the labor force and those who are unemployed would require a
lengthy review of policies and institutions among the countries to
explain the differences in nonemployment. This would complicate the
story and add several pages of policy analysis. Third, we have more
information about employed persons than nonemployed persons.
Occupation and industry are available for all employed persons
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whether they are employed full-time regular, part-time regular, fixed-
term, or self-employed. This makes it possible to compare choices by
otherwise similar people. 
In Table 7.1, we present information (including the rate of nonem-
ployed persons) aged 16–64, by gender (in the remainder of the chap-
ter, we disregard the nonemployed). In the Swedish data, the age range
is 18–64. In the Dutch data, full-time students are not interviewed,
which increases the employment rate among young people given that
only employed individuals aged 16–19 are included. This differs from
the British and German data, where secondary school students are
interviewed.
Table 7.1 Employment Status by Sex, 1998 (%)
Not
employed 
Dependent 
employed 
Self-
employed 
and others 
No. of 
observations
Britain
Men 19.7 68.2 12.1 3,725
Women 32.0 63.4 4.6 4,420
Western Germany
Men 25.0 65.9 9.1 1,802
Women 50.4 45.6 4.0 2,014
Eastern Germany
Men 30.6 63.2 6.3 1,178
Women 45.3 50.9 3.8 1,257
The Netherlands
Men 18.0 73.6 8.4 1,543
Women 47.0 48.1 4.9 1,856
Sweden
Men 19.3 65.2 15.5 1,519
Women 25.6 69.3 5.1 1,506
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on BHPS 1998 for Britain; Sample A (Ger-
man residents in former West Germany) of GSOEP 1998 for western Germany; Sam-
ple C (German residents in former East Germany) of GSOEP 1998 for eastern
Germany; OSA 1998 for the Netherlands; and HUS 1998 for Sweden. See Appendix
A for a detailed definition of variables.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 230  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
Employment Choices and Pay Differences 231
The rate of nonemployed men in western Germany is surprisingly
high, even considering the fact that the inclusion of secondary school
students increases the rate (OECD 1998). The labor force participation
rate for men in western Germany should be similar to that in Sweden,
which it is not, and the labor force participation rate of women in west-
ern Germany should be similar to that of women in the Netherlands,
which it is. Whereas 25 percent of men in western Germany are not
employed, in Sweden, Britain, and the Netherlands, the corresponding
rates are between 18.0 and 19.7 percent.
A noted difference in our data is the greater proportion of Swedish
self-employed men compared with German men. In western Germany,
9.1 percent of men are self-employed compared with 15.5 percent of
Swedish men. The gap in the rate of nonemployed between women in
the Netherlands and Germany is narrowed if women who are on leave
are counted as employed in Germany. However, we cannot include
those on leave in the German data because there is no information on
type of contract, industry, and occupation. In the Swedish data, those
who are on leave fewer than two months are counted as employed,
whereas in the Dutch data, there is no information on leave status.
Dutch full-time maternity leave is only 16 weeks; therefore, not as
many Dutch women would be on leave compared with German
women, who receive maternity leave for up to three years. A detailed
description of definition of variables is presented in Appendix A.
Table 7.2 presents tabulations of all information available in our
data sets on dependent employed, self-employed, or a combination
according to type of contract and whether full-time or part-time. The
dividing line between full-time and part-time is 35 hours of work per
week. British and Swedish men are much more often self-employed
than the women in their countries. For the other countries, the differ-
ence between male and female self-employment is less distinct. The
Netherlands clearly has the highest percentage of women in regular
part-time jobs (58.5 percent), the second highest percentage of women
in part-time fixed term (5.1 percent), and the highest percentage of
self-employed women working part-time. The Netherlands also has the
highest percentage of men in part-time regular jobs (9 percent); the
percentage in the other countries does not exceed 3.8 percent. The pro-
portion of self-employed among Dutch men is lower than among men
in the other countries, except for eastern Germany. 
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gainfully employed)
Britain Western Germany Eastern Germany Netherlands Sweden
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Dependent employed 84.9 93.3 87.9 91.9 90.9 93.0 89.7 90.8 80.8 93.1
Of which:
Regular, FT 74.8 48.7 75.9 42.5 76.5 60.8 77.1 25.6 72.4 55.5
Regular, PT 3.5 35.2 3.6 39.9 2.2 15.7 9.0 58.5 3.8 30.1
Fixed-term, FT 4.3 2.8 7.3 6.8 11.4 13.2 2.6 1.5 3.4 3.8
Fixed-term, PT 2.3 6.5 1.0 2.7 0.9 3.3 1.0 5.1 1.2 3.8
Of which:
Irregular contract 6.7 8.6
Agency fixed-term
(temp-help agency)
1.3 3.5
Apprentice 1.8 1.2
On-call 0.1 1.5
Special programs 1.0 0.8
Contract company 2.5 1.6
Self-employed 15.1 6.8 12.1 8.1 9.1 7.0 10.3 7.1 11.4 4.5
Full-time 13.0 3.4 10.7 4.9 8.4 5.8 8.9 3.0 10.4 3.6
Part-time 2.1 3.4 1.5 3.2 0.6 1.2 1.3 4.2 1.0 0.9
Of which:
Self-employed farmer 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.2
Professional worker 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.7
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Other self-employed
Without employees 3.0 3.9 3.3 2.8
With 1–9 employees 5.0 1.6 3.3 1.9
With 10 or more employees 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.2
Family member helping out 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.3
Own businessa 2.9 1.4
Partner in businessb 2.5 1.4
Working for selfc 6.1 3.0
Subcontractor 2.2 0.3
Freelance 1.1 0.6
Others 0.2 0.1
Family workersd 0.0 2.1
Self-employed and dependent 
employed 
7.8 2.4
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
983 1,226 1,120
a Running a business or a professional practice.
b Partner in a business or a professional practice.
c Working for myself. 
d In Dutch “meewerkende echtgenote” (wife helping out in business of her husband). 
SOURCE: Computations based on BHPS, GSOEP, OSA, and HUS (see note 1). For definition of variables, see Appendix A.
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The Dutch data show more details on irregular contracts (Table
7.2). Dutch women are in irregular contracts more often than men. This
is especially true for work in temporary help agencies. Dutch men with
irregular contracts are concentrated in contract company work. 
The German data offer more detailed information on the self-
employed than other countries. The self-employed are categorized as
either farmers, professionals, “other” self-employed in various-sized
firms, or employed by family members. Approximately one-fifth of the
self-employed women in both western and eastern Germany are pro-
fessional workers. Another one-fifth are “other” self-employed and
work in firms of fewer than ten employees, and about half work in
firms with no other employees. The numbers in family operations are
quite low (0.5 percent among western German women) and also low
compared with the Netherlands (2.1 percent). In Britain, most of the
self-employed work for themselves and, to a lesser extent, operate a
business or a professional practice with or without partners. British
men, but few women, tend to be subcontractors. 
RESULTS OF MULTINOMIAL LOGITS AND WAGE 
REGRESSIONS
In the following, we analyze four different employment choices:
full-time with a regular contract (“full-time”); part-time with a regular
contract (“part-time”); fixed-term contract, full-time or part-time
(“fixed-term”); and self-employed (“self-employed”). We proceed to
merge the data from the four countries into one data set with the pur-
pose of interpreting country dummies in light of policy differences dis-
cussed above. We summarize the results of three multinomial logit
models on country-pooled data in Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5, and country-
specific wage regressions using national currency in Tables 7.6, 7.7,
and 7.8. 
We analyze how otherwise similar people end up in different work
arrangements and the wage differences using three separate models.
The first model includes both men and women and includes a dummy
variable for women. The second model includes only men, and the
third model includes only women. The joint model allows us to analyze
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Table 7. 3 Multinomial Logit Analysis: Relative Probability of 
Employment State for Both Sexes (Reference state is 
full-time work)
Part-time Fixed-term Self-employed
RRR Z-value RRR Z-value RRR Z-value
Women 12.420 35.26 2.007 9.05 1.196 2.59
Britain 0.434 –11.18 1.101 0.80 1.251 2.41
Western Germany 0.503 –7.73 1.738 4.15 1.262 2.14
Eastern Germany 0.152 –15.67 2.159 5.69 0.656 –3.25
Sweden 0.307 –12.97 1.299 1.85 1.250 2.15
Netherlands = base
Educational groups
Low 1.117 1.62 1.064 0.70 0.727 –3.99
Medium = base
High 0.647 –5.49 0.982 –0.18 0.789 –2.74
Age groups
16–24 0.855 –1.45 5.842 15.56 0.209 –8.41
25–34 0.605 –6.77 1.314 2.66 0.620 –5.54
35–44 = base
45–54 1.414 4.53 0.787 –1.90 1.553 5.40
55–64 2.579 9.76 0.988 –0.08 2.223 8.01
Married or cohabiting 1.181 2.39 0.552 –7.28 0.911 –1.13
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years)
in the household
No children = base
1 child 2.262 9.54 1.121 0.84 1.241 2.12
2 or more children 3.208 11.61 1.610 3.02 1.763 4.89
Age of youngest child 
in the household
0–2 1.307 2.35 0.834 –0.97 0.972 –0.21
3–5 1.269 2.10 1.007 0.04 0.986 –0.10
N 14,451
Log likelihood 6675.2
Pseudo R2 0.219
NOTE: RRR is the relative risk ratio for a one-unit change in the corresponding variable,
and risk is measured as the risk of the category relative to the base category. Industry
(8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not
reported. The full version of estimation results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and
Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description
of variables, and Appendix B, Tables 7.B1 and 7.B2 for descriptive statistics.
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Table 7.4 Multinomial Logit Analysis: Relative Probability of 
Employment State for Men (Reference state is full-time work)
Part-time Fixed-term Self-employed
RRR Z-value RRR Z-value RRR Z-value
Britain 0.378 –6.27 1.311 1.47 2.085 6.26
Western Germany 0.439 –4.48 2.644 4.95 1.727 4.03
Eastern Germany 0.273 –4.88 3.398 5.98 0.949 –0.31
Sweden 0.468 –4.06 1.988 3.14 2.401 6.79
Netherlands = base
Educational groups
Low 0.889 –0.77 0.879 –0.96 0.877 –1.30
Medium = base
High 0.854 –0.92 0.934 –0.44 0.764 –2.44
Age groups
16–24 3.185 5.07 8.564 12.10 0.251 –5.99
25–34 1.044 0.23 1.574 2.74 0.673 –3.64
35–44 = base
45–54 1.294 1.32 0.915 –0.46 1.719 5.37
55–64 3.497 6.17 0.880 –0.51 2.355 7.07
Married or cohabiting 0.676 –2.45 0.511 –5.13 0.733 –2.92
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years)
in the household
No children = base
1 child 0.633 –1.68 0.670 –1.55 1.044 0.32
2 or more children 0.775 –0.83 0.545 –1.86 1.465 2.62
Age of youngest child in the
household
0–2 1.988 2.18 1.157 0.45 0.985 –0.09
3–5 1.801 1.75 0.922 –0.21 0.967 –0.19
N 7,653
Log likelihood –5205.6
Pseudo R2 0.155
NOTE: RRR is the relative risk ratio for a one-unit change in the corresponding variable,
and risk is measured as the risk of the category relative to the base category. Industry
(8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not
reported. The full version of estimation results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and
Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description of
variables, and Appendix B, Tables 7.B1 and 7.B2 for descriptive statistics.
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Table 7.5 Multinomial Logit Analysis: Relative Probability of 
Employment State for Women (Reference state is full-time 
work)
Part-time Fixed-term Self-employed
RRR Z-value RRR Z-value RRR Z-value
Britain 0.317 –11.63 0.723 –1.98 0.405 –5.72
Western Germany 0.422 –7.38 1.041 0.21 0.663 –2.18
Eastern Germany 0.100 –15.88 1.210 1.02 0.302 –5.60
Sweden 0.187 –14.45 0.620 –2.47 0.300 –6.42
Netherlands = base
Educational groups
Low 1.113 1.28 1.179 1.37 0.557 –4.18
Medium = base
High 0.591 –5.52 0.995 –0.04 0.836 –1.24
Age groups
16–24 0.543 –4.81 3.951 9.14 0.150 –5.86
25–34 0.436 –9.21 0.934 –0.51 0.440 –5.61
35–44 = base
45–54 1.463 4.18 0.705 –2.06 1.439 2.54
55–64 2.371 7.31 1.043 0.19 2.295 4.52
Married or cohabiting 1.548 5.50 0.698 –3.42 1.417 2.55
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years)
in the household
No children = base
1 child 3.303 11.45 1.588 2.73 1.952 3.94
2 or more children 6.480 14.30 3.841 6.84 3.942 6.80
Age of youngest child in 
the household
0–2 1.508 2.72 0.942 –0.24 1.178 0.65
3–5 1.461 2.53 1.286 1.11 1.207 0.78
N 6,798
Log likelihood –6377.8
Pseudo R2 0.175
NOTE: RRR is the relative risk ratio for a one-unit change in the corresponding variable,
and risk is measured as the risk of the category relative to the base category. Industry
(8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not
reported. The full version of estimation results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and
Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description of
variables, and Appendix B, Tables 7.B1 and 7.B2 for descriptive statistics.
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Britain Western Germany Eastern Germany Netherlands Sweden
Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value
Women –0.156 –12.17 –0.141 –7.79 –0.126 –5.03 –0.181 –9.94 –0.168 –14.82
Part-time –0.131 –8.44 –0.203 –9.53 –0.036 –0.94 –0.005 –0.26 0.020 1.46
Fixed-term –0.117 –5.78 –0.466 –16.22 –0.420 –13.21 –0.177 –5.48 –0.083 –4.06
Educational groups
Low –0.091 –5.77 –0.068 –3.46 –0.098 –3.78 –0.105 –6.38 –0.081 –6.46
Medium = base
High 0.050 3.09 0.163 6.38 0.117 3.50 0.126 6.54 0.126 9.01
Age groups
16–24 –0.313 –16.51 –0.522 –14.96 –0.430 –10.84 –0.402 –13.65 –0.190 –6.78
25–34 –0.082 –5.59 –0.108 –5.71 0.015 0.53 –0.147 –7.67 –0.085 –5.82
35–44 = base
45–54 –0.028 –1.68 0.072 3.36 0.008 0.29 0.071 3.60 0.047 3.48
55–64 –0.071 –3.03 0.058 2.23 –0.015 –0.41 0.143 4.82 0.073 4.68
Married or cohabiting 0.045 3.37 0.017 0.93 0.083 2.90 0.075 3.92 0.010 0.73
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years) 
in the household
No children = base
1 child 0.017 0.86 0.002 0.09 –0.016 –0.54 0.006 0.25 0.037 2.24
2 or more children 0.024 1.06 0.093 3.03 –0.049 –1.06 0.039 1.50 0.036 1.81
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Age of youngest child 
in the household
0–2 0.042 1.75 0.017 0.48 0.039 0.65 0.025 0.89 0.008 0.30
3–5 0.019 0.75 0.022 0.65 –0.044 –0.82 –0.017 –0.56 0.030 1.28
Constant 1.934 81.78 3.266 106.9 2.84 65.16 3.229  105.1 4.659 219.6
N 4,787 1,927 1,274 1,624 1,927
Adj. R2 0.451 0.568 0.510 0.539 0.351
NOTE: Industry (8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not reported. The full version of estima-
tion results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description
of variables, and Appendix B, Tables 7.B1 and 7.B2 for descriptive statistics.
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240Table 7.7 OLS Regressions on the Logarithm of Hourly Wage in National Currency for Men
Britain Western Germany Eastern Germany Netherlands Sweden
Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value
Part-time –0.094 –2.32 –0.223 –4.61 –0.062 –0.55 0.053 1.77 0.071 2.00
Fixed-term –0.178 –5.68 –0.466 –12.34 –0.455 –9.28 –0.200 –4.07 –0.106 –3.11
Full-time = base
Educational groups
Low –0.096 –4.20 –0.063 –2.48 –0.131 –3.46 –0.106 –4.87 –0.085 –4.62
Medium = base
High 0.036 1.59 0.194 6.08 0.027 0.54 0.150 5.92 0.126 5.77
Age groups
16–24 –0.370 –13.18 –0.637 –13.03 –0.396 –6.38 –0.473 –10.82 –0.183 –4.38
25–34 –0.096 –4.60 –0.122 –5.18 0.038 1.02 –0.192 –7.60 –0.105 –4.68
35–44 = base
45–54 –0.009 –0.35 0.090 3.33 0.031 0.79 0.102 4.09 0.061 3.02
55–64 –0.093 –2.77 0.059 1.82 –0.075 –1.52 0.175 4.80 0.066 2.81
Married or cohabiting 0.080 3.82 0.056 2.25 0.075 1.72 0.110 4.05 0.034 1.61
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years)
in the household
No children = base
1 child 0.062 2.02 –0.012 –0.39 –0.012 –0.30 0.006 0.19 0.066 2.41
2 or more children 0.092 2.75 0.079 2.09 –0.078 –1.26 0.040 1.20 0.059 1.75
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Age of youngest child in 
the household
0–2 –0.065 –1.86 0.048 1.22 0.036 0.51 0.003 0.08 –0.053 –1.14
3–5 –0.047 –1.22 0.008 0.21 0.005 0.07 –0.042 –1.10 0.026 0.64
Constant 1.962 61.20 3.267 89.20 2.880 48.30 3.230 84.95 4.636 150.30
N 2,264 1,106 682 916 944
Adj. R2 0.444 0.601 0.491 0.562 0.284
NOTE: Industry (8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not reported. The full version of estima-
tion results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description
of variables, and Appendix B, Table 7.B1 for the descriptive statistics.
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242Table 7.8 OLS Regressions on the Logarithm of Hourly Wage in National Currency for Women
Britain Western Germany Eastern Germany Netherlands Sweden
Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value
Part-time –0.099 –5.56 –0.139 –4.87 –0.024 –0.57 –0.001 –0.02 0.017 1.22
Fixed-term –0.064 –2.41 –0.417 –9.44 –0.394 –9.39 –0.132 –2.94 –0.073 –2.98
Full-time = base
Educational groups
Low –0.067 –3.09 –0.077 –2.51 –0.060 –1.66 –0.092 –3.76 –0.069 –4.02
Medium = base
High 0.067 3.01 0.153 3.63 0.210 4.65 0.092 3.21 0.136 7.31
Age groups
16–24 –0.263 –10.24 –0.428 –8.49 –0.429 –8.16 –0.382 –9.50 –0.198 –5.26
25–34 –0.057 –2.83 –0.072 –2.28 –0.013 –0.32 –0.109 –3.71 –0.060 –3.16
35–44 = base
45–54 –0.046 –1.98 0.040 1.17 –0.007 –0.16 –0.003 –0.11 0.026 1.42
55–64 –0.065 –2.03 0.047 1.10 0.069 1.25 0.044 0.90 0.065 3.10
Married or cohabiting 0.007 0.42 –0.044 –1.63 0.081 2.14 0.011 0.40 –0.007 –0.40
Single = base
No. of children (≤ 11 years) 
in the household
No children = base
1 child –0.020 –0.79 –0.013 –0.32 –0.012 –0.29 –0.029 –0.75 0.010 0.50
2 or more children –0.041 –1.37 0.038 0.72 –0.022 –0.30 0.022 0.53 0.012 0.48
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Age of youngest child 
in the household
0–2 0.118 3.63 –0.166 –1.95 0.063 0.40 0.068 1.54 0.044 1.30
3–5 0.049 1.44 0.060 1.03 –0.103 –1.16 0.006 0.12 0.020 0.74
Constant 1.665 42.06 3.088 52.42 2.669 37.36 3.033 45.43 4.516 134.57
N 2523 821 592 708 983
Adj. R2 0.409 0.469 0.548 0.449 0.297
NOTE: Industry (8 categories) and occupational (7 categories) dummy variables are included but not reported. The full version of estima-
tion results is presented in Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels (2001c). See Table 7.1 for the source, Appendix A for a detailed description
of variables, and Appendix B, Table 7.B2 for the descriptive statistics.
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how otherwise similar men and women compare in work outcomes.
Estimating separate models for men and women allows us to analyze,
for example, whether male part-time work differs between the coun-
tries studies. Houseman (1999) notes that an individual in the United
States who works in a nonstandard work arrangement is likely to be
female, young, low paid, and desiring a standard work arrangement.
We find (Table 7.3) that, all else equal, women in the four European
countries we study are 12 times as likely as men to work part-time, are
twice as likely to have a fixed-term contract, and they are also 20 per-
cent more likely than otherwise similar men to be self-employed. The
first part of Houseman’s observation for the United States, therefore,
also applies to the four countries we study. The second observation of
Houseman, that nonstandard workers earn less than standard workers,
is not generally true in the four European countries we study. All else
equal, women earn 12 to 18 percent less than men (Table 7.6). Work-
ing part-time or with a fixed-term contract carries a negative wage
effect, except for part-time work in eastern Germany, the Netherlands,
and Sweden (Table 7.6). However, separating by gender (Tables 7.7
and 7.8) modifies the picture.
Swedish men working part-time earn more per hour than full-time
workers (Table 7.7), a result that badly scores with the fact that so
many part-time workers in Sweden are part-time unemployed. How-
ever, even if 25 percent of part-time working men are part-time unem-
ployed (see “The Changing Status of Part-Time Work,” above), 75
percent may, to a large extent, be part-time retirees with a relatively
high hourly wage. Part-time work among men is most common in the
oldest age group, aged 55–64, and the youngest age group, aged 16–24
(Table 7.3).
Part-Time Work
The country dummy variables of the multinomial logits are of spe-
cial interest in light of policy and institutional differences between
countries. The Netherlands is confirmed as the largest part-time econ-
omy in the world. All else equal, there are many more part-time work-
ing men and women in the Netherlands than in the other countries
(Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5). As noted, we treat the eastern part of Ger-
many (the former DDR) and the western part of Germany (the former
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FRG) as two different countries. The data justify such a treatment
because eastern and western Germany often reveal sharper distinctions
than one would expect from one country affected by a given set of
institutions. For example, there is very little part-time work in eastern
Germany but considerable part-time work in western Germany, placing
western Germany second in ranking after the Netherlands for men and
women combined and for women only (Tables 7.3 and 7.5). Germany
is ranked as such even though the probability of working part-time is
only 40 percent to 50 percent as large in western Germany as in the
Netherlands. Among eastern German women, however, the likelihood
of working part-time is only one-tenth that in the Netherlands.
All else equal, the probability of a Swedish woman working part-
time is only one-fifth that of a similar Dutch woman (Table 7.5). This
is a sharp drop compared with the aggregate figure of 23 percent part-
time workers among employed Swedes and 39 percent among
employed Dutch in 1999 (Fagan and Ward, Table 3.1, in this volume)
and also compared with the results in Table 7.2. Our raw data in Table
7.2 show that the proportion part-time among Dutch employed women
is 58.5 percent, and the corresponding figure for Swedish women is
30.1 percent. 
This difference is likely explained by the fact that Swedish part-
time working women are much more concentrated in a certain category
that we control for in our multinomial logit analysis, whereas in the
Netherlands, part-time work is more evenly spread among all types of
women. Nearly all Swedish mothers make use of the right to work 30
hours per week in their regular full-time work until the youngest child
is eight years old. Because we control for whether there is a child
younger than age 12 in the household, this variable catches the Swed-
ish mothers making use of this family policy. Again, this result may
modify the large amount of part-time unemployed among Swedish
women, 30 percent, who would be spread over all kinds of women.
However, the other 70 percent may be concentrated among women
with young children. This control variable is also highly significant
(Table 7.5); women with one young child are three times more likely to
work part-time, and those with two or more young children are six
times more likely to work part-time. Perhaps the effect of young chil-
dren would have been even larger in a separate model for Swedish
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women than it is in Table 7.5, where women from all four countries are
included.
Part-time workers in western Germany earn at least 20 percent less
per hour than otherwise similar full-time workers (Table 7.6). This is
hardly the equal treatment of part-time work and full-time workers
demanded by the EU 1997 directive and by German legislation. How-
ever, this is in line with the remark by Schömann and Schömann (in
this volume) that part-time work is not available in skilled occupations,
which differs from the Netherlands, where there is a general right to
shorten or lengthen work hours in any job. In Britain, where no such
legislation exists, the pay disadvantage for part-time workers is smaller
both for men and women than it is in western Germany. 
An explanation for the phenomenon that western German part-time
workers earn substantially less than full-time workers, despite equal
pay laws, is that for these laws to be effective, part-time and full-time
workers must hold comparable jobs within firms. If all positions in a
particular occupation within a firm are part-time, then a firm can
legally pay these part-time workers low wages. Part-time workers are
probably concentrated in low-skill occupations in Germany and in
Britain, which has no equal-pay legislation for part-time workers,
whereas in Sweden and the Netherlands, part-time workers hold a
broad spectrum of occupations, including high-skill occupations.
Fixed-Term Work
In both eastern and western Germany, the probability of working
under a fixed-term contract is much higher than in the other countries.
For men, it is 2.6 to 3.4 times more common in Germany than in the
Netherlands, and for women, the probability is almost equal to that in
the Netherlands. Above it was shown that a fixed-term contract in Ger-
many is seen as an alternative to unemployment (see “Flexibility of the
Labor Market and Protection of Workers” above). One can therefore
assume that German workers who have fixed-term contracts may not
be the most competitive workers. There is also the largest negative
wage effect in Germany (–0.42 to –0.46) compared with full-time
work, which translates to a wage ratio of only 63 percent to 66 percent
of regular worker hourly wages, all else equal (Table 7.6). This nega-
tive wage effect is similar for men and women (Tables 7.7 and 7.8).
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In Britain, there are relatively few fixed-term contracts. As
explained by Fagan and Ward (in this volume), there is no reason for a
British firm to offer a fixed-term contract for a period shorter than one
year because all workers’ rights in Britain apply only after the worker
has been employed for at least one year. The Netherlands has many
fixed-term contracts for women but few for men, all else equal (Tables
7.4 and 7.5). There are, for example, twice as many Swedish as Dutch
men on fixed-term contracts, but only 62 percent as many Swedish as
Dutch women on fixed-term contracts, all else equal (Tables 7.4 and
7.5). There are more restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts in
Sweden than in the Netherlands, given that a Swedish firm must spec-
ify the reason why a fixed-term contract is offered rather than a regular
contract. In Sweden, the typical fixed-term contract worker is a female
substituting for someone on leave in the public health care sector. This
scores with the fixed-term worker of Table 7.3. The probability of
being a fixed-term worker doubles (2.0 in Table 7.3) if one is female,
almost doubles if employed in the public and nonprofit sector (1.9),
and is almost six times larger (5.8) if aged 16–24. In addition, a woman
who has two or more children is almost four times as likely to have a
fixed-term contract as women without children (Table 7.5). For men
and women combined, Sweden has more workers with fixed-term con-
tracts than all other countries except eastern Germany (Table 7.3),
although the right to offer fixed-term contracts is quite regulated (see
“Flexibility of the Labor Market and Protection of Workers,” above).
The largest proportion of fixed-term workers, twice as many as in the
Netherlands, is found in eastern Germany (Table 7.3).
Self-Employed
The German legislature has concerns that self-employment may be
hidden dependent employment (see “Self-Employment: Entrepreneur-
ial Inventiveness or Hidden Dependent Employment?” above). Self-
employment is about equally prevalent in Britain, western Germany,
and Sweden, and less common in the Netherlands and eastern Ger-
many. We were unable to analyze wage differentials between self-
employed and employed workers because of vague reporting of earn-
ings and hours worked by the self-employed. If there were self-
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employment among “weaker” workers, one would have seen a nega-
tive wage effect. 
The Swedish legislature has viewed self-employment as an alterna-
tive to unemployment, which may also coincide with lower earnings.
There is substantially more self-employment among men (Table 7.4) in
Sweden, Britain, and western Germany than in the Netherlands, and
substantially less self-employment among women than in the Nether-
lands (Table 7.5). The results score with the observation for the United
States by Carré (in this volume) that independent contractors among
men are executives, professionals, and salespersons, whereas female
independent contractors offer domestic help, child care, real estate, ser-
vices, and sales. A self-employed woman offering child care would be
classified as public or nonprofit sector and a service worker.
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this chapter provides a partial answer to a number
of questions. For example, why are there so many part-time workers,
both men and women, in the Netherlands? Sweden saw an increase in
part-time work among women in the 1970s, when combining work and
motherhood became common. A combination lifestyle has only
become acceptable and supported by public policies since the 1990s in
the Netherlands and that may be an important reason why part-time
work increased so much.
A second reason for the large proportion of part-time work in the
Netherlands can be found in the way funds are raised, for example, in
the care sector. It is customary for a private entrepreneur to compete
for public funds with other entrepreneurs and also raise funds by pri-
vate donations and user fees. It is rather likely that such a financing
system may create part-time jobs supplemented by voluntary work. A
third reason, from the demand side, is that the Dutch consensus society
may result in two part-time jobs rather than one full-time job in the
public sector (e.g., in academics). The Netherlands is also the one
country that has legislated the right for the worker to demand increases
or decreases of work hours in any job. 
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Another question that arises from the analysis is, Why are there so
many self-employed Swedish men? The Swedish legislature views
self-employment as an alternative to unemployment, granting entrepre-
neurs who would otherwise be unemployed the right to receive a sub-
sidy equal to the unemployment benefit for half a year. Many Swedish
self-employed workers have one-person firms, and their situation is not
very different from dependently employed workers. The mobile tele-
phone has also allowed people who work in the construction and home
repair sector to be available to potential customers while at work. Peo-
ple in forestry own their own machinery and are independent entrepre-
neurs, and a hairdresser may be an independent entrepreneur renting a
chair at some firm rather than being a dependent worker of the firm. In
contrast, the German legislature has sought to decrease such practices,
claiming that it is simply masked dependent employment that should
be turned into a regular work contract in order to supply the worker
with job protection and social security benefits. This can explain a
smaller proportion of self-employed in Germany than in Sweden,
which is consistent with our findings.
Why are there so many fixed-term workers in Germany and why
are they so poorly paid? Although there are negative effects on wages
per hour of having a fixed-term contract in all the countries we study,
in both eastern and western Germany, the hourly wage of fixed-term
workers is only about 63 percent to 67 percent that of regular workers,
for both men and women. In the other countries, the fixed-term con-
tract workers have an hourly wage of 84 percent to 93 percent that of
regular workers (Tables 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8).
In Germany, fixed-term contracts have been seen as an alternative
to unemployment and there are no limits on the number of months a
person can work under a fixed-term contract if he or she is older than
60. This explains the large number of people who are employed on
fixed-term contracts in both western and eastern Germany (Tables 7.3,
7.4, and 7.5). For younger people, a fixed-term contract turns into a
regular contract after 24 months. It may be that there are exceptionally
many older people in Germany on fixed-term contracts with low pay
and they are then compared with other older employees who have bet-
ter wages because of accumulated human capital and seniority. 
Finally, the analysis raises the question of why part-time workers
are relatively better paid in Sweden and the Netherlands than in Britain
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and Germany. In Sweden, part-time work is seen as a temporary solu-
tion, and one of the parents of young children has a legal right to
shorten work hours to 30 hours a week until the youngest child is eight
years old. Part-time workers in Sweden in 1998 averaged 23.1 hours
per week compared with Britain at 17.1 hours, the Netherlands at 18.1,
and Germany at 18.3 for both men and women. Swedish mothers regu-
larly make use of 12 to 18 months of parental leave during the child's
first one and one-half years of life. By the time the child is age five, 90
percent of mothers work at least 25 hours per week, in contrast to the
other three countries. In the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany, only
about 50 percent of mothers of five-year-olds are employed, and fewer
than 10 percent are employed full-time (Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wet-
zels 2001b).
Further, part-time work in Sweden and the Netherlands occurs in
all types of occupations and in all educational groups, whereas in Brit-
ain, part-time work is very often temporary and limited to low-skilled
jobs. Part-time work is not available in higher-level jobs in Germany,
where works councils have a veto if a firm wants to install part-time
jobs.
Note
1. Another comparison across the European Union States offered by Fagan and
Ward (in this volume) is the average number of hours per week worked by a part-
time working woman. Sweden and France are the only two countries that have
averages of 23 hours per week, whereas part-time working women in most EU
countries average less than 20 hours per week. This is also the case for the Nether-
lands, Britain, and Germany.
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Appendix A
Definition of Variables
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Table 7A.1 Current Labor Force Status
Not employed Dependent employed Self-employed
Britain (BHPS) • Respondent did not do any paid work 
last week;
[and]
• respondent does not have a job or is 
waiting for job.
• Respondent did paid work last week; 
or respondent did no paid work, but he/
she has a job and is on leave;
[and]
• Employed.
• Respondent did paid work last week; 
or respondent did no paid work, but he/
she has a job and is on leave;
[and]
• Self-employed
Germany (GSOEP) • Not gainfully employed; or on 
temporary work leave.
Note: Those who were on leave are 
included in “not employed” because 
they did not report the information on 
their job characteristics (type of 
contract, industry, occupation, etc.).
•Employed full-time; or employed 
part-time; or in occupational trianing, 
apprenticeship; or marginally or 
sporadically employed
[and]
• Not self-employed
• Self-employed, including family 
members helping out.
Netherlands (OSA) • Unemployed, nonparticipant, full-
time student.
• Gainfully employed • Self-employed, family worker.
Sweden (HUS) • Respondent is in the labor force but 
on leave from work, more than two 
months; or respondent is looking for 
work; or respondent is not in the labor 
force.
• Respondent is employed: 1) 
performed paid work during the last 
week, 2) had time off, was ill, or was 
on leave for less than 2 months, or 3) 
was laid off but expected to return to 
work within one week;
[and]
• Salaried employee.
• Respondent is employed: 
1) performed paid work during the last 
week, 2) had time off, was ill, or was 
on leave for less than 2 months, or
 3) was laid off but expected to return 
to work within one week;
[and]
• Salaried employee;[and]
• Self-employed/professional or both 
salaried employee and self-employed
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Contract
Full-Time Work
Full-time work with a regular contract (35 hours and more worked per
week, including overtime hours).
Part-Time Work
Part-time work with a regular contract (fewer than 35 hours worked per
week, including overtime).
Fixed-Term Work
Fixed-term work is full-time or part-time work with a fixed-term contract.
Hourly Wage
Hourly wage includes gross earnings per week/(normal working hours per
week incl. paid and uinpaid overtime).
Because we do not have direct information on hourly wages, we calculate
hourly wage from gross earnings per week divided by normal working hours
per week, including paid and unpaid overtime. For gross earnings, we use gross
monthly earnings in BHPS, GSOEP, OSA, and the majority of employees in
HUS. To obtain gross earnings per week, monthly earnings are divided by 4.3.
In addition, for HUS, respondents report their earnings based on how to be
paid. Annual earnings are divided by 46, and biweekly earnings are divided by
2. When case hourly earnings are reported, this is regarded as the hourly wage.
However, after doing this procedure, we have a few very “strange” cases; that
is, wages considerably below the minimum wages or very high wages. To en-
sure wage estimations are not affected by these cases, which occurred because
of missed reporting, and other extreme cases, we exclude the observations with
Regular contract Fixed-term contract
Britain (BHPS) Permanent job Seasonal/temporary job 
contract/fixed time
Germany (GSOEP) Unlimited contract Limited contract
Netherlands (OSA) Permanent employment; 
Temporary contract with a 
view of permanent 
employment
Temporary contract
Sweden (HUS) Year-round job Temporary job; 
Seasonal work
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1 percent of the lowest and 1 percent of the highest wage distribution from our
wage estimations. The original descriptions of gross earnings and hourly wag-
es in each data set are as follows:
Gross Earnings
Britain (BHPS)
The last time you were paid, what was your gross pay—that is, including
any overtime, bonuses, commission, tips or tax refund, but before any
deductions for tax, national insurance or pension contributions, union
dues, and so on?
Germany (GSOEP)
How high were your earnings last month? If you received any additional
payments last month, e.g., holiday money or back-pay please do not
include these. Also do not include child benefits even if received from
employer. However, do include money earned for overtime. If possible
please enter for both: Gross earnings, in other words earnings before
deductions for tax and social security; net earnings, in other words the
amount after deductions for tax and social security.
Netherlands (OSA)
Gross income per month, current situation.
Sweden (HUS)
What are your regular weekly (biweekly, monthly, annual, or hourly)
earnings, before taxes and other deductions?
Working Hours per Week (including paid and unpaid overtime work)
Britain (BHPS) 1 + 2
1) Thinking about your (main) job, how many hours, excluding overtime
and meal breaks, are you expected to work in a normal week?
2) And how many hours overtime do you usually work in a normal week
(including unpaid overtime)?
Germany (GSOEP)
How many hours (per week) do you actually work, on average, including
overtime?
Netherlands (OSA) 1 + 2 + 3
1) Contracted working hours
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2) Unpaid overtime per week
3) Paid overtime per week
Sweden (HUS)
On average, how many hours per week are you currently working at your
main job, including both paid and unpaid overtime?
Education
Education high: Obtained highest qualification, requires 15 years or more
of schooling.
Education medium: Obtained highest qualification, requires between 12
and 14 years of schooling.
Education low: Obtained highest qualification, requires fewer than 12
years of schooling. See Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels (2001c) for detailed
description.
Marital Status
Occupational Classification
We use the 1 digit ISCO-68 Occupational Classification for our four-coun-
try comparison of occupations. The reason we follow ISCO-68 instead of
ISCO-88, which is the latest international standard classification of occupa-
tions, is that the occupational classification in HUS does not distinguish be-
tween skilled work and elementary occupation. Because this distinction is
essential in making data correspond to the 1 digit ISCO-88, we can only create
a variable that corresponds to 1 digit ISCO-68 for HUS. GSOEP includes a
Married or cohabiting Single
Britain (BHPS) Married; living as couple Widowed; divorced; 
separated; never married
Germany 
(GSOEP)
Married, living together with 
spouse; or Married, living 
permanently separated from 
my spouse, single, divorced or 
widowed; and living with 
partner in same household
Married, living permanently 
separated from my spouse; 
single; divorced; or widowed 
and not living with partner in 
same household
Netherlands 
(OSA)
Married; living with partner Divorced (not living with 
partner); widowed (not living 
with partner); single/never 
married
Sweden (HUS) Married; cohabiting Single
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variable of ISCO-68 directly. BHPS and OSA give the classification based on
ISCO-88 and we convert ISCO-88, using “Index of occupational titles accord-
ing to ISCO-88 numerical order” in ILO (1990, pp. 273–334).
Industrial Classification
Industrial classifications are as follows: agriculture (agriculture, forestry,
and fishing), manufacturing and mining, energy (energy and water supply),
construction, shops, restaurants, etc. (wholesale and retail trade/hotels and res-
taurants), transportation (transportation and communications), finance (fi-
nance, insurance, and real estate), and public nonprofit (nonprofit business:
industrial classification in HUS, except we combine manufacturing and mining
industry, and the British Standard Industrial Classification 1980 [SIC] in BHPS
1998 does not provide an independent category for mining). We do not adopt
NACE-European Community Classification of Economic Activities as our in-
dustrial classification because it is impossible to make the corresponding clas-
sification using HUS, which has the roughest industrial classification among
our four data sets.
Note
1. Another comparison across the EU states offered by Fagan and Ward (in this vol-
ume) is the average number of hours per week worked by a part-time working
woman. Sweden and France are the only two countries that have averages of 23
hours per week, whereas part-time women in most EU countries average fewer
than 20 hours per week. This is also the case for the Netherlands, Britain, and
Germany.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 257  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 258  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
259
Appendix B
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 259  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
260Table 7B.1 Descriptive Statistics (the means of explanatory variables): Men Who Are Gainfully Employed 
Britain
Western 
Germany
Eastern 
Germany Netherlands Sweden
Educational groups
Low 0.394 0.632 0.637 0.463 0.490
Medium = base
High 0.450 0.189 0.166 0.240 0.226
Age groups
16–24 0.162 0.064 0.115 0.080 0.036
25–34 0.278 0.313 0.236 0.235 0.179
35–44 = base
45–54 0.196 0.209 0.214 0.278 0.325
55–64 0.093 0.121 0.116 0.100 0.202
Married or cohabiting 0.715 0.751 0.785 0.808 0.858
No children = base
1 child 0.131 0.164 0.186 0.146 0.091
2 or more children 0.138 0.140 0.079 0.201 0.106
Age of youngest child in the 
household
0–2 0.110 0.095 0.049 0.112 0.038
3–5 0.069 0.085 0.054 0.087 0.054
Industry 
Agriculture 0.026 0.027 0.044 0.039 0.024
Energy 0.016 0.022 0.023 0.010 0.026
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Construction 0.090 0.108 0.227 0.101 0.084
Shops, restaurants, etc. 0.176 0.089 0.100 0.151 0.090
Transportation 0.095 0.087 0.098 0.081 0.091
Finance 0.139 0.056 0.026 0.145 0.104
Public, nonprofit 0.188 0.278 0.222 0.287 0.259
Manufacturing = base
Occupation (ISCO-68)
0/1: Professional 0.190 0.228 0.127 0.300 0.245
2: Administrative 0.140 0.075 0.066 0.107 0.099
3: Clerical 0.103 0.135 0.076 0.107 0.122
4: Sales workers 0.091 0.061 0.067 0.077 0.095
5: Service workers 0.100 0.078 0.075 0.051 0.075
6: Agricultural workers 0.030 0.024 0.040 0.044 0.023
7/8/9: Production 
workers = base
N 2,992 1,351 818 1,266 1,266
See Table 7.1 for the source and Appendix A for a detailed description of variables.
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262Table 7B.2 Descriptive Statistics (the means of explanaory variables): Women Who Are Gainfully Employed 
Britain
Western
 Germany
Eastern 
Germany Netherlands Sweden
Educational groups
Low 0.466 0.653 0.541 0.391 0.483
High 0.366 0.138 0.156 0.219 0.322
Age groups
16–24 0.181 0.087 0.137 0.121 0.044
25–34 0.271 0.310 0.233 0.275 0.184
45–54 0.215 0.198 0.215 0.240 0.329
55–64 0.076 0.106 0.089 0.060 0.186
Married or cohabiting 0.690 0.723 0.769 0.784 0.846
No. of children in the household
1 child 0.152 0.143 0.170 0.153 0.148
2 or more children 0.130 0.091 0.048 0.182 0.158
Age of youngest child in 
the household
0–2 0.087 0.023 0.009 0.121 0.044
3–5 0.066 0.067 0.036 0.081 0.090
Industry 
Agriculture 0.008 0.015 0.025 0.018 0.009
Energy 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.009
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Construction 0.008 0.006 0.015 0.012 0.006
Shops, restaurants, etc. 0.257 0.201 0.161 0.197 0.091
Transportation 0.036 0.079 0.084 0.043 0.037
Finance 0.134 0.082 0.060 0.114 0.065
Public, nonprofit 0.437 0.485 0.542 0.558 0.667
Occupation (ISCO-68)
0/1: Professional 0.196 0.260 0.305 0.325 0.513
2: Administrative 0.073 0.014 0.025 0.034 0.046
3: Clerical 0.284 0.293 0.286 0.242 0.180
4: Sales workers 0.123 0.166 0.164 0.118 0.077
5: Service workers 0.250 0.169 0.108 0.225 0.093
6: Agricultural workers 0.007 0.018 0.025 0.019 0.006
N 3,007 1,000 688 983 1,120
See Table 7.1 for the source and Appendix A for a detailed description of variables.
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8
Standard and Nonstandard Work 
Arrangements, Pay Difference, 
and Choice of Work 
by Japanese Mothers
Nobuko Nagase  
Ochanomizu University
In this chapter, we analyze two questions.  First, how do marriage
and children affect women’s choices among full-time regular employ-
ment and part-time employment and no work; and do they differ by
cohorts and by the educational attainment of females?  Second, why is
the part-time employment wage so low in Japan, and why do increas-
ingly more females still choose to work part-time?
The age profile of female labor participation still retains an M-
shape in Japan: labor force participation rises at first with age, declines
during women’s childbearing years, and rises again with age until
retirement ages.  In contrast, in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, and in many other western countries, the profile has
slowly changed to a high plateau over the last 20–30 years.  Has the
work behavior also changed for the younger cohorts in Japan?  To
address this question we use microdata from the Eleventh Japanese
National Fertility Survey–Married Wife, collected by the National
Institute of Population and Social Security Research in 1997.  To
explore the second question of why the wage level of part-time work-
ers remained low despite the general increase in demand for part-time
workers, and the increase in part-time work, we use the Survey on the
Diversified Workers at Workplace, conducted by the Japan Labor Insti-
tute in 1999.  The chapter attempts to show what effects the tax and
social security system had, together with labor practices, in keeping the
part-time wage rate low. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows.  We first report the general
time trends of Japanese female labor using descriptive statistics.  In
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contrast to other western countries reviewed in this volume, many mar-
ried females have worked as informal family workers in the past.  The
emerging part-time employment opportunities coincided with the
decline in informal work opportunities in the 1980s.  Part-time employ-
ment further increased among unmarried females, the aged, and young
males in the 1990s.  We then examine specific features of Japanese
nonstandard work, its definition, and time trends in wage levels.  In the
third section, we analyze the important policy changes in recent years
that have strongly influenced women.  Although the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Law and Child Care Leave Law promoted equality
between the sexes and continued labor force participation, the tax and
social security reform encouraged wives to remain as secondary earn-
ers, especially in part-time work.  These early sections, therefore, offer
general and up-to-date information concerning female labor in Japan.
In the fourth section, we examine marriage and childbirth and the
mother’s choice of no work, regular work, or nonstandard work using
descriptive statistics and multinomial logit analysis of microdata.
Although the younger generations are more likely to continue to work
after marriage, the majority of women still quit work after the birth of
their first child.  The less educated are more likely to return to non-
standard work arrangements.  The more educated may have a higher
attachment to work during child-rearing years, but they are less likely
to return to work once they interrupt their first career.  In the following
section, the wage structure of nonstandard employees is estimated, and
the effect of the tax and social security tax system on wage is dis-
cussed.  The chapter ends with concluding remarks.
GROWTH OF NONSTANDARD WORKERS
Japan perhaps contrasts with other countries in this volume in that
about 40 percent of all married female labor participants were in self-
employment as late as the 1980s.  Self-employment includes family
workers or the self-employed in small family-owned stores, small fam-
ily-run manufacturing, or in agriculture.  Table 8.1 shows that part-time
and other nonstandard employment rapidly replaced self-employ-
ment.  In 1987, self-employment comprised 36 percent of the married
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female labor force, and nonstandard work comprised 26 percent; in
1997, the percentage was just about the opposite, 26 percent for the
former and 35 percent for the latter.  Table 8.1 also shows that the per-
centage of such nonstandard employment and informal sector work
was much lower for males and for females, if unmarried females are
included. 
Because the increase in part-time employment offsets the decline
in informal sector work, Nitta (2001) attributes the increase in part-
time work to supply-side matters. Indeed, many married women chose
this form of work to better coordinate household chores and market
work.  According to the Statistics Office Basic Employment Survey,
the percentage of workers who replied that they are “mainly working”
Table 8.1 Trends in Labor Participation and Type of Work (%) 
Dependent employmenta
Labor 
participationb
Self-
employedc Total Seishain
Part-
timed Otherse
Male
1982 79 22 78 66 2 4
1987 77 20 80 67 3 3
1997 76 16 84 68 5 3
Female
1982 49 34 66 43 17 3
1987 48 30 70 43 22 3
1997 50 20 80 43 30 4
Married 
femalef
1982 44 42 58 32 20 3
1987 50 36 63 31 26 3
1997 51 26 74 32 35 3
a As a percentage of all employed. Dependent employment = Seishain (regular work-
ers) + Part-time + Others + Executives of corporations. 
b As a percentage of working-age population.
c As a percentage of all employed. Self-employed includes family workers.
d Part-time includes arubaito.
e Others include dispatched workers and shokutaku.
f Spouse of household heads in an ordinary household.
SOURCE: Statistics Office Basic Employment Survey.
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remained at about one-fourth of all married females throughout the
1980s and 1990s, despite the rise in the labor participation rate.  On the
other hand, those who replied that they are “working as secondary
activities” increased from 20 percent to 25 percent of married females.
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show how women’s work choices differ by fam-
ily characteristics.  Table 8.2 shows that single women have a high
labor force participation rate, at around 90 percent, and also have a
high share of regular full-time work (around 80 percent) for the 25–34
Table 8.2 Labor Force Participation: Single Women and Married Women 
without Children
Age
Total 15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+
Single women
Population size (in 10,000) 758 104 114 47 61 90 342
Labor participation rate (%) 45 60 94 91 85 56 9
Wage and salaried earners to 
labor force participants (%)
88 98 94 93 84 83 50
Nonagricultural wage and 
salaried earners (%)a
Regular employees 68 64 80 75 67 47 38
Part-time and arubaito 28 34 14 19 31 45 54
Dispatched workers 2 0 3 3 0 3 –
Shokutaku and others 3 2 3 6 3 5 8
Married women (with no
children or other relatives
in household)
Population size (in 10,000) 996 14 164 78 152 294 311
Labor participation rate (%) 43 50 65 65 64 45 15
Wage and salaried earners to
labor force participants (%)
72 100 94 85 74 63 30
Nonagricultural wage and 
salaried earnersa (%)
Regular employees 47 57 56 49 46 38 43
Part-time and arubaito 46 27 35 46 50 58 50
Dispatched workers 2 0 4 2 1 0 –
Shokutaku and others 5 0 6 5 4 5 14
a Percentage may not add up to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Labor Force Special Survey 2001 and 2000.
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Table 8.3 Labor Participation Pattern, Married Women by Age of Children
Age of the youngest child No. of children
0–3 4–6 7–9 10–12 13–14 15–17 18+ 1 2 3+
Population size (in 10,000) 326 166 141 140 101 173 701 774 735 239
Labor participation: nuclear family (%) 28 46 62 63 71 69 56 47 54 54
Labor participation: extended family (%) 40 63 79 78 81 81 71 67 70 74
Nuclear/all families (%) 85 79 76 71 69 72 83 85 77 70
For married women of nuclear families
Percentage of total populationa
     Regular employees 12 15 13 16 19 18 15 15 14 13
     Part-time and arubaito 8 21 32 34 36 38 25 20 28 27
     Dispatched workers 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
     Shokutaku and others 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
Percentage of labor force participants
     Regular employees 44 33 23 26 27 26 27 32 27 23
     Part-time and arubaito 32 47 55 55 52 57 45 42 52 49
     Dispatched workers 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
     Shokutaku and others 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Percentage of nonagricultural wage and 
salaried workers
     Regular employees 55 40 28 31 33 31 36 42 33 30
     Part-time and arubaito 40 57 68 65 64 67 61 55 64 64
     Dispatched workers 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
     Shokutaku and others 3 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 4
a Percentages do not add up to labor force participation rate because informal sector work is not included.
SOURCE: Labor Force Special Survey, February 2001.
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age group.  The labor force participation rate of married women with-
out children drops by 20 to 30 percentage points and the share of non-
standard employment (part-time, dispatched, shokutaku, and others)
increases to nearly half of those employed.  Table 8.3 shows the work
patterns for mothers by the age of their youngest child.  The second and
third rows show that the labor participation rate is about 10–17 per-
centage points lower for nuclear families than for extended families.
Because nuclear families compose around 80 percent of families with
children today, the middle and lower sections of the table show the
work categories in detail for nuclear families. 
The participation rate drops to 28 percent for the nuclear family
when the youngest child is under age 3; it rises to 71 percent when the
youngest child is 13–14 years old. The share of regular workers to total
population stays relatively stable: 12 percent when the youngest child
is age 0–3 and 18 percent when the youngest child is 15–17.  On the
other hand, the share of nonstandard employment to the total popula-
tion increases as children age, from 8 percent of families whose young-
est child is 0–3 to 38 percent when the youngest child is age 15–17. 
Interestingly, as Table 8.2 reveals, the ratio of women who work in
nonstandard employment generally increases with age for both single
and married women.  This indicates that the choice is not only a desire
to coordinate household chores and work, but also an inability to find a
regular job. Such an age effect is not evident for males, except for
those over age 60. Nagase (1995) showed that the unwilling choice of
nonstandard work increases when women are over age 35 and when
men are over age 45 when controlling for education, area, and other
factors. 
In the 1990s, with the economy in a deep recession, the labor mar-
ket scene changed, with demands for a flexible and less costly work-
force becoming stronger.  Nonstandard work expanded not only among
housewives, but also among young males, and females and older
males. The share of nonstandard employees in nonagricultural employ-
ment (excluding the informal sector) rose by 6 percent from 1990 to
2000, to 18 percent for males younger than 25 and not attending
school, and to 28 percent for males over age 65, according to the Labor
Force Special Survey.  For females, the share increased by 7 percent-
age points from 1990 to 2000, to 49 percent for the age group 35–64,
and by 12 percent to 23 percent for females younger than age 24 and
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not attending school.  Part-time work still composes the largest share of
nonstandard employment, as shown in Table 8.1, but a new form of
nonstandard employment is increasing, and the definition of “part-
time” also includes full-time nonstandard workers, as will be discussed
below. 
SPECIFIC FEATURES OF JAPANESE “PART-TIME” 
WORKERS AND THEIR LOW WAGES 
A very interesting feature of part-time employment is that a large
body of workers is called “part-time” irrespective of work hours: their
jobs have been often low-paying and short-term, with flexibility in
working hours and fewer responsibilities.  Ichino (1989) concluded
that “part-time” workers are mostly married females and have longer
average work weeks, while “short work week” workers included com-
paratively more males.  Surprisingly, more than half of the workers
classified as part-time worked more than 35 hours in 1989, according
to the Labor Force Special Survey.  The percentage is lower (26 per-
cent) in 2000.1 
This has much to do with Japanese employment practice that treats
the regular workers, or seishain, and nonstandard workers differently.
Court law has also supported such differential treatment.  The seishain
are hired as long-term contract workers, given greater job protection,
and often have wages linked to tenure.  Substantial biannual bonus
payments are customary as is a higher severance payment upon retire-
ment along with social security insurance coverage and other employee
benefits.  In return, the ready acceptance of overtime work and reloca-
tion was often required by employer and employee agreements.  Sug-
eno, from the viewpoint of labor law, comments that such agreement
can be rational under long-term labor contracts (Sugeno 1997, p. 101).
On the other hand, part-time employees and other nonstandard employ-
ees are provided less employment stability and lower wages.  There is
as yet only one court that has ruled that the wage difference between
workers of different work categories conducting the same work is
against public benefit.2  Kojima and Fujikawa (in this volume) explain
the different treatment and the law. 
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Nagase (1997a,b) found that hourly wages of female part-time
workers are as low as those of family workers and self-employed
workers when education, tenure, and other factors are controlled for
and when work selection correction was made.  The wage gap between
regular and part-time workers was found to be as large as 30 percent,
even when education, tenure, work selection correction, and other fac-
tors were controlled for. 
Despite the relatively higher demand for part-time than regular
full-time workers evident in more job openings and the job-seeker
ratio, the generally lower pecuniary compensation of part-time workers
compared with regular workers never narrowed.  Rather, the hourly
wage level compared with that of the average females in full-time reg-
ular workers deteriorated.  The average hourly wage gap between the
two was around 10 percent in the early 1970s, but declined throughout
the 1970s and leveled off in the 1980s.  It showed a small reversal dur-
ing the economic boom that began in 1986, but again started to decline
after 1990.  The Part-Time Labor Law was implemented in 1993 to
enhance the working conditions of part-time workers.  However, the
average hourly wage gap between part-time employees and regular
full-time employees is as large as 34 percent today.  Among female
part-time workers, only 35 percent were covered by Social Security
Insurance in 1995, and many fewer were covered by corporate bene-
fits. 
POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES CONCERNING 
WOMEN AND LABOR 
Policy changes that affected family and work were rather contra-
dictory, in that on one hand they encouraged female labor, and on the
other hand, increased protection to housewives.
The two main laws that encouraged female labor involvement were
the Equal Employment Opportunity Law and the Child Care Leave
Law.  The former was implemented in 1986 to prohibit discrimination
between sexes.  The law was outstanding but introductory, since many
clauses were written as “duty to make effort” for employers, and others
that were mandatory lacked any penalty.  Some clauses were strength-
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ened in 1999.  For example, the prohibition of discrimination between
men and women in hiring, location, and promotion became manda-
tory.3
The Child Care Leave Law was implemented in 1992 to facilitate
women’s work after childbirth.  It allowed leave from work until the
child reached the age of one.  Leave was originally nonpaid, but pecu-
niary compensation began with employment insurance in 1995, and the
level improved in 2001 to 40 percent of the previous salary.  The law
applied to all enterprises (including businesses with fewer than 30
employees) in 1995.  Leave, however, can exclude certain workers,4
and nonstandard workers are often excluded (Nihon Rodo Kenkyu
Kiko 2001).  Most nonstandard workers, therefore, lack child care
leave rights (Nagase 2000).  The leave law was strengthened in 2001.
On the other hand, changes made in the Tax and Social Insurance
Law increased benefits to low-earning or nonworking wives in the late
1980s and early 1990s.  It, in effect, promoted secondary employment
among women.
Securing women’s pension rights was on the agenda of the Pension
Reform Law of 1985.  Before the reform, housewives of waged and
salaried workers were not mandatory participants, but were supposed
to be supported by their husband’s public pension.  The new law made
social insurance mandatory for dependent spouses without any new
premium payment.5  The Ministry of Health and Welfare described the
reform as that of transferring part of the breadwinner’s income-related
national occupational pension to his dependent spouse while maintain-
ing the household total pension level.  However, although the reform
gave pension rights to nonearning and low-earning spouses, it did so by
gradually thinning the pension benefit of the full-time working popula-
tion without dependents.  After the reform, the only addition that a wife
could add to her pension by her own premium payment was the earn-
ings-related second tier, since she was already given the first tier.  On
the other hand, the dependent spouse gained the full basic pension with
no personal premium payment.
The definition of dependent spouse was quite generous: up to 1.3
million yen annually since the early 1990s.6  Moreover, all other social
security premium exemption rules for dependent spouses of waged and
salaried workers were tied to the same limit, namely the health insur-
ance premium and the long-term care insurance that was newly intro-
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duced in 1999.  Because the level of premium payment rose rapidly in
the 1990s, the benefit obtained by remaining as a dependent spouse in
effect enlarged.  In fact, according to the Statistics Bureau’s Basic
Employment Survey of 1997, among married females, more than 70
percent of nonstandard employees with children were earning less than
1 million yen, below the minimum level for tax and social security pay-
ments. 
In terms of tax, the Income Tax Special Deduction of Spouse was
introduced in 1987.  Before its introduction, the household tax
increased once a wife’s income exceeded a certain limit (then 0.9 mil-
lion yen) because the main income earner lost the full value of the
spouse’s deduction on his income tax.  The addition of the Special Tax
Deduction of Spouse was to lessen this large increase, not by reducing
the low-earning wives’ tax benefits, but by adding income steps on it.
Some observers noted that this change was implemented to ease the
heated objection of housewives to the introduction of the Consumption
Tax. 
Labor practices also encourage married women to stay home, or at
least remain low-income earners.  Many firms pay “spouse’s addition”
to the regular salary.  According to the General Survey on Wage and
Working Hours System of 1997, by the Ministry of Labor, and con-
ducted among enterprises with 30 and more full-time regular employ-
ees, 77 percent of the firms provided spouse allowances that averaged
10,500 yen a month.  However, the payment is often linked to whether
the wife is dependent.7 
MARRIAGE, CHILDBIRTH, AND LABOR SUPPLY
Cohort Difference
Using the microdata from the Eleventh Japanese National Fertility
Survey—Married Women (hereafter referred to as Married Women), I
examine how having children affects the work choices of females.  The
data were collected by the National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research (NIPSSR) in 1997 for married women under age 50,
or born after 1948, and comprise a national sample of 7,370, when
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missing samples are excluded.  The data include retrospective ques-
tions on work status before and after marriage, date of first child’s
birth, and mother’s present work status.8 
The upper half of Table 8.4 shows the older cohort (age 35 to 49
when surveyed), and the lower half shows the younger cohort, who
were under age 35.  A majority of married women in both cohorts (84
percent) had regular full-time employment before marriage.  The older
cohort had a slightly higher percentage of self-employment and no
work, while the younger cohort had a slightly higher percentage of
nonstandard work before marriage, but the difference is small. 
The transition at marriage in two age groups is shown in the second
column.  A higher proportion of the younger generation continues full-
time regular work after marriage; 46 percent versus 41 percent of the
older cohort.  Being a housewife, however, was still a popular choice:
as many as 40 percent of those under age 35 left the labor force to
Table 8.4 Change in Labor Force Participation and Type of Work with 
Marriage and Childbirth (%)
When first child was age 1a
Before 
marriage
After
marriagea 
Education (years)
Total 9 12 14 16
Born 1948–1962
Regular employment 84 41 17 15 14 22 30
Nonstandard 
employment 11 10 3 4 3 2 4
Self-employed 2 5 5 7 6 6 2
Home piece rate work – 1 2 5 2 1 –
Out of labor force 3 42 67 61 71 66 62
Born 1963–
Regular employment 84 46 13 3 11 15 25
Nonstandard 
employment
7 12 4 3 5 3 2
Self-employed 4 2 3 9 3 3 3
Home piece rate work – 0 1 3 1 1 1
Out of labor force 5 39 70 77 74 73 65
a For those who are regular employees before marriage.  Nonstandard employment
includes part-time and arubaito.
SOURCE: Nagase (1999).
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 277  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
278 Nagase
become housewives, which is much higher relative to U.S. women, at
1.4 percent (Cassirer, Table 9.11, in this volume).9 
Despite the Child Care Leave Law, work continuation dropped
slightly for the younger generation after the birth of their first child
(third column, Table 8.4).  About 70 percent of women were found to
be out of the labor force when their first child was one.10  More than
half of those who remained in regular work at marriage quit work at
childbirth, which again is exceptionally high compared with 6 percent
in the United States (Cassirer, in this volume).
The next four columns show the difference in work status by edu-
cational attainment when the first child is age one.  High school gradu-
ates compose the largest share of females, 49 percent for the younger
and 53 percent for the older age group.  Only 14 percent of high school
graduates in the older cohort held a full-time regular job after their first
child was born, and the percentage was 11 for the younger age group.
Although more university and college graduates continued work, the
percentage who held regular jobs declined in the younger age group.
Overall, 62 percent of university graduates were out of the labor force
in the older age group, and 65 percent in the younger age group.11 
Because the Married Women does not include those who would
marry in the future, young women who would marry and would have
births in their 30s are excluded from the data.  Osawa and Suzuki
(2000) pointed out that there is an emergence of educated women who
postpone childbirth until the 30s and continue work after childbirth.  In
these data, too, if the sample is restricted to more educated and those
who had their first child in later years,12 a small sign of increased par-
ticipation after childbirth was seen for the younger generation.  It
should also be noted that, although increasing, women who have their
first child in their 30s are a minority.13  Therefore, it is still uncertain
whether postponed marriage will result in continued labor participation
after childbirth in the future or whether more women in the younger
cohort will remain childless.  The likelihood of the latter so far seems
to be higher.  The birth projection of NIPSSR in 2002 predicted that 31
percent of women born in the 1985 cohort would remain childless and
17 percent would not marry. 
Since a small decline in labor force participation for the younger
cohort is rather surprising, I checked two sets of larger cross-sectional
data, the Basic Employment Survey of 1987 and 1997, to confirm the
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findings on the women’s work pattern.  By the cross-sectional compar-
ison, the labor participation rates of mothers of young children are low
and show almost no change.14  
A much larger and significant change in behavior is the delay in
marriage among both sexes in Japan.  According to the census, among
women in their late 20s, only one in four were not married in 1980.  In
2000, the ratio was over one in two.  The number of women who are
not married in their early 30s is also on the rise.  The percentage was 10
percent for those born between 1951 and 1955, 14 percent for those
born between 1956 and 1960, 20 percent for those born between 1961
and 1965, and 27 percent for those born between 1966 and 1970.  This
means that a higher percentage of younger women continue to work
while postponing marriage.  However, when they do get married, about
40 percent still become full-time housewives.
Child Care
The Married Women survey also included a question on the main
caregivers of the first child in his or her first year.15  The data show that
before the Child Care Leave Law was enacted, only 1.9 percent of
mothers used child care leave.  The use of such leave increased after
the implementation of the law, yet fewer than 10 percent of the total
births used this leave even after 1996.  The use of child care leave is
low because a substantial number of women were already out of the
labor force before pregnancy, and even for those who worked during
pregnancy, about 60 percent chose to quit work right before childbirth.
It is, however, also true that child care for regularly employed
workers changed substantially in recent years.  The use of child care
leave increased from 5 percent to 39 percent when comparing children
born between 1966 and 1986 and those born between 1992 and 1997.
The use of government-sponsored day care also increased from 7 to 18
percent, while the role of cohabiting grandparents declined from 36 to
22 percent and the role of noncohabiting grandparents increased.
Grandmothers who were the main child support during work before are
now increasingly replaced by more formal care and formal leave.
However, one should again recall that only 20 to 30 percent of women,
a minority, continue work when the child reaches age one. 
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Choice of Retirement, Full-Time Work, and Part-Time Work
 at Childbirth 
In this section, work choice after first childbirth will be analyzed by
multinomial logit analysis for those women who had full-time, regular
employment prior to giving birth. Three different statuses are compared
when the mother’s child is age one: 1) continuation of full-time work
with a regular contract, 2) change to part-time or other nonstandard
form of employment, including informal employment, and 3) retire-
ment from full-time regular work.
For explanatory variables, education, occupation, and a firm-size
dummy before childbirth were used to account for the wage level of the
women.  In Japan, in general, larger firms on average pay higher
wages.16  Family characteristics, such as the husband’s income and hav-
ing a grandmother in the family, were included in the regression as
variables for the reservation wage.  Higher wages are expected to
increase participation, while a higher reservation wage is expected to
increase the probability of leaving the labor force.  One’s attitudes
toward family and marriage, which were derived by factor analyses,
were added, as well as one’s mother’s work history to determine the
effect of attitude and values (see Appendix A, Table 8.A1).  The choice
to work in regular employment is expected to be a longer-term choice,
while participation in a nonstandard job is a short-term choice owing to
the current need for income.
Table 8.5 shows that highly educated mothers are more likely to
continue full-time regular work instead of leaving the labor force (the
base category in the multinomial logit models).  Having a full-time
position at large firms before childbirth did not increase the probability
of mothers continuing to work.  However, when mothers do continue to
work, they are less likely to change their jobs to nonstandard work if
they had a regular position at larger firms.  In terms of occupation,
women in professional, technical, and managerial occupations, as well
as blue-collar workers, are more likely to continue work, while clerical
workers are most likely to leave the labor force at childbirth.  Workers
in sales and service are likely to work as nonstandard workers.  Public
servants are most likely to continue a regular full-time job, possibly
because the child care leave can more easily be taken and also because
the male-female wage gap is often small in this sector.
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Table 8.5 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Employment Status of Women 
(to age 49) When First Child is Age 1
Full-time Nonstandard
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Educational attainment (base = junior 
high school)
High school 0.371 1.35 –0.151 0.46
College 0.677** 2.27 –0.402 1.06
University 1.104*** 3.25 –0.575 1.12
Workplace characteristics (base = 
firm size below 30)
Firm size 30–99 –0.002 0.01 0.097 0.39
Firm size 100–299 –0.027 0.15 –0.641** 2.26
Firm size 300–999 0.367* 1.92 –0.194 0.66
Firm size 1000+ 0.099 0.57 –0.470* 1.79
Work in public sector 1.792*** 8.41 –0.069 0.15
Occupation (base = clerical and 
others)
Professional and technical 0.536*** 3.82 0.761*** 3.28
Administrative 1.564** 2.31 –30.125 0.00
Sales and service –0.152 0.86 0.460* 1.90
Blue-collar work 0.823*** 4.06 1.102*** 3.84
Family characteristics
Husband self-employed –0.064 0.38 0.678*** 3.12
Extended family 0.996*** 8.56 0.413** 2.27
Income of husband –0.002*** 3.10 –0.001 1.21
Years after marriage –0.003 0.16 –0.010 0.36
Child born after the enactment of  
Child Care Leave Law –0.185 1.28 0.035 0.16
One’s mother’s work history (base = 
worked when children were small)
At home when children were small –0.542*** 4.02 –0.317 1.53
Never worked –0.285** 2.08 –0.443* 1.93
Attitude toward family and marriage
Traditional 0.016*** 2.47 0.001 0.05
Individualistic 0.031*** 4.74 –0.001 0.13
Openness in sex –0.003 0.46 0.003 0.39
(continued)
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Table 8.5 (continued)
Full-time Nonstandard
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant –4.791*** 3.63 –1.286 0.64
Sample size 1959
Psuedo adjusted R2 0.123
Log likelihood –1564.52
NOTE: The base category is “out of labor force.”  Nonstandard work includes part-
time, arubaito, and family- and self-employment. The analysis was conducted only
with those who had full-time regular work prior to childbirth.
*p = 0.1; **p = 0.05; ***p = 0.01.
SOURCE: Nagase (1999).
The general family environment and taste also have a large explan-
atory power. Mothers with kin help from the extended family are more
likely to continue full-time regular employment.  On the other hand,
higher husband income decreases the probability of continuing full-
time regular work.17  Mothers are more likely to follow the way they
themselves were raised.  They are more likely to leave the labor force
when their own mother stayed at home during their childhood.  Tradi-
tional as well as individualistic attitudes toward marriage encourage
continuation of full-time regular work.18 
Interestingly, the enactment of the Child Care Leave Law did not
have a significant effect on the work continuation choice.  The sign
was even negative.  This could be owing to the prolonged recession
after the enactment of the law.  It could also be that the commitment
requirement of full-time regular work strengthened further during the
recession.  The shortage of government-sponsored child care facilities
also remained high, especially in the cities.  Because I included family
workers in the category of nonstandard work, the choice of nonstand-
ard work increases when the husband is self-employed.
The multinomial logit analysis shows (in contrast to the United
States; Cassirer, in this volume) that nonstandard work in Japan
increases only slightly after childbirth, except for self-employed house-
holds, some manual workers, and professionals.  This may be due to a
large drop in wages for part-time employment, which will be discussed
later.
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Reentry to the Labor Market
When and how do the 70 percent of women who were out of the
labor force return to the labor market?  Because the data lack the direct
timing of the return to labor market, I will show the cross-sectional
relationship of the youngest child’s age and present work status.
Table 8.6 shows the labor participation and work category of moth-
ers by the age of their youngest child.  It only includes those mothers
who were out of the labor force when their first child was age one.  The
reentry to work differs by educational attainment.  Returning to work
is, in contrast to other countries, less common when mothers have
higher education.  The percentage of women out of the labor force
declines as children age, but it is 44 percent for university graduates
and 29 percent for high school graduates when the youngest child is
older than age 12.  The “over 12” category includes mostly women in
their 40s.  The most popular way to reenter the labor market was
through work in nonstandard employment, that is, part-time and
arubaito.  Self-employment was also comparatively higher among the
lower-educated group and also the university graduates.19 
On the other hand, Table 8.7 shows the more educated had the
higher and stronger attachment to regular full-time work when the first
child was at age one.  Approximately 60 percent remain in regular
work, while the percentage is less than 40 percent for high school grad-
uates.  The less-educated are more likely to quit or change work, per-
haps when they have a second child or when the first child grows up. 
The continuation of work at marriage has advanced for the younger
generation, but the trend has not extended to continuing work upon
childbirth.  Delaying marriage became popular, rather than a new work
style that balances family and work.  Unlike in many other countries,
fewer women in Japan use part-time work as a bridge to continue work
when they have small children.  Part-time work is often selected by
those who reenter employment, especially among the lower-educated,
and the ratio of regular full-time employment does not increase much
even when one’s smallest child grows older.  Although only a minority
of mothers continue to work right after the birth of the first child, when
they do, it is the more educated who are likely to be attached to this
regular employment opportunity.  Another feature is that the highly
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out of labor force when the first child was age one)
Age of 
youngest child
Out of labor force (%)
Nonstandard 
employment (%) Standard employment (%)
Family work, self-
employment (%)
9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs 9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs 9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs 9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs
< 3 years of age 80 88 89 88 7 6 4 6 2 1 1 3 10 4 5 4
3–6 years of age 77 61 69 68 15 24 19 16 0 5 3 9 8 10 9 7
6– 9 years
of age 
28 43 51 63 50 40 30 15 6 4 5 4 17 12 14 17
9–12 years 
of age 
38 40 39 47 43 42 39 28 0 8 13 19 19 10 10 7
12+ 27 29 35 44 37 45 41 33 19 15 14 7 18 11 11 16
Total 40 50 60 65 32 32 24 18 12 8 7 7 16 10 9 10
SOURCE: Nagase (2000).
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educated are likely not to return to work once they leave the labor
force.  I now turn to why this is the case.  
WAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WORK CATEGORIES AND 
INCOME ADJUSTMENT FOR TAX PURPOSES
One answer to this question is the large wage gap and the less
favorable working conditions of nonstandard workers, and the diffi-
culty of returning to regular, full-time, white-collar jobs with seniority
payment. 
In this section, using the Married Women, I will first show that the
continuation of work in part-time status does not increase future wages.
The Survey on Diversified Workers at the Workplace will be used to
show that the income adjustments of housewives have a very large
impact on the low wages of part-time workers, and that the acceptance
of low wages and satisfaction toward work in nonstandard employment
is rather high for married females and low for nonmarried females.
The Married Women is not the best data set for studying income, as
it only has six annual income categories of present income and no data
on work hours.20  However, on examining the income pattern, it does
exhibit the characteristics of different work categories.  For women
with children working as part-time or arubaito, as many as 79 percent
Table 8.7 Work Pattern by the Age of Youngest Child and by Educational 
Attainment (for those who were in full-time regular work when 
the first child was age one)
Standard employment (%)
Age of youngest child 9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs
< 3 years of age 8 37 43 63
3–6 years of age 14 36 46 67
6–9 years of age 9 31 37 43
9–12 years of age 36 35 52 56
12+ 26 34 45 62
Total 23 35 44 59
SOURCE: Nagase (2000).
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earn below the level for income tax levies.  The comparable figure was
6 percent for regular work and 49 percent for family workers and the
self-employed.  The lowest two income categories covered 97 percent
of nonstandard workers, while the comparable figure was 21 percent
for regular workers and 67 percent for informal work participants. 
Table 8.8 shows the regression with the logarithm of present
annual income as the dependent variable for the sample of women with
children who had regular work positions before marriage.21  The work
category was the most significant explanatory variable for the differ-
ence in annual income.  The annual income of wives with children was
reduced by 55 percent if they were in nonstandard work and was
increased by 74 percent if they were in regular work, compared with
the informal sector work and while not counting for the work hour dif-
ferences.  Continuation of regular work after marriage significantly
increased present income by 8 percent, while a change to nonstandard
work did not.  Continuation of regular work at the birth of the first
child significantly increased present income by 27 percent, while the
continuation as a nonstandard worker did not.  Interestingly, the effect
of childbirth after 1996 or having children under age 2, as well as the
effect of childbirth after 1991 or children under age 6, are positive and
significant on the annual income.  Because these are samples of women
who have children, this may be interpreted as “recent births.”  The
Equal Employment Opportunity Law and the Child Care Leave Law
may have helped to increase the continued participation of potentially
higher-income mothers, though the percentage to total of such females
is still very small.  The selection equation shows that labor force partic-
ipation declined when children under 6 are at home and when the hus-
band’s income was high, and increased when kin help was available
and when the wives had family work opportunities, all of which sug-
gests the effect through the reservation wage.  Labor participation
increased with educational attainment when other factors are con-
trolled for.  When the women’s mother had been a full-time housewife,
their labor participation significantly declined, showing the effect of
inheritance of “family values.”  Overall, the regression showed that the
continuation of “regular employment” increased future income while
nonstandard work employment never did. 
How much can the difference in annual income be attributed to
work hour differences?  The annual income difference attributable to
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Table 8.8 Income Regression for Mothers with Children: The Effect of 
Work Continuation on Present Income
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-value
Wage regression
Age 0.021*** 8.25
Education (junior high school = base)
High school graduate 0.021 0.48
College graduate 0.066 1.37
University graduate 0.162*** 2.71
Occupation (blue-collar workers = base)
Professional and technical workers 0.231*** 6.25
Managers and officials 0.416*** 4.08
Clerical and related workers 0.203*** 6.19
Sales and service workers 0.057* 1.86
Work status (informal and other nonstandard 
work = base)
Full-time and regularly employed 0.739*** 19.92
Part-time or arubaito work –0.548*** 17.42
Work choice right after marriage (full-time 
housewife = base)
Full-time and regularly employed 0.082*** 2.97
Part-time or arubaito work 0.013 0.34
Work choice right after childbirth (full-time 
housewife = base)
Full-time and regularly employed 0.276*** 8.10
Part-time or arubaito work 0.027 0.49
Number of children –0.020 1.30
First child birth year (birth before 1991 = base)
Births after 1996 0.138*** 2.33
Births after 1991 0.132*** 3.04
λ –0.299 0.40
Constants 3.872*** 31.23
Probability of labor participation equation
Education (junior high school = base)
High school graduate 0.070*** 0.89
College graduate 0.177*** 2.10
University graduate 0.337*** 3.27
(continued)
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Table 8.8 (continued)
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-value
Husband self-employed 0.403*** 7.18
Live within extended family at marriage 0.370*** 8.72
Husband’s income (predicted) –0.002*** 6.97
First child birth year (birth before 1991 = base)
Births after 1996 –0.438*** 6.39
Births after 1991 –0.750*** 17.05
One’s mother’s career (worked throughout her 
life = base)
Interrupted work when children are small –0.065 1.41
Full-time housewife throughout her life –0.210*** 4.77
Constant 1.112*** 8.31
Log likelihood –5469.779
Sample size noncensored 2798
Total for those who had regular work before 
marriage 5043
*p = 0.1; **p = 0.05; ***p = 0.01.
SOURCE: Nagase (2000); Nagase (2001).
work hours can be estimated at around 30 to 40 percent,22 which
explains only a part of the income difference shown in Table 8.8 by
work category.  Wage regressions using different data sets consistently
showed that the part-time wage is very low, distinctly lower than that
of regular employment even when hours, education, tenure, and other
factors are controlled for, and that the return to education and experi-
ence is low (see, for example, Houseman and Osawa, in this volume). 
The low wage rate of part-time workers was often attributed to the
intermittent work experience, the low skill level, the lower educational
level, or the lack of commitment to work.  Nitta (1993a,b), for exam-
ple, argued that for many part-time workers, their wage was only addi-
tional income to their household and they had little ambition to
increase the wage.  Sato (1998), moreover, pointed out that more part-
time workers replied that they are contented with their work compared
with full-time regular workers, even though their wage level is low; he
also pointed out that their preferences are distinctly different from
those of full-time regular workers.  Higuchi (1981) treated work choice
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as a high-wage, long-work-hour set and a low-wage, short-work-hour
set, implicitly treating the low wage of part-time workers as a compen-
sating wage differential for work hours.  Osawa (1993, 1994) and
Asakura (2001), on the other hand, argued that the wage gap is the
direct result of the Japanese employment system, which discriminates
among workers by working status and not by hours.  Nagase (1994),
using microdata, estimated the effect of “short-hours” and “part-time
hiring status” in the wage regression of married females.  The result
showed a strong negative effect of the latter, but the effect of the
former was small.  She concluded that the wage gap cannot be fully
attributed to a compensating differential to short hours worked but to
an entry barrier to regular status work, especially for the long-work-
week “part-time hiring status” workers.  Nagase (1997b) further found
the widening and the large wage gap to be self-enforcing because of the
social security and tax system.  Takeishi (2001), on the other hand,
based on interviews with 50 companies that had high nonstandard
worker:employee ratios, showed that in many firms, part-time employ-
ees are increasingly substituted for work that was formerly done by
full-time regular employees.  She concluded that more part-time work-
ers are taking on greater responsibilities.  Her interviews, however, also
showed that often pecuniary compensation does not parallel the
increase in responsibilities. 
For the remainder of the discussion, I use the Survey on Diversi-
fied Workers at the Workplace, conducted by the Japan Institute of
Labor in 1999.23  This survey was conducted with nonstandard workers
to determine how the nonstandard workers viewed their wages in rela-
tion to full-time regular workers at the same workplace in relation to
their work-hour flexibility, their responsibility and level of work, and
so forth.  The survey also asked whether the nonstandard workers
believe the wage difference between full-time regular workers at the
same workplace is reasonable.
As to the wage rate difference, 72 percent of nonstandard workers
replied that their hourly wage rate was lower than those of full-time
regular employees.  Among them, 43 percent accepted the difference as
understandable and 39 percent replied it was unreasonable.  Responsi-
bility and work content were important elements for acceptability.
Thirty-three percent of those who replied “understandable” said that
the difference was reasonable because of differences in responsibility,
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and 24 percent because of the differences in work content.  On the
other hand, 53 percent of those who replied “unreasonable” thought
that the content and responsibility of the work were the same.  The dis-
sent rose with nonstandard employee experience.  Among nonstandard
workers who viewed their work level as equal to that of the entry level
of seishain, the percentage of dissent was only 17 percent.  Among
those who viewed their work as equal to seishain with five or more
years of tenure, 46 percent thought the wage difference was unreason-
able.  The percentage of dissent was near 50 percent among females
who were in a nonstandard job because they could not find regular full-
time work, but the percentage was lower, 27 percent, for males with
similar reason.  On the other hand, the percentage of those who replied
“understandable” was the highest, at 40 percent, among those who tar-
geted their income below a certain level.  Among married females, 51
percent voluntarily chose nonstandard employment and 30 percent
involuntarily ended up as such due to a lack of full-time work.  The
percentage was just the opposite for unmarried females: 25 percent
voluntary and 51 percent involuntary.  The involuntary percentage for
males was about the same as that for married females, 30 percent,
which highlights a significant difference in dissent by sex and marital
status.
On the whole, dissent about wages was highest for unmarried and
divorced females, followed by married females who were unable to
find a regular job.  In contrast, dissent was, on average, low for males
and the lowest for the married females who were controlling their earn-
ings below the tax levy limit.
Today, part-time work is very much linked to non–tax-levied
income levels, especially among married females.  Because many
wives adjust their work hours to fall below the income threshold, the
annual income distribution is extraordinarily skewed for part-time
workers.  These data show that as many as 39 percent of all nonstand-
ard working married females were found to be on the critical target,
ready to decrease their work hours once they met the increase in wage
level. Twenty-nine percent of all married females are exactly in the
critical income bracket for tax purposes (the bracket from 0.9 to 1.03
million yen).  Those who paid the tax but avoided the social security
payment (who were in the income bracket of 1.03 million to 1.3 mil-
lion) composed another 10 percent.  This ratio corresponded well with
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their reply on the questionnaire, “Are you adjusting your work hours or
work days for the consideration of tax and other income limits, so that
annual income does not exceed a certain limit?”  When the sample is
confined to married women working shorter hours compared with reg-
ular workers at the workplace, 52 percent replied that they were
“income targeting.”24  A study group at the Cabinet Office estimated
that if a wife increased her income from 1.03 to 1.40 million yen, total
household income would increase by a mere 0.02 million yen due to
the rise in tax by 0.04, social security by 0.14, and a spouse allowance
reduction of 0.18 million yen (Study Group at Cabinet Office 2001).
The estimated 0.38 million yen fixed cost equals 428 labor hours when
measured by the average hourly wage of female part-time workers of
877 yen.  This institutional hedge is strongly affecting the part-time
wage and the labor supply of part-time workers.
Married females are still a large source of supply to the nonstand-
ard labor market.25  The effect of wage increases on labor supply in
general is not determined in economic theory, for it is the combined
effect of the negative income effect and the positive substitution effect.
However, if the “income-targeting” behavior is very strong, the wage
increase is only met by work hour decreases in the same ratio for those
who are at the threshold.  When such behavior is predicted, firms
would be unwilling to increase wages unless the employees agree
beforehand to work over the 1.03 million yen ceiling.  On the other
hand, married females would not gain by working more hours unless
the firm promises to raise the hourly wage so as to cover the fixed
expenses in tax and social security to overcome the target.
Because the data set has only data for nonstandard workers, I con-
ducted a wage regression of nonstandard workers while dividing the
sample by those who target their income below a certain ceiling and
those who do not (see Table 8.9).26  The intention to adjust one’s work-
ing hours for the purpose of income targeting was used to make a self-
selection correction in the wage regression.  The wage regression
shows that the return on education is much lower for those who are
ready to income target.  Higher responsibility in the work ladder is also
reflected more fully for those who do not adjust their work hours.
Interestingly, lambda is positive, showing that the errors in wage and
errors in those who target income below the ceiling are positively
related.  This can be interpreted as meaning that those women who tar-
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Table 8.9 Wage Regression of Nonstandard Workers: Those 
Adjusting Work Hours below Tax or Social Insurance 
Fee Exemption Ceiling and Those Who Do Not Intend to
Target Specific Income
Target income ceiling No work hour adjustment
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Wage regression
Educational attainment (base = 9 
years)
12 years 0.059*** 2.50 0.043** 1.93
14 years 0.102*** 4.05 0.135*** 4.62
16 years 0.120*** 3.60 0.257*** 5.94
Tenure 0.008*** 3.00 –0.001 0.22
Tenure2 0.000*** 2.58 0.000* 1.86
All work experience years 0.000 0.27 0.001 0.81
Level of job as compared to full-
time regular workers (base = 1–2 
years tenure equivalent)
Equivalent to 3–4 year tenure
full-timers –0.010 0.94 0.063*** 3.76
Equivalent to more than 5-year 
tenure full-timers 0.001 0.04 0.082*** 3.93
Group leaders 0.013 0.46 0.084*** 2.98
More than group leaders –0.091*** 4.42 0.147*** 3.09
No answer (cannot be 
compared) –0.013 0.93 0.047*** 2.15
Job similarity with full-time 
regular workers (base = nothing 
in common)
Do much same work as full-
timers 0.010 0.43 –0.063*** 2.45
Have some work similar as full-
timers –0.003 0.12 –0.101*** 3.93
Not much similarity 0.004 0.17 –0.082*** 2.87
Occupation
Clerical 0.032*** 2.79 0.035* 1.89
Professional 0.106*** 2.72 0.151*** 4.22
Sales 0.015 0.89 0.008 0.29
Service 0.019 1.03 0.029 1.17
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Target income ceiling No work hour adjustment
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Blue-collar work –0.016 1.16 –0.052*** 2.98
Think the low wage unreasonable –0.019* 1.78 –0.050*** 3.47
Constant 6.409*** 103.12 6.752*** 208.82
Selection equation
Single, not married –0.522*** 5.79 0.625*** 10.15
Could not find regular full-time 
job –0.580*** 6.24 0.821*** 15.91
Educational attainment (base = 9 
years)
12 years 0.400*** 4.96 –0.293*** 3.76
14 years 0.360*** 3.79 –0.230*** 2.50
16 years 0.400*** 3.14 –0.256** 2.03
No children in household –0.159*** 2.57 0.177*** 2.87
Child < 6 –0.063 0.66 0.108 0.98
Child < 10 –0.020 0.28 0.018 0.19
Child < 15 0.210*** 3.43 –0.256*** 3.61
Constant –0.553*** 6.10 0.228*** 3.03
1/2 ln(1+ρi)/(1–ρi) 1.240*** 4.84 –0.281*** 6.74
ln σi –1.600*** 10.88 –1.231*** 25.63
ρi 0.845 –0.274
σi 0.202 0.292
λi 0.171 –0.080
Noncensored sample 1075 2214
Censored sample 2464 1179
All samples 3539 3393
Log likelihood –1355.454 –2274.272
*p = 0.10; **p = 0.05; ***p  = 0.01.
SOURCE: Nagase (2002).
get their work hours to make the most of the present tax and social
security exemption system are those who may potentially have higher
quality, controlling for education and for the type of work that they do.
This is probably because nonstandard workers who work over the ceil-
ing consist of those who were unable to find a full-time regular job.  If
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 293  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
294 Nagase
they did find a better job in regular employment, they would not be
included in the data.
The self-selection regression shows that the probability that mar-
ried females adjust work hours is high compared with singles, espe-
cially when they have children older than age 10 but younger than 15
compared with those who have children over age 15.  Women without
children, including those whose children have left home, are more
likely to exceed the non-tax-levied bracket.  The lowest-educated
group is more likely not to income target their work hours, possibly
because their spouse is in a lower income bracket, or because they can-
not make the transition from nonstandard work to regular full-time
work, even though they want to work longer hours. 
CONCLUSION
Half of women workers in Japan currently work in nonstandard
work arrangements, and the ratio has risen rapidly in the past decade.
According to the Married Women, more than 80 percent of women had
regular full-time positions before marriage, but among them, 40 per-
cent left the labor force at marriage and more left at first childbirth,
leaving only 20 to 30 percent in the labor force one year after first
childbirth.  Among those who are out of the labor force, the less-edu-
cated are likely to return as nonstandard employees.  The labor force
participation rate of mothers, therefore, drops at first childbirth, but
eventually rises to more than 70 percent when their children are over
age 13, with 60 percent of them working as nonstandard employees.
The higher-educated are more likely to continue to work in regular full-
time employment.  Yet, the majority of university graduates also leave
the labor force at childbirth and are less likely to return relative to the
lower-educated category.  Perhaps the largest difference between the
countries compared in this volume is that few women in Japan use
part-time employment as a bridge to continue employment through
child-rearing.  The majority interrupt work for some years, but if they
do work, those with higher education and those employed in larger
firms prefer to continue to work in regular full-time positions rather
than in part-time work.  This is possibly because the wage level is very
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low in part-time work, while the wage return on work continuation is
much higher for full-time regular employment, especially for those
with higher education and those who work at larger firms.  The deci-
sion has much to do with Japanese long-term employment practices
with seniority payment, which excludes nonstandard employees from
the same wage table.  The percentage of those who continue work has
not changed much even for younger females, though younger genera-
tions increasingly postpone marriage and childbirth.
The wage rate of part-time workers is low, and the gap has not nar-
rowed in recent years despite the relatively higher demand for non-
standard workers and despite findings that part-time workers are
increasingly taking on greater responsibilities.  Why is this, and is the
work choice as a nonstandard employee voluntary?  Many surveys
have shown a higher percentage of part-time workers are content with
work compared with regular full-time workers.  This is rather surpris-
ing, though the level of expectation toward work may be lower for
part-time workers.  In terms of wages, however, the Survey on the
Diversified Workers at Workplace showed that about 40 percent of
nonstandard workers who replied that they are being paid less than
full-time regular workers thought the gap was unreasonable.  Interest-
ingly, more married women, many of whom adjusted their work hours
below the tax-free level, replied that they thought the gap was reason-
able.  On the other hand, more unmarried women (either never married
or divorced) thought the gap was unreasonable.  The actual wage level
of the latter was not lower, but more thought the wage level was unrea-
sonable.  The percentage of workers who thought the gap was unrea-
sonable rose with work level and was higher for women than for men.
Analysis showed that the tax and social security fee exemption criteria
caps the preferred annual income for housewives, and this discouraged
work hours of potentially more able workers.  The income-targeting
behavior creates a negative relationship between wages and work
hours, and this must have had a negative impact on the average wages
of part-time workers.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law implemented in 1986
and amended in 1999, as well as the Child Care Leave Law of 1992,
aimed to better the working conditions of women in standard work.
The change in society, however, has not increased the continuation of
work among mothers.  Benefits to nonearning wives, on the other hand,
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have strengthened the effect on work hours among part-time workers in
the past decade.  The benefit has caused many married females to self-
restrain their income below the ceiling, which in turn restricted their
wage level.  Although surveys show that many part-time workers are
content with their low-wage job, an important change of the labor mar-
ket in the 1990s was that more unmarried and divorced females
increased their presence in this nonstandard labor market.  Before the
1990s, the nonstandard work market was primarily for middle-aged
housewives, but it is now being transformed rapidly by newcomers.
More women may be included as involuntary nonstandard workers in
this new group. 
Notes
1. Three factors may have contributed to the decrease in average work hours.  Previ-
ously, long work week workers hired as “part-time” were most popular in manu-
facturing, but such work opportunities decreased due to the decline in the
manufacturing sector and the increase in sales and clerical work.  The second fac-
tor was avoidance of tax and social security payments.  As the general wage level
increased while the tax-free limit remained stable, more part-time workers and
businesses shortened the hours of work to avoid tax and insurance premiums (see
next section).  The third factor was the general decline in work hours of regular
workers and the subsequent decline in average work hours of part-time workers
beginning in 1987 following the Labor Standard Law that reduced the work week
to 40 hours (from 48); the phase-in period ended in 1999.  More firms today, how-
ever, are starting to hire nonstandard employees again for long hours to substitute
for regular workers.  
2. Maruko Keihoki Sosho at District Court in 1996 was the first court that ruled that,
even though an employer has degrees of freedom in wage setting among different
work contract categories, wage differences of more than 80 percent cannot be
accepted.  At this firm, only males and nonmarried females were hired as seishain
and all the married women were hired as part-time, though their designated work
hours were only 15 minutes shorter than seishain and their work days were the
same as seishain.  The work contract was only two months, but because of recon-
tracting, part-time workers had tenures from 4 to 25 years.  They were doing the
same work as female seishain in the factory line, though over time fewer female
seishain were doing the same work and were replaced by part-time workers.
Although seishain were given a senority factor in their wages, part-time workers
had only three steps in their wages.  The wage gap was calculated as 34 percent
for a woman working for 25 years.  One woman reported that her wages were
lower than newly hired female seishain in their first year.  The court ruled that the
seniority payment is basic practice in Japan, and so the same work/same payment
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principle cannot be said to exist as a general norm in Japan.  That said, however,
people in general should be paid equally for the same work in principle, and wage
differences of more than 80 percent cannot be accepted.  Sugeno and Suwa
(1998), skeptical of the court decision, commented that because of the different
labor practice, especially because seishain are paid by age, tenure, educational
level, work attitude, performance, number of dependents, and other factors, the
equal job/equal payment principle between seishain and part-time workers cannot
be supported.  
3. At the same time, the Labor Standard Law’s protection of female workers was
reconstructed as protection to mothers.  In 1997, general protections for female
workers that capped overtime work and banned work after midnight were
removed and protections became equal between the sexes.
4. Daily laborers and workers with definite duration of contract are excluded from
leave eligibility.  Also, the following workers can be excluded under employer-
employee contract: workers with less than one year of tenure, worker whose
spouse can take care of the child, workers whose contract ends within one year,
workers with less than two days work days.  Nonstandard workers, though in
actuality having more than one year tenure, often have a defined duration contract
that ends within a year.
5. The change was made such that if the working spouse paid his own portion of
income-related pension fee, the nonworking spouse was given the full record of
full premium payment for the first tier of the public pension.  Wives working as
“part-time” were included as “nonworking” if their income was below a defined
limit.  A couple with the same income were to be given the same premium pay-
ment and the same pension level regardless of whether the couple was a double
income or a single income couple in principle.
6. It was 0.9 million yen, the same as the tax-free bracket in 1985; it was  raised to 1
million yen in 1987, to 1.1 in 1989, to 1.2 in 1992, to 1.3 in 1993, and has
remained at 1.3 million yen since. 
7. According to this survey, 50 percent linked the eligibility of the spouse allowance
to the spouse’s income level, and 76 percent of those firms linked eligibility limits
to annual income of 1.03 million yen.  This is the amount where the tax levy to the
wage and salaried worker begins and where one’s spouse loses the spouse deduc-
tion if the worker is married.
8. Births out of wedlock are exceptionally low in Japan (fewer than 2 percent in
2000).  Although the divorce rate is rising, only 1.4 percent of all households were
headed by single mothers (0.61 million households) in 1999, according to the
Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kokumin Seikatu Kiso Chosa).  Therefore, the
Married Women is representative of the labor pattern of Japanese mothers.
Because panel data available in Japan concerning such issues are limited, these
data may be the best national sample covering different cohorts on such questions.
9. It should be stressed, however, that the U.S. sample that Cassirer used is not
directly comparable to the Married Women data. The U.S. data is panel data that
was gathered in 1994, 1996, and 1998, and the women who were surveyed were
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aged 29–39. Cassirer shows the labor supply behavior of women whose marriage
and childbirthing occurred primarily in their 30s. It is probable that those women
have higher attachment to work than women who married or bore children in their
20s. On the other hand, Married Women data is retrospective data, and it shows
the labor supply behavior of women who married mostly in their 20s.
10. Such a general tendency was found when extended families were treated sepa-
rately, and when cities and rural areas were treated differently.
11. To control for age of marriage and age of childbirth between cohorts, I restricted
the marriage age and the age of the first child to those between age 25 and 30 and
compared the age groups 30–34 and 35–49.  However, despite such control, the
overall trend was about the same, especially for the more educated group.  For
university and college graduates, more women continued work in the older gener-
ation; for the younger age group, 73 percent became housewives and 19 percent
stayed in regular work, while for the older group, 65 percent became housewives
and 24 percent continued regular work.
12. For example, 14 or more years of education and the birth of the first child at age
30 to 34.  Among women aged 35–40, 24 percent continued regular work as
opposed to 22 percent in the 40–49 age group.  The percentage of those out of the
labor force was also slightly less.
13. The peak age for having a first child was age 26–27 in 2000.
14. Traditionally, women continued work in extended families with the help of kin
care, but such extended families declined within a decade, from 22 percent in
1987 to 15 percent in 1997.  When only the nuclear families are compared, a small
rise (rather than a drop) is seen.  Because the Basic Employment Survey only
shows the work pattern of the last child, not the first, these results can be inter-
preted either as a small rise in continuation or as a slight speed-up in the return to
employment.
15. Respondents could choose up to three options among the twelve candidates, such
as one’s self, father, kin, or whether day care, child care leave, or other institu-
tional help was used.
16. See, for example, the wage regression for husbands and the effect of firm size in
Appendix A, Table 8.A2.
17. Because information on the husband’s income at childbirth is not available, I esti-
mate the husband’s permanent income from his educational attainment and from
the size of the firm for which he works and used the predicted income for Table
8.5 (in Appendix A, Table 8.A2).
18. By factor analysis and scoring, three attitudes concerning marriage and family
were taken out: the traditional attitude that places high values in marriage, in hav-
ing children, and in supporting division of work between the sexes.  The second
axis was the individualistic attitude that supports one to pursue one’s own objec-
tive in life and accepts divorce if a couple does not get along.  The last attitude is
one that supports sexual relationships before marriage, and the attitude that mar-
riage and a love affair are different.  The younger cohort had higher scoring for
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the last, the older for the first, and the more educated for the second, on average.
See Appendix A, Table 8A.1.
19. Women with nine years of education composed 16 percent of women in their 40s,
but only 3 percent of those in their late 20s to early 30s.  Therefore, the women
with nine years of education compose some share for the women with children in
the higher age group, but not so much so for women with small children.
20. The first income category is “less than 1 million yen,” which is near the upper
threshold below which income tax is not levied, as explained earlier.  The income
category increases by 1 million yen to more than 5 million yen.
21. The estimation was made correcting the censoring using Heckman (1976).
  Wage regression
   Selection equation for labor participation 
u1 ~ N(0,σ)
mu2 ~N(0,1)
Corr(u1, u2) = ρ
The likelihood for observation i is
The husband’s wage was estimated by OLS wage regression (see Appendix A),
and the estimated value was used for an explanatory variable in the women’s
wage regression.
22. According to the Ministry of Labor’s Survey on the Diversification of Workers of
1999, the average work week of part-time workers was 27.9 hours, while the aver-
age was 40.3 for full-time regular workers. 
23. Five thousand enterprises with 30 and more employees, excluding mining, con-
struction, education, welfare, and medicine were selected, with replies from 1,128
enterprises.  Among those enterprises that replied to the first survey, the survey
sheet for nonstandard workers was to be given to no less than 10 nonstandard
employees at the workplace.  The workers were to return the questionnaires by
mail.
24. The percentage is comparable to a larger survey, Survey on Part-Time Employees,
conducted by Ministry of Labor in 1995. Forty percent of short-work-week, part-
time workers intentionally adjusted their annual income to not exceed the limit of
tax-free income.  The percentage had risen by 5 percentage points from 1990.
Because of the general increase in the wage level, more part-time workers are
constrained by the non-tax income limit, which stayed about the same during the
period.
25. According to the Statistics Office’s Labor Force Special Survey, the population of
nonstandard workers in 2001 was 27 percent male and 73 percent female.  Among
females in nonstandard dependent employment, about 60 percent are married, if
the rate shown by Basic Employment Survey of 1997 is used.  In this year, among
female nonstandard workers, 62 percent were married.  This particular survey
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included 17 percent males and 28 percent nonmarried females.  Sixty-five percent
of females were married.
26. The estimation was made correcting the censoring using Heckman (1976). 
W1i = Xiβ1 + u1i   Wage of those who target income 
Ziγ1 + u2> 0    Selection equation for income targeting
where u1 ~ N(0,σ1)
u2 ~ N(0,1)
Corr(u1, u2) = ρ1 
W2i = Xiβ2 + u3i  Wage of those who do not adjust work hours for the purpose of
tax  and other considerations
Ziγ2 + u4i > 0    Selection equation for not adjusting work hours 
where  u3 ~ N(0,σ2)
u4 ~ N(0,1)
 Corr(u3, u4) = ρ2
The likelihood of observation i is 
(j = 1, 2; j = 1, income targeting; j = 2, income nontargeting)
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Table 8A.1 Factor Analysis of Marriage Attitudes
Traditional Individualistic
Openness 
in sex Uniqueness
Remaining single one’s entire life 
is no good 0.503 –0.124 0.023 0.731
Couple should get married if they 
live together 0.634 –0.153 –0.181 0.542
Sex before marriage is all right if 
there is love –0.241 0.064 0.332 0.827
One should have an independent 
aim in life besides one’s family –0.165 0.283 0.269 0.820
Partly sacrificing one’s way of 
life or one’s trait is natural 
when married 0.258 –0.484 –0.027 0.699
Men should do market work and 
women domestic work 0.365 –0.465 –0.069 0.645
One should have children when 
married 0.570 –0.229 0.013 0.622
Not getting along is not enough 
reason for divorce 0.452 –0.256 –0.080 0.724
Marriage and love are different –0.084 0.020 0.219 0.945
NOTE: “Traditional values” place high value in marriage, in having children, and in
supporting division of work between the sexes. “Individualistic values” support one to
pursue one’s own objective in life and accept divorce if a couple does not get along.
“Openness in sex” supports sexual relationships before marriage, and also the value
that marriage and a love affair are different.
SOURCE: Nagase (1999).
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Table 8A.2 Husband’s Income Regression
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Work Arrangements among 
Women in the United States
Naomi Cassirer
University of Notre Dame
The past couple of decades have seen considerable growth in non-
standard employment in industrialized nations across the world.
Although levels of and growth in part-time, temporary, on-call, and
contract work differ considerably from nation to nation, one feature of
these work arrangements appears to be universal among nations: they
tend to be dominated by women. For some, the growth in nonstandard
work is a welcome trend, offering certain groups of women, particu-
larly married women, a compromise for balancing work with family or
other responsibilities (e.g., Schwartz 1989; Blossfeld 1997; Hakim
1995, 1997). Some workers may desire or need to engage in paid
employment, but their priorities in caring for their families, pursuing
their education, or easing into retirement make nonstandard work
arrangements attractive for their flexibility or reduced hours. Non-
standard jobs may pay less, but many women make their decisions in
the context of a household division of labor in which the earnings of a
male breadwinner enable women to forgo some compensation in
exchange for work conditions and schedules that accommodate their
preferences (e.g., Hakim 1995, 1997).
For others, women’s overrepresentation in nonstandard work
arrangements is worrisome in view of the lower pay and benefits of
nonstandard work that place women in precarious economic positions,
many of them involuntarily (e.g., Beechey and Perkins 1987; Appel-
baum 1992; Smith 1993; Rubery 1998; Spalter-Roth and Hartmann
1998). Nonstandard work arrangements have grown as employers have
sought to cut costs and increase flexibility over the past couple of
decades in an increasingly competitive economy (Pfeffer and Baron
1988; Rubin 1995). Women may be particularly vulnerable to recent
trends in the workplace, given the tendency for workplace transitions
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to occur along and perpetuate preexisting gender divisions. Employers
construct jobs and develop work and skill expectations according to the
gender of the expected incumbent (e.g., Acker 1990; Reskin and Roos
1990; Steinberg 1990). Nonstandard work may be no different as
employers create nonstandard jobs with women in mind, drawing on
ideological assumptions about women as wives and mothers with a
male income on which to depend and a family that assumes priority
over paid work, regardless of whether such assumptions are true
(Beechey and Perkins 1987; Colclough and Tolbert 1992; J. Smith
1984; Smith and Gottfried 1998; Spalter-Roth and Hartmann 1998).
For example, Beechey and Perkins (1987, p. 76) reported that in
restructuring existing jobs to achieve greater flexibility, employers put
workers on part-time schedules in typically female jobs, but used over-
time hours or other arrangements that maintained full-time schedules
for workers in typically male jobs. In this view, women are overrepre-
sented in nonstandard work arrangements, not because they prefer
them, but because they are more vulnerable than men to employers’
efforts to shift away from permanent, full-time employment.
Understanding women’s participation in nonstandard work
requires a close examination of the characteristics and work prefer-
ences of women in regular and nonstandard work and their patterns of
nonstandard employment. This chapter provides a detailed overview of
American women in full-time, part-time, temporary, contract, and on-
call jobs. The first section examines the demographic, family, and job
characteristics of women in different work arrangements. The second
section studies women’s reasons for working in part-time and other
nonstandard jobs and their preferences for regular full-time work. The
third section focuses on women’s transitions across and stability within
different work arrangements, and how family characteristics and life
events of marriage, divorce, and childbirth affect their employment
transitions and stability.
To examine women’s work arrangements, I use data from two dif-
ferent sources. Data from the February 1997 Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) and its supplement on contingent work provide an overview
of the demographics, family characteristics, and work preferences of a
nationally representative sample of women in different work arrange-
ments. To examine women’s patterns of nonstandard employment over
time, I use data from the 1994, 1996, and 1998 rounds of the National
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Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). NLSY data are well suited to
examining women’s work patterns because they provide data for one of
the age groups of women most likely to use nonstandard work arrange-
ments in conjunction with family responsibilities. Women in the NLSY
were between the ages of 29 and 36 in 1994 and were 33 to 40 years
old by the final round included in this analysis, 1998. Ideally, a study of
the relationship between nonstandard work and family roles would
include younger women as well, since many women begin bearing
children in their 20s or earlier; however, because the NLSY did not ask
for detailed information about women’s work arrangements until 1994,
such data are not available.
This chapter discusses five mutually exclusive types of work
arrangements: temporary, on-call, contract, regular part-time, and regu-
lar full-time employment.1 The definitions and measurements of work
arrangements are as follows:
Temporary Workers. Temporary workers provide services for
employers for a limited period of time or to complete a particular
project. They may work either part- or full-time hours. Temporary
workers include agency temps (workers who are paid by a temporary
help agency, but perform services for the client to which they are
assigned) and direct-hire temps (workers whose jobs are temporary for
economic reasons). Slightly more than one percent (1.3 percent) of
American women worked as agency temps and 2.7 percent worked as
direct-hire temps in 1997. Women are overrepresented in temporary
work; they are 46.3 percent of all workers, but 56 percent of agency
temps and 52 percent of direct-hire temps. 
On-Call Workers. On-call workers work on an as-needed basis,
reporting to work when called upon by their employers. The NLSY
offers no measure of on-call work. I used the CPS to identify on-call
workers as those who work only when called.2 On-call workers may
work part- or full-time. Almost one percent (0.9 percent) of American
women work on an on-call basis, and 50.5 percent of all on-call work-
ers are women.
Contract Workers. I identified contract workers in the CPS as those
who work for a company that contracts their services out to other orga-
nizations. Contract workers may work for more than one customer and
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may work at the customer’s worksite or at a different location. In the
NLSY, contract workers are those who self-identified as consultants,
contractors, or employees of contractors. Contract workers may work
either part- or full-time hours. Contract workers are disproportionately
male; only 30.4 percent are women. Just 0.9 percent of all women
worked in contract jobs in 1997.
Regular Part-Time Workers. Regular part-time workers are
employed in standard work arrangements, but work fewer than 35
hours per week. More than one out of every five American women
(22.5 percent) works in a regular part-time job.3 Part-time work is the
most female-dominated of all work arrangements, with women consti-
tuting almost two-thirds of all regular part-time workers. 
Regular Full-Time Workers. Regular full-time workers are regular
employees who work more than 35 hours per week. Most employed
American women work in regular full-time jobs (63.1 percent),
although women are slightly underrepresented in full-time work;
women are 43.7 percent of full-time workers. 
WHO WORKS IN NONSTANDARD JOBS?
The demographic and family characteristics of female workers dif-
fer considerably, not only between nonstandard workers and full-time
workers, but across different types of nonstandard work arrangements
as well. As the following section shows, women’s age, education, race,
and family roles all contribute to the sorting of women into different
types of work arrangements. Table 9.1 presents the distributions of full-
time and nonstandard workers by age, education, race, and family type;
and Table 9.2 presents logistic regressions of the effects of workers’
characteristics on working in each type of nonstandard work arrange-
ment. 
Part-Time Workers
Women in part-time work are disproportionately young, with
nearly one in four under the age of 24. They are also slightly more
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Table 9.1 U.S. Women’s Demographic and Family Characteristics by Work Arrangement (%)
Characteristic Full-time Part-time
Agency 
temps
Direct-hire 
temps On-call Contract All
Age
18–24 9.9 24.0 18.4 35.6 14.5 8.3 13.4
  25–44 57.7 48.9 55.0 43.7 51.8 69.5 54.9
  45–54 23.4 17.3 18.4 13.7 17.8 14.4 22.1
  55+ 9.0 9.8 8.2 7.0 15.8 7.7 9.7
Education
  Less than high school 7.3 11.4 9.4 9.0 7.9 8.4 8.3
  High school 33.8 34.5 34.9 21.0 24.1 34.0 33.4
  Some college 30.2 35.9 37.9 37.9 30.6 25.8 31.7
  Bachelor’s degree 19.8 13.5 15.2 20.3 31.4 23.1 18.5
  Higher than bachelor’s degree 8.9 4.7 2.6 11.8 6.0 8.8 8.0
Race/ethnicity
  Non-Hispanic white 73.3 79.5 65.8 72.3 76.7 75.2 75.6
  Non-Hispanic black 13.9 9.4 20.3 9.3 11.8 10.5 12.0
  Hispanic 8.6 7.9 10.5 10.8 7.7 8.7 8.3
  Asian 3.5 2.7 3.4 6.4 3.1 4.2 3.4
  Other groups 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.2 0.6 1.3 0.6
(continued)
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Characteristic Full-time Part-time
Agency 
temps
Direct-hire 
temps On-call Contract All
Family type
  Single–no children 31.4 32.2 38.1 50.8 26.5 30.3 31.0
  Single–children under 5a 4.4 4.9 6.6 4.4 5.0 6.1 4.4
  Single–children, aged 5–18b 7.7 5.8 7.5 3.4 6.4 5.9 6.9
  Married–no children 26.8 21.1 27.7 15.9 24.0 24.3 25.8
  Married–children under 5a 12.1 16.2 8.5 9.8 16.5 14.8 13.5
  Married–children, aged 5–18b 17.7 19.7 11.7 15.7 21.7 18.6 18.4
a Respondent has children in the household, and at least one is younger than age 5.
b Respondent has children in the household, but none is younger than age 5.
SOURCE: 1997 Current Population Survey, weighted.
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Table 9.2 Logistic Regression of Likelihood of Nonstandard Work 
Relative to Regular,Full-Time Work for U.S. Women 
Characteristic Part-time
Agency 
temps
Direct-hire 
temps On-call Contract
Age
  18–24 1.120** 0.412* 1.530** 0.801** –0.416
  25–44 (reference group)
  45–54 0.019 –0.324 –0.250 0.096 –0.665**
  55+ 0.462** –0.277 0.110 1.136** –0.361
Education
  Less than high school 0.468** 0.189 0.597** 0.341 0.181
  High school (reference 
group)
  Some college 0.122** 0.178 0.655** 0.395* –0.186
  Bachelor’s degree –0.359** –0.309 0.506** 0.928** 0.054
  Higher than bachelor’s 
degree
–0.543** –1.137** 1.082** 0.034 –0.042
Race/ethnicity
  White (reference group)
  Black –0.533** 0.420** –0.387** –0.186 –0.326
  Hispanic –0.461** 0.179 0.160 –0.170 –0.110
  Other groups –0.337** –0.017 0.634** –0.225 0.214
Family type
  Single–no children 
(reference group)
  Single–children under 5a 0.110 –0.100 –0.488* 0.556 0.327
  Single–children, aged 5–18b 0.160* –0.303 –0.683** 0.418 –0.325
  Married–no children –0.013 0.041 –0.628** 0.083 –0.034
  Married–children under 5a 0.651** –0.568* –0.471** 0.770** 0.029
  Married–children, aged 
5–18b 0.527** –0.518* –0.051 0.762** –0.041
* = p < 0.05, two-tail test; ** = p < 0.01, two-tail test.
a 
 Respondent has children in the household, and at least one is younger than age 5.
b 
 Respondent has children in the household, but none is younger than age 5.  
SOURCE: 1997 Current Population Survey, weighted.
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likely than full-time workers to be older than 55. Part-time workers are
clustered at the lower end of the educational distribution, with higher
percentages of part-time than full-time workers lacking a high school
education or having started, but not completed, a college education.
These differences exist, in part, because a considerable proportion of
young women in part-time work are enrolled in school while they
work. Sixty percent of all female part-time workers between the ages
of 18 and 24 were currently enrolled in either high school or college
(results not shown). Four out of five women in part-time work are
white, with blacks, Hispanics, and other groups underrepresented in
part-time jobs. Family characteristics are somewhat important for
understanding women’s use of part-time work: married women with
children are significantly more likely to work part-time than full-time.
However, the differences are not large: 36 percent of women in part-
time jobs are married mothers, compared with 30 percent of women in
full-time jobs. 
Temporary Workers
Agency temps and direct-hire temporary workers are dispropor-
tionately young; agency temps are twice as likely and direct-hire temps
are four times as likely as full-time workers to be between the ages of
18 and 24. Women who work as agency temps are fairly similar to reg-
ular, full-time workers in their educational characteristics, although
they are significantly less likely to hold advanced degrees. In contrast,
direct-hire temps, though more likely than regular, full-time workers to
lack a high school diploma, are more likely to have at least some col-
lege education, a four-year college degree, or an advanced degree. One
in five agency temps is black, considerably higher than the percentage
of black women in the labor force overall (12 percent). However, a
smaller percentage of direct-hire temps are black—just 9.3 percent.
The family characteristics of temporary and regular, full-time workers
are markedly different. Married women with children are significantly
less likely to work in temporary jobs than regular full-time jobs.
Instead, temporary workers are more likely than workers in any other
work arrangement to be single and childless; fewer than one-third of
women in regular, full-time jobs were single and childless, but 38 per-
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cent of agency temps and half of all direct-hire temporaries were single
with no children. 
On-Call Workers
On-call workers are more likely to be either young (under 25) or
older than 55 compared with their full-time counterparts. Nearly one-
third (31.6 percent) held bachelor’s degrees; a much higher proportion
than women in any other type of work arrangement. Like part-time
work, being married with children significantly increases women’s
likelihood of working in an on-call rather than regular, full-time posi-
tion, with married mothers constituting 38 percent of female on-call
workers. 
Contract Workers
The characteristics of women in contract jobs differ very little from
those in regular, full-time jobs. A larger proportion were between the
prime working ages of 25 and 44, but in terms of education, race, and
family characteristics, contract workers were very similar to their full-
time counterparts. 
OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NONSTANDARD 
WORK ARRANGEMENTS
Previous studies have indicated that nonstandard work arrange-
ments tend to be clustered in low-skill occupations, offer fewer
advancement opportunities, and are generally inferior in quality rela-
tive to regular, full-time jobs (e.g., Beechey and Perkins 1987; Cal-
laghan and Hartmann 1991; Tilly 1996; Kalleberg et al. 1997;
McAllister 1998). To compare the types of work performed in different
arrangements, the following section examines the occupational charac-
teristics, the skills of the workers, and the working hours of each work
arrangement.4 In general, nonstandard work arrangements are rela-
tively scarce in managerial occupations and more plentiful in sales and
service occupations, and women in nonstandard jobs typically work in
occupations that require fewer skills and more repetitive, routinized
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tasks than the occupations held by women in regular full-time positions
(see Table 9.3). 
Occupations
Occupations vary considerably in the proportions of workers
employed on nonstandard bases. Most managerial positions are orga-
nized as regular full-time positions, with just 15 percent of female
managers in nonstandard work arrangements. In contrast, employers
are most likely to organize work on a nonstandard basis in service and
sales occupations; full-time workers are slightly less than half of the
entire female labor force in service occupations, and are just 60 percent
of the female sales labor force. Sales and service occupations organize
a disproportionately high percentage of positions on part-time sched-
ules; almost 38 percent of sales positions and 43 percent of service
positions are regular part-time jobs. Although very few workers in any
occupational group work as temporaries, on-call, or contract workers,
employers do differ in their use of these work arrangements across
occupations. For example, agency and direct-hire temps are overrepre-
sented in administrative support occupations. However, employers do
not appear to use agency and direct-hire temporaries interchangeably;
agency temps are overrepresented in production and labor occupations,
while direct-hire temps are overrepresented in professional occupa-
tions. The higher educational levels of direct-hire temps relative to
agency temps reported in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 apparently facilitate the
ability of direct-hire temps to obtain employment in more highly
skilled occupations. Finally, female on-call workers are overrepre-
sented in professional occupations as well as in service occupations,
while female contract workers are relatively rare in sales and adminis-
trative support jobs, but not in service jobs, where their representation
is twice as high as their representation in the labor force as a whole. 
Skills and Tasks 
In general, women in regular, full-time jobs have the greatest
opportunities to exercise complex and challenging skills and to avoid
repetitive and routinized work. Part-time workers and temporary
agency employees work in occupations that require, on average, fewer
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Table 9.3 Occupational and Skill Characteristics of Work Arrangements, U.S. Women 
Full-time Part-time
Agency
temps
Direct-hire 
temps On-call Contract
Occupations (%)
  Managerial 85.3 11.1 0.9 1.8 0.1 0.9
  Professional 72.8 19.2 0.3 4.3 2.2 1.2
  Technical 70.4 24.3 1.4 2.0 0.4 1.5
  Sales 59.9 37.6 0.2 1.6 0.4 0.2
  Administrative support 71.6 21.2 2.7 3.6 0.5 0.4
  Service 49.5 43.0 0.8 3.1 1.6 2.0
  Production/labor 74.8 18.2 2.8 2.3 1.0 1.0
  Alla 69.1 24.6 1.4 3.0 1.0 1.0
Skill complexityb
  Skill with people 2.46
(1.68)
2.04*
(1.39)
1.50*
(1.02)
2.76*
(1.94)
2.90*
(2.19)
2.06*
(1.43)
  Skill with data 3.15
(1.31)
2.64*
(1.22)
2.44*
(1.24)
2.99
(1.36)
2.71*
(1.41)
2.80*
(1.70)
  Skill with things 2.14
(1.77)
2.24*
(1.85)
2.75*
(1.71)
1.76
(1.76)
1.61*
(1.71)
2.27
(1.65)
  Repetitive work 17.52
(26.40)
22.71*
(28.19)
24.84*
(30.80)
16.22
(24.82)
15.28
(27.38)
17.93
(27.32)
  Routinized work 33.92
(36.01)
47.51*
(38.52)
50.81*
(36.48)
38.27
(37.29)
37.00
(40.22)
38.12
(35.73)
(continued)
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Full-time Part-time
Agency
temps
Direct-hire 
temps On-call Contract
  Specific vocational 
       preparation
5.44
(1.42)
4.74*
(1.51)
4.76*
(1.28)
5.25
(1.62)
5.01*
(1.46)
5.29
(1.65)
Percent who work part-time hours 0.0 100.0 30.8 62.0 86.6 37.6
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The range for each variable is indicated in note 4.
*Difference in mean from regular, full-time workers is significant at p < 0.05.
a The values in this row differ slightly from those reported in the text on pp. 309–310 for the overall distribution of women across work
arrangements because the self-employed and independent contractors are omitted from the sample.
b
 Higher values reflect greater skill complexity.
SOURCE: 1997 Current Population Survey, weighted.
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skills in working with people or data and less vocational preparation
for the work. Their occupations do require greater complexity in work-
ing with things (see note 4), but this apparently does not protect them
from performing more repetitive and routinized work than the average
full-time female worker. Direct-hire temporaries work in occupations
that require more complex skills with people, on average, than full-
time workers; however, they perform less complex skills with data or
things, and their work is more routinized and requires less training to
perform. On-call workers also perform work requiring greater people
skills but fewer data or machinery skills and less training than the work
of women in regular full-time jobs. Contract workers differ very little
from regular full-time workers in the tasks they perform, although their
work does require fewer people or data skills on average. Thus, while
the skill complexity of work that nonstandard workers perform tends to
be lower than that of the average regular full-time worker, there is vari-
ation in skill complexity across work arrangements. Moreover, as the
standard deviations for the means of skill complexity show, there is
considerable variation within each type of work arrangement as well.
On-call workers, for example, show substantial variation in their
opportunities to exercise people skills (std. dev. = 2.19, see Table 9.3),
reflecting the diversity in the types of work they perform, from profes-
sional jobs such as substitute teachers and on-call nurses to service
jobs, working as cooks or household cleaners. 
Work Hours
By definition, regular full-time workers work full-time hours and
part-time workers work fewer than 35 hours per week. However, other
types of nonstandard workers can work full- or part-time hours. The
last row of Table 9.3 presents the percentage of workers in each work
arrangement who work part-time. Most agency temps and contract
workers work full-time hours, with 30 percent of agency temps and
nearly 38 percent of contract workers usually working fewer than 35
hours per week. In contrast, most direct-hire temps and on-call workers
work part-time. More than three out of five direct-hire temps and
roughly 87 percent of on-call workers work fewer than 35 hours per
week.
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WORKERS’ REASONS AND PREFERENCES FOR 
NONSTANDARD WORK
Much debate about nonstandard work centers around the question
of whether workers accept nonstandard jobs voluntarily or involun-
tarily. The availability and growth of nonstandard employment may be
viewed as a positive trend in the American economy if nonstandard
work arrangements allow women greater options for successfully bal-
ancing work and family needs and if women welcome these arrange-
ments. Alternatively, nonstandard work may be more reflective of the
needs of employers for low labor costs and greater employment flexi-
bility, and some workers may pay the costs of employment flexibility
and cost-cutting measures in terms of fewer options for permanent,
full-time work and greater involuntary employment in nonstandard
jobs. This section examines women’s preferences for regular full-time
employment, followed by their reasons for accepting nonstandard jobs.
Data from the 1997 CPS indicate that preferences for regular
employment differ by work arrangement (see Table 9.4). Most women
in temporary, on-call, or contract arrangements would prefer regular
employment. Temporary workers, in particular, would prefer regular or
permanent employment—two-thirds of agency temps and nearly three-
quarters of direct-hire temps responded that they would prefer perma-
nent employment. Nearly 60 percent of on-call workers and two-thirds
of contract workers would have preferred regular employment. Part-
time workers differed from workers in other nonstandard arrange-
ments; most did not report a preference for full-time work. Neverthe-
less, nearly one in four would have preferred to work full-time.
Because women’s preferences for regular jobs may depend on their
marital and parental status, the lower panel of Table 9.4 presents work-
ers’ preferences for regular employment by family type. The data indi-
cate only slight deviations from overall patterns by family type, with
married women slightly less likely to report a preference for regular
employment than single women. Significance tests (not shown) indi-
cated that the effect of family type on workers’ preferences was signif-
icant only for part-time workers (χ2 = 237.61 with 3 degrees of
freedom, significant at p < 0.01) and for direct-hire temporaries (χ2 =
49.39 with 3 degrees of freedom, significant at p < 0.01). Among part-
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time workers, single mothers were particularly likely to want full-time
hours, while the preferences of single, childless women, and married
women for full-time work hovered around 21 percent. Among direct-
hire temporaries, a larger proportion of single women than married
women (regardless of parental status) wanted permanent employment.
In sum, women’s family responsibilities do not appear to be steer-
ing women toward a preference for nonstandard work. Instead, many
of the women who work in most types of nonstandard work arrange-
ments preferred regular employment. The notable exception is part-
time work, where most women in every family type except single-
mother households do not wish to work full-time hours. Single mothers
were more likely than married mothers in every arrangement to want
regular full-time work, suggesting that nonstandard work arrangements
are particularly unlikely to meet the needs of women who may alone be
providing economically for their families. 
Given the considerable proportion of women in each type of work
arrangement who would prefer regular employment, it is important to
examine why women are working in them. What compels women to
find nonstandard work arrangements preferable to regular, full-time
jobs, and why do women who do not want nonstandard work accept
such jobs? Previous research categorizes workers’ reasons into three
Table 9.4 Worker Preferences by Nonstandard Work Arrangement and 
Family Type, U.S. Women
Part-time
Agency 
temps
Direct-
hire
temps On-call Contract
Percent who would 
prefer regular work
All workers 23.8 65.9 74.3 57.2 66.2
By family type 
  Single–no children  21.5 70.5 77.8 59.6 74.1
  Single–children 53.2 63.1 77.5 70.0 — a
  Married–no children 20.7 63.9 71.1 53.5 62.1
  Married–children 21.7 57.0 72.4 54.1 63.0
a Insufficient sample size.
SOURCE: 1997 Current Population Survey, weighted.
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mutually exclusive categories: involuntary (i.e., related to economic
conditions), voluntary (noneconomic reasons for nonstandard work),
and family-related reasons. Researchers are cautious about classifying
family responsibilities as either voluntary or involuntary because the
types of jobs that are available, access to and affordability of child care,
and the family policies that are in place all serve to shape women’s
choices about labor force participation and attachment (see O’Reilly
and Fagan 1998 for a comprehensive discussion).
Because of this, it is unclear whether nonstandard employment for
family reasons reflects voluntary or constrained choices. Prior findings
indicate that married women in dual-earner households frequently
cited family reasons for nonstandard, particularly part-time, employ-
ment, while single, childless women typically cited voluntary reasons
for part-time work, and involuntary reasons for temporary and on-call
employment (Kalleberg et al. 1997, p. 59). However, each of these
three categories of reasons—involuntary, voluntary, and family—com-
bines a number of potentially different reasons. For example, the cate-
gory of family reasons includes “problems with child care,” which
suggests an involuntary choice, as well as the more general response,
“other family or personal obligations,” which can include women with
a wide array of views and choices about combining work and family. I
present the detailed reasons that workers most commonly provided for
their nonstandard employment, distinguishing workers by whether they
reported a preference for regular employment, given that these two
groups are likely to differ in their reasons for nonstandard employment. 
Among workers who would not have preferred a regular job, the
desire for flexible or short-term employment was the most common
reason for working in a temporary agency, on-call, and contract jobs,
and it was the second most common reason cited by direct-hire tempo-
raries (see second column, Table 9.5). Part-time workers typically cited
family or personal obligations. Most of the responses for those who
would not prefer regular employment, such as short-term or flexible
employment or currently obtaining training or schooling, imply volun-
tary reasons for nonstandard work; however, a substantial minority of
women reported involuntary reasons for their nonstandard employ-
ment, even though they did not respond that they would have preferred
a regular job. Fourteen percent of temporary workers who did not pre-
fer permanent jobs said a temporary job was the only type of work they
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could find, and 12 percent of contract workers said their job was sea-
sonal. Five percent of part-time workers said they worked part-time
because of problems with child care (not shown). 
Among workers who would have preferred regular employment,
the most commonly cited reasons pertained to the lack of alternative
job opportunities. More than two-fifths of temporary agency workers
reported that temporary work was the only type of job they could find,
and another one-fifth took their job in hopes that it would turn into a
regular position. Similarly, slightly more than 45 percent of on-call
workers either reported that on-call work was the only type of work
they could find or that they hoped the job would become regular.
Among direct-hire temps, current enrollment in school was the most
common reason cited, but 19 percent indicated that temporary work
was the only work they could find, and another 8 percent took their job
in hopes that it would become permanent. More than one-third of part-
time workers worked part-time because they could not find another
type of job, and more than one-quarter cited slack business conditions.
In sum, the majority of agency and direct-hire temporaries, con-
tract, and on-call workers would have preferred regular employment,
and cited involuntary reasons for working in the types of jobs they did.
Most part-time workers preferred to work part- rather than full-time,
and typically worked part-time hours to accommodate family or per-
sonal obligations or schooling. Nevertheless, 24 percent would have
preferred regular full-time work, but worked part-time primarily
because they were unable to find full-time work or because business
conditions were slack. The evidence that women prefer nonstandard
work because of their family roles is slight. Clearly, family roles steer
some women toward nonstandard jobs, particularly part-time jobs,
where almost 80 percent of married women prefer their work arrange-
ment to regular full-time work. However, most women, regardless of
their family roles, do not wish to work in temporary, on-call, or con-
tract jobs, and those who do rarely cite family reasons for accepting
their current work arrangement. 
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for Regular Work, U.S. Women
Would not prefer regular employment Would prefer regular employment
Part-time Family or personal obligations (42.6%) Only type of work respondent could find (35.2%)
Currently in school or training (27.7%) Slack business conditions (27.6%)
Unspecified personal reasons (6.5%) Currently in school or training (9.2%)
Agency temps Wants flexible or short-term employment (29.6%) Only type of work respondent could find (45.1%)
Unspecified personal reasons (12.5%) Hopes job becomes permanent (21.4%)
Hopes job becomes permanent  (13.6%) Wants flexible or short-term employment (9%)
Direct-hire 
temps
Currently in school (54.1%)
Wants flexible or short-term employment (10.7%)
Currently in school (20.2%)
Only type of work respondent could find (19.0%)
Unspecified personal reasons (8%) Hopes job becomes permanent (8.2%)
Contract Wants flexible or short-term employment (41.2%) Only type of work respondent could find (23.5%)
Job is seasonal (11.9%) Wants flexible or short-term employment (11.2%)
Unspecified economic reasons (10.1%)
On-call Wants flexible or short-term employment (35.2%) Only type of work respondent could find (37.6%)
Currently in school or training (20.4%) Unspecified personal reasons (12.3%)
Unspecified personal reasons (10.5%) Hopes job becomes regular position (9.9%)
SOURCE: 1997 Current Population Survey, weighted.
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WOMEN’S TRANSITIONS IN AND OUT OF NONSTANDARD 
EMPLOYMENT
To date, research on nonstandard work primarily uses data from the
CPS or other cross-sectional surveys that provide snapshots of non-
standard employment at one point in time. However, because workers
move in and out of nonstandard jobs at a higher rate than regular full-
time jobs, the fraction of workers who experience nonstandard employ-
ment over a longer time period is greater than the fraction in nonstand-
ard jobs at any single point in time. Moreover, cross-sectional data do
not permit researchers to identify how long workers remain in non-
standard work arrangements, or what they do before entering or after
leaving nonstandard jobs. Ideally, to develop estimates of how many
workers use nonstandard work arrangements over the course of their
work histories, researchers would use nationally representative data for
the U.S. labor force that track workers' work arrangements over time.
Although such data do not exist, the NLSY does offer longitudinal data
for a nationally representative sample of individuals born between
1957 and 1965.
In 1994, the NLSY incorporated in their biennial questionnaire an
item asking workers about the type of job they currently held. Based on
this survey item, I have distinguished between regular full-time work-
ers, regular part-time workers, temporary workers, contract workers,
and other unspecified nonstandard workers. The category of temporary
workers includes both agency temps and direct-hire temps because
sample sizes were not large enough to retain separate categories. The
definition of contract workers in the NLSY includes workers who self-
identify as consultants, contractors, or employees of contractors; this
category may not be directly comparable with the CPS definition of
contract workers. The NLSY does not have a separate category for on-
call workers; these workers are likely to be captured in the category of
other nonstandard work.
A comparison of estimates of women’s participation in nonstand-
ard work based on cross-sectional and longitudinal data indicates some
movement between regular full-time and nonstandard work arrange-
ments, so that higher percentages of women show nonstandard
employment over the course of four years than suggested by cross-sec-
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tional estimates (see Table 9.6). Cross-sectional estimates of women’s
work arrangements from NLSY data are similar to estimates for
women of the same age group in the CPS (results not shown), with
approximately two-thirds of the female workforce in regular full-time
jobs, about one-quarter in regular part-time jobs, and about 3 percent in
temporary jobs in each survey year. Estimates of contract work are
slightly higher in the NLSY (1.8 percent in the NLSY compared with
1.2 percent in the CPS among women aged 33–40), probably because
of definitional differences in the two measures. The final column of
Table 9.6 indicates the percentage of women in the NLSY who
reported working in a particular arrangement in at least one of the three
surveys. Thus, for example, although approximately 3 percent of
women reported using temporary work in any one particular survey
year, nearly 5 percent of all women who had worked at any time
between 1994 and 1998 had worked in a temporary job.5 Higher per-
centages of women also work in contract and other nonstandard work
arrangements over time than single point-in-time estimates capture.
Finally, the percentages of women reporting regular full- and part-time
employment over the course of four years are slightly higher than
cross-sectional estimates, but the differences are much smaller than
those for other work arrangements, reflecting the greater job stability
of regular full-time and part-time jobs.
Table 9.6 Percentage of U.S. Women in Each Work Arrangement in 
1994, 1996, and 1998, and at Any Time between 1994 and 1998
1994 1996 1998
At any time between 
1994 and 1998a
Regular full-time 68.5 67.6 67.4 70.0
Regular part-time 23.4 24.2 25.4 31.2
Temporary 3.1 3.1 2.8 4.9
Contract 1.9 1.7 1.8 3.4
Other 3.0 3.2 2.5 5.1
All workers 3,254 3,509 3,554 3,788
a Percentages in this column exceed 100 because workers could have held more than
one work arrangement within the four-year period.
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, weighted.  
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By using longitudinal data, it is possible to identify how women
combine work arrangements over time. Table 9.7 categorizes women
by their employment patterns from 1994 to 1998. A majority of women
worked at some point during this time period. Seventy-six percent were
continuously employed, another 16 percent were employed intermit-
tently, and just 8 percent did not work at all from 1994 to 1998. Of
those who were continuously employed, about half worked in a regular
full-time job throughout the entire period. Few women were continu-
ously employed in a single type of nonstandard work the entire dura-
tion; fewer than 9 percent held regular part-time jobs, and fewer than 1
percent held temporary, contract, or other nonstandard jobs continu-
ously from 1994 to 1998. More common than steady employment in a
single type of nonstandard work was the practice of piecing together
work arrangements; nearly one-third of continuously employed women
shifted between full-time and nonstandard employment, and another 4
percent combined different types of nonstandard employment. These
findings suggest considerable movement between work arrangements
among this cohort of women.
Among the nearly 16 percent of women who were not in the labor
force continuously between 1994 and 1998, most worked in nonstand-
ard jobs at least part of the time they were employed. Just one-third
moved between nonemployment and full-time work alone, while 44
percent moved between nonemployment and nonstandard jobs, and
another 18 percent shifted between nonemployment, nonstandard
work, and regular full-time jobs. The high rate of nonstandard employ-
ment among intermittently employed women may reflect women’s use
of nonstandard jobs to ease transitions in and out of the labor market as
family or personal needs dictate, or it may reflect constrained eco-
nomic opportunities for these women and their difficulties in finding
permanent employment. Unfortunately, the NLSY does not include an
item about workers’ preferences for regular or nonstandard work that
would permit me to adjudicate among these two arguments. In sum, the
findings in Table 9.7 indicate that many workers use nonstandard work
arrangements at some point in their work histories. Within the rela-
tively short period from 1994 to 1998, almost half (47.7 percent) of the
employed women in this age cohort had worked in a nonstandard job at
least at one survey point.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 327  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
328 Cassirer
The data in Table 9.7 suggest that a considerable percentage of
women combine work arrangements, but they do not indicate how long
women stay in particular work arrangements, or what types of work
arrangements women obtain on leaving nonstandard jobs. Given the
high percentages of women in temporary and on-call work who would
prefer regular employment, women may work in these arrangements
only briefly while seeking standard full-time employment. Part-time
workers are less likely to prefer full-time jobs; however, the reasons
they offer for part-time employment often include obligations that
Table 9.7 Employment Patterns from 1994 to 1998 for U.S. Women Aged 
29–37 in 1994 
 Number
As percentage 
of all women
As percentage
 of subcategory
Continuously employed, 
1994–1998 3,144 76.0 100.0
   In full-time jobs 1,627 51.8
   In regular part-time jobs 274 8.7
   In temporary jobs 6 0.2
   In contract jobs 3 <0.1
   In “other” nonstandard 7 0.2
   In a combination of 
nonstandard jobs 130 4.1
   Combined full-time and 
nonstandard jobs 989 31.5
   Unable to categorize 108 3.4
Intermittently employed, 
1994–1998 644 15.6 100.0
   Full-time only 228 35.4
   Nonstandard only 282 43.8
   Combined full-time and 
nonstandard jobs 116 18.0
   Unable to categorize 19 3.0
Continuously out of labor market 326 7.9
All women, aged 29–37 in 1994 4,114
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, weighted.
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eventually end or diminish in urgency—schooling or family responsi-
bilities—so these workers also may use part-time jobs temporarily.
The NLSY data allow us to further look at transitions to and from
nonstandard employment over time to identify patterns of turnover in
regular full-time and nonstandard jobs and to examine the origins and
destinations of women as they enter and exit nonstandard jobs. To cal-
culate transitions across work arrangements (including nonemploy-
ment), I compare the work arrangements of women in one survey year
to the work arrangements they reported two years later. I summarize
the two periods of cross-survey comparisons—1994 to 1996 and 1996
to 1998—in a single matrix of two-year transition rates. 
The female labor force as a whole shows very high rates of
employment stability in full-time jobs (see Table 9.8). About 83 per-
cent of women working full-time in one year still worked full-time two
years later (although they may work for a different employer; these
analyses identify employment stability by work arrangement, not
employer). Employment stability in part-time work is much lower at 57
percent, and is quite low in other nonstandard arrangements; just 19.2
percent of temporary workers, 22.6 percent of contract workers, and
21.5 percent of other nonstandard workers remained in these work
arrangements two years later. Table 9.8 also shows whether women in
nonstandard work arrangements moved to regular full-time jobs, to
other nonstandard jobs, or out of the labor market entirely. Nearly one-
third of women working part-time had moved to regular full-time jobs
within two years. Relatively few women moved from part-time jobs to
temporary, contract, or other nonstandard jobs. Most temporary work-
ers who exited temporary work moved into regular full-time employ-
ment, but 14 percent of women who were in temporary work at the
beginning of the two-year period were without a job at the end of the
two-year period—a higher percentage than any other type of work
arrangement (except for those who were not employed at the outset).
Contract workers were most likely to exit contract employment and
shift to full-time work within two years, but slightly more than one-
fifth moved to part-time jobs, and nontrivial proportions ended up in
temporary or other nonstandard jobs or without a job entirely. In gen-
eral, women in nonstandard work arrangements at the beginning of the
two-year time period were more likely than women in full-time jobs to
end up without a job two years later. Finally, women who moved from
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Time t + 1
Time t
Regular 
full-time
Regular 
part-time Temporary Contract
Other 
nonstandard No job
As a percentage of all 
women at time t
Regular full-time 83.3 10.2 1.5 0.9 1.6 2.5 56.9
Regular part-time 30.6 57.0 2.8 2.0 2.7 4.8 20.0
Temporary 42.3 22.1 19.2 1.4 0.5 14.1 2.6
Contract 35.5 22.6 4.8 22.6 8.9 8.1 1.5
Other nonstandard 35.0 28.5 1.9 5.1 21.5 7.5 2.6
No job 14.4 14.1 2.7 0.8 1.9 66.0 16.4
As a percentage of all 
women at time t + 1
58.5 21.1 2.5 1.5 2.5 13.9 100.0
N = 8,085.
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1994–98, weighted.
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nonemployment to employment were somewhat more likely to move
into a nonstandard work arrangement rather than directly into full-time
jobs. Although 14.4 percent of nonemployed women moved into full-
time jobs, 14.1 percent moved into part-time jobs, 2.7 percent moved
into temporary jobs, and 2.7 percent moved into contract or other non-
standard jobs.
The greater likelihood of exiting the labor force or moving to other
nonstandard work arrangements among nonstandard rather than regu-
lar full-time workers may stem from events in women’s lives, such as
childbirth, marriage, or divorce. Alternatively, women may leave the
workforce discouraged by a lack of desirable opportunities, or they
may move from nonstandard job to nonstandard job because they are
unable to find other employment. Although the NLSY does not provide
data on workers’ reasons for shifting work arrangements, examining
work transitions separately for women by skill levels and by whether
they experienced major life transitions may shed light on the effects of
employment opportunities, childbirth, marriage, and divorce on
women’s employment transitions. 
Skill Levels
Differences in job stability across work arrangements may depend
partly on skill level. Nonstandard workers work in occupations requir-
ing fewer skills than regular full-time workers, and low-skill work is
characterized by higher rates of turnover as workers seek more inter-
esting and challenging work. Nevertheless, nonstandard work arrange-
ments vary in their skill levels, and workers may be more receptive to
nonstandard arrangements and less likely to quit if employers offer
high-quality nonstandard jobs. Moreover, workers with high levels of
skill may be better able to negotiate favorable nonstandard work
arrangements and conditions than workers with fewer skills and, thus,
may be more likely to stay in nonstandard jobs for longer periods of
time. To evaluate how skill levels affect women’s job stability and tran-
sitions across work arrangements, I summarized transition patterns
separately for less-skilled women (defined as those with a high school
education or less) and skilled women (those with more than a high
school education). 
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A comparison of the two panels in Table 9.9 shows nearly equal
rates of stability in regular full-time jobs for low- and high-skilled
workers, but considerably lower rates of stability for low-skilled work-
ers in part-time and temporary jobs. For example, just 15 percent of
low-skilled temporary workers remained in temporary positions two
years later, compared with 25 percent of higher-skilled temporary
workers. Low-skilled workers in every type of nonstandard work were
more likely than their high-skilled counterparts to move into regular
full-time jobs by the end of a two-year period. However, low-skilled
workers were also slightly more likely than high-skilled workers to
move out of the workforce from full-time, part-time, and other non-
standard jobs. The overall distributions of women across work arrange-
ments (see last column or row of panels) indicate a smaller percentage
of low-skilled than high-skilled workers in regular, full-time work and
larger percentages in temporary work or without a job. In sum, the pat-
terns suggest that low-skilled workers are less likely to work in regular,
full-time jobs than high-skilled workers, and that when low-skilled
workers work in nonstandard jobs, they are less likely than their high-
skilled counterparts to stay in them, perhaps because they are less able
than higher skilled workers to negotiate favorable terms and conditions
for nonstandard work or because low-skill jobs are inherently more
unstable than skilled jobs. 
Childbirth
Women may use nonstandard work arrangements to reduce or vary
work commitments in conjunction with childbearing and increasing
demands associated with the presence of a new family member.
Women who had a child showed slightly lower rates of stability in full-
time employment and higher rates of stability in nonstandard employ-
ment than women who did not give birth within each two-year period.
Among women who bore a child, three-fourths of those in full-time
jobs at the beginning of the two-year period remained in full-time jobs
two years later. This rate is lower than the 84 percent of full-time
women who did not bear a child; however, for both groups, there is
considerable stability in full-time jobs (see Table 9.10). Women who
exited from full-time jobs were more likely to move to part-time work
or out of the labor force entirely if they gave birth than if they did not.
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Table 9.9 Transition Patterns across Work Arrangements for Women by Education (%)
Time t + 1
Time t
Regular 
full-time
Regular 
part-time Temporary Contract
Other 
nonstandard No job
As a percentage of 
all women at time t
With a high school education or less
   Regular full-time 82.6 10.1 2.0 0.7 1.8 2.9 53.2
   Regular part-time 36.6 53.1 2.2 1.2 2.0 5.1 20.6
   Temporary 45.5 25.6 14.9 0.8 0.0 12.4 2.9
   Contract 40.0 23.3 10.0 26.7 0.0 6.7 0.7
   Other nonstandard 37.2 29.2 1.8 1.8 17.7 11.5 2.7
   No job 16.5 14.7 2.7 0.4 2.6 63.0 19.9
   As a percentage of all 
women at time t + 1
57.3 20.9 2.6 0.9 2.4 15.8 100.0
N = 4,112
With more than a high school 
education
   Regular full-time 83.9 10.2 1.1 1.1 1.5 2.2 60.8
   Regular part-time 24.2 61.6 3.3 3.0 3.5 4.8 19.3
   Temporary 38.0 18.5 25.0 2.2 1.1 16.3 2.3
   Contract 36.7 22.4 4.1 24.5 6.1 8.2 1.2
   Other nonstandard 33.1 25.5 2.1 11.7 24.1 4.8 3.7
   No job 11.1 12.9 3.0 1.6 1.0 70.8 12.7
    As a percentage of all       
women at time t + 1
59.6 21.4 2.3 2.1 2.6 11.9 100.0
N = 3,971
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1994–98, weighted.
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Stability in part-time, temporary, and contract employment was
higher among women who bore a child than those who did not. For
example, nearly half of part-time workers who had not had a child in a
two-year period had moved on to other work arrangements, typically to
full-time work. In contrast, just one-quarter of those who gave birth
had moved out of part-time employment. Temporary workers were
twice as likely to retain temporary jobs if they had a child than if they
did not. However, because workers in most other work arrangements
were much less likely to move into temporary jobs after the birth of a
child, the rate of temporary employment among childbearing women
dropped after childbirth, from 3 percent to 1.4 percent (see Table 9.10).
Childbirth also had the effect of increasing the rate of part-time
employment and nonemployment among women, and decreasing full-
time employment. As a result, the work arrangements of childbearing
and nonchildbearing women looked quite similar at the beginning of a
time period (compare the last columns of each panel, Table 9.10), but
had diverged by the end of the time period as some women who gave
birth exited full-time employment, increased their rates of part-time
employment, and dropped out of the labor force (compare the last rows
of each panel, Table 9.10). Thus, childbearing apparently has a moder-
ate effect on women’s employment patterns and their use of nonstand-
ard work arrangements, with women gravitating to part-time
employment in particular and away from temporary employment.
Access to part-time work may enable women to maintain labor force
participation after childbirth rather than dropping out of the labor force.
Indeed, although some women exited the labor force after childbirth,
the vast majority—80 percent—did not. It is also important to note that
although part-time employment increased as women bore children, it
remained more common for childbearing women to work full-time
than to work part-time. 
Marriage and Divorce
To assess the effects of marriage and divorce on women’s patterns
of standard and nonstandard employment, I categorized women into
four mutually exclusive groups: those who remained single throughout
a two-year period, those who remained married throughout a two-year
period, those who entered marriage within a two-year period, and those
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Table 9.10 Transition Patterns across Work Arrangements for Women by Childbirth Status (%)
Time t + 1
Time t
Regular 
full-time
Regular 
part-time Temporary Contract
Other 
nonstandard No job
As a percentage of 
all women at time t
Who gave birth between 
time t and time t + 1 
   Regular full-time 74.2 16.8 0.2 0.7 2.1 6.0 56.2
   Regular part-time 14.0 74.1 0.0 2.8 3.5 4.9 18.5
   Temporary 26.1 17.4 34.8 0.0 4.3 13.0 3.0
   Contract 5.9 23.5 11.8 23.5 11.8 11.8 2.2
   Other nonstandard 19.2 38.5 0.0 0.0 30.8 19.2 3.4
   No job 2.3 3.9 0.8 0.8 1.6 89.1 16.7
   As a percentage of all 
  women at time t + 1
46.2 26.3 1.4 1.7 3.4 20.6 100.0
N = 772
Who did not give birth 
between time t and time t + 1
   Regular full-time 84.2 9.5 1.7 0.9 1.0 2.2 57.0
   Regular part-time 32.3 55.3 3.1 1.8 2.6 4.8 20.1
   Temporary 44.7 22.1 16.8 1.6 0.0 14.2 2.6
   Contract 33.2 17.1 3.1 18.6 7.0 20.9 1.5
   Other nonstandard 38.0 27.3 2.1 5.9 20.3 5.9 2.6
   No job 15.8 15.1 3.0 0.8 1.9 63.5 16.3
As a percentage of all
women at time t + 1
59.8 20.6 2.6 1.5 2.4 13.5 100.0
N = 7,312
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1994–98, weighted.
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who divorced within a two-year period. I averaged their work patterns
across the two-year periods for a single summary matrix for each of the
four groups. A comparison of the matrices for stably single and stably
married women (Table 9.11) shows higher labor force participation
rates overall for single women (11.5 percent of single women were not
in the labor force at time t + 1 compared with 16 percent of married
women; Table 9.11), with higher rates of full-time and temporary
employment and lower rates of part-time and contract employment
among single than married women. Single and married women had
similar rates of stability in regular full-time jobs, but single women
were much more likely than married women to move to regular full-
time employment from nonstandard jobs, and they were much less
likely to move to part-time or contract work from other work arrange-
ments. Thus, married women appear to be much more likely to move
to, and stay in, nonstandard jobs—at least part-time and contract
jobs—than single women.
The distribution across work arrangements of women who
divorced during a two-year period was very similar at time t to that of
women who were continuously married (see Table 9.11). This pattern
is not surprising given that women in this category were still married at
time t. By time t + 1, the work arrangements and labor force participa-
tion rates of women who went through a divorce were more similar to
those of single women. Divorced women were more likely than women
in any other marital status group to move out of regular part-time work,
with most moving to regular full-time jobs. They were also more likely
to move from nonemployment into the labor force, resulting in a
decline in the average nonemployment rate of 14 percent before
divorce to just 8.8 percent afterward. Very few moved from nonem-
ployment into nonstandard jobs. However, the small sample size (just
308 of the 4,114 women experienced a divorce between 1994 and
1998) precludes strong conclusions about the relationship between
divorce and work patterns for work arrangements other than regular
full-time and part-time jobs. 
Women who married during a two-year period had the lowest rates
of nonemployment and the highest rates of full-time employment of all
the marital status groups (see Table 9.11). They showed relatively high
rates of stability in both full-time and part-time jobs. (The small sample
size for this group hinders strong interpretations of the transition rates
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Table 9.11 Transition Patterns across Work Arrangements for Women by Marital Status (%) 
Time t + 1
Time t
Regular 
full-time
Regular 
part-time Temporary Contract
Other 
nonstandard No job
As a percentage of 
all women at time t
Who remained single
   Regular full-time 84.9 9.2 2.2 0.6 1.2 1.9 64.8
   Regular part-time 46.2 43.7 4.0 1.5 2.4 2.1 13.3
   Temporary 46.6 19.2 21.9 1.4 1.4 9.6 3.0
   Contract 46.4 7.1 10.7 10.7 10.7 7.1 1.1
   Other nonstandard 48.1 14.8 1.9 1.9 27.8 7.4 2.2
   No job 20.8 13.5 3.1 0.3 1.8 60.2 15.6
   As a percentage of all 
women at time t + 1
67.4 14.8 3.3 0.9 2.1 11.5 100.0
N = 2,460
Who remained married
   Regular full-time 81.6 11.3 1.2 0.9 1.9 3.1 51.7
   Regular part-time     24.8 62.0 2.6 2.2 2.6 5.8 23.6
   Temporary 37.4 22.8 18.7 1.6 0.0 18.7 2.5
   Contract 33.3 25.6 2.2 24.4 6.7 7.8 1.8
   Other nonstandard 29.9 32.7 1.4 6.1 21.1 8.2 3.0
   No job 9.7 14.5 2.7 1.1 2.2 70.1 17.4
   As a percentage of all 
women at time t + 1
52.1 25.0 2.3 1.8 2.7 16.0 100.0
N = 4,921
(continued)
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Time t + 1
Time t
Regular 
full-time
Regular 
part-time Temporary Contract
Other 
nonstandard No job
As a percentage of 
all women at time t
Who divorced
   Regular full-time 87.2 4.7 0.6 1.2 2.9 2.9 55.8
   Regular part-time 50.0 36.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 5.3 24.7
   Temporary 50.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
   Contract 0.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 0.0 1.3
   Other nonstandard 33.3 16.7 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
   No job 39.5 14.0 2.3 0.0 2.3 41.9 14.0
 As a percentage of all     
women at time t + 1
68.8 15.6 1.6 1.6 2.9 8.8 100.0
N = 308
Who married
   Regular full-time 86.9 9.0 0.7 2.1 0.3 1.4 73.7
   Regular part-time 37.0 58.7 2.2 0.0 4.3 0.0 11.7
   Temporary 54.5 27.3 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8
   Contract 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
   Other nonstandard 57.1 42.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 1.8
   No job 25.7 11.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 65.7 8.9
   As a percentage of all 
   women at time t + 1
73.2 15.8 1.5 2.3 1.0 6.9 100.0
N = 392
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1994–98, weighted.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 338  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
Work Arrangements among Women in the United States 339
from less prevalent nonstandard work arrangements.) The findings
suggest that marriage has little effect on women’s work patterns, per-
haps because women who marry in their 30s may be a self-selected
group whose commitment to the labor market affects both their marital
and their work patterns. (Of course, this group of women includes
those who delayed marriage until their 30s as well as those who are not
marrying for the first time; although the effects of marriage on work
patterns may differ for these two subgroups of women, the sample size
is too small to allow reliable comparisons.) 
Presence of Children
Finally, I present transition patterns separately for women by
parental and marital status. In general, single and married women with-
out children are less likely to work in nonstandard jobs than mothers,
and single mothers are less likely than married mothers to work in non-
standard jobs (see last columns or rows of Table 9.12). However,
although parental status may affect women’s rates of full-time work,
the stability rates of those in regular full-time jobs were similar for
women in every family type. Turnover in nonstandard jobs did, how-
ever, vary somewhat across family type. The stability rates for child-
less single women show that nearly half remained in part-time jobs two
years later—slightly higher than the rates of single mothers or childless
married women, but much lower than married mothers. A considerable
minority of childless single women remained in temporary, contract,
and other nonstandard jobs two years later, and their stability rates in
these types of jobs were substantially higher than those of married
women. However, childless single women who did not remain in the
same nonstandard arrangement two years later were more likely than
women in any other group to shift to a regular, full-time job. Childless
married women also showed higher rates of stability in temporary, con-
tract, and other nonstandard jobs than mothers, but they differed from
childless single women in that fewer of those who left a nonstandard
arrangement moved to full-time jobs, while more shifted to regular
part-time jobs (see Table 9.12). 
The presence of children clearly affects women’s transition pat-
terns, but the patterns depend on whether mothers are single or mar-
ried. Single mothers have lower rates of stability in all nonstandard
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 339  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
340Table 9.12 Transition Patterns across Work Arrangements by Parental and Marital Status (%) 
Time t + 1
Time t
Regular 
full-time
Regular 
part-time Temporary Contract
Other 
nonstandard No job
As a percentage of all 
women at time t
Single women with no children
   Regular full-time 86.7 8.5 1.8 1.1 1.3 0.7 74.3
   Regular part-time 40.1 48.9 2.2 0.7 7.3 2.2 11.6
   Temporary 51.7 10.3 31.0 0.0 3.4 3.4 2.4
   Contract 54.5 0.0 0.0 27.3 9.1 0.0 0.9
   Other nonstandard 55.6 8.3 0.0 0.0 27.8 5.6 3.0
   No job 15.2 14.1 2.2 0.0 2.2 66.3 7.8
   As a percentage of all
    women at time t + 1
73.7 13.6 2.4 1.3 3.0 6.2 100.0
N = 1,185
Single women with children
   Regular full-time 83.8 9.8 2.2 0.4 1.0 2.6 60.2
   Regular part-time 47.9 43.7 4.6 1.7 0.8 1.7 14.3
   Temporary 44.6 25.0 16.1 1.8 0.0 10.7 3.4
   Contract 36.8 10.5 15.8 10.5 10.5 10.5 1.1
   Other nonstandard 34.6 26.9 26.9 11.5 19.2 7.7 1.6
   No job 22.9 13.1 11.0 0.3 0.9 59.0 19.6
    As a percentage of all 
    women at time t + 1
64.3 16.1 3.4 0.8 1.3 14.1 100.0
N = 1,666
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Married women with no children
   Regular full-time 83.3 11.0 0.3 1.0 2.4 2.2 74.8
   Regular part-time 43.3 44.3 2.1 1.0 3.1 5.2 12.2
   Temporary 14.3 28.6 42.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9
   Contract 25.0 37.5 0.0 18.8 6.3 6.3 2.0
   Other nonstandard 22.7 4.5 9.1 4.5 50.0 0.0 2.8
   No job 17.2 5.2 1.7 1.7 3.4 69.0 7.3
  As a percentage of all 
   women at time t + 1
70.4 15.1 1.5 1.8 4.0 7.6 100.0
N = 793
Married women with children
   Regular full-time 81.6 10.9 1.4 0.9 1.9 3.3 47.8
   Regular part-time 24.9 62.0 2.6 2.2 2.5 5.8 25.7
   Temporary 39.7 23.1 17.4 1.7 0.0 19.0 2.7
   Contract 33.3 24.4 2.6 24.4 9.0 7.7 1.8
   Other nonstandard 31.3 36.6 0.8 5.3 14.5 9.2 3.0
   No job 10.8 15.1 2.7 0.8 2.1 68.6 19.0
As a percentage of all 
   women at time t + 1
50.1 26.1 2.4 1.5 2.5 17.0 100.0
N = 4,436
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1994–98, weighted.
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work arrangements than married mothers, and when they exit non-
standard work arrangements, they are more likely to move into full-
time jobs (see Table 9.12). However, a higher percentage of single
mothers appear to land in temporary jobs; a considerable proportion of
those who held part-time, contract, or other nonstandard jobs at the
beginning of the two-year period were working in temporary jobs by
the end of the period. Not surprisingly then, the rate of temporary
employment among single mothers at 3.4 percent is higher than that of
women in any other family type. Because data on reasons for nonstand-
ard employment are not available in the NLSY, it is impossible to
determine with certainty whether these single mothers want temporary
jobs, but the fact that they are more likely to leave temporary jobs (only
16.1 percent are still in temporary jobs by time t + 1) than any other
group suggests that they do not choose these jobs voluntarily. More-
over, the CPS data show that nearly 70 percent of single mothers in
temporary jobs would prefer permanent positions (see Table 9.4).
Together, the matrices of women’s employment patterns suggest
that women who are stably married, those who are married and have
children, and those who recently had a child are most likely to use non-
standard work arrangements and to stay in them—particularly in part-
time jobs. Very few women hold temporary, contract, or other non-
standard jobs for long durations of time. Workers in these types of
arrangements most commonly move into full-time positions, although
they are also much more likely than regular full-time workers to be
without a job by the subsequent survey date. Given the ready availabil-
ity of temporary and contract jobs, women’s high transition rates from
these jobs suggest that women typically do not find these work
arrangements suitable for their long-term needs. Although this comes
as no surprise for temporary work, which is not stable by definition and
which researchers agree is typically a marginal form of employment, it
does suggest that workers do not view contract jobs on par with regular
full-time work, despite the similarities of these two work arrange-
ments, at least in terms of pay, benefits, and work characteristics (e.g.,
Kalleberg et al. 1997; Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000). 
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CONCLUSION
One-third of women workers in the United States currently work in
nonstandard work arrangements. A much larger percentage have
worked or will work in nonstandard jobs over their work history. As
the data from the NLSY show, nearly half of all working women born
between 1957 and 1965 reported nonstandard employment in at least
one of three surveys between 1994 and 1998. Consequently, it is of
great importance to understand the promise of such jobs for meeting
women’s employment and economic needs as well as their family
needs. Evidence to date provides a mixed view of nonstandard work
arrangements. Part-time, temporary agency, and on-call jobs tend to be
clustered in occupations that offer few opportunities to exercise chal-
lenging and complex skills and are characterized by routine, repetitive
tasks, while direct-hire and contract jobs are similar to full-time jobs in
their skill characteristics. Part-time, temporary, and on-call workers
earn considerably less on average than similar regular full-time work-
ers, are less likely to receive health insurance or retirement benefits,
and are more likely to live in families with incomes near or below the
poverty line (Kalleberg et al. 1997; Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson
2000; Houseman and Osawa, in this volume). Contract workers earn
hourly wages that are as much or more than their regular full-time
counterparts but receive fewer benefits (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hud-
son 2000; Houseman and Osawa, in this volume), and many do not
work full-time. The majority of women who work in temporary, on-
call, and contract jobs would prefer regular employment and work in
these jobs primarily because they were unable to find regular work or
because they hoped their position would become a regular position.
Most women in these arrangements do not stay in them for long peri-
ods of time, and although many move from their nonstandard jobs into
full-time jobs, a substantial minority end up in other types of nonstand-
ard work or without a job altogether.
Nevertheless, nonstandard jobs are not universally bad, nor do all
workers desire regular employment. In part-time work especially, the
majority of women do not prefer regular, full-time work. In addition,
almost 30 percent of temporary workers, 40 percent of contract work-
ers, and 47 percent of on-call workers would not prefer a regular job.
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Women voluntarily work in nonstandard jobs for a variety of reasons;
some to continue working while tending to other family or personal
needs and interests, others to pursue schooling or training, and yet oth-
ers because they want flexible or short-term employment. Women also
differ in the education, skills, and experience they bring to the labor
market, and more skilled and educated women may be more successful
than others in parlaying their advantages into nonstandard work
arrangements that meet their needs and preferences. For example, Tilly
(1996) found that although most part-time jobs are located in the sec-
ondary labor market and are characterized by little skill and low wages,
a minority of women obtain “retention” part-time jobs, which offer
high wages and challenging work. Variation in the skills, characteris-
tics, and consequences of work within each type of nonstandard work
arrangement draws attention to the importance of recognizing the het-
erogeneity of nonstandard jobs in addition to the typical characteristics
of such jobs that have been the focus of most research (but see Polivka
1996; Blank 1998; and Cohany 1998). Clearly, some workers are in
nonstandard arrangements that fit their preferences and needs and offer
them the type of work they desire.
It is women with family responsibilities in particular who are
thought to benefit from the availability and growth of nonstandard
work (e.g., Schwartz 1989; Blossfeld 1997; Hakim 1997). How impor-
tant are workers’ family arrangements for understanding women’s par-
ticipation in nonstandard work? The data suggest workers’ family
arrangements do affect their participation in and patterns of nonstand-
ard work. Married women are more likely than single women to move
into and stay in some types of nonstandard jobs, particularly part-time
and on-call arrangements. Married women with children are most
likely to work in nonstandard jobs compared with childless married
women or single women with or without children. They are somewhat
less likely to report a preference for regular employment than childless
single women, although for the most part, differences in work prefer-
ences across family type were not significant. Married women who
have children are more likely than women in any other family type to
work in nonstandard jobs. Some researchers have argued that the over-
representation of married women in part-time and on-call work may be
less reflective of women’s voluntary choices and preferences and more
reflective of the structural constraints on women’s choices, such as the
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availability of child care (see O’Reilly and Fagan 1998). This is a valid
point but difficult to test given the data presented in this chapter. A rare
piece of evidence for this argument is the finding that, among the
women who reported a preference for part-time work, 5 percent cited
child care problems as their reason for working part-time. Nonetheless,
with this caution in mind, the findings are consistent with the argument
that some women use nonstandard work arrangements, primarily regu-
lar part-time jobs, to balance work and family.
That nonstandard work accommodates the needs of some women,
however, does not mean that family responsibilities or other interests
are the primary explanation for women’s participation in nonstandard
jobs, nor does it imply that such jobs are entirely unproblematic even
for those who voluntarily work in them. Instead, while women’s family
responsibilities appear to be related to their use of part-time jobs, they
are not strongly linked with any other type of nonstandard work
arrangement. Married women were no more likely than single women
to work in contract jobs, and were less likely than single women to
work in agency or direct-hire temporary jobs. Of the married women
who did work in nonstandard arrangements other than regular part-
time jobs, the majority would have preferred regular employment.
Moreover, even if nonstandard work does fit the needs and preferences
of some women, the argument that nonstandard jobs undermine
women’s economic security also finds support in findings that non-
standard jobs typically provide inferior opportunities for skill develop-
ment, and they offer less pay and fewer benefits than regular full-time
employment.
Attention to the economic consequences for women in nonstandard
jobs is particularly critical for single mothers, given the recent (1996)
reforms in welfare programs in the United States mandating work in
exchange for cash assistance benefits. Requirements that welfare recip-
ients find employment may push women to accept temporary and other
nonstandard work arrangements that enable them to meet employment
requirements but not necessarily gain economic security. The NLSY
data show that rates of temporary employment are higher among single
mothers than women in any other family type. Single mothers rarely
report a preference for temporary over regular employment, and those
who work in temporary jobs show high exit rates within two years.
However, single mothers are more likely than women in any other fam-
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ily type to end up in temporary jobs after working in other nonstandard
jobs or full-time jobs, or after periods of nonemployment. As single
mothers approach time limits on welfare assistance (another welfare
reform stipulation) the economic security of these families will be in
greater jeopardy.
The inferior pay, benefits, and quality that are typical of nonstand-
ard work arrangements are cause for concern for women in every fam-
ily type. Considerable growth in nonstandard jobs over the past several
decades (Abraham 1990; Gonos 1997) and the overrepresentation of
women in such jobs mean that large percentages of women are
employed on a nonstandard basis for some proportion of their work
lives. Further research must assess the long-term consequences of non-
standard employment for women, their families, and for society.
Understanding the conditions under which nonstandard arrangements
work well for women and families, as well as the conditions under
which such arrangements constrain women’s workplace opportunities,
individual and family earnings, and health and pension benefits over
the long term, is critical for constructing work arrangements and family
and employment policies that protect the economic security of women
and their families.
Notes
I am grateful to Jamie Przybysz and Laura Geschwender for their research and techni-
cal assistance on this project, to Anne Polivka for sharing with me her expertise on the
Current Population Survey, and to Susan Houseman and Machiko Osawa for their care-
ful reading and valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this chapter.
1. This paper does not consider the nearly 9 percent of women who worked in inde-
pendent contracting or self-employment arrangements.
2. Some workers hold full-time jobs and are on-call after regular work hours. I did
not include these workers in the on-call category.
3. Estimates of part-time work in other studies are generally higher because they
include nonstandard workers who work part-time hours.
4. Data on occupational skill complexity come from the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles. Values range from 0 to 8 for people skills, 0 to 6 for data skills, and 0 to 7
on skills with things; variables are coded so that higher values reflect greater skill
complexity. People skills involve tasks such as taking instruction and serving (low
complexity) to negotiating and mentoring (high complexity). Skills with data
range from comparing and copying data (low complexity) to coordinating and
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synthesizing data (high complexity). Skills with things entail tasks such as han-
dling, feeding, or tending machinery (low complexity) to precision working and
setting up (high complexity). Repetitive process measures the percentage of work-
ers in the occupation that must perform repetitive work or continuously perform
the same work following set procedures, sequences, or speeds. Routinized work
measures the percentage of workers in jobs requiring a preference for routine,
concrete, organized tasks. Specific vocational preparation is the amount of train-
ing required to achieve average performance on the job. 
5. In fact, the percentage who held a temporary job during this time period is likely
to be even higher than this figure. The estimates reported here are based on work-
ers’ responses about their current main job at the time of the survey. However, the
surveys are conducted two years apart, and some workers are likely to have held
temporary jobs in the two-year interim but not during the survey weeks which
would not be reflected in these estimates.
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In Search of a New Framework 
for Flexibility
Reregulation of Nonstandard Employment 
in the European Union
Isabelle Schömann
Klaus Schömann
WZB Social Science Research Center 
THE ROLE OF LAW
Developing regulations for nonstandard employment remains an
important feature of labor law and labor market practice at the Euro-
pean, national, sectoral, and firm levels in European countries. Stan-
dard employment contracts and nonstandard employment regulations
are closely linked. The evolution of one form of employment contract
has repercussions for the other. Regulation of nonstandard employment
has combined a concern for employment flexibility for the firm and job
security for the employee. 
Nonstandard employment has been strictly regulated in Europe
because it has been viewed as a way to circumvent employment protec-
tion legislation in standard employment relationships. Nonstandard
employment is sometimes also called “atypical” or “precarious”
employment, in contrast to open-ended and full-time employment con-
tracts. The regulations are designed to protect workers in nonstandard
employment against discrimination in the workplace. Without regula-
tion, the use of atypical work could lower personnel costs of employers
by lessening legal protection of workers.
Dismissal protection, which is generally greater in Europe than in
the United States or Japan, is an example of the advantage to employ-
ers of easing regulations. In Europe, there are, on average, longer
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notice periods in cases of dismissals, high redundancy payments in cer-
tain cases, the right to participate in training programs financed by the
firm, and the right to be employed in another firm of the group if there
are suitable vacancies. Similarly, standard employment contracts in
Europe provide for generally higher levels of social protection (e.g.,
paid leave, paid overtime, paid sick leave, protection from unfair dis-
missal), and they are financed through higher social security contribu-
tions. The legal regulation of nonstandard employment tends to
guarantee nonstandard workers the same rights pro rata temporis (in
time equivalents) that permanent workers have; that is, rights to social
protection, dismissal protection, the right to be counted as staff for the
election of workers’ representatives, and to participate in work coun-
cils. 
However, in the 1980s, nonstandard employment was seen as a
possible tool to better tackle the unemployment crisis in Europe and,
therefore, the legal corset of regulations was loosened, with more flex-
ibility given to nonstandard arrangements. This trend led to the
increase of nonstandard work contracts in most European countries,
but also to the development of new forms of work contracts. One of the
effects of this deregulation was to increase the precariousness of cer-
tain employment situations (with, e.g., the introduction of frequent
renewal of short-duration work contracts, the possible cessation of the
work contract with no notice period and redundancy payments, or the
nonpayment of social benefits in short-tenure jobs).
In the late 1990s, nonstandard employment became much more
accepted; its necessity was acknowledged in the existing economic and
political context. This new trend re-regulates nonstandard employment
in a way that harmonizes employer flexibility with the job flexibility of
employees (to better address professional and personal issues), while
developing notions of social protection compatible with new forms of
employment. The main function of labor law is no longer to simply
restrict, but to facilitate, the use of nonstandard employment.
In this respect, two different legal theories (Schömann, Rogowski,
and Kruppe 1998) have been advanced to explain the new role of laws,
and even changes to laws. On the one hand, the legal theory of the
“standard employment relationship” aims to shape an employment
relationship or employment status as a right to a minimum of social
protection, independent of the employment contract. The aim of this
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legal doctrine is to rectify socially unequal relationships between the
partners in an employment contract, in which the forms of employment
express the employers’ demands. Nonstandard employment is recog-
nized as a different form of normal employment, and as an expression
of a general trend of deregulation and changes in lifestyles, with social
protections safeguarded. 
Another legal theory, the theory of reflexive labor law (Rogowski
and Wilthagen 1994), emphasizes that legal innovations are reactions
to social or legal consequences of previous legal regulations (Schö-
mann, Rogowski, and Kruppe 1998), such that internal factors related
to the legal system itself influence the development of law. External
changes (political, economic, or social) influence legal construction
only if they are recognized as a problem within the legal discourse.
When applied to nonstandard employment, this theory tends to view
regulation (and deregulation) as a reaction to the difficulties created by
employment protection measures themselves. Furthermore the re-regu-
lation of nonstandard employment can be interpreted as a reaction to
the abuses of nonstandard employment in circumventing standard
employment relationships. 
Both theories highlight the need to take into account the internal
and external factors in legal regulation to better understand how the
regulation of nonstandard work developed. These legal theories add
complementary perspectives to the understanding of legal changes to
nonstandard employment. In this respect, a particularly interesting
issue is the legal modifications at both the European and national levels
regarding nonstandard work. A cross-section of the various legal
frameworks of nonstandard employment in selected European mem-
bers states enables us to investigate in more depth the role of and
changes to laws binding nonstandard work, as well as to evaluate coun-
try-specific approaches to employment protection. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a
legal definition of various forms of nonstandard employment. The
supranational European legal framework is outlined in the third sec-
tion, followed by a country-specific review of the variety within the
European framework in the fourth section. The fifth section compares
regulation and practice across European Union (EU) countries. The
final section reviews the legal changes and provides some conclusions
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on the role of trade unions and employers’ organizations in the process
of regulation. 
LEGAL DEFINITION OF NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT
The definition of legal nonstandard employment focuses on part-
time work, fixed-term employment, employment in temporary agen-
cies, and self-employment. A major element of the classification of the
individual labor contract is the term of the contract, that is, the dura-
tion. Nonstandard employment is usually defined with reference to
standard employment, which is a legal, permanent, full-time work con-
tract under the subordination of an employer. A standard employment
contract secures a range of social protections (e.g., social benefits,
measures against unfair dismissal) based on seniority in a firm. In con-
trast, nonstandard employment embraces a vast range of employment
contracts that do not fit the former definition of standard employment
because of the duration of work (not permanent work or full-time) or
because of lack of subordination. 
Generally, there are four categories of nonstandard employment:
fixed-term employment, part-time work, temporary agency work, and
self-employment. Each of these categories provides very specific legal
and contractual conditions. Subcategories, such as independent con-
tractors or workers provided by contract firms as well as on-call work-
ers, enhance the diversity and complexity of nonstandard employment,
with a range of regulation details and evolution in each national legal
system. 
Fixed-Term Contracts
A comparison of fixed-term contracts across the EU member states
enables some general conclusions about their regulations (Schömann,
Rogowski, and Kruppe 1998). In the majority of EU countries, fixed-
term contracts are regulated by law, except for the Nordic countries,
where such forms of employment are governed by collective agree-
ment. Legal provision is frequently complemented by collective agree-
ments at national, sectoral, and company levels. Legislation rarely
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contains a clear definition of fixed-term contract work, using, on the
one hand, a negative definition (referring to an open-ended employ-
ment relationship), and on the other hand, stating conditions of use of
fixed-term contracts. In most EU countries, fixed-term employees must
be supplied with legal provisions, and obligatory provisions must be
clearly specified. A common legal sanction for breaching legal require-
ments is to convert the fixed-term contract to a contract of unlimited
duration.
There are no clear trends in the EU on duration, renewals, and
“objective/serious reasons” for using fixed-term employment. Most
European countries give fixed-term workers access to certain rights
(e.g., claims for unfair dismissal, redundancy pay, social security
rights, limited access to training opportunities, no right to information
about vacant posts in the firm, no right to participate in strike actions,
or to stand for or vote for employees’ representative bodies, such as
works councils). The exercise of those rights is enabled through, for
example, employee representative bodies (information, counseling,
and in some cases, as in France, the ability to support employees in
labor courts). 
The contractual job security implied in a fixed-term contract, in
which the worker cannot be dismissed before the end of the term, pro-
vides less security than the statutory regulations of permanent con-
tracts, which offer comprehensive legal protection against unfair
dismissals. This regulation does not, in general, apply to fixed-term
contracts.
Part-Time Work
Part-time work can be defined as an employment relationship char-
acterized by daily, weekly, or monthly working hours that are appre-
ciably fewer than the standard working hours laid down by law or
collective bargaining.1 In many countries, laws allow employees to
choose part-time work to better balance a private life and professional
career (such as in northern European countries). A well-established
legal provision in labor law guarantees equal treatment for part-time
employees in most EU member states. This provision, however, does
not eliminate the practical problems associated with part-time work
(such as the right to overtime, or [gender] discrimination concerning
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 355  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
356 Schömann and Schömann
lower pay or other social benefits). The International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) definition of part-time work specifies that working hours be
distributed throughout the week (horizontal) or concentrated only in
certain days (vertical) or periods of the month or the year. The latter
part of the definition reflects the close connection to fixed-term
employment even in attempts to arrive at a general definition. The
combination of fixed-term and part-time employment is, in fact, com-
monly combined within nonstandard employment. For statistical pur-
poses and country comparisons, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines part-time work as
usual working hours that are fewer than 30 hours per week. 
Temporary Agency Work
Temporary agency work is a “triangular” employment relationship
that involves a worker, a company acting as temporary work agency,
and a user company. The agency employs the worker and places him or
her at the disposition of the user company. Beyond this basic defini-
tion, the reality of temporary agency work differs widely across EU
member states (Michon 1999a). For example, in Denmark and in the
United Kingdom, temporary agency work is not regulated as a separate
type of employment. Moreover, some countries focus on the relation-
ship between the agency, the user, and the worker, such as in Germany,
Spain, and Sweden, and in other countries, namely France and Italy, a
specific status for temporary agency workers is legally defined.
The majority of countries have at least a relatively comprehensive
set of legislation governing temporary agency work. In terms of regula-
tion, two distinct groups of countries emerge: those with extensive reg-
ulation (such as France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), and those with
minimal or nonexistent regulation (such as Denmark, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom). 
Self-Employment
Self-employment can be defined as a form of employment in
which a person assumes responsibility as a business owner, with no
superiors, to develop and operate a business (Pfeiffer 1994). Different
categories of self-employment exist, including operating as dependent
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employees, family workers, and the self-employed in the original sense
of the term (Kruppe, Oschmiansky, and Schömann 1999). Differences
stemming from the nature of the employment relationship (compared
with dependent work) determine the social and fiscal treatment of the
person affected. Social, individual, and collective rights of a dependent
employment relationship do not exist. Moreover, social and fiscal obli-
gations that offer social protection depend on the willingness of the
owner and the health of the business.
Two trends can be distinguished in the European community
regarding self-employment regulations. One is the move to view this
form of employment as a bridge from unemployment to employment.
Self-employment is understood as a labor market policy (like start-up
grants and start-up support programs) whereby private initiatives can
create employment opportunities. The second trend is the legal attitude
that views self-employment as more restrictive, aiming to reduce its
use to avoid abuses of social protection rights and evasion of social
security contributions.
Intermittent Work
A long legal tradition exists in most countries surrounding the
treatment of intermittent work, especially in the agricultural or con-
struction sectors. Intermittent work, sometimes also called seasonal
work, is defined as work in which periods of activity alternate with
periods of inactivity. It gives rise either to a succession of fixed-term
contracts, whose lawfulness is sometimes contested, or to a single con-
tract, of fixed-term or indefinite duration, in which provision is made
for the intermittent nature of work. This latter form has led to special
regulations that treat intermittent work as a form of part-time work
organized on an annual basis. The laws allow for alternating periods of
work and nonwork within a single contract of indefinite duration. The
laws, however, make this arrangement subject to certain conditions,
including a collective agreement.
This broad overview of the major forms of nonstandard employ-
ment across Europe reflects the large scope, and country-specific treat-
ment, of these issues. The agricultural, industrial, or service-sector
employment structure in a country determines, to a large extent, the
regulatory climate. National legislation in Europe demonstrates the
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broad range of legal possibilities in tackling nonstandard employment.
The analytical framework we present facilitates an understanding of
the recent legal evolution of nonstandard employment in selected
European countries. Because European directives on employment-
related issues have had a direct impact on national law and, above all,
on recent national regulations, we first present the European legal
framework of nonstandard employment before turning to country-spe-
cific regulations. 
THE EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT
As nonstandard forms of employment became more common in
the 1980s and the 1990s, both the European Commission and the Euro-
pean labor movement (ETUC, European Trade Union Confederation)
pushed to create a European legal framework to protect the rights of
workers in nonstandard employment contracts. Successive draft direc-
tives proposed by the commission failed to gain approval of the Coun-
cil of Ministers,2 leading the European Commission in September 1995
to initiate consultations with social partners (e.g., workers’ representa-
tives, mainly trade unions and elected workers’ representatives) at the
European level to implement the “Community Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights of Workers,” signed in Strasbourg in December 1989
(Blanpain 1998).
On December 15, 1997, the draft directive on part-time work was
issued to implement the framework agreement reached in June 1997 by
the European social partners of the Union of Industrial and Employers’
Confederation of Europe (UNICE), the European Center of Enterprises
with Public Participation and of the Enterprises of General Economic
Interest (CEEP), and the ETUC. This agreement and directive aim to
institute the principle of nondiscrimination for part-time workers and
to facilitate the development of part-time work on a voluntary basis,
contributing to the flexible organization of work while accounting for
the needs of employers and workers.
Faced with the reluctance of the UNICE to enter the deal on fixed-
term contracts, the social partners led negotiations in 1996 under the
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procedure set out in protocol 14 on social policy annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty on the European Union (signed February 7, 1992). This
mechanism (art. 4 §§ 1 and 2) allows management and labor to negoti-
ate and eventually conclude agreements at the community level on
employment issues, leading to implementation, either directly through
practices specific to the member states or at the joint request of the sig-
natory parties, by a European Council decision on a proposal from the
European Commission.
This mechanism led to a framework agreement on fixed-term con-
tract work signed in June 1997, and following further negotiations,
agreement with UNICE was reached March 18, 1999 (at a major con-
ference on social dialogue and enlargement in Warsaw). On the basis
of article 4 § 2 of the social policy agreement, the commission adopted
on May 1, 1999, the proposal for a council directive concerning the
framework agreement on fixed-term contracts concluded by UNICE,
CEEP, and ETUC. At the same time, the Amsterdam Treaty was insti-
tuted May 1, 1999, and protocol 14 on social policy was incorporated
into the body of the European Commission Treaty as Articles 136–139,
which then gave the draft directive the legal basis of Article 139 § 2. 
The same procedure was followed with the draft directive on tem-
porary agency work, beginning with negotiations between UNICE and
ETUC on May 3, 2000. An accord among the social partners and a sub-
sequent directive completed the legislation on atypical work, which
was initiated in 1996 by the European Commission. The commission
supports the consultation procedure of the social partners at the Euro-
pean level. 
We now turn to the content of the draft directive on fixed-term
employees (to be implemented in each member state within two years).
The aims of the social partners are to improve the quality of fixed-term
work by ensuring nondiscrimination, and to establish a framework to
prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employ-
ment contracts (Vigneau 1999). The directive defines minimum
requirements, recognizing that their detailed application must take
account of different national and specific organizational needs of
industrial sectors. In this respect, members states or social partners can
maintain or introduce more favorable provisions.
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The main features of the directive concern:
1) A general principle of nondiscrimination in employment condi-
tions of fixed-term workers (such as requiring no additional
length of service for access to particular conditions and benefits
than those offered in open-ended contracts, except for those that
can be justified on objective grounds). 
2) Minimal legal provisions to prevent abuses (member states shall
introduce one or more of the following three measures: 1)
objective reasons justifying the renewal of fixed-term contracts;
2) a maximum duration in the succession of fixed-term employ-
ment relationships; 3) the number of renewals).
3) The obligation of the employer to inform fixed-term workers of
vacancies in the enterprise. 
4) Guarantee of representative rights. For the purpose of employee
representation, fixed-term contract workers must be considered
when calculating workforce size thresholds, and they must be
given appropriate information on workers’ representative bodies. 
For most member states, this directive creates no need for legisla-
tive action, given that it sets only minimum levels of regulation. For
example, the fourth feature is currently covered in legislative provi-
sions in at least nine of the 15 member states. The remaining six coun-
tries, however, must proceed to a more restrictive legislation within
two years of implementing the directive. 
In the broad field of self-employment, no action has been taken by
the social partners or the European Commission to restrict the evasion
of social security contributions in member states. However, since the
late 1990s, the EU member states, as well as the European institutions,
have taken into account the need to promote flexibility while guaran-
teeing security for the workforce. The European political leaders,
meeting in Luxembourg on November 20–21, 1997, for a special
employment summit, agreed to a package of measures and employ-
ment guidelines that aim to improve employability, support entrepre-
neurship, increase adaptability, and strengthen equal opportunities. To
date, the focus has been on promoting self-employment with little
attention paid to the potential for self-employment to be used as a way
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to circumvent social security contributions for persons who are solely
dependent on one enterprise as their client. 
The European legislation constitutes only a framework legislation,
which must be translated into the national legislative texts and legal
procedures. This is far from certain, given that national majorities in
favor of such legal changes must be found, which will entail broad
political discussions. Although a comparison of this implementation
procedure for each of the above-mentioned topics is beyond the scope
of this chapter, we review country-specific regulations, which will
reveal to some extent the discrepancy between member states in imple-
menting the European directives. 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC REGULATIONS OF NONSTANDARD 
EMPLOYMENT
The most comprehensive legislation is found in France, Germany,
Spain, and Italy. In these countries, nonstandard arrangements are
strictly regulated, and special attention is given to ensuring nondis-
crimination for nonstandard workers. Less restrictive regulation is
found in Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands. In these countries,
nonstandard employment has a long history. Finally, in the United
Kingdom, steps have been recently taken to regulate abuse in non-
standard employment arrangements, and initiated mainly by the Euro-
pean directives. A common feature throughout Europe is the important
role that the national social partners play in lawmaking—its formula-
tion as well as its implementation—and as initiator of collective bar-
gaining at different levels. We use the general term of social partners to
include the various forms of workers’ representatives, mainly trade
unions and elected workers’ representatives.
The French Legal Framework of Nonstandard Employment
In France, regulations on nonstandard employment date back to
1972 (quite early compared with other European countries). Several
changes in regulations were made at the end of the 1970s, followed by
deregulation in the mid 1980s and reregulation in the mid 1990s. Nev-
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ertheless, France remains one of the strictest regulators in Europe. Reg-
ulations focus on 1) promoting alternative ways to organize work
schedules to provide more flexibility to firms, and 2) ensuring greater
security for nonstandard workers by reinforcing equality in the work-
place, especially through more stringent regulation of part-time work. 
Fixed-term contracts 
A main feature of the French legislation is the close link between
the regulation of fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work,
both regulated similarly until late 1990. Comprehensive provisions
contained in the labor code still defined fixed-term contracts as an
exception. The use and renewal of fixed-term contracts remained
strictly delimited, and the uses of such a contract were clearly defined.
Abuses led to the automatic transformation into an open-ended con-
tract, whereby ordinary dismissals during the fixed term were prohib-
ited, except in case of gross misconduct. Some specific fixed-term
contracts coupled with training periods, called contrats aides, were
introduced into law in 1993, 1995, and 1998 to create incentives to
look for employment, gain experience, and return to the labor market. 
Temporary agency work
A specific legal definition and regulation of temporary agency
work (contrat d’intérim) has existed since 1972, creating a special sta-
tus for temporary agency workers (as in Italy). It is defined as work
performed by employees hired by an employer (employment contract)
and placed temporarily at the disposal of another user enterprise (con-
trat de mission). The employer’s sole occupation must be the hiring-
out of labor, and he or she must hire employees under fixed-term con-
tracts covering the period during which they will be assigned to work
in the user enterprise. Hence, only temporary employment agencies are
authorized to hire out workers on a for-profit basis.
This approach is complemented to a large extent by collective
agreements at the national and intersectoral levels and by specific col-
lective agreements at the sectoral level. Other sectoral agreements also
cover the field of temporary agency work (as in Italy and Spain). The
social partners have played prominent roles in improving regulation in
this sector, as the intersectoral agreement of 1990 reveals. Provisions
are very detailed in three key aspects of the regulation, such as the
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maximum length of a contract or the restrictions on the use of the tem-
porary agency employment. An important provision regulates the par-
ity between permanent workers and temporary agency workers and the
representation rights they may exercise in the temporary agency.
Employees’ representatives have information and consultation rights in
temporary agency work. 
Part-time work
Part-time employment legislation has undergone recent changes
with the regulation of a 35-hour work week (Bilous 2000) adopted in
June 1998 and January 2000. These changes concern the definition and
organization of part-time work (Defache et al. 2000). Part-time work-
ers were formerly defined as employees whose weekly work hours
were at least 20 percent lower than the statutory work week or whose
hours were fixed by a sector-level agreement. This definition was
changed with the EU directive on part-time work in December 1997.
Henceforth, part-time workers are those who work fewer than the stat-
utory (35) hours a week, or, if statutory hours are lower, a duration
fixed by a sector-level agreement or company work schedule.
Furthermore, part-time work requires a prior collective agreement
(at the sectoral or company level). As a default, the comments (consul-
tation) of the works council or employees’ representatives can be sub-
stituted; the labor inspector must be notified of such consultation or, in
absence of any representative institution in the company, the employer
must inform the labor inspector of his or her intention to use part-time
work. The part-time work must be specified in the individual employ-
ment contract. Any modification (e.g., concerning overtime) must be
approved by the part-time worker (at least three days prior to the
change), and a refusal cannot lead to a dismissal or be considered mis-
conduct.
Reaction to this legislation focuses on two elements. Boyer (1999)
recommends a complete reversal of the logic behind current govern-
ment financial assistance schemes to promote part-time employment.
He suggests that aid be allocated not to the companies, but to workers
themselves, giving them more freedom of choice. Freysinnet (1999)
stresses the “legal fiction” of an individual employment contract in
contrast to full-time work, which is governed by collectively agreed or
statutory standards. This latter view adds weight to the argument that
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collective bargaining should be promoted in part-time work to provide
more leverage in individual choices (Michon 1999b).
The German Legal Framework of Nonstandard Employment
German regulation of nonstandard employment dates back to the
early 1970s, one of the first countries in Europe to regulate such work.
German regulation has more recently moved toward deregulation and
re-regulation. 
Fixed-term contracts
Legal provisions of fixed-term contracts were amended with the
Employment Promotion Act (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) of
April 1985. The act introduced a degree of deregulation, viewing
fixed-term contracts as a method of lowering unemployment. Justifica-
tion for using fixed-term contracts is no longer required, and provisions
allow such contracts to be implemented for a longer period of time, and
permit more renewals than previously allowed. The act has been twice
renewed and was valid until the end of 2000. Because parallel legisla-
tion, largely developed by labor courts, has coexisted, the partial aboli-
tion of the Employment Promotion Act means a return to the need to
specify reasons why a job is of limited duration for most practical
cases. 
Temporary agency work
Regulation of temporary agency work dates from the 1970s and
has been amended recently to allow greater flexibility. A characteristic
of the German regulation is its focus on the relationship between the
agency, the user, and the worker. Moreover, legal dispositions closely
regulate the status of temporary agencies, owing to the role of the fed-
eral employment office as a job placement office. The German case is
interesting for its lack of sector-specific bargaining for temporary
agency work. It is noteworthy that in Germany, where sectoral bargain-
ing is the norm, the temporary agency is not yet covered by such an
agreement (a former agreement covering clerical workers belonging to
the DAG union was terminated in 1989). However, agreements at the
company level have been reported. In this respect, a rather innovative
agreement has been reached between a bargaining cartel of six trade
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unions and a temporary employment agency (Adecco) to cover the
agency workers who worked at the World Expo 2000 exhibition. This
agreement may point the way to a multiemployer agreement for tempo-
rary agency work, as well as provide a gateway for further bargaining
in this sector. 
Legal provisions are less extensive concerning flexibility. For
example, there are few restrictions on the use of temporary agencies,
and no provisions dealing with parity in the workplace. However, legal
provisions guarantee the exercise of workers’ rights; temporary work-
ers can use work council consultation hours, attend staff meetings, and
exercise individual rights at the user company. Moreover, employee or
union representatives have information and consultation rights relating
to the use of temporary agency work.
Part-time work
Part-time work in Germany is defined as an arrangement whereby
the normal working week is shorter than that of full-time employees
(Improvement of Employment Opportunities Act). Discriminatory
treatment of part-time employment is prohibited; part-time workers
enjoy the same entitlements as other workers (in proportion to the
shorter working hours). Part-time work, moreover, should be volun-
tary. If individual employees want to change to a part-time job, the
employer must inform them of any vacancies in the firm. There is no
entitlement, however, to a corresponding transfer. The introduction of
part-time work is subject to the co-determination right of the works
councils.
Self-employment
The boundaries between self-employment and employment under
subordination were often unclear in practice, leading to difficulties in
applying social protection provisions and fiscal regulations. Recent
changes in the German legislation better clarify such differences and
make it easier to apply social protection laws. The Correction Law of
Social Provisions to Secure Workers’ Rights was implemented in Janu-
ary 1999. It aims to reduce cases of “fictitious self-employment,”
where subordination in the employment relationship is clearly indi-
cated. The fictitious self-employment (Scheinselbständigkeit) is an
employment relationship that appears as an independent one (“ficti-
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tious” freedom in the organization and completion of the work and
with no other dependent employees present), but in practice correlates
more with subordinated work. If this dependency is hidden success-
fully, contributions by both parties to social protection are evaded. The
new legal provisions under the Correction Law of Social Provision
restrict such a practice by providing a detailed definition of self-
employment as well as an additional list of criteria to better define the
employment relationship. Four selected criteria determine the nature of
the employment relationship: 1) no employees other than family mem-
bers, 2) the business serves only one customer, 3) the business operates
under no special professional qualifications or tasks, and 4) there is no
professional contact with the clients. The fulfillment of two criteria
permits the transformation of a “fictitious” self-employment into a sub-
ordinated employment relationship. 
Beginning in early 1999, the new federal coalition government ini-
tiated labor reforms in all major fields. Following the approval by the
Bundesrat (the upper chamber of the German parliament), the Interim
Law (Vorschaltgesetz, second law amending the third book of the
Social Law Code) came into force on August 1, 1999. It aims to render
labor market policy instruments more efficient in advance of the
planned, more comprehensive reform of labor promotion legislation.
The enacted changes are: 1) The elimination of short-term employment
as an obstacle to training support; short periods of employment (up to
three months) with the same employer as that providing training no
longer constitute grounds for precluding support for training measures
in the company; and 2) the ability to use employee assistance from the
employment offices to promote fixed-term employment relationships.
The experimentation clause expires at the end of 2002 (European
Employment Observatory, 1999). These recent re-regulation changes
reflect the impact of the EU directives on German labor law in recent
years. 
The Spanish Legal Framework of Nonstandard Employment
Spanish legislation of nonstandard employment is of a recent vin-
tage. As with most of the other EU member states, regulations on tem-
porary agency work and fixed-term contracts date from 1994 and 1999.
However, contrary to the deregulation trend in the EU, Spanish regula-
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tions tend to tighten rules and introduce more rights for “atypical”
workers. In this respect, the recent evolution of the Spanish legal
framework can be considered re-regulation (Miguélez 1999). 
Fixed-term contracts
Legal provisions concerning fixed-term contracts are addressed in
the Employees’ Statute of March 24, 1995. The statute defines objec-
tive factors or elements of fixed-term contracts. The norm in Spanish
labor law remains an employment relationship of an indefinite dura-
tion, such that all contracts illegally limited are deemed to be for an
indefinite period of time. Furthermore, the general legal acceptance of
the indefinite duration rule has been anticipated by a long line of court
decisions regarding renewals or continuation of fixed-term contracts as
cause for requalifying the relationship in an employment contract of
indefinite duration (Olea and Rodriguez-Sanudo 1996). 
Temporary agency work
A relatively recent innovation in Spanish labor law was the intro-
duction of temporary agency work by Act no. 14, on June 1, 1994. Pro-
visions regulate, on the one hand, the status of agencies, requiring an
authorization of the Ministry of Labor or of an administrative organ of
the Autonomous Region, as well as financial guarantees to ensure the
payment of salaries and social security contributions. On the other
hand, provisions stipulate the nature of the different contracts. The
relationship between the agency and the worker is defined as an
employment contract in which the agency is the only employer,
whereas the contract between the agency and the user is a sui generis
contract. In most other EU member states, the sui generis contract reg-
ulates the relationship between the user and the worker. Should the
work be prolonged in the user firm, the temporary agency worker is
considered to be an employee of the user firm for an indefinite period
of time.
As in most EU countries, collective bargaining plays an important
role in the overall regulation of nonstandard work. In Spain, there is
specific sectoral bargaining involving trade unions and employers’
associations of temporary agency work with a bargaining mandate.
This is also the case in France, Italy, and in the Netherlands. Further-
more, collective agreements in other sectors cover aspects of tempo-
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rary agency work, and the role of company-level bargaining in this
field is increasing. Evidence in Spain (as in the Netherlands and in the
United Kingdom) suggests that unions are now paying greater attention
to temporary agency work and the protection of workers against abuse
of temporary recruitment (that is, hiring workers on the basis of tempo-
rary work in order to counter legal protection measures and avoid per-
sonnel costs). The latter remains the largest problem of the
employment crisis in Spain. Some of the 1997 reforms to reduce tem-
porary employment have failed, and new rounds of consultations
between the government and the social partners are under way to fur-
ther improve this issue.
Part-time work
The Interconfederal Agreement on employment stability was
reached between the leading Spanish trade union and employer organi-
zations in April 1997, and with it the regulation of part-time work was
strengthened. The aim of the changes was to balance a need for greater
flexibility by employers in order to remain competitive with the need
to ensure fixed-term contract workers adequate solidarity and social
protection. These efforts were an attempt to address Spain’s high level
of insecure employment, with few open-ended employment contracts
being signed and temporary employment at very high levels by EU
standards (32.5 percent, on average, and 22 percentage points higher
than other EU countries).
An agreement on stable part-time work was reached on November
13, 1998, between the Spanish government and the trade union organi-
zations, Union General de Trabajadores (UGT) and the Comisiones
Obreras (CCOO). The agreement was incorporated into Spanish law
November 27, 1998, by virtue of Royal Decree-Law 15/1998, on
urgent measures to improve the labor market with respect to part-time
work and the promotion of its stability. This regulation signals a will-
ingness to reorient labor market policy and marks a step toward a
larger distribution of work among employees. Part-time workers enjoy
the same rights as full-time workers. Pay and social security rights and
obligations are calculated on a pro rata basis.
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Self-employment
Similar to Italy, Spanish trade unions have also tackled the issue of
the unionization of the self-employed, who form a large part of the
country’s active work population. The Union of Professionals and Self-
Employed Workers, within the general workers’ union (the UGT), was
formed in January 2000, and it is likely to instigate further regulation
of the self-employed in the next few years.
The Italian Legal Framework of Nonstandard Employment
Fixed-term contracts
Beginning with Act no. 230 of 1962, a labor contract is assumed to
be for an indefinite period. The parties can resort to a contract for a
fixed term only in exceptional cases and under conditions strictly
defined by law. More recently, high levels of unemployment for
women and the young have led parties to consider easing provisions on
fixed-term contracts. In fact, since 1978, there has been a gradual
decline in the restrictive regulations. A first reversal, in 1978,
expanded the use of fixed-term contracts in commerce and in the tour-
ist industry, and in 1983 this relaxation was extended to all sectors of
the economy. 
Act no. 56 of February 28, 1987, introduced major changes to leg-
islation on fixed-term employment. The act enables collective bargain-
ing to expand the opportunities to use nonstandard employment to
better address unemployment among targeted groups, such as youth.
An intersectoral agreement was signed between Cofindustria and the
trade union confederations in December 1988. Act no. 196 of 1997
introduced less strict sanctions in two categories. The sanction of auto-
matically converting an open-ended contract remains for renewals of
fixed-term contracts beyond 20 or 30 days from the job’s end date. In
other cases, the employer is only required to pay the worker an increase
for each day of continuation. This trend of deregulation has, however,
been countered somewhat by an increase in control by public authori-
ties (inspector of labor) or trade unions.
Temporary agency work
Italy has traditionally prohibited temporary work, which was for-
bidden in any form by Act no. 264 of 1949. Recent legislation in June
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1994, with amendments in June 1997 (Act no. 196), introduced tempo-
rary agencies on an experimental basis for particular sectors. Further-
more, a national intersectoral agreement in 1998 regulated some
aspects of temporary agency work not covered by the law (such as the
duration and renewal of contracts). 
The regulations stipulate a specific status for temporary agency
workers, similar to that in France, in which the employment contract
regulates the relationship between the employer (i.e., the agency) and
the employee. Moreover, provisions specify situations in which tempo-
rary agency work is prohibited, for example, to replace workers on
strike, by firms that have resorted to collective dismissals in the last 12
months, or for dangerous work. Legal provisions guarantee, in princi-
ple, the same individual and collective rights that regular employees
enjoy (wages and accessories; social contributions, for which both the
agency and the hirer are responsible). Furthermore, legal provisions
ensure a comprehensive role of the social partners in the further regula-
tion of temporary agency work, such that the use of temporary agencies
will consequently depend significantly on collective bargaining (Treu
1998).
Temporary agency work is recognized as a sector-specific bargain-
ing field involving trade unions and employers’ associations of tempo-
rary agencies. This focus has led to sectoral agreements, such as the
1999 amendments that acknowledge the interactions between and com-
plementary nature of the government and the social partners in regulat-
ing temporary agency work. Collective agreements in other sectors
also cover aspects of temporary agency work. Moreover, Italian trade
unions have created specific organizations for “atypical” workers, the
only such instance in Europe.
Consequently, the Italian legal and bargaining framework of tem-
porary agency work is one of the more comprehensive and regulated
among the EU member states (similar again to that in France). More-
over, the Italian legal system guarantees comprehensive rights to trade
unions to represent temporary agency workers. Workers’ rights are
exercised mainly in the agency, but they have some entitlements within
the user company, and as such may engage in trade union activity and
attend workplace meetings at the user company. They are also counted
in workforce size calculations for health and safety representation. 
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Part-time work
Part-time work in Italy is not regarded as a special labor contract,
and general principles and regulations of standard employment con-
tracts apply to part-time workers. The adaptations owing to the reduced
working hours and the role of the provincial labor inspector are
addressed in Act no. 863 of 1984, and amended in Act no. 196 of 1997.
The most substantive regulations adapt social security contributions
and benefits to the reduced number of working hours. Act no.196 rein-
forces incentives built into a prior act, no. 549 of 1995, which included
monetary incentives to firms adopting more flexible work schedules,
especially part-time work. The later Act no. 196 added specific incen-
tives in the form of social security reductions to promote part-time
work among young, unemployed workers in economically depressed
areas.
Collective agreements are a key source of regulation of part-time
work. Although trade unions first rejected a shift to part-time work
(because of the discriminatory use of part-time work favoring women
and young workers), a recent, more flexible, attitude is emerging
toward controlled use of part-time work. This new attitude is tied to the
trend, supported by unions, of reducing working hours as a means of
fighting unemployment. Collective agreements at national and com-
pany levels regulate common issues, such as wages, moving from part-
time to full-time work, and vice versa, and in some cases, quotas of
part-timers, employment conditions, and prohibition of overtime. In
January 2000, new regulations on part-time work were introduced, fol-
lowing EU directive 97/81/EC. Among the most important innovations
are a more flexible use of part-time work and the introduction of over-
time for part-time workers. These legal provisions should help create
approximately 100,000 new jobs, according to official estimates.
Self-employment
In 1997, the Italian government emphasized the lack of legal pro-
tection in new employment relationships that fell midway between
dependent work and self-employment. As a result, a new job statute
was introduced based on a proposal by the Minister of Labor to guaran-
tee protection when working without permanent contracts under
dependent employers. Moreover, the Italian trade union confederations
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created several organizations to provide representation for workers in
these new employment relationships, such as temporary agency work-
ers or those in consultancy and coordinated freelance work. 
The above countries share a long tradition of limiting the prolifera-
tion of nonstandard employment. We now turn to countries in the EU
that have engaged in less regulation of nonstandard employment.
The Danish Legal Framework of Nonstandard Employment
Nonstandard employment, widespread in Denmark, even among
highly qualified individuals, is not considered a separate form of
employment, and, therefore, the government pays little special atten-
tion to it (Jorgensen 2000).
Fixed-term contracts
Danish law does not specify any legal definition of the labor con-
tract nor the concept of a labor contract (Jacobsen and Hasselbalch
1998). The classification of a contract as a labor contract does not
imply the use of a special set of legal provisions. Rather, how the con-
tract is interpreted depends on the special nature of the contract and the
parties involved. Consequently, there are no general Danish provisions
regulating the duration of a labor contract. Only a few provisions con-
cern fixed-term employment contracts in the public services. The par-
ties are free to define the length of the relationship and the reason for
its termination, although parties should expressly agree on these ele-
ments of a contract. 
Seniority, legally guaranteed in collective agreements, determines
worker rights, such as the length of notice and compensation in the
case of dismissal. Consequently, should a fixed-term contract be pro-
longed beyond the original intent, it is assumed that the parties tacitly
agreed on the indefinite duration. Should no formal agreement between
the parties be reached, and in absence of general legal provisions, the
Labor Court and the industrial arbitration courts intervene to counter
attempts to evade or breach stipulations of collective agreements.
Temporary agency work
As in the United Kingdom, specific regulation of temporary
agency work in Denmark is scarce, given that nonstandard employ-
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ment is not considered to be a separate type of employment relation-
ship. Regulations on temporary agency work were deregulated in 1990,
and temporary agency work, in terms of pay and parity, is covered by
the existing collective agreements within employment sectors (e.g.,
commercial and clerical sector, health and social services). As in the
Netherlands and in Germany, company-level bargaining with unions
and works councils is common. 
Self-employment
A study carried out in March 2000 by Technological Institute deals
with self-employment among the highly qualified. Two groups can be
distinguished among the nearly one-third (32 percent) of those with
higher educational backgrounds who work in nonstandard employ-
ment. The first group is the more-educated individuals who choose
nonpermanent jobs to gain a higher degree of control over their work-
ing life. This group (about two-thirds of all academically qualified peo-
ple) is defined as a “nonexposed” group because their income is secure.
On the other hand, there is a group of highly educated persons (36 per-
cent of the academically qualified workers) who must combine atypi-
cal employment with other supplementary unemployment. This
“exposed” group of workers is found among architects and those with a
master’s of arts, for example. The decisive factor between the two
groups, therefore, is the degree of security in their labor market attach-
ment.
The Swedish Legal Framework of Nonstandard Employment
The Swedish approach to nonstandard employment is quite differ-
ent from the Danish approach, although in both countries the use of
nonstandard employment is rather limited. Nonstandard employment
received little attention in Sweden until recently because its numbers
among overall employment levels were low, except for a short period
during deregulation. The situation, however, has been reversed in
recent years under the EU directives. 
Fixed-term employment
Closely linked to new legislation on unfair dismissal (Employment
Protection Act of 1974 and 1982) are legal provisions restricting the use
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of fixed-term contracts. The purpose of the restrictions is to counter
unfair dismissals. In fact, the employer of fixed-term employees does
not have to give notice for the termination of the contract (contrary to
the employment contract of indefinite duration, whereby the employer
must notify a just cause of dismissal). An agreement in the employment
contract must determine the purpose for which the duration of the con-
tract is definite and must pass one of the six cases legally named (§ 5).
Since an amendment to the Employment Protection Act of 1996, fixed-
term contracts can be agreed to for indefinite purposes for a period
between 12 and 18 months, distributed over a period of three years, in
order to give incentives to employers of small firms to increase their
number of employees. Furthermore the Labor Court plays an important
role in determining whether an agreement satisfies the requirement of
the act (Adlercreutz 1997).
Temporary agency work
A feature of the Swedish legal system of nonstandard employment
is that temporary work agencies are grouped into a sector-specific bar-
gaining unit that initializes and concludes collective agreements. Spe-
cific legislation (since 1991) laid down only a few basic conditions of
temporary agency work, and they were deregulated in 1993. For exam-
ple, only certain provisions require an agreement by the employee’s
representative for using temporary agency work. Most issues of tempo-
rary agency work apply to tertiary sectors (in services, transport, and
nursing) with a mainly (90 percent) female workforce. New collective
bargaining involving temporary agency work led to a collective agree-
ment in February 2000 that enhances the working conditions of tempo-
rary workers; the conditions are already of a high level compared with
the EU average. Three main improvements have been reached: 1) the
guaranteed wage after 10 months of employment has been increased
from 75 percent to 85 percent of the full-time monthly wage, 2) the
institution of a minimum salary system ensuring temporary workers a
stable income every month, and 3) the ability to participate in training
during paid working hours.
Self-employed, start-up grants
One of the more successful Swedish labor policies is the start-up
grant, aimed at those wishing to start their own business. More than
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three-fourths (78 percent) are still in business four years after entering
the program. This grant was created in the early 1980s and expanded in
1992 and 1998. The grant covers living costs during a six-month start-
up period and is equal to the unemployment benefit. Targeted groups
are job-seekers, persons at risk of unemployment, and individuals liv-
ing in regional development areas, whose application and project was
selected by the employment service. An innovative feature of the pro-
gram is the ability to plan the enterprise in the context of employment
training and entrepreneurship training. A potential drawback, however,
is the creation of a large group of casual laborers with no employment
protection. Acknowledging changes in the labor market features, and
especially the growth of self-employment, more trade unions in the
1990s turned their attention to the entrepreneurs to better inform and
support these individuals, and, more generally, to prevent future unem-
ployment by offering retraining measures. 
The Dutch Legal Framework of Nonstandard Employment
Nonstandard employment has played an important role in the
“Dutch Miracle.” The main focus, however, has been on the develop-
ment of part-time work, and much less attention has been paid to other
forms of nonstandard employment. We shall give only a brief overview
of regulations in this field. (See also Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels
this volume.)
Fixed-term contract
Until recently, provisions regulating fixed-term contracts secured
workers against early dismissal, that is, before the contract expired. In
January 1999, amendments introduced important modifications and
flexibility to the dismissal regulations. For example, a fixed-term con-
tract can legally be renewed for up to 36 months, or with two subse-
quent fixed-term contracts, without changing the contract to an
indefinite one, as was previously required. The termination of a
renewed fixed-term contract occurs automatically. This change in dis-
missal law is viewed as favorable to workers, so that only parties to a
collective agreement can depart from this rule to the workers’ disad-
vantage (Rood 1999). A more flexible dismissal law encourages
employers to give work to fixed-term workers who otherwise would be
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unemployed. Furthermore, more flexibility can give employees more
freedom in their private and professional lives.
Temporary agency work
Temporary agency work existed prior to World War II, and
increased considerably during the 1950s, especially in shipbuilding and
engineering. Temporary workers were often paid higher wages than the
standard workforce (owing to wage regulations). This discrepancy led
to great instability and even strikes in the workforce. This phenomenon
encouraged the government to regulate temporary agency work in the
1960s. Legal provisions required agencies to have a license from the
Ministry of Social Affairs with conditions attached regarding the use of
temporary agency work. The law was reversed in the 1990s, influenced
by a general movement to make industrial and labor conditions more
flexible. 
In 1998, a license was no longer required, and hiring conditions
were removed. Since 1999, Dutch legal provisions recognize tempo-
rary agency work as a regular employment form. In 1996, a collective
agreement on flexibility and security was reached within the Dutch
Foundation of Labor, and union federations recognized that temporary
employment agencies have a legitimate function. Based on this agree-
ment the Flexicurity Act came into effect on January 1, 1999. This
reform of temporary agency work is twofold: first the act abolishes the
permit requirement for temporary employment agencies and the maxi-
mum period for temporary worker placement. Second, it classifies the
relationship between a temporary work agency and a temporary worker
as a “regular” employment contract, with the specification that both
parties may agree that the contract of employment will end without
notice when there is no more work. This rule does not apply when the
duration of the employment contract exceeds 26 weeks. Thereafter, the
relationship between employer and worker remains as before, a sui
generis contract (Rood 1999). Additional improvements in worker pro-
tection were negotiated and are to be found in collective agreements
such as entitlement to pensions, training, and a permanent contract
once workers have gained enough tenure. Legal provisions and collec-
tive agreements have, therefore, given to temporary agency work
another dimension, combining flexibility for the agency as well as
security for temporary workers. However, there is no regulation of the
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duration and renewals of temporary agency work contracts, nor is there
regulation covering the circumstances in which companies may use
temporary agency work. The parity with permanent workers, however,
is guaranteed. Further, representative rights exist for temporary work-
ers in the agency, and those who have been employed in the same user
company for two years are considered employees of the user company
for representative purposes. This represents one of the most compre-
hensive legal provisions in the EU.
Specific sectoral agreements complement legislation and build on
extensive legislative provisions. At the company level, unions play an
important role in concluding agreements through works councils with
individual agencies (which is the case also in Denmark and Germany).
The consensus between the social partners and the bipartite Labor
Foundation creates an assumption that temporary agency work plays a
legitimate role and tends to become a standard form of employment.
Part-time work
Social partners today pay more attention to reaching agreements on
part-time employment than in the past. The Foundation of Labor
(STAR, the top-level platform of the social partners) has made impor-
tant recommendations to the social partners on this issue. The Labor
Inspectorate Report (Deeltijdarbeid in Collectieve Arbeidsovereen-
komst’s–CAO [collective agreements]) sent to the parliament by the
State Secretary of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) spans
approximately 3.8 million employees and investigates 1) whether stip-
ulations have been added in CAOs that promote part-time employment
or the extension of an individual employee’s working time, and 2)
whether the social partners distinguish between full-time and part-time
workers. There are, however, still recognizable differences in the treat-
ment of different forms of part-time jobs, including:
1) Exclusion from the CAO of those who work fewer than 13 hours
per week. Often these part-time workers are excluded fully or
partially from the CAO, and especially in relation to certain
terms of employment (e.g., bonuses, extra legal benefits, and
early retirement schemes). 
2) Lower income supplements. Although one-fourth of the CAOs
offer income (specific) supplements for part-time workers, the
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supplements are lower for part-time workers than for full-time
employees, again leading to discrimination. These differences
are not regarded as discriminatory measures because collective
bargaining parties are allowed to deviate from agreements on
the terms of employment so long as these deviations can be jus-
tified on objective grounds.
Self-employment
The Netherlands, like Spain and Italy, has seen a recent trend
toward unionizing the self-employed. Since 1999, the number of inter-
est groups representing the self-employed has rapidly grown, stem-
ming from the buoyant economy and the perceived greater
opportunities in self-employment. Some trade unions affiliated with
the FNV confederation specifically target the self-employed for
recruitment.
The United Kingdom Legal Framework of Nonstandard 
Employment
In the United Kingdom, nonstandard employment is not subject to
a special legal framework. Moreover, there is a general lack of specific
definitions and regulations of temporary agency work and fixed-term
contracts as a separate type of employment relationship, with the
exception of laws on the activities of agencies (Employment Agency
Act of 1973). Existing provisions were deregulated in the United King-
dom in 1994. However, the U.K. government intends to expand
employment protections to agency workers (Grimshaw and Ward
1999). During 1997–1998, the U.K. government advocated industrial
relations partnerships as a means of reconciling labor flexibility with
employment security, with consultation proceeding in 1999. 
Temporary agency work
Temporary agency workers in the United Kingdom do not enjoy a
special legal protection, and the legal nature of this relationship
remains ambiguous (Hepple and Fredman 1992) because the contract
between the agency and the worker is held, not as an employment con-
tract, but as a sui generis contract. A temporary agency worker does
not have a contract of any kind with the hirer. The agency is responsi-
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ble for deducting social security contributions, and the hirer is respon-
sible, under health and safety legislation, for work accidents. 
Part-time work
There is no statutory definition of part-time work in the United
Kingdom, but many employment protection rights are related to the
number of hours worked per week. For example, working a minimum
of eight hours per week guarantees worker protection rights, such as
redundancy, unfair dismissal, guarantee pay, maternity pay, and the
right to return to work after confinement. There is no legal limit for
working hours. In official statistics, part-time work applies to those
who work fewer than 30 hours a week, and a growing number of part-
timers work between 8 and 16 hours a week. For female workers, an
indirect method of countering discrimination is to bring sex and race
discrimination suits to the Labor Courts under existing nondiscrimina-
tion acts, in which hours of work are irrelevant to protection rights
(Hepple and Fredman 1992). 
The Employment Regulation Act of 1999 brought into force a new
provision concerning part-time work and fixed-term contracts. The act
outlawed the use of waiver clauses in fixed-term contracts, under
which employees agree to forgo the right to claim unfair dismissal at
the end of the term. Moreover, the act gives the trade and industry sec-
retary power to make regulations and to issue codes of practice, and it
is through this act that protection against discrimination in part-time
work came into effect. The act also facilitated the development of flex-
ible working arrangements and provided opportunities for part-time
work, including provisions to implement the EU directive on part-time
work. 
In January 2000, the U.K. government proposed a draft of Part-
Time Employees Regulations 2000 (Prevention of Less Favorable
Treatment) aimed at restraining discrimination between full-time and
part-time workers in matters of pay, sick pay, maternity and parental
leaves, pension schemes, training, and redundancy. However, these
provisions do not cover casual workers (who are not considered as
employees in the legal sense). At present, unions have no bargaining
role in the regulation of nonstandard employment. However, at the
company level, several union recognition agreements have been con-
cluded with temporary work agencies, typically with large agencies
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that regularly supply temporary workers to organizations with high
levels of union membership among their permanent staff.
Self-employment
We know of no specific legislation regulating self-employment in
the United Kingdom. A survey of workplaces in the major industrial
regions shows that the use of nonstandard employment and outsourc-
ing is more widespread in the West Midlands than initiatives to
increase the flexibility of work organization and working time. How-
ever, it is the use of these internal forms of flexibility that seems to gain
more importance. Self-employment through outsourcing is providing
additional external flexibility to firms. However, transition rates (Mea-
ger and Bates 2002) and survival analyses suggest the insecurity and
risks of poverty for some of the new self-employed. 
A COMPARISON OF NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
IN EUROPE
The legal framework surrounding nonstandard employment in
Europe varies greatly. It has its roots in the historical, political, and
economic development of a country’s employment system and has
changed with political majorities, with time, and with economic cycles.
However, some similarities in nonstandard employment regulations are
evident. Looking at two forms of nonstandard employment—tempo-
rary agency work and fixed-term employment—we compare national
approaches and legal forms of incorporating these nonstandard types of
employment into the general legal framework, as well as compare their
status in the legal framework of the employment relationship.
The first legal regulations covering temporary work agencies date
from 1970 in France and Germany, and 1990 in Sweden and Spain, and
only very recently in Italy. Another way to address this form of atypi-
cal employment has been to “moralize” the activities of the temporary
agency, that is, to strictly regulate the solvency, licensing, and registra-
tion of the agency as a way to reduce abuses in the merchandising of
manpower. This is the case in the United Kingdom. Some countries,
such as Denmark and the Netherlands, see no need for special legal
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regulations, mainly because of the integration of so-called atypical
forms of employment into a standard employment status. Moreover, a
code of fair behavior has been established by employers’ organiza-
tions, while collective bargaining guarantees nondiscrimination
between temporary agency workers and full-time workers (Kessler
2000).
Collective bargaining plays an important role, and complements
the law, in most of the European member states. In France and Italy,
national intersectoral agreements complete the legal provisions on tem-
porary agency work. In France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, spe-
cific agreements regulate temporary agency work. On the contrary,
there is no such intervention in Sweden or in the United Kingdom,
which leads to less social protection of temporary workers, especially
when most of the legal labor provisions depend on seniority, a criterion
that temporary workers do not generally enjoy. In Germany, recent col-
lective negotiations attempt to develop a specific collective bargaining
field. 
This great diversity among the European member states does not
allow us to group national legal frameworks together or to discern sim-
ilar tendencies in their orientations. For this reason, a European-level
regulation would help member states to complete and harmonize their
legal framework, and would grant temporary workers a minimum of
social and employment protection rights. This possibility has been
studied by the European trade unions and employers’ associations.
Fixed-term employment reveals a different trend, mainly because
of the recent influence of legislation at the EU level through the coun-
cil directive on fixed-term contracts, which was adopted in May 1999.
The European legal framework, which must be implemented at
national levels within two years, guarantees the principle of nondis-
crimination and aims to prevent abuse arising from the use of succes-
sive fixed-term employment contracts. Most national labor legislation
already covers fixed-term employment, ensuring fixed-term workers a
minimum of protection rights. For example, representative rights for
fixed-term workers exist in nine of the 15 member states. The purpose
of the directive is to harmonize the labor legislation of the 15 member
states while simultaneously complementing any national legislative
frameworks that do not provide a minimum of protection rights for
workers.
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There are some shared orientations among fixed-term legislation in
the EU. The first is regulation on the use and renewal of fixed-term
contracts, and includes the prohibition against using those contracts to
avoid abuse. Fixed-term contracts remain an exception in legal terms
compared with open-ended contracts (in France, Germany, Spain, and
Italy). In cases of abuse, another common orientation is the automatic
transformation of a fixed-term contract into an open-ended contract (in
France and Italy, e.g.). Another common regulation is prohibiting the
dismissal of a fixed-term worker during the duration of the contract,
and the application of standard social protections of ordinary dismissal
in cases of gross misconduct, or “force majeure,” to fixed-term con-
tracts. 
Less common is the use of fixed-term contracts coupled with train-
ing to enable workers to gain experience while studying or to undergo
training without leaving the labor market. In these specific cases,
fixed-term employment is seen as an instrument of labor policy to
reduce unemployment (as in France and Germany). Collective bargain-
ing, as well as labor courts (in Germany and Spain), coexist in the fur-
ther, parallel regulation of fixed-term employment in most EU member
states. For example, in Italy, collective bargaining uses this kind of
nonstandard employment to better address unemployment among tar-
get groups, such as youth and ethnic minorities. In cases of deregula-
tion, an increase of control by public authorities (Inspector of Labor) or
trade unions is notable (as in Denmark and Sweden). The deregulation
of fixed-term employment, and even more so of part-time employment,
stems from the need for more flexibility by employers and for more
freedom in organizing private and professional lives among employ-
ees. In this perspective, changes in part-time regulation, as in the Neth-
erlands, are considered to favor employees because of the greater
ability to better balance work and private life, such as family, training,
and social activities. 
Legal regulation of part-time work—the third pillar of nonstandard
employment—reveals wide divergence in legislation across the EU,
despite an EU directive in December 1997. Legislation ranges from
considering part-time work to be just another form of employment (as
in the Netherlands), although female-dominated, to considering such
work as a nonstandard form of employment (as in France) with a high
risk of discrimination against employees. Especially for those who
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work shorter hours, there is greater risk of marginal attachment to the
firm. 
CONCLUSION
Key regulation to prevent abuse in nonstandard employment in EU
countries has largely been negotiated at either the European level,
between the top-level associations of the social partners, or within sec-
toral or intersectoral collective bargaining. This was evident in the
directive adopted by the European Council. The EU directive must be
implemented in the national legislation within two years by way of
legal provision or by collective agreement having the force of law.
Recent European legislation (under the procedures set forth in protocol
14 on social policy annexed to the Maastricht Treaty) enables social
partners to negotiate and eventually conclude agreements on employ-
ment issues at the community level. The implementation of such an
agreement follows practices of member states or, at the joint request of
the signatory parties, by a European Council decision on a proposal
from the European Commission (directive).
Much of the nonstandard employment—part-time, fixed-term, and
temporary agency work—was deregulated during the late 1980s and
the first half of the 1990s. The expected gains in labor market flexibil-
ity or lower unemployment, however, have not been achieved through
these legislative means of deregulation. However, the deregulation of
nonstandard employment has led to a counter reaction, with collective
bargaining addressing the issue of nonstandard contracts. Sectors in
which social partners are firmly rooted and have a strong influence
have rapidly incorporated these forms in their collective bargaining. In
nonunionized sectors of the economy, these deregulation attempts have
been more successful, but at the cost of widening the gap between dif-
ferent segments of the labor market. 
In fact, it is difficult to derive a common trend within the legal
frameworks for nonstandard employment in European countries. Each
country’s legal system is based on a different understanding of the role
of the labor law. In northern European countries, legal regulation is not
welcomed owing to the important role played by social partners. In
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other European countries, nonstandard employment is a common form
of work contracts (as in the Netherlands). However, in other parts of
Europe, regulation of nonstandard employment is seen as necessary, as
in France and Germany, owing to fears of discrimination and abuses in
nonstandard forms of employment. The latter countries have regulated
these contracts in more detail, thereby limiting their spread. 
Collective bargaining is always largely determined by the eco-
nomic well-being of the firm, the sector, and, to some extent, the coun-
try. These features have a nonnegligible impact on the agreements
reached concerning wages in standard and nonstandard employment.
Given that these factors can change rapidly, the factors that determine
the use of nonstandard contracts have also changed, albeit less rapidly.
For the moment, Europe is in a relatively stable period of economic
growth, with forecasts of declining unemployment. With the coexist-
ence of still high unemployment in some European countries with skill
shortages in some sectors, deregulation versus re-regulation debates
have calmed down somewhat. The major focus in the EU set now is to
avoid discriminatory practices in all forms of employment contracts. It
is in this feature that we likely find the most important transatlantic
feature across standard and nonstandard forms of employment. 
According to the theory of reflexive labor law, outlined briefly in
the introduction of this chapter, there is a reflexive relationship
between strict dismissal protection in standard employment relation-
ships and the proliferation of nonstandard forms of employment.
Largely unobserved is reflexivity within the shadow economy or
“black market” activities. Stricter regulation of nonstandard forms of
employment might lead to tacit, undeclared private contracts evading
social contributions by both parties of the contract. 
Another interesting legal approach to the development of atypical
employment lies in the tendency to unify workers’ status (suppressing
the differences between white- and blue-collar workers, e.g., or
between specific categories of workers) and the parallel development
of new sources of fragmentation of the labor relationship in nonstand-
ard employment. Fragmentation across employment contracts is
directly linked to the issue, on the one hand, of flexibility and, on the
other hand, to the unification of workers’ status (Supiot 1994). 
The response of labor law to more flexibility in the employment
relationship, while guaranteeing a minimum of social rights, is likely to
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be found in the advancement of well-defined and negotiated forms of
nonstandard employment. However, it remains to be seen if the distinc-
tion between standard and nonstandard employment relationships
remains pertinent in the coming years. Constituent notions of the stan-
dard employment contract, such as subordination to the decisions of an
employer, undergo fundamental changes not only in the more
advanced sectors of the economy. Trends such as the blurring of the
differences between dependent employees and the self-employed will
provide the next challenge to labor law, regulation, and collective
negotiation of employment relationships. 
Notes
We would like to thank the editors for helpful comments on an earlier draft as well as
the feedback from participants at the workshop in Kalamazoo, Michigan.
1. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule, such as when a part-time employee
works overtime. Legal treatment of such exceptional cases through labor courts
could constitute a paper of its own.
2. The directives included a proposal for a directive on voluntary part-time work, a
proposal for a directive on the supply of workers by temporary employment busi-
nesses and fixed-duration contracts of employment. A main reason for the failure
was the restriction on the use of atypical work. The later attitude of the commis-
sion toward greater flexibility resulted in the understanding that these forms of
employment, on the one hand, were viewed as opportunities for creating employ-
ment. On the other hand, they responded to the will of both employers and
employees for greater flexibility in the workplace (Blanpain 1998). A proposal
resulted in one directive on safety and health issues for temporary workers and
fixed-term workers, adopted by the council in 1991.
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Nonstandard Work Arrangements
in Japan and the United States
 A Legal Perspective
Noriaki Kojima and Keiko Fujikawa
Osaka University
When the framework of the Japanese employment and labor laws
was established after World War II, Japan was still under the control of
the Allied powers, including the United States.  Major Japanese labor
statutes—the Trade Union Act (enforced in 1945, amended completely
in 1949); the Labor Relations Adjustment Act (enforced in 1946); and
the Labor Standards Act (enforced in 1947), which together are called
the “Three Major Labor Acts,” were imported, in part, from the United
States.  For example, unfair labor practices under the Trade Union Act
were a replica of the U.S. system.
Some provisions of the Employment Security Act governing the
Japanese labor market (enforced in 1947) were also influenced by
American labor law, which has, for example, introduced a license sys-
tem for the fee-charged job placement business.  However, the act had
the character of a controlled-economy legislation formed prior to
World War II under national general mobilization; it did not allow pri-
vate organizations an intermediary role in the labor market, given that
public employment services fulfilled this role.  Fee-charged job-place-
ment services were allowed only for the jobs that were not easily han-
dled by the public employment service (11 jobs in the beginning, later
extended to 29 jobs).  Even job-placement services free of charge and
commissioning of recruitment had substantially been restricted under
the license system.  Thus, those who supply workers for a third-party
employer are engaged in the labor supply business prohibited under
Article 44 of the Employment Security Act (except when trade unions
provide the service free of charge [Article 45]).  The labor supply busi-
ness has been prohibited for the reason it could establish subordinate
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relationships between a supplier and a worker, which could lead to
forced labor and wage skimming, a situation that existed before World
War II.
The Temporary Help Business Act (which was enacted in 1985,
and took effect in 1986) greatly relaxed restrictions on the temporary-
help business by excluding the prohibited labor supply clause.1 It
should be noted, however, that the prohibition (Article 44) has never
been deleted.  In other words, the temporary help business has been an
exception to the provision.  
On the contrary, in the United States only recently have a few
states regulated the temporary-help business via a notification or regis-
tration system; no federal law yet controls the business.  Later in this
chapter, the differences between the United States and Japan in the
temporary-help business will be described in greater detail.  Regarding
some other nonstandard arrangements, broad common points are evi-
dent in that neither country has ever strictly regulated part-time work
and fixed-term contract work. 
In the following sections, we introduce the current Japanese law on
nonstandard work arrangements, describe the U.S. system, and focus
on the regulations of so-called “temp-to-hire” arrangements to high-
light the peculiarity of the Japanese law.
NONSTANDARD WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN JAPAN
Coverage of Labor Law
The Japanese labor law can be characterized by its wide coverage;
labor law is applied to any establishment with one or more
employee(s), with few exceptions.2 The feature is grounded on “equal-
ity in the eye of the law,” which is quite different from the labor law
systems of the United States and European countries.
Employers are obliged to bargain with any trade unions regardless
of the number of members.  When employers refuse to bargain with a
trade union without good reason, it is deemed an unfair labor practice
and subject to remedies by the Labor Relations Commission.3 It may
appear a peculiarity of the Japanese law that it attaches greater impor-
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tance to equality between trade unions than to the efficiency of collec-
tive bargaining.  
As for employment law, the coverage varies depending on each
act,4 and the law shall be applied to anyone who meets the require-
ments of each act, regardless of working hours or fixed-term employ-
ment contract.  Exceptions include 1) employees whose working hours
are less than the prescribed hours, for whom the days of annual paid
leave are reduced proportionally according to their actual working
hours, and 2) employees with a fixed-term employment contract, who
are excluded from the system of child and family care leave under the
Child and Family Care Leave Act.5
On the other hand, the Employees Pension Plan Act and the
Employees Medical Insurance Act limit coverage by tenure or working
hours, which causes lower coverage rates for part-time workers and
temporary agency workers.6 However, we should note that under the
universal pension and insurance system, even those who are ineligible
for social insurance are supposed to join the National Pension Plan and
National Medical Insurance plan, and the majority of part-time workers
and temporary agency workers are covered as dependents.7
Companies have legal responsibilities as employers under employ-
ment and labor laws only when employees have an “employment rela-
tionship” with the companies.  Under this “employment relationship,”
the following applies:
1) The form of employment contract shall not be considered.  The
employment relationship shall be determined realistically.
Thus, even though the contract says “contract with an indepen-
dent contractor” or “contract of commission,” employment and
labor laws may be applied when these workers are in reality
employees.  The Labor Standards Act8 offers a guideline to
determine whether a person is an employee (Table 11.1).  The
guideline is similar to the American “right to control” test (see
note 25).
2) Even though employers do not have an employment relationship
with a person, they may be legally responsible as the employer.
A recent Supreme Court decision expansively interpreted the
definition of “employers,” who are liable for unfair labor prac-
tices under Article 7 of the Trade Union Act.  The Supreme
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Court ruled that when the client company was in a position to
specifically command and control the basic working conditions
of leased workers in the same way as a leasing company, the
client company was assumed to be an employer under Article 7
of the Trade Union Act, and the employer cannot refuse to bar-
gain collectively with any union without good reason (the case
of Asahi Broadcasting Co., February 28, 1995).  Thus, the cli-
ent companies in some cases must accept a request of collective
bargaining from the trade unions of temporary agency workers
even though those workers are not their employees.
As for temporary agency workers, client companies are liable for
some stipulations of the Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety
Table 11.1 Test to Determine Employee Status under the Labor 
Standards Act, Japan
1. The employer’s degree of control 
A. Type of employer control
i. whether the individual is required to follow the employers instructions
ii. whether the employer gives control and direction on the work and 
method, or whether the individual is required to follow the employer’s 
instructions or orders beyond the usual work
iii. the degree of restriction (where to work, when to work)    
iv. whether the individual’s work can be substituted 
B. Compensation for work performed: whether the compensation is for the 
work performed for the working hours under the control by the employer 
2. Factors that reinforce the decision of an employee’s status
A. Whether the employee is an independent contractor (i.e., whether the 
individual provides equipment or tools; the amount of compensation; 
other factors such as responsibility for any damage or use of his own trade 
name)
B. Degree of exclusiveness
i. whether the individual is restricted from working for other companies
ii. how much the individual depends on the compensation by the 
employer
iii. other factors such as hiring process, withholding tax, or application of 
labor insurance
SOURCE:  The Ministry of Labor, “The Report on the Labor Standards Act Meeting”
(1985).
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and Health Act, and the Employment Opportunities Equality Act to the
extent provided under the Temporary Help Business Act (Table 11.2).
In 1997, the Equal Employment Opportunities Act added a major
amendment.  The provisions include 1) recruitment and hiring, 2)
assignment and promotion, 3) fringe benefits, 4) compulsory retire-
ment age, retirement, and dismissal.  Different from Title VII in the
United States, this act applies to any establishment regardless of size.
It also applies to part-time workers and workers with fixed-term con-
tracts, but temporary help agencies shall be liable as an employer for
temporary agency workers.
Table 11.2 Employers’ Responsibilities for Temporary Agency Workers, 
Japan
Hiring company (temporary agency) Client company
The Labor Standards Act
   Equal treatment
   Equal pay for men and women
   Prohibition of forced labor
   Contract of employment
   Wages
   Agreement of overtime work
   Paid annual leave
   Maternity leave
Compensation for accidents
   Rules of employment
Equal Treatment
Prohibition of forced labor
Voting rights
Working hours, break, holidays
Maternity leave
Nursing hours
The Occupational Safety and Health Act
Responsibilities to maintain:
Occupational safety and health at 
workplace
Periodic basic health check
Responsibilities to maintain:
   Occupational safety and health at 
workplace
Appointment of safety manager
   Health check for specific occupations 
(e.g., VDT)
Act of Equal Employment Opportunities
   Prevention of sexual harassment Prevention of sexual harassment
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation from the Labor Standards Sct.
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Employment and Labor Policy for Part-Time Workers—The 
Administration and the Judiciary Take the Lead
According to the Survey of Diversification of Work Styles con-
ducted by the Ministry of Labor in September 1999, 27.5 percent of the
total employed were nonstandard workers (including transferred work-
ers).9 Of this percentage, the largest group was part-time workers (20.3
percent), followed by contract workers (2.3 percent), casual workers
(1.8 percent), and temporary agency workers (1.1 percent).10 Thus,
most nonstandard workers in Japan are part-time employees, and the
number of temporary agency workers is only one-twentieth in compar-
ison.  The Survey of Part-Time Workers in 1995, conducted by the
Ministry of Labor, also showed that approximately 40 percent of part-
time workers were based on a fixed-term employment contract, and
some consider part-time employment to be the typical nonstandard
working style.
Table 11.3 shows the monthly average wage rate of nonstandard
workers.  The wage rate of part-time workers is relatively low, and the
gap between part-time and regular workers is large.  These are the big-
gest issues concerning part-time workers.  Despite arguments over leg-
islative solutions, no bill has passed to limit fixed-term contracts or
determine comparable worth that would redress the differential wages
Table 11.3 Average Monthly Wages of Nonstandard Workers, United 
States and Japan 
Type of employment Yena US$
Total 140,800 1,341
Contract workers 237,900 2,266
Casual workers 109,800 1,046
Part-time workers (short hours) 89,700 854
Part-time workers (others) 152,800 1,455
Temporary agency workers 209,300 1,993
NOTE: Part-time workers (short hours) are those who work fewer hours than regular
full-time workers.
a Calculation is based on the exchange rate US$1 = 105 yen.
SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, “The Survey of Diversification of Work Styles” (1999).
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between full-time and part-time workers; however, this does not mean
that Japan has done nothing to solve the problem, and in fact it has
come up with positive results by administrative and judicial efforts.
Employment security
The Civil Code of Japan stipulates that any employment contract
without a fixed term can be terminated at any time, and it shall expire
two weeks after a party requests termination of the employment con-
tract (Article 627[1]).  The code clearly states that employment con-
tracts with no fixed term can be terminated with two weeks’ notice,11
and the Labor Standards Act provides, based on this article, that
employers shall provide at least 30 days’ prior notice.12 On the other
hand, the Japanese courts introduced the “principle of abuse of right to
dismissal” after World War II, which is based on Article 1(3) of the
Civil Code.  According to judicial precedent, an employer’s right to
dismissal is null and void when a dismissal cannot be socially and gen-
erally approved without good reason.
On the other hand, part-time workers often enter into a fixed-term
contract with their employer.  Fixed-term contracts end with the expira-
tion of the contract.  It is possible to renew the contract for an extended
term based on Article 14 of the Labor Standards Act, and refusal to
renew the contract shall not be treated as a dismissal.  Yet, it is notable
that the administration issued a notice that employers should provide
30 days’ prior notice to part-time workers when they choose not to
renew the fixed-term contract, just as in cases of dismissal.  For
instance, a guideline issued by the Ministry of Labor concerning
employment contracts with a fixed term (grounded in Article 8 of the
Part-Time Work Act [which was enacted in June 1993, and took effect
in December 1993]) states: 
a) If an employer has been hiring a part-time worker on a series of
fixed-term contracts for a year or more, when the contract comes
up for renewal the worker must be offered a contract for the maxi-
mum allowable duration, which is one year. The exception is for
workers who are 60 years of age and older. For them, fixed-term
contracts may last up to three years. If the employer is not renew-
ing the contract, advance notice must be given to the worker.
b) In the case where an employer has continuously employed a
part-time worker for more than one year by renewing a fixed-term
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employment contract, and has not renewed said contract, the
employer shall endeavor to provide advance notice of at least
thirty days to the part-time worker.13 
Moreover, the courts have taken the position to apply the principle of
the abuse of right to dismissal to the cases of refusal to renew fixed-
term employment contracts when one of the following three conditions
is met:
1) An employment contract has become identical to a contract with
no set term because the fixed-term contract has been renewed
repeatedly and routinely (the case of Toshiba Yanagimachi
Plant, the Supreme Court, July 22, 1974); 
2) An employment contract has been renewed with an expectation
that the employment relationship would continue indefinitely,
and the job was not a casual one (the case of Hitachi Medico,
the Supreme Court, December 4, 1986); 
3) An employment contract was concluded on the premise that it
shall be renewed as a matter of course, with special conditions
to continue the employment. 
Indeed, hiring part-time workers or casual workers is compara-
tively simple, which differs from hiring regular employees; thus, the
Japanese legal system has deemed it acceptable to treat regular workers
differently since they enter into an employment contract with no set
term and with an expectation of lifetime or long-term employment, as
the Supreme Court affirmed (the case of Hitachi Medico, aforemen-
tioned).14 However, it cannot be construed that an employment contract
shall automatically expire when the term expires, even for casual work-
ers.  Courts have argued that the status of nonstandard workers should
not be unreasonably precarious, even though it might be less stable
than that of regular employees.15
Differential wages
It is not the purpose of this section to analyze why part-time work-
ers earn lower wages (Houseman and Osawa, this volume; Nagase, this
volume).  However, it should be noted that wages are not designed for
each individual, but for a household, as well as taxation and social
insurance in Japan.  This system greatly influences the work style of
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part-time employees, especially married women.  Part-time workers
within a certain range of annual income are exempted from income
taxes and social insurance premiums, and they are also paid family
allowances.16 As a result, some part-time workers try to limit their
working hours from the beginning or take leaves at year’s end to con-
trol their annual income.  According to the Survey of Part-Time Work-
ers in 1995, 37.6 percent of female part-time workers have adjusted
their annual working hours not to exceed the tax-exempt line.  This has
resulted in a low valuation of part-time workers.17
Thus, in order to lessen the wage differences between part-time
and full-time workers, the taxation and social insurance systems need
to be redesigned.  However, that redesign would be difficult because
many part-time workers have taken their vested rights for granted.
Further, the principle of “comparable worth” may not be broadly
accepted in Japan, because traditionally wages have been calculated
based on the age, tenure, and number of dependents of an employee
rather than job evaluation.  Nevertheless, Article 3 of the Part-Time
Workers Act provided that employers shall endeavor to promote effec-
tive utilization of part-time workers, and the Ministry of Labor has also
clarified its view on part-time employment (Table 11.4) from a per-
spective of equivalence with full-time employees (Meeting on
Employment Management of Part-Time Workers, April 2000).
Administrative measures have been taken to redress the differential
wages between part-time and full-time workers, although these have
met with some resistance.18
The Temporary Help Business Act—Emphasizing the 
Regulation of Business
The Temporary Help Business Act took effect in July 1986 (pro-
mulgated in July 1985).  As mentioned earlier, the labor-supply busi-
ness had been prohibited by the Employment Security Act until the
temporary-help business was permitted as an exception when a tempo-
rary agency worker has an employment relationship with a temporary
help agency, not with a client company.19 There are two types of tempo-
rary help businesses in Japan: one is fixed-term employment called
general temporary help business (enrolled temp), and the other is a
non-fixed-term employment type, in which all temporaries are regular
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workers of the agency, and is called specified temporary help business
(regular temp).  The former requires a license from the Ministry of
Labor, while the latter only needs a registration.  The act maintains its
characteristics in emphasizing the regulation of the business.
At the time it took effect in 1986, only 13 jobs were permitted,
which expanded to 26 jobs in 1996.  For those substituting for child
and family care leaves and workers older than 60, all jobs were allowed
except port labor, construction, security guard, and manufacturing
(older workers only), with a limitation of the working period to one
year.
Article 2[4](a) of the Private Employment Agencies Convention
(adopted by the General Meeting of the International Labor Organiza-
tion in 1997 as Convention no. 181) prohibits private employment
agencies, including temporary help agencies, only from “certain cate-
gories of workers or branches of economic activity.”  Japan was thus
Table 11.4 Japan Ministry of Labor Guidelines on Part-Time 
Employment (for part-time workers who perform the same 
duties as full-time regular workers)
Treatment and working conditions:
a. The determining method of treatment and working conditions for part-
time workers should be same as that of full-time workers; different
treatment must be justified with good reason.
b. Employers should try to balance the working conditions between part-
time and full-time workers.
c. Part-time employees who perform the same duties as full-time
employees should be treated equally in bonus and retirement pay.
d. When there is a difference in treatment or working conditions between
part-time employees and full-time employees, it is necessary to clarify
the situations, explain the reasons, and prepare a grievance system to
satisfy them.
Preparation for various working styles
It is important to establish a system for part-time workers to become
full-time employees; to raise their morale, enhance their satisfaction,
and improve their ability.
SOURCE: The Ministry of Labor. “A Report on Part-Time Workers” (2002).
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compelled to adopt a “negative listing” for jobs that were not permit-
ted, since it planned to ratify the convention (see Table 11.5).20 Accord-
ingly, the Amendment Act was enacted with two major features: a
negative listing and limitations on the duration of temporary help ser-
vice up to one year for newly permitted jobs (promulgated in July
1999, enforced in December 1999).  One of the main features of the
Amendment Act is this shift from a positive listing (of permitted jobs)
to a negative listing.  The jobs relating to manufacturing are not yet
permitted, which is often in contention and is quite unusual compared
with other advanced countries’ regulations.
Limitation on the duration of temporary work
The second major feature of the Amendment Act is the limitation
on the duration of temporary work.  Client companies may not receive
the service of temporary help businesses for more than one year for the
same job at the same establishment, with some exceptions.
Table 11.5 Jobs Not Permitted under Temporary Work in the Japanese 
Amendment Act 
Jobs not permitted
1. Port labor
2. Construction
3. Security guard
4. Medical-related jobs (by a government ordinance, including doctors, 
dentists, nurses, pharmacists, dieticians, and X-ray technicians)
5. Production line work in manufacturing (for the time being),a provided that 
substitutes for maternity leave (up to 2 years) and family care leave (up 
to 1 year) shall not be applied in this case
6. Other jobs
a. relating to personnel management, and collective bargaining at the 
client’s worksite
b. attorneys, solicitors handling foreign laws, judicial scriveners, real 
estate appraisers, tax accountants, certified public accountants, patent 
attorneys, social insurance specialists, and public notaries
a The Diet is currently reviewing an amendment to the Temporary Help Business Act
tht would lift such bans.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation from the Temporary Help Business Act..
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 399  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
400 Kojima and Fujikawa
Previously, temporary work through an agency was never viewed
as a temporary or casual work style in Japan.  For instance, there was
no limitation on the duration of temporary help contract jobs in sanita-
tion, infrastructure maintenance, parking-lot management, or telemar-
keting.  In addition, although the contract term for other jobs on the
positive list was limited to one year or less, companies could renew the
contract through the Ministry of Labor for up to three years.21 By more
strictly limiting the duration of temporary help contracts, the amend-
ment recognizes temporary work through an agency as a temporary or
casual work style. 
The purpose of the limitation is to prevent temporary agency work-
ers from substituting for regular employees.22 Nonetheless, the limita-
tion may not benefit temporary agency employees.  Many agency
temporaries prefer to work longer with the same client, as Table 11.6
shows.  According to a survey by the Osaka Prefecture (1998), 64.2
percent of temporary agency workers prefer to continue to work as a
temp.  Thus, some argue that the Amendment Act does not meet this
desire of temporaries.23 
NONSTANDARD WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES
The U.S. labor market is widely viewed as “flexible” and
“dynamic” and it appears that the recent economic boom has been sup-
ported with nonstandard work arrangements.  It may be true that
employers can use the workforce effectively and efficiently with less
cost under nonstandard work arrangements.  On the other hand, some
concerns have been expressed over the rights of nonstandard workers.
We will discuss the legal issues in nonstandard work arrangements in
the United States, focusing particularly on independent contractors,
temporary agencies, and leased employees.24
Independent Contractors
Workers can be classified in one of two basic legal categories:
employees or independent contractors.  Such distinction is crucial
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because an employee is protected under employment and labor laws
and an independent contractor is not.  Employees are covered under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Title VII, and other antidiscrimina-
tion laws, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Family Med-
ical Leave Act (FMLA), unemployment insurance laws, and workers
compensation laws.  Corporations, therefore, must undertake responsi-
bilities and liabilities as an employer, and they are obliged to obey
these laws whenever they hire regular employees.  Some employers
prefer hiring independent contractors to employees when they need
people with expertise or technique for specialized projects or when
they need flexibility in hiring. However, some employers use indepen-
dent contractors to avoid paying taxes, avoid paying workers benefits,
or to circumvent other labor regulations. 
It is not easy to determine whether a worker is an employee or
independent contractor, and employers often misclassify some of their
employees as independent contractors.  Courts and agencies are trying
to distinguish the two by using various tests such as the common law
test,25 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) test,26 or the economic reali-
ties test.27 See Table 11.7 for the tests applied under various statutes.  In
a recent case in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York (S.D.N.Y. 98 Civ. 7589), the U.S. Department of Labor sued
Time Warner in October 1998 for allegedly misclassifying hundreds of
Table 11.6 Japanese Worker Preference on Length of Temporary 
Employment (%)
Regular temp
(Specified temporary 
help business)
Enrolled temp
(General temporary 
help business) 
Total 
temp
(%)
1 year or less 10.3 27.8 21.1
   3 months or less
   3–6 months 
   6+ months
1.3
1.9
7.1
1.2
7.8
18.8
1.2
5.7
14.1
Longer than 1 year 76.9 62.9 68.2
   1–2 years
   2–3 years
   3+ years
14.1
9.0
53.8
26.1
13.9
22.9
21.3
11.9
35.0
Other or n/a 12.8 9.4 10.7
SOURCE: Osaka Prefecture, “Report of Temporary Work Business and Working Con-
ditions of  Temporary Workers” (1998).
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full-time employees as temporaries or independent contractors and
thereby denying them health insurance and pension benefits.  The gov-
ernment sought a court order appointing an independent fiduciary to
audit Time Inc., and identify all employees who were potentially mis-
classified and denied the opportunity to participate in nine benefit
plans, including health, savings, and stock ownership programs.  The
Secretary of Labor stated in a press release that “employers must
deliver promised benefits to all eligible employees, and we believe
some misclassified Time Inc. employees did not receive benefits they
were entitled to” (U.S. Department of Labor 1998).  The implications
Table 11.7 Tests Used to Distinguish an Employee from an Independent 
Contractor, United States
Statute
Test used to determine
employee status
Potential liability for 
mischaracterization
Federal taxes IRS control test Liability for unpaid taxes
Penalty
Interest
Fair Labor Standards Act
(covers overtime, 
minimum wages)
Economic realities test Liability for unpaid overtime 
or minimum wage
Liquidated damages
Fines
Criminal sanctions
Federal Employment 
Discrimination Statutes
(Title VII, ADEA, ADA)
Economic realities test
(sometimes economic
realities combined with
common law/IRS control 
test)
Back pay
Front pay
Equitable relief
Attorney’s fees
National Labor Relations 
Act
Common law; IRS control 
test
Reinstatement
Back pay
New bargaining unit election 
and expenses
Cease and desist orders; other 
equitable relief
Employee Retirement
Income Security Act 
(covers employee 
pension, welfare benefits)
Common law; IRS control 
test
Liability for benefits not 
received
Equitable relief
Attorney’s fees and costs
NOTE: See notes 25 and 27 for description of IRS control test and economic realities test.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation based on the Internal Revenue Code; the Fair Labor
Standards Act; the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; the National Labor Relations
Act; and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
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of the Labor Department’s action are far-reaching for the growing
practice of nonstandard work arrangements in the United States (Lurie
1999).  Because of the high visibility of the contestants, it is likely to
focus public attention and the attention of Congress on the nagging
issue of worker misclassification.
In another case, Vizcaino vs. Microsoft Corp.,28 the Ninth U.S. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals ruled that Microsoft Corp. could not exclude
freelance workers, hired before 1990, from its employee benefit plans
(including the stock purchase plan and savings purchase plan), even
though the company had called them “independent contractors,” and
even though the workers had signed contracts that specifically stated
that the workers were independent contractors (freelancers) and that
they would not be provided with employee benefits.  In 1989 and 1990,
the IRS examined Microsoft’s employment records and concluded that
Microsoft’s freelancers were not independent contractors, but employ-
ees for federal withholding and employment tax purposes.  Microsoft
was required to pay millions of dollars in back taxes, penalties, and
overtime pay to the misclassified workers.  After learning of the IRS
rulings, the plaintiffs sought various benefits, including those under the
company’s savings purchase plan and the employee stock purchase
plan.  Although the federal district court in Washington State granted
summary judgment for Microsoft, on the appeal, the U.S. Circuit Court
twice overturned the judgment of the district court and held that the
workers were entitled to the benefits.  This favors some temporary
agency workers employed by temporary help agencies.  Microsoft cur-
rently has agreements requiring that temporary agency workers agree
that Microsoft will not provide benefits regardless of how their legal
status may be characterized, and they expressly waive any right to ben-
efits attributable to services performed after signing the agreement.29
Moreover, under a new policy, Microsoft will do business only with
staffing firms providing a certain level of employee benefits to tempo-
raries.30  In December 2000, Microsoft agreed to pay $96.9 million to
settle the case (American Staffing Association 2000).
These cases suggest to employers that using independent contrac-
tors or temporary workers could cost them a large sum of money if the
workers file a suit against them for misclassification.  Thus, just like
Microsoft, employers using temporary agency workers ensure that
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temporary help agencies take responsibility for the benefits of the
workers.31
Temporary Agency Workers
More than 2 million temporary agency workers are currently
employed in the United States.  Many employers of all sizes increas-
ingly rely on temporary agency workers to fill staffing needs, reduce
employment costs, escape legal liabilities, fill in for absent employees,
or to accommodate a seasonal or temporary necessity in workload (see
Houseman and Osawa, this volume; and Carré, this volume).  From a
worker’s perspective, temporary work is beneficial in gaining work
experience, accessing training, or maximizing their employability.
Irrespective of company or worker interests, many legal issues sur-
round their relationships.  We now examine some of the main concerns. 
Joint employer relationship
Joint employment liability is emerging as an important area of con-
cern for employers who use temporary agency workers.  The key issue
for temporary workers is to determine which parties are responsible for
ensuring that they are granted the benefits and protection to which they
are entitled, and which parties are responsible for remedying violations
of those rights.  There are two potentially responsible parties, the host
employer and the temporary help agency.  In many cases, more than
one party will supervise or control various aspects of the individual's
work or pay.  Treatment of the “joint employer” relationship differs
substantially among the various employment and labor statutes.
FLSA
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the term employer is
expansive.  The Department of Labor (DOL) has issued regulations
that a determination of joint employment “depends upon all the facts in
the particular case,” but where there is an “arrangement between the
employers to share the employee's services,” a joint employment will
generally be found.32  For temporary agency workers, temporary help
agencies usually have primary responsibility for keeping records on
hours worked and for paying overtime.  The DOL, however, held that
temporary workers assigned to work for various clients were typically
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employed jointly by the temporary help agency and its clients, and cli-
ents may be held jointly responsible for overtime and minimum wage
obligations (U.S. Department of Labor 1968).  According to case law,
the nature and structure of the employment relationship are the keys in
determining whether the economic realities are such that a joint
employment relationship should be found.33 
Antidiscrimination laws
A client company of temporary help agencies can be held liable for
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  At least one
court has ruled that the temporary agency worker shall be an employee
of both the temporary help firm and the client should the employer–
employee relationship be substantial enough to support a Title VII
claim against the client, particularly when the employee is subject to
the direction of the client in his or her work assignments, hours of ser-
vice, and other typical aspects of an employer–employee relationship.34 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has specific provi-
sions dealing with the obligations of staffing contractors and their cli-
ents.35 Although these duties are not specifically expressed in terms of
joint employment, clients should assume that their legal obligations are
similar to those arising under Title VII.
FMLA
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) states that where two
or more businesses exercise some control over the work or working
conditions of an employee, the businesses may be joint employers
under FMLA.  The FMLA applies to employers with 50 or more
employees per day for 20 or more weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year.  For individual employees to be eligible for FMLA
leave, they must have worked at least 1,250 hours in the preceding 12
months.  To comply with the FMLA, workers jointly employed by two
employers must be counted by both employers, whether or not main-
tained on one of the employer’s payrolls. Thus, an employer who
employs 15 workers from a staffing service and 40 of its own perma-
nent workers is covered by the FMLA.  The employer, however, is only
responsible for providing FMLA leave to its 40 permanent employees.
This means that only the primary employer is responsible for giving
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required notices to its employees, providing leave, and maintaining
health benefits during leave.
 
 Temporary help agencies generally are
the primary employers for their temporary workers (29 C.F.R.
§825.106 (1993).
OSH Act and OSHA
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) and
state workplace safety laws require employers to maintain a safe and
healthy workplace.  Offices of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) have been advised that when temporary
agency workers are used, the party in direct control of the workplace
and the actions of the employees should be cited.36  Under these deter-
minations, a temporary help agency generally will be cited only if nec-
essary to correct the violation or if it knew or should have known of an
unsafe condition (Lenz 1997).
Employee benefit plans
The federal and state laws (except those of Hawaii) do not require
employers to provide any health or pension benefits.  The Employee
Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) states, however, that an
employer who offers a pension plan for any of its employees must
cover 70 percent of all non-highly-compensated individuals who work
1,000 or more hours in a year (1,000 hour rules) to qualify for preferen-
tial tax treatment.  The rule applies to the direct employers.  Thus,
where temporary help agencies offer any pension plans for employees,
those who meet the qualifications mentioned above should be able to
participate in such plans.37
Under the Internal Revenue Code, leased employees38 can be
treated as the recipient’s employees. Article 414(n) of the code defines
a leased employee as any person furnishing services to a recipient if the
following conditions are met: the person's services are performed
under an agreement between the recipient employer and the leasing
organization; the person’s services are performed under the primary
direction and control of the recipient; and the person has performed
services on a substantially full-time basis for one year.
Under IRS guidance, this test is met if during a 12-month period
one of the following conditions is met: The employee performs at least
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1,500 hours of service for the client (or related entities), or the
employee performs a number of hours of service for the client (or
related entities) that is equal to at least 75 percent of the average num-
ber of hours customarily worked by the client’s own employees per-
forming similar services. 
There is an exception to the rule that leased employees are consid-
ered employees of the recipient.39  Unless the exception applies, the
recipient must count its leased employees as employees when deter-
mining whether its own tax-qualified plans satisfy the tax law require-
ments. 
Labor law
A temporary help agency and its client may be considered joint
employers for purposes of unfair labor practice cases.  The key to
determining whether the two parties are joint employers is whether the
client is substantially involved in determining the terms and conditions
of employment of the temporary help company’s employees.40  In such
cases, clients may have joint employer obligations with respect to a
temporary help agency’s employees.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and a federal court
have held that where there is a sufficient connection between tempo-
rary agency workers and the client, the temporary agency workers may
be included in the client’s collective bargaining unit.41  Reviewing the
case law, for temporary agency workers to be included in the client’s
bargaining unit, they must clear three hurdles:42 1) the temporary help
agency and its client are found to be joint employers; 2) the temporary
agency workers and the client’s full-time employees have sufficient
“community of interest”; and 3) all joint employers have expressly
conferred on a joint bargaining agent the power to bind them in negoti-
ations (the consent principle).
As a practical matter, satisfying joint-employer status in the con-
text of supplier and user companies is not difficult.  Under NLRB case
law, employers are joint if they “share or co-determine matters govern-
ing essential terms and conditions of employment.”43 If two employers
have the authority to affect matters of the temporary workers, such as
hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and direction, then they are joint
employers.  If joint-employer status exists, the board will decide
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whether the temporary agency workers share a community of interest
with the client company’s regular employees.  Community of interest
means there is a “mutuality of interests” in wages, hours, and working
conditions.  However, if the temporary employees are performing the
same work as the employees of the user company and if they interact
with one another and share facilities such as break rooms, parking lots,
and restrooms, then more likely than not the board will find a commu-
nity of interest and will grant representational rights.44
A community of interest also applies in determining whether tem-
porary agency workers who have been hired directly by an employer
without the involvement of a supplier company or an agency are eligi-
ble for inclusion in a bargaining unit.  In such situations, temporary
employees who are employed as of the eligibility date for a union elec-
tion, but whose tenure remains uncertain, can vote if they otherwise
share a community of interest with eligible employees.  To make this
determination, the NLRB considers two factors: a reasonable expecta-
tion of further employment and, more important, a contract expiration
date.  Generally, if temporary workers do not have a reasonable expec-
tation of further employment or their job is to end on a “certain date,”
they are ineligible to vote.45
The NLRB held in August 2000 that employees obtained from a
labor supplier may be included in the same bargaining unit as the per-
manent employees of the employer to which they are assigned when
the supplied employees are jointly employed by both employers.46 The
board overruled Lee Hospital,47 which held that bargaining units
including jointly employed employees together with the employees of
the user employer are multiemployer bargaining units and require the
consent of the employers.  When combined units are employer units
under the statute, the board will apply its traditional community of
interest analysis to determine their appropriateness on a case-by-case
basis.
Employee Leasing 
The employee leasing business emerged during the 1970s and has
grown since (KRA Corporation 1996).  Employee leasing firms are
neither temporary help services nor payroll services.  Employee leasing
firms provide work arrangements that help small business cut human
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resource management costs.48  According to the National Association
of Professional Employer Organizations (NAPEO), professional
employer organizations assume responsibility and liability for the busi-
ness of employment by establishing an employment relationship with
the worker and thereby enabling the client to focus on the business of
business.49  More specifically, clients fire all employees (or most of
them), put them on the payroll of an employee leasing firm, and then
lease the employees back to the same workplaces (Willey 1993).
Employees who are leased back to the client’s worksite experience no
change in their jobs because they work for the same employer, under
the same boss, at the same workplaces, and with the same pay.  The
only difference is that they are paid by the employing leasing firm, not
the client employer.
Some employers had used employee leasing arrangements to cir-
cumvent pension laws, which caused a major amendment to tax law.50
Today, some employers use the arrangements to control rising benefit
costs and to avoid navigating the increasing complexity of government
regulation and reporting requirements. With the employee leasing
arrangement, employers need not stay informed about regulatory and
reporting changes or maintain the staff to complete paperwork.
There is no federal law or definition concerning employee leasing.
Many states, however, regulate the business, either through state stat-
utes that require general licensing or registration of employee leasing
organizations, or state regulations that deal specifically with Workers’
Compensation and unemployment insurance.51  Fourteen states have
enacted licensing statutes, three states have registration statutes, 24
states have workers' compensation statutes, and 31 states have unem-
ployment insurance statutes (Fujikawa 1999).  
The term “employee leasing” is misleading when used as a generic
term to describe all forms of service arrangements involving the fur-
nishing of labor.52  At the same time, it is not very easy to distinguish
the employee leasing business from the temporary help business.  In
practice, however, it is apparent that the employee leasing business is
quite distinct.  Leased employees work for only one client, while tem-
porary agency workers work for various clients; leased employees
work for a much longer period of time, while temporary agency work-
ers usually work for shorter periods (Hammond 1994).
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The primary advantage of using a leasing arrangement is that the
employers’ burdens can be alleviated because leasing firms assume
legal and administrative liabilities as the employer of leased employees
who work for their clients (Houseman 1999).  Employee leasing firms
become joint employers with their clients in most cases (Fujikawa
1998).  Thus, leasing firms are subject to the joint employer doctrine. 
Part-Time Workers
It is often beneficial for companies to use nonstandard work
arrangements to reduce employment costs and provide flexibility in the
competitive global marketplace.  Many workers also enjoy these
arrangements given the flexibility to adjust work to their daily lives
and needs. 
On the other hand, some workers have faced difficulties with non-
standard employment.  For example, some receive lower wages than
regular employees, and no medical insurance or other benefits (see
Houseman and Osawa, in this volume).  According to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics report, Contingent and Alternative Employment
Arrangements, published in February 1999, only 41 percent of tempo-
rary agency workers were provided health insurance, compared with
82.8 percent of regular employees, 73.3 percent of independent con-
tractors, 79.9 percent of contract company workers, and 67.3 percent of
on-call workers.  This is one of the biggest issues facing nonstandard
workers in the United States.
Another area of concern is the legal treatment of part-time employ-
ees.53 Generally speaking, state and federal laws make no differentia-
tion between a full-time and part-time employee.  For instance, if a
company has more than 15 employees, it is required to follow a range
of antidiscrimination laws.  However, the current laws do not require
companies to provide fringe benefits, such as health insurance, to part-
time workers, even if they provide them to full-time employees.
According to a Hewitt Associates survey of 350 large companies con-
ducted in 1997,54 78 percent of respondents provided part-time workers
with health and dental coverage, compared with 73 percent in 1995.
The survey also found that 91 percent of the companies offered part-
time workers paid vacation days, 77 percent offered sick days, and 57
percent provided short- and long-term disability coverage.  It seems
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that when the economy is strong, part-time workers gain more benefits
at large companies.
FEATURES OF JAPANESE TEMP-TO-HIRE 
ARRANGEMENTS
In December 2000, one year from the enactment of the Amend-
ment Act in Japan, it became permissible to arrange so-called “temp to
hire positions.”  Such arrangements entail sending temporary agency
employees to client companies with an expectation that they will be
hired by the client companies after they work as a temporary for sev-
eral months.  It is similar to temp-to-permanent or temp-to-hire
arrangements in the United States and Europe.
The Japanese version of temp-to-hire arrangements, however, has
unique regulations.  Temporary help agencies are not allowed to per-
form job placement services for temporary agency workers during their
tenure as a temporary employee.  The current situation in Japan and the
lifting of the ban on the Japanese version of temp-to-hire arrangements
reveals the peculiarity of the Japanese regulations, which differ from
those in the United States.  
Lifting the Ban on Temp-to-Hire Arrangements in Japan 
Temp-to-hire arrangements have been prohibited in Japan even
after the Temporary Help Business Act took effect in July 1986
because the labor supply business was prohibited by the Employment
Security Act (enforced in 1947).  Under Article 4(6) of the Employ-
ment Security Act, the labor supply business is defined as having
employees under the direction and orders of another person based on a
supply contract.  However, the Temporary Help Business Act specifi-
cally exempts this industry from the prohibition of labor supply.  Under
Article 2(1) of the Temporary Help Business Act the temporary help
industry is defined as providing workers employed by one person to
another person under the direction of the latter, while maintaining their
employment relationship with the former; by this definition, the tempo-
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rary help industry excludes cases where the client firm makes an agree-
ment with an agency to hire workers supplied by the agency.
It is possible for a subordinate relationship between the worker and
the supplier to exist in the labor supply business when the supplier pro-
vides workers for another person.  One aim of the Employment Secu-
rity Act is to prevent forced labor or wage skimming.  The Temporary
Help Business Act allowed for temporary employment agencies, with a
condition that such agencies would be responsible as an employer for
temporary agency workers based on an employment contract.  The act
separated this new business from the prohibited labor supply business.
On the other hand, Article 2(1) of the Temporary Help Business Act
stipulates that cases in which a client contracts with an agency to
employ temporary agency workers shall be deemed a labor supply
business and prohibited under Article 4(6) of the Employment Security
Act.
The intention of this prohibition is to prevent duplicate employ-
ment relationships in the labor supply business, which would make the
relationship ambiguous.  Informally it was also intended to exclude
shukko (workers transferred to another company) from the definition of
the temporary employment business because shukko had been popu-
larly used as a personnel management tool by many corporations.
Shukko could be deemed a labor supply business, but it is not construed
to violate Article 4(4) of the Employment Security Act when it is not
done as a business.
Temp-to-hire arrangements by temporary employment agencies,
on the contrary, are different from shukko and could be deemed a pro-
hibited labor supply business.  Thus, to receive both a temporary help
business license and job placement business license, a requirement
needed to be met by a notice from the Ministry of Labor that an agency
did not use the temporary employment business as a means to find jobs
for job seekers.  This requirement was considered as a basis to ban
temp-to-hire arrangements by agencies.
It should be noted that controls had been placed on temporary help
agencies and job-placement agencies until the deregulation of the fee-
charged job-placement business in April 1997; thus, prior to this time,
there was no room for temporary employment agencies to perform job
placement in any case.  In December 1999, the scope of the jobs
arranged by fee-based job-placement agencies and temporary employ-
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ment agencies was liberalized with an amendment to the Employment
Security Act and the Amendment Act.  The acts dramatically expanded
the opportunities for any agency to perform job placement for tempo-
rary agency employees.  Resistance of trade unions and other organiza-
tions, however, deferred the lifting of the ban of temp-to-hire
arrangements for one year.
Current Regulations on Temp-to-Hire Arrangements in Japan
The temp-to-hire arrangement in Japan is unique in that it is
allowed not based on amendments of the Employment Security Act or
Temporary Help Business Act, but on amendment of the aforemen-
tioned notice from the Ministry of Labor.  In other words, the arrange-
ment is allowed only when several requirements are met.  One of the
requirements is that agencies must offer job placement for temporary
agency workers in agreement with the temps and clients, and with con-
firmation of proper working conditions when they complete the term of
temporary help service.  Thus, agencies are not allowed to perform job
placement until the contract for temporary help service has been com-
pleted. 
More specifically, clients may not interview temporary agency
workers or request résumés until the contract has expired.  Under Arti-
cle 4(6) of the Employment Security Act, job placement is not allowed
while the temporary help service contract is in effect because the arti-
cle deemed such an arrangement to be the (prohibited) labor supply
business, not a temporary employment business.55 Thus, temp-to-hire
arrangements in Japan are only another type of temporary employment
service providing job placement after the contract ends.
Although to prohibit job placement during temporary employment
service might hinder the smooth operation of the job-placement busi-
nesses (as some criticize), it would be very difficult to lift the ban on
the labor supply business because it would deprive trade unions of their
privilege to provide the labor supply business (trade unions are allowed
in this business as an exception to Article 44 of the Employment Secu-
rity Act).
In Japan, when enactment of a new law or amendment is consid-
ered, a committee composed of the government, trade unions, and
employers discusses the issues.  If either trade unions or employers are
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opposed to such enactment or amendment, enactment does not pro-
ceed.  It can be inferred this is the reason why change does not come
easily.
CONCLUSION
The structures and approaches to regulating nonstandard work
arrangements in staffing agencies are markedly different in Japan and
the United States.  Japan has established a statute with the aim of con-
trolling staffing businesses and protecting the rights of temporary
agency workers, whereas the United States has relied on existing labor
and employment laws and court decisions rather than enacting specific
regulations.  Japan also limits the occupations and jobs handled by
temporary staffing agencies, whereas the United States allows agencies
to handle all occupations and jobs.  Further, with the Temporary Help
Business Act and related ordinances, Japan explicitly limits the con-
tract term of temporary employment so that temporary agency workers
may not replace regular employees of client firms, while the United
States does not limit the term.
When comparing the laws of Japan and the United States, the Japa-
nese labor and employment laws appear stricter in terms of the entry
control of staffing agencies.  This may be due to the distinctive histo-
ries in labor market developments.  Before World War II, unscrupulous
labor brokers were rampant in Japan and exploited a great number of
workers.  Thus, the image of labor intermediaries was quite negative.
This image later led to the prohibition of the labor supply business
under the Employment Security Act of 1947.  At the same time, the
lifetime employment system evolved and became widespread after
World War II, Japanese industrial relations and labor policies focused
on job security and seniority-based wages for full-time workers, and
temporary staffing agencies were not relevant to this focus.
Concerns arose in government and union circles that liberalization
of the labor supply business would undermine the job security of full-
time workers (who could be replaced by temporary agency workers),
reduce the bargaining power of labor, and as a result undermine the
Japanese employment system. Thus, in post–World War II Japan, regu-
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lation of the labor supply business was tight and, until the mid 1980s,
the numbers and job categories of temporary agency workers were lim-
ited. 
On the other hand, the United States has had a less regulated and
more flexible labor market for nonstandard employment.  A great vari-
ety of staffing businesses exist and they have extended their operations
to other countries.  In a sense, the emergence of these new businesses
has helped the economy to expand while lowering the unemployment
rate, but not without controversy over some aspects of this growing
category of workers. 
Different historical backgrounds and employment practices
explain some of the differences in the scale and patterns of growth in
nonstandard employment.  However, similar economic pressures influ-
enced the Japanese labor market to loosen restrictions on this form of
employment.  Intensified global competition and stronger pressure to
reduce labor costs in Japanese firms forced the government to signifi-
cantly liberalize the labor supply business and open the field for staff-
ing agencies.  
Currently, policymakers are considering further deregulation of the
labor supply business, such as the duration that temporary agency
workers can be hired, the maximum fees companies may charge, and,
most important, revision of the Employment Security law as it affects
and constrains the labor supply business.  Clearly, the trend in Japan is
toward greater deregulation as firms try to trim labor costs and become
more competitive.  Thus, a surge in the number of temporary agency
workers is expected.
Notes
1. The Temporary Help Business Act does not recognize as legitimate “temporary
help business” situations in which agency workers are hired by the client compa-
nies.  Thus, placement services are still prohibited under Article 44.
2. The Labor Standards Act provides a few exceptions.  For example, employers
who employ fewer than 10 employees shall not be obliged to draw up rules of
employment (Article 89), and the 40 working hour rule shall not be applied to
these small enterprises in commercial and service businesses (Article 40).  On the
other hand, neither the Trade Union Act, the Equal Employment Opportunities
Act, nor the Child and Family Care Leave Act provide exceptions for the size of
businesses.
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3. Unlike the U.S. majority representation system, small membership shall not be
construed as just cause for refusal to bargain.  Only employers are obliged to bar-
gain with unions.  The Trade Union Act in Japan does not require trade unions to
bargain with employers as the National Labor Relations Act does in the United
States.
4. For instance, because of the different definitions of an “employee” baseball play-
ers are deemed employees under the Trade Union Act but not under the Labor
Standards Act.  While the Trade Union Act defines an employee as “an individual
who makes a living depending upon a salary or wages,” the Labor Standards Act
specifies an employee as “an individual who is employed by a company or an
office, and paid wages.”  Based on this definition, baseball players are usually not
deemed employees. 
5. More specifically, 1) while regular workers who have worked for six months or
longer are entitled to 10 days of paid annual leave, and those who have worked for
six years and six months are entitled to 20 days, part-time workers who work for
four days a week are entitled to seven days for the former employment period, 15
days for the latter employment period (Article 39 of the Labor Standards Act);
and 2) workers with a fixed-term employment contract are eligible for maternity
leave under the Labor Standards Act.  Employers are not obliged to pay wages to
workers on maternity leave, the Employees Medical Insurance Act (Article 50, 60
percent of wages) and Unemployment Insurance Act (Article 61[4], 25 percent of
wages at present, 40 percent of wages after 2001) provide a certain level of
income security.
6. The Employees Pension Plan and the Employees Medical Insurance shall not be
applied to workers who are employed with a fixed-term contract shorter than two
months and whose working hours are less than 75 percent of those of regular
workers.  No unemployment insurance shall be applied to workers who work less
than 20 hours and who expect to work less than one year. 
7. Dependents include those who are a member in the same household as the
insured, and who earn less than US$10,833 annually (1,300,000 yen, US$1 =
120).  Dependents are exempted from the insurance premiums, which may result
in lower wages for part-time workers.  Moreover, dependents whose annual
income is less than US$8,583 (1,030,000 yen) are exempted from income tax lia-
bilities, and many companies provide family allowances to workers with depen-
dents if they satisfy this requirement.
8. The Labor Standards Act of Japan has 13 chapters whose provisions cover a wider
range than the Fair Labor Standards Act of the United States.
9. In most cases, transfers involve a parent company sending its employees to its
subsidiary or affiliated companies for the purpose of technical training, restructur-
ing, and so forth.  The working conditions of transferred workers are usually
unchanged; thus, it is not appropriate to discuss this issue here.  Further, the Tem-
porary Help Business Act excludes transfer of workers from the temporary
employment business under Article 2. 
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10. According to the survey, contract workers are those who are employed with a
fixed-term contract to be assigned to a specialized job, and casual workers are
those who are employed casually or daily with a fixed term of one month or
shorter.
11. To terminate a contract with a fixed-term employee could be deemed a breach of
contract, and it shall be allowed only when there is an unavoidable reason.
12. The Labor Standards Act prohibits unequal treatment or dismissal by reason of
the nationality, creed, or social status of any worker, dismissal during a period of
rest for medical treatment with respect to injuries or illnesses suffered in the
course of duty or within 30 days thereafter, and dismissal of women during a
period of rest before and after childbirth in accordance with the provisions of Arti-
cle 65 or within 30 days thereafter.  The Trade Union Act and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Act also have provisions on the ban of dismissal in certain
cases.  These provisions are applied equally to part-time workers and temporary
agency workers.
13. The Ministry of Labor settled on a guideline regarding conclusion, renewal, and
refusal of fixed-term employment contracts in December 2000.  The guideline
mentioned that this idea should be adopted in any fixed-term employment con-
tract, and clarified the standards on renewal and refusal.  It also ruled that employ-
ers should endeavor to notify workers of the reason for refusal to renew the
contract.
14. More specifically, the decision said “it is not unreasonable not to renew the con-
tract of casual workers when there was an unavoidable necessity to reduce person-
nel, and no way even to transfer the excess personnel to another establishment,
accordingly the employer has no choice other than not renewing the contracts
with casual workers without a voluntary resignation procedure of regular employ-
ees beforehand.”
15. Some argue that because of this ruling, employers limit the number of contracts
renewed and nonstandard workers do not expect a continuous employment rela-
tionship, which makes their status less stable.
16. See note 7.
17. Moreover, part-time workers who work 20–29 hours to be eligible for unemploy-
ment insurance must work more than 10 days per month in 12 consecutive
months.  Those who do not meet this requirement owing to adjustment of working
days are ineligible for unemployment benefit.
18. A lower court has concluded that “female part-timers whose duties were very sim-
ilar to those of female regular employees of the same establishment should be
entitled to wages equivalent to at least 80 percent of the regular employees. The
employer who had not paid that rate to the part-timers was liable and deemed to
be operating against public interest or the principle of comparable worth.  This
decision has been disparaged by some labor law scholars as a repugnant idea to
the Japanese custom. Consequently, the employer should pay the difference.  (See
Maruko Keiho-ki, Nagano Dist. Court, Ueda Chapter, March 15, 1996.)
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19. The original purpose was to distinguish “transfers” from temporary work.  Trans-
fers are not construed as the labor supply business and so are not prohibited under
Article 44 of the Employment Security Act.  In contrast, it is usually deemed to be
illegal for client companies to interview temporary agency workers in advance. 
20. Japan ratified on July 28, 1999.
21. Although we use the term “temporary work or temporary help” for Rodosha
Haken, it has traditionally been translated as “dispatched work.”
22. Article 40(2) of the Temporary Help Business Act clarifies that temporary jobs
whose duration are not limited are those specified by a government ordinance as
jobs that shall not threaten the sound employment stability and the chance to max-
imize employees’ ability for the entire tenure.  Article 4 of the Government Ordi-
nance for the Temporary Help Business Act specifies 26 jobs that were formerly
listed on the positive list.  It is considered harmless to substitute regular employ-
ees in these jobs.
23. For more details of the survey and analysis of the Amendment Act, see, Kojima
and Fujikawa 2000. 
24. We will not discuss the issues of part-time workers in the United States due to
space limitations.  In most states, part-time workers are defined as those who are
employed in jobs of fewer than 40 hours per week.  Compared with temporary
agency or leased employees, there are few legal concerns about the employment
of part-time workers because they are hired directly by their employers, and are
often included in the same bargaining units as regular employees.
25. Also called the “right of control” test.  It depends on the following 10 factors,
which may indicate independent contractor status (Restatement 2d, Agency, §220
(1958)): 1) the degree of “employer” control over the details of the work; 2)
whether the individual's business is a distinct occupation or business; 3) whether
the individual's occupation usually is done without supervision; 4) whether a high
level of skill is required by the occupation; 5) whether the worker provides the
supplies, tools, and the place of work; 6) the length of time the services are pro-
vided; 7) method of payment, by the job rather than the hour or day; 8) whether
the work is part of the regular business of the employer; 9) whether the parties
believe they are creating an independent contractor relationship; and 10) whether
the hiring entity is not in business.  Of these criteria, the right to control the
worker in the performance and manner of doing the work is the most decisive test
(Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Gould, 331 A.2d 55, 74 (Md. 1975)).
26. The IRS is concerned with determining whether a worker is an independent con-
tractor because employers are required to arrange for three types of employment
taxes for employees.  These are required under the Federal Insurance Contribu-
tions Act governing employer and employee contributions to the Social Security
System, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act governing employer contributions to
the unemployment fund, and the IRS rules governing employee personal income
tax withholding.  If the employer classifies independent contractors incorrectly,
and the IRS concludes that a worker is in fact an employee, the employer may be
liable for penalties as well as any unpaid taxes.  An important element often
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present in the case law where the courts have found a worker to be an employee,
not an independent contractor, is the ability of the employer to dictate not only the
result but also the process (or methods) the worker uses to produce his or her
result.
27. Also called the FLSA test.  The FLSA governs the federal minimum wage and
overtime pay obligations of many employers.  If the U.S. Department of Labor
determines that the workers are employees and not independent contractors, the
employer may be subject to substantial penalties, including payment of unpaid
overtime premiums to liquidated damages, fines of US$10,000 and six months’
imprisonment for willful violations.  The “economic realities” test focuses on
whether an individual is economically dependent on the business to which ser-
vices are provided, thus establishing employee status, or whether the worker
effectively is in business for himself or herself.  
28. Vizcaino et al. v. Microsoft Corporation et al., 120F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997), 97
F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir, 1996). D.C. No. CV-93-00178-CRD2/13/98, 173 F.3d
713 (9th Cir. 1999), Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., U.S., No.99-498, cert. denied 1/
10/00.
29. NATSS Connection for May 17, 1999. 
30. The benefits must include medical and dental insurance, at least half funded by
the staffing firm, 13 days of paid leave, training opportunities valued at US$500
per year, and a 401(k) or other retirement plan in which the staffing firm makes
partial matching contributions (see NATSS Connection for April 12, 1999). 
31. Other problems may be involved such as Workers’ Compensation benefits.  For
example, to obtain greater damages outside of Workers' Compensation benefits, a
worker injured on the job may resist the Workers' Compensation Law prohibition
of a direct cause of action against the employer for personal injury by claiming
that he was not an employee but an independent contractor at the time of the inci-
dent. 
32. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (1961).
33. Brocks v. Superior Care, 840 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1988).
34. Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, 611 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.wd 157
(2d Cir.1985).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.
36. Memorandum to regional administrators from Richard P. Wilson, Deputy Direc-
tor, Federal Compliance and State Programs, OSHA, Department of Labor (July
5, 1977).  
37. 29 C.F.R. § 2350-200b-1(a):1(b) (1992).
38. “Leased employees” means not only employees hired by employee leasing com-
panies, but also temporary agency workers who meet the requirements.
39. There is an exception to the rule that leased employees are considered employees
of the recipient.  The exception applies if not more than 20 percent of the recipi-
ent’s non–highly-compensated workforce consists of leased employees, and if the
leased employees are covered by a safe harbor retirement plan with a guaranteed
employer contribution rate of at least 10 percent of compensation.  It must provide
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for immediate full vesting and for participation by all employees of the leasing
organization for the plan year and each of the preceding four plan years.
40. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
41. NLRB v. Western Temporary Services, 821 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1987).  In this case,
the court found that the temporary help firm and its client both exercised substan-
tial control over the employees and that both were involved in determining the
essential terms and conditions of employment.  Thus, the court found that Western
and its client were joint employers.  Western and its client argued that the tempo-
rary workers had insufficient “community of interest” with the client’s full-time
workers to warrant including them in the bargaining unit.  The court held, how-
ever, that the temporaries worked on a “fairly regular basis over a sufficient
period of time and thus demonstrated a substantial interest in the unit’s wages,
hours and conditions of employment.”  Working an average of four hours per
week over a six-month period was held to be “fairly regular.”
42. See, for example., Laerco Trans. & Warehouse, 269 NLRB 324,325 (1984); TLI
Inc., 271 NLRB 798 (1984); and Lee Hospital, 300 NLRB 947 (1990).  
43. NLRB v. Browning Ferris Industries, 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982).
44. NLRB v. Western Temporary Services, and ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. M.B. Sturgis, Inc. and Jeffboat Div., American Commercial Marine Service Co.,
14-RC-11572, 9-UC-406; 331 NLRB No. 173 (2000). 
47. 300 NLRB 947 (1990).
48. Minnesota Department of Economic Security (1997). 
49. See National Association of Professional Employer Organizations online: <http://
www.napeo.org/index-j.html>.
50. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 provides that leased
employees must be counted by the client as employees for the purposes of quali-
fying retirement plans and certain other fringe benefits if the workers have pro-
vided these services “on a substantially full-time basis for at least a year” and the
client primarily controls or directs the work of the leased or temporary employees.
See Houseman (1999). 
51. See note 37.
52. See note 37. 
53. See, for details, Houseman and Osawa, this volume.
54. A survey conducted by Hewitt Associates in 1997; accessed online at: <http://
was.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroom>.
55. In Japan, a client company is prohibited by administrative notice to interview a
temporary agency worker before the contract begins.  This is because such action
might contravene the Employment Security Act prohibiting the labor supply busi-
ness.  The Amendment Act stipulates that client companies endeavor not to spec-
ify a temporary agency worker when concluding a contract of temporary help
service, and a guideline also prohibits client companies from interviewing a tem-
porary agency worker in advance or requesting his or her résumé as such actions
would specify a temporary agency worker.
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Work Attitudes and 
Nonstandard Work Arrangements
in the United States, 
Japan, and Europe
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Debates about the desirability and disadvantages of nonstandard
work arrangements often make assumptions about the motivations and
attitudes of individuals who work in these arrangements, as well as the
quality of jobs associated with them. For example, temporary work-
ers—and some part-time workers—are usually thought to work in their
jobs involuntarily and to have jobs with less security, lower earnings,
and fewer other job rewards. Consequently, temporary and part-time
workers are usually believed to be dissatisfied with their jobs and to
engage in fewer organizational citizenship behaviors. Although these
assumptions provide the basis for much of our thinking about non-
standard work arrangements and for our policy recommendations
related to them, these beliefs are often untested. 
To the extent that studies have examined the correlates of non-
standard work arrangements at all, they have generally focused on their
economic rewards (usually wages, and sometimes fringe benefits). We
know much less about the meanings that nonstandard workers attach to
their work, such as the extent to which they regard work as a central
life interest, the importance they place on various job characteristics,
and whether they choose nonstandard work voluntarily. It is commonly
assumed, for example, that part-time workers are more concerned than
full-time workers with nonwork aspects of life, such as family and lei-
sure, and that part-time and temporary workers are less concerned than
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full-time workers with career advancement. Moreover, we know rela-
tively little about the noneconomic benefits and utilities that nonstand-
ard workers obtain from their jobs, such as their degree of job security,
perceived opportunities for promotion, and assessments of the intrinsic
rewards (i.e., the degree to which jobs are interesting, meaningful, and
challenging). Finally, there is little empirical evidence available on
how regular full-time workers and nonstandard workers differ in mea-
sures of well-being, such as job satisfaction and work-related stress,
and outcomes, such as organizational commitment, work effort, and
absenteeism.
In this chapter, we seek to fill in some of these gaps by examining
the extent to which workers in nonstandard arrangements differ from
full-time workers in their work values, job rewards, work attitudes (job
satisfaction, work-related stress, and organizational commitment) and
work behaviors (such as reported absenteeism). Our analysis is based
on a cross-national survey data set, the 1997 International Social Sur-
vey Program (ISSP) module on “work orientations” (see Appendix A
for a description of the data). This data set permits us to examine the
work attitudes and job rewards associated with various nonstandard
work arrangements in the United States, Japan, and a number of Euro-
pean countries.
We first discuss how we measure nonstandard work arrangements
in this data set. We then summarize how our measures of work values,
job rewards, and worker attitudes and behaviors differ among the vari-
ous work arrangements and countries. Finally, we indicate implications
of our findings for future research on nonstandard work arrangements.
NONSTANDARD WORK ARRANGEMENTS
Types of Nonstandard Work Arrangements
Nonstandard work arrangements between an employer and worker
may differ in one or more ways from standard (i.e., full-time, open-
ended) work arrangements. First, nonstandard work arrangements
might be part-time and involve fewer hours per week than full-time
work. Second, they might be temporary, such as in fixed-term arrange-
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ments, where the employment relation is closed- rather than open-
ended. Third, the nonstandard work arrangement might not be an
employment relationship at all, but might constitute a contracting rela-
tionship between an employer and a self-employed contractor. We will
examine these three common types of nonstandard work arrangements
in this chapter.
Measuring Work Arrangements
We restricted the sample to those working for pay and then coded
respondents into four mutually exclusive types of work arrangements.
Respondents who indicated that they were self-employed were coded
as such regardless of their full- or part-time status. We identified as
“fixed-term temporaries” those who said that their job is for a fixed
term lasting either “less than 12 months” or “for one year or more.”1
The remaining respondents were then classified as being either full-
time or part-time based on a work status variable coded by the ISSP
researchers.2
Table 12.1 presents estimates of the prevalence of part-time, fixed-
term temporary, and self-employed work arrangements in the ISSP
data for the 11 countries we examine.3 In the remainder of the chapter,
we examine how these four categories of work arrangements differ
with regard to their work values, job rewards, and work attitudes and
behaviors. Appendix Table 12.B1 describes how we measured each of
these dependent variables in the ISSP data set. 
WORK VALUES
By work values, we mean the motivations that people have for
working and the importance they place on work in general and on spe-
cific facets of their jobs. Work values consist of three sets of concepts:
1) the extent to which people are involved in work, or the centrality of
work to their lives; 2) the importance people place on various job fac-
ets, or their “conceptions of the desirable” with regard to their work
activity; and 3) the extent to which people work in the particular
arrangement voluntarily or involuntarily.
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Table 12.1 Persons in Nonstandard Work Arrangements, 
by Country (%)
Table 12.2 presents descriptive statistics (means or percentages) on
these three sets of variables for each of the four work arrangements in
each of the 11 countries. Table 12.3 presents results for regression
models that estimate differences in these measures of work values
between full-time workers, on the one hand, and part-time, fixed-term,
and self-employed persons, on the other, controlling for gender, age,
education, and three dichotomous variables representing occupational
groups (i.e., managerial, professional, and other white-collar occupa-
tions). These regression coefficients were obtained from the following
equation, which we estimated for each work value.
(1) Y = a + b1PT + b2FIXED-TERM + b3SELF-EMPLOYED 
+ b4CONTROLS + e 
Centrality of Work
Part-time workers do not differ much from full-time workers in the
extent to which they regard work as a central life interest. This result is
consistent with analyses of U.S. data from earlier time periods (Kalle-
Country Part-time
Fixed-term 
(temp) Self-employed
United States 15 10 14
Japan 9 24 27
West Germany 11 9 11
Great Britain 15 12 15
Netherlands 35 22 NA
France 12 11 5
Italy 5 8 30
Spain 11 25 4
Denmark 14 11 7
Sweden 19 8 11
Norway 10 12 11
SOURCE:  1997 ISSP data.
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Table 12.2 Mean Work Values by Job Status and Country
Importance 
of . . . Work
Job 
security
High 
earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interest-ing 
work
Flexible 
hours
Percent 
involuntary
United States
Full-time 2.6 4.6 4.0 4.2 4.4 3.6 28.1
Part-time 2.5 4.4 3.8 4.2 4.5 3.7 43.2
Fixed-term 2.6 4.5 4.1 4.1 4.6 3.6 22.2
Self-employed 2.8 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.8 32.7
Total 2.6 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.6 30.3
Japan
Full-time 3.7 4.0 4.0 2.8 4.0 3.4 15.4
Part-time 4.1 3.9 3.7 2.6 3.9 3.6 22.6
Fixed-term 3.8 4.2 3.8 2.8 3.9 3.3 16.9
Self-employed 4.4 4.1 4.0 2.9 4.0 3.7 39.5
Total 4.0 4.1 3.9 2.8 4.0 3.5 22.8
West Germany
Full-time 2.9 4.7 3.9 3.8 4.5 3.3 27.3
Part-time 2.8 4.6 3.7 3.7 4.4 3.5 9.6
Fixed-term 2.7 4.6 3.8 3.9 4.6 3.4 25.8
Self-employed 3.1 4.3 3.5 3.7 4.6 3.6 35.5
Total 2.9 4.6 3.8 3.8 4.5 3.4 26.2
Great Britain
Full-time 2.5 4.7 3.9 4.0 4.5 3.2 30.9
(continued)
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428Table 12.2 (continued)
Importance 
of . . . Work
Job 
security
High 
earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interest-ing 
work
Flexible 
hours
Percent 
involuntary
Part-time 2.5 4.5 3.7 3.8 4.4 3.5 15.2
Fixed-term 2.6 4.6 3.8 4.0 4.5 3.3 30.2
Self-employed 2.7 4.5 3.8 3.8 4.4 3.5 32.9
Total 2.5 4.6 3.9 3.9 4.4 3.3 28.8
Netherlands
Full-time 2.8 4.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 3.4 19.3
Part-time 2.7 4.2 3.5 3.8 4.3 3.7 28.0
Fixed-term 2.7 4.2 3.5 3.9 4.4 3.6 22.5
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total 2.8 4.2 3.6 3.9 4.4 3.6 23.0
France
Full-time 3.0 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.7 3.6 52.7
Part-time 3.1 4.6 3.8 3.5 4.6 4.0 22.1
Fixed-term 3.2 4.5 3.8 3.6 4.6 3.6 33.3
Self-employed 3.5 4.2 3.8 3.6 4.7 3.9 58.3
Total 3.1 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.7 3.7 47.1
Italy
Full-time 3.0 4.6 4.1 3.9 4.4 3.8 34.4
Part-time 2.9 4.3 3.8 3.9 4.5 3.9 30.8
Fixed-term 3.4 4.7 4.1 3.9 4.5 3.6 39.5
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Self-employed 3.2 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.6 4.2 38.2
Total 3.1 4.6 4.1 3.9 4.5 3.9 35.8
Spain
Full-time 3.5 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.6 11.9
Part-time 2.9 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.1 3.9 50.0
Fixed-term 3.3 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.3 3.7 23.0
Self-employed 3.1 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.1 57.1
Total 3.4 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.6 20.3
Denmark
Full-time 3.1 4.1 3.5 3.2 4.6 3.4 27.0
Part-time 3.0 4.1 3.4 3.2 4.5 3.5 24.7
Fixed-term 2.9 3.7 3.5 3.3 4.6 3.4 29.7
Self-employed 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.1 4.7 4.2 26.7
Total 3.1 4.0 3.5 3.2 4.6 3.4 27.0
Sweden
Full-time 3.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 4.5 3.7 37.9
Part-time 3.3 4.5 3.7 3.3 4.4 3.7 26.7
Fixed-term 2.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 4.5 3.8 43.1
Self-employed 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.3 4.4 3.9 44.8
Total 3.1 4.4 3.8 3.4 4.5 3.8 37.0
Norway
Full-time 3.1 4.5 3.8 3.5 4.5 3.5 31.1
Part-time 3.1 4.6 3.6 3.3 4.4 3.6 18.2
(continued)
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Importance 
of . . . Work
Job 
security
High 
earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interest-ing 
work
Flexible 
hours
Percent 
involuntary
Fixed-term 3.1 4.3 3.6 3.5 4.6 3.4 19.4
Self-employed 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.2 4.4 3.7 52.9
Total 3.2 4.5 3.7 3.4 4.5 3.5 30.8
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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berg 1995).  The mean levels of work involvement are higher for part-
time than for full-time workers in Sweden, Japan, and France (Table
12.2), although this difference is statistically significant only in Swe-
den when we control for the background demographic variables and
occupational differences (Table 12.3). Only in Spain are part-time
workers significantly less likely than full-time workers to regard work
as a central life interest once we control for demographic and occupa-
tional differences.
Self-employed persons are more likely than full-time employees to
regard work as a central life interest (except in Spain; Table 12.2), but
this gap is statistically significant only in Sweden and (at p < 0.10) in
Norway and Italy (Table 12.3).
Fixed-term workers in Italy, France, and Norway are significantly
more likely than full-time workers to regard work as a central life inter-
est (Table 12.2). Fixed-term employees in West Germany, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden are less likely to be involved in
work than full-time workers (Table 12.2), but these differences are not
statistically significant when demographic and occupational variables
are controlled for (Table 12.3).
Importance of Job Facets
Individuals value different things about their work. Some persons
place primary importance on money, or extrinsic rewards. Others find
more meaning in jobs that are intrinsically satisfying. Still others see a
job as a stepping-stone to other, more highly rewarding jobs. This sec-
tion examines whether employees in nonstandard work arrangements
value different aspects of their jobs differently than full-time workers.
Job security
Part-time workers are significantly less likely to place high impor-
tance on job security than full-time workers in the United States, West
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain; part-time workers are more
likely than full-time workers in the Netherlands to value job security
(Table 12.3). Self-employed persons are significantly less likely to
value job security than are regular full-time employees in all countries
except Great Britain, Spain, and Japan (Table 12.3). Fixed-term
employees are significantly less likely than regular full-time workers in
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Table 12.3 Regressions of Work Values on Job Statusa
Dependent
 variable =
 Importance
 of . . . Work
Job
 security
High 
earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interesting 
work
Flexible 
hours Involuntaryb
United States
Part-time –0.13 –0.17** –0.21*** –0.04 0.08 0.05 1.92***
Fixed-term 0.00 –0.07 0.12 –0.07 0.10 0.01 0.68 
Self-employed 0.11 –0.27*** 0.01 –0.05 0.10 0.29*** 1.24
N = 817 808 806 801 806 800 816
Adj. R2 = 0.011 0.023 0.022 0.035 0.013 0.021 0.059
Japan
Part-time 0.18 –0.07 –0.20* 0.02 0.00 0.18 2.67**
Fixed-term 0.06 0.14* –0.12 –0.07 –0.05 –0.09 1.28 
Self-employed 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.28** 5.85***
N = 724 714 723 708 725 721 672
Adj. R2 = 0.109 0.019 0.024 0.025 0.015 0.028 0.121
West Germany
Part-time –0.18 –0.15* –0.14 –0.01 0.08** 0.19 0.12***
Fixed-term 0.01 –0.10 –0.14 0.12 0.08 –0.01 0.95 
Self-employed 0.06 –0.28*** –0.39*** –0.02 0.07* 0.33** 1.35 
N = 603 627 620 611 624 607 629
Adj. R2 = 0.057 0.036 0.027 0.001 0.051 0.015 0.156
Great Britain
Part-time 0.04 –0.25*** –0.16 –0.03 –0.01 0.19 0.19***
Fixed-term 0.21 –0.11 –0.06 0.05 0.08 –0.02 0.65 
Self-employed 0.12 –0.10 –0.12 –0.12 0.02 0.32*** 1.15 
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Table 12.2 Mean Work Values by Job Status and Country
Importance 
of . . . Work
Job 
security
High 
earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interest-ing 
work
Flexible 
hours
Percent 
involuntary
United States
Full-time 2.6 4.6 4.0 4.2 4.4 3.6 28.1
Part-time 2.5 4.4 3.8 4.2 4.5 3.7 43.2
Fixed-term 2.6 4.5 4.1 4.1 4.6 3.6 22.2
Self-employed 2.8 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.8 32.7
Total 2.6 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.6 30.3
Japan
Full-time 3.7 4.0 4.0 2.8 4.0 3.4 15.4
Part-time 4.1 3.9 3.7 2.6 3.9 3.6 22.6
Fixed-term 3.8 4.2 3.8 2.8 3.9 3.3 16.9
Self-employed 4.4 4.1 4.0 2.9 4.0 3.7 39.5
Total 4.0 4.1 3.9 2.8 4.0 3.5 22.8
West Germany
Full-time 2.9 4.7 3.9 3.8 4.5 3.3 27.3
Part-time 2.8 4.6 3.7 3.7 4.4 3.5 9.6
Fixed-term 2.7 4.6 3.8 3.9 4.6 3.4 25.8
Self-employed 3.1 4.3 3.5 3.7 4.6 3.6 35.5
Total 2.9 4.6 3.8 3.8 4.5 3.4 26.2
Great Britain
Full-time 2.5 4.7 3.9 4.0 4.5 3.2 30.9
(continued)
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428Table 12.2 (continued)
Importance 
of . . . Work
Job 
security
High 
earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interest-ing 
work
Flexible 
hours
Percent 
involuntary
Part-time 2.5 4.5 3.7 3.8 4.4 3.5 15.2
Fixed-term 2.6 4.6 3.8 4.0 4.5 3.3 30.2
Self-employed 2.7 4.5 3.8 3.8 4.4 3.5 32.9
Total 2.5 4.6 3.9 3.9 4.4 3.3 28.8
Netherlands
Full-time 2.8 4.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 3.4 19.3
Part-time 2.7 4.2 3.5 3.8 4.3 3.7 28.0
Fixed-term 2.7 4.2 3.5 3.9 4.4 3.6 22.5
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total 2.8 4.2 3.6 3.9 4.4 3.6 23.0
France
Full-time 3.0 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.7 3.6 52.7
Part-time 3.1 4.6 3.8 3.5 4.6 4.0 22.1
Fixed-term 3.2 4.5 3.8 3.6 4.6 3.6 33.3
Self-employed 3.5 4.2 3.8 3.6 4.7 3.9 58.3
Total 3.1 4.5 3.9 3.8 4.7 3.7 47.1
Italy
Full-time 3.0 4.6 4.1 3.9 4.4 3.8 34.4
Part-time 2.9 4.3 3.8 3.9 4.5 3.9 30.8
Fixed-term 3.4 4.7 4.1 3.9 4.5 3.6 39.5
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Self-employed 3.2 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.6 4.2 38.2
Total 3.1 4.6 4.1 3.9 4.5 3.9 35.8
Spain
Full-time 3.5 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.6 11.9
Part-time 2.9 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.1 3.9 50.0
Fixed-term 3.3 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.3 3.7 23.0
Self-employed 3.1 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.1 57.1
Total 3.4 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.6 20.3
Denmark
Full-time 3.1 4.1 3.5 3.2 4.6 3.4 27.0
Part-time 3.0 4.1 3.4 3.2 4.5 3.5 24.7
Fixed-term 2.9 3.7 3.5 3.3 4.6 3.4 29.7
Self-employed 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.1 4.7 4.2 26.7
Total 3.1 4.0 3.5 3.2 4.6 3.4 27.0
Sweden
Full-time 3.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 4.5 3.7 37.9
Part-time 3.3 4.5 3.7 3.3 4.4 3.7 26.7
Fixed-term 2.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 4.5 3.8 43.1
Self-employed 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.3 4.4 3.9 44.8
Total 3.1 4.4 3.8 3.4 4.5 3.8 37.0
Norway
Full-time 3.1 4.5 3.8 3.5 4.5 3.5 31.1
Part-time 3.1 4.6 3.6 3.3 4.4 3.6 18.2
(continued)
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430Table 12.2 (continued)
Importance 
of . . . Work
Job 
security
High 
earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interest-ing 
work
Flexible 
hours
Percent 
involuntary
Fixed-term 3.1 4.3 3.6 3.5 4.6 3.4 19.4
Self-employed 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.2 4.4 3.7 52.9
Total 3.2 4.5 3.7 3.4 4.5 3.5 30.8
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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Table 12.3 Regressions of Work Values on Job Statusa
Dependent
 variable =
 Importance
 of . . . Work
Job
 security
High 
earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interesting 
work
Flexible 
hours Involuntaryb
United States
Part-time –0.13 –0.17** –0.21*** –0.04 0.08 0.05 1.92***
Fixed-term 0.00 –0.07 0.12 –0.07 0.10 0.01 0.68 
Self-employed 0.11 –0.27*** 0.01 –0.05 0.10 0.29*** 1.24
N = 817 808 806 801 806 800 816
Adj. R2 = 0.011 0.023 0.022 0.035 0.013 0.021 0.059
Japan
Part-time 0.18 –0.07 –0.20* 0.02 0.00 0.18 2.67**
Fixed-term 0.06 0.14* –0.12 –0.07 –0.05 –0.09 1.28 
Self-employed 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.28** 5.85***
N = 724 714 723 708 725 721 672
Adj. R2 = 0.109 0.019 0.024 0.025 0.015 0.028 0.121
West Germany
Part-time –0.18 –0.15* –0.14 –0.01 0.08** 0.19 0.12***
Fixed-term 0.01 –0.10 –0.14 0.12 0.08 –0.01 0.95 
Self-employed 0.06 –0.28*** –0.39*** –0.02 0.07* 0.33** 1.35 
N = 603 627 620 611 624 607 629
Adj. R2 = 0.057 0.036 0.027 0.001 0.051 0.015 0.156
Great Britain
Part-time 0.04 –0.25*** –0.16 –0.03 –0.01 0.19 0.19***
Fixed-term 0.21 –0.11 –0.06 0.05 0.08 –0.02 0.65 
Self-employed 0.12 –0.10 –0.12 –0.12 0.02 0.32*** 1.15 
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N = 523 539 535 535 535 534 540
Adj. R2 = 0.015 0.013 0.026 0.024 0.046 0.030 0.120
Netherlands
Part-time –0.03 0.12* –0.05 –0.03 0.06 0.17* 1.95***
Fixed-term –0.06 0.09 –0.08 –0.03 0.05 0.05 1.27 
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
N = 1204 662 651 646 381 1146 1063
Adj. R2 = 0.036 0.042 0.039 0.031 0.049 0.028 0.034
France
Part-time 0.08 –0.09 –0.12 –0.32*** –0.03 0.23 0.17***
Fixed-term 0.32** –0.15* –0.23** –0.26** –0.01 –0.11 0.37***
Self-employed 0.36 –0.37*** –0.17 –0.29* 0.04 0.29 1.69 
N = 687 689 679 676 686 673 693
Adj. R2 = 0.080 0.085 0.012 0.031 0.015 0.024 0.129
Italy
Part-time 0.17 –0.30** –0.31* –0.02 0.06 0.00 0.48 
Fixed-term 0.50** 0.12 –0.05 0.03 0.09 –0.26 0.97 
Self-employed 0.25* –0.22*** –0.11 0.01 0.16*** 0.34*** 1.10 
N = 476 475 475 473 476 473 474
Adj. R2 = 0.041 0.071 0.032 0.021 0.046 0.047 0.085
Spain
Part-time –0.616*** –0.19* 0.16 –0.11 –0.05 0.47** 6.65***
Fixed-term –0.128 –0.06 0.02 –0.10 0.04 0.19 1.69 
Self-employed –0.522 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.54* 13.75***
N = 388 392 391 391 391 387 392
Adj. R2 = 0.044 0.003 0.005 –0.012 0.051 0.018 0.200
(continued)
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N = 523 539 535 535 535 534 540
Adj. R2 = 0.015 0.013 0.026 0.024 0.046 0.030 0.120
Netherlands
Part-time –0.03 0.12* –0.05 –0.03 0.06 0.17* 1.95***
Fixed-term –0.06 0.09 –0.08 –0.03 0.05 0.05 1.27 
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
N = 1204 662 651 646 381 1146 1063
Adj. R2 = 0.036 0.042 0.039 0.031 0.049 0.028 0.034
France
Part-time 0.08 –0.09 –0.12 –0.32*** –0.03 0.23 0.17***
Fixed-term 0.32** –0.15* –0.23** –0.26** –0.01 –0.11 0.37***
Self-employed 0.36 –0.37*** –0.17 –0.29* 0.04 0.29 1.69 
N = 687 689 679 676 686 673 693
Adj. R2 = 0.080 0.085 0.012 0.031 0.015 0.024 0.129
Italy
Part-time 0.17 –0.30** –0.31* –0.02 0.06 0.00 0.48 
Fixed-term 0.50** 0.12 –0.05 0.03 0.09 –0.26 0.97 
Self-employed 0.25* –0.22*** –0.11 0.01 0.16*** 0.34*** 1.10 
N = 476 475 475 473 476 473 474
Adj. R2 = 0.041 0.071 0.032 0.021 0.046 0.047 0.085
Spain
Part-time –0.616*** –0.19* 0.16 –0.11 –0.05 0.47** 6.65***
Fixed-term –0.128 –0.06 0.02 –0.10 0.04 0.19 1.69 
Self-employed –0.522 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.54* 13.75***
N = 388 392 391 391 391 387 392
Adj. R2 = 0.044 0.003 0.005 –0.012 0.051 0.018 0.200
(continued)
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434Dependent
 variable =
 Importance
 of . . . Work
Job
 security
High 
earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interesting 
work
Flexible 
hours Involuntaryb
Denmark
Part-time –0.053 –0.09 –0.08 0.06 –0.10 0.01 0.60*
Fixed-term 0.017 –0.40*** 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.10 1.51 
Self-employed 0.358 –0.50*** –0.24 –0.17 0.15 0.92*** 1.08 
N = 625 623 625 625 625 623 625
Adj. R2 = 0.062 0.064 0.008 0.057 0.041 0.049 0.053
Sweden
Part-time 0.24** –0.11 –0.19* –0.12 –0.14** 0.03 0.38***
Fixed-term –0.20 –0.28*** –0.28*** –0.26** –0.07 –0.01 1.02 
Self-employed 0.32** –0.63*** –0.32*** –0.12 0.00 0.14 1.63**
N = 750 773 769 765 772 769 786
Adj. R2 = 0.114 0.157 0.034 0.046 0.073 0.030 0.072
Norway
Part-time 0.003 –0.09 –0.15** –0.13 –0.04 0.06 0.21***
Fixed-term 0.000** –0.22*** –0.14** –0.01 0.09** –0.17** 0.39***
Self-employed 0.000* –0.34*** –0.26*** –0.24*** –0.03 0.30*** 3.42***
N = 1406 1433 1425 1413 1427 1423 1432
Adj. R2 = 0.079 0.085 0.023 0.045 0.038 0.032 0.192
*p ≤ 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
a Unstandardized coefficients are presented.
b The last column reports odds ratios from logistic regressions and the Nagelkerke R2. All the other coefficients are unstandardized OLS estimates. All mod-
els control for sex, age, education, and occupation (except the model for the Netherlands, which does not include variables for occupation).The Nagelkerke
R2 is a measure of the strength of association in a logistic regression model (see N.J.D. Nagelkerke, 1991. “A Note on a General Definition of the Coef-
ficient of Determination.” Biometrika 78(3): 691–692. There is, however, no widely accepted direct analog to OLS regression's R2 in a logistic regression.
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and France, to value job security, but they
are more likely to value job security in Japan (Table 12.3).
Earnings
Full-time workers are more likely to place greater importance on
high income than part-time workers in all countries except Spain
(Table 12.2). The differences between part- and full-time workers
remain statistically significant in the United States, Japan, Italy, Swe-
den, and Norway once we control for demographic characteristics and
occupational differences (Table 12.3). 
Fixed-term employees in France, Sweden, and Norway are signifi-
cantly less likely to value high income; only in West Germany, Swe-
den, and Norway are self-employed persons significantly less likely
than full-time employees to value high income (Table 12.3).
Opportunities for promotion
Individuals in the four work arrangements do not appear to differ
much in the importance they place on opportunities for promotion.
Part-time workers place less value on opportunities for promotion than
full-time workers in Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, the Nether-
lands, France, Spain, Sweden, and Norway (Table 12.2), although only
in France are these differences statistically significant once we control
for demographic characteristics and occupational groups (Table 12.3).
In addition only in France and Sweden do fixed-term employees place
significantly less importance than full-time workers on opportunities
for promotion (Table 12.3).
Interesting work
There are also relatively few differences among workers in terms
of the importance placed on interesting work. Part-time workers value
interesting work significantly more than full-time workers only in
West Germany and they value it less only in Sweden. Self-employed
persons in West Germany and Italy are significantly more likely to
value interesting work. Fixed-term and full-time employees differ in
the importance they place on having interesting work only in Norway
(fixed-term workers value this more; Table 12.3).
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Flexible hours
Part-time workers are more likely than full-time workers to value
flexible hours in all countries except Sweden (Table 12.2), but only in
the Netherlands, France, and Spain is this difference statistically signif-
icant once we control for demographic characteristics and occupation
(Table 12.3). Self-employed persons value flexible work more highly
than regular full-time workers in all countries (Table 12.2); this differ-
ence remains statistically significant after controlling for the back-
ground demographic variables and occupation in all countries except
France and Sweden (Table 12.3). This pattern is consistent with the
view that workers (especially women with children) often become self-
employed to have greater flexibility in their schedules (Boden 1999).
Full-time and fixed-term employees do not differ significantly in the
importance they place on flexible hours except in Norway (where
fixed-term employees value flexible hours less; Table 12.3).
Working Voluntarily versus Involuntarily
Individuals may choose or be constrained to work in the various
types of work arrangements. Research on this issue, of course, is ham-
pered by the ambiguity of what is meant by “voluntary” behavior. 
We coded respondents as working voluntarily or involuntarily dif-
ferently in the various work arrangements. Self-employed persons
were coded as involuntary if they said that they would rather work for
someone else as opposed to being self-employed. Full-time workers
were coded as involuntary if they said that they would rather work
part-time, while part-time workers were coded as involuntary if they
said that they preferred to work full-time. Unfortunately, we do not
have a measure of whether fixed-term workers chose temporary work
arrangements involuntarily. Thus, for fixed-term employees, we cre-
ated a measure of involuntary status based on their part-time/full-time
status. The resulting estimates for fixed-term employees are somewhat
lower than we would expect based on a conventional understanding of
involuntary employment given that most fixed-term employees do not
likely choose fixed-term work. For example, data from the Current
Population Surveys (CPS) in the United States indicate that people
tend to work in temporary jobs involuntarily in the sense that they
would prefer to work in standard work arrangements.4 
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Workers in the United States are especially likely to say they are
working part-time involuntarily. Our results suggest that 43.2 percent
of part-time workers in the United States are involuntary, a little higher
than estimates based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), which indicate that about one-third of part-time workers in
1993 preferred a full-time job. Our estimate of involuntary full-time
employment in the United States (28.1 percent) is also higher than the
estimate from BLS data of the full-time workers who prefer part-time
jobs (about 10 percent in 1985; see Tilly 1996). Fifty percent of the
part-time workers in Spain and 30.8 percent of part-time workers in
Italy also say that they would prefer a full-time job (Table 12.2). Rela-
tively few part-time workers in West Germany (9.6 percent) and Great
Britain (15.2 percent) say they would prefer a full-time job. On the
other hand, more than half the full-time employees in France say they
would prefer a part-time job. Part-time workers in the United States,
Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain are significantly more likely to
desire a change in work status than full-time employees. In Italy, part-
time workers and full-time workers are equally likely to desire a
change in work status. In all the other countries, workers seem to prefer
part-time work: a larger percentage of full-time workers desire part-
time work than vice versa (Table 12.3).
More than one-quarter of self-employed persons in each country
say that they would prefer to work for someone else (Table 12.2); the
highest percentages (more than half of such persons) are in Spain, Nor-
way, and France. Approximately 40 percent of self-employed persons
in Sweden and Japan say they would rather work for someone else. In
some cases, these relatively high rates of involuntary self-employment
may reflect poor economic conditions. For example, in Japan, a signif-
icant portion of unemployment is likely to be disguised as self-employ-
ment. Given the prolonged recession in that country, the Japanese have
a tendency to dismiss (retire) older workers and hire them back as low-
paid consultants. 
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JOB REWARDS
Job rewards refers to the benefits and utilities that people obtain
from their jobs. Most research on nonstandard work and job rewards
focuses on earnings and has shown that part-time workers and tempo-
raries generally earn less than regular full-time workers and they
receive fewer fringe benefits. However, workers may also seek other,
noneconomic benefits from their jobs. These include intrinsic rewards
obtained from jobs that are interesting, meaningful, and challenging;
opportunities for promotion and career advancement; job security; and
flexibility in setting one’s own hours.
Table 12.4 presents mean levels of job rewards for each work
arrangement in each of the 11 countries. Table 12.5 presents results for
regression models that estimate differences in these measures of job
rewards between full-time workers, on the one hand, and part-time,
fixed-term, and self-employed persons, on the other, controlling for the
importance the person places on the reward, along with his or her gen-
der, age, education, and occupation (similar to Equation 1). 
Perception of pay
Full-time employees perceive that their pay is high compared with
part-time workers in each country (Table 12.4), although the gap is sta-
tistically significant only in West Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
and Sweden (Table 12.5). Full-time workers are more likely than
fixed-term employees to perceive that their pay is good in all countries,
except Japan (Tables 12.4 and 12.5) and Norway (Table 12.5). Full-
time employees are significantly more likely than self-employed per-
sons in Japan, West Germany, and Sweden to perceive that their pay is
high (Table 12.5).
Job security
The differences between part-time and full-time employees in their
perceived job security are not large. Part-time workers are less likely
than full-time workers in Japan, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, and Norway to report that their job security is good
(Table 12.4), but only in Italy is this difference statistically significant
once we control for the background demographic variables and occu-
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Table 12.4 Mean Reported Level of Job Rewards by Job Status and Country
Reported level of . . .
Fear of 
losing job
Job 
security Earnings
Opportunity for 
promotion
Interesting
 job
Ability to 
set hours
United States
Full-time 1.7 3.8 2.8 2.9 3.8 1.5
Part-time 1.5 3.8 2.5 2.7 3.7 1.6
Fixed-term 1.9 3.5 2.5 2.8 3.8 1.4
Self-employed 1.5 3.8 3.0 3.2 4.2 2.3
Total 1.6 3.8 2.7 2.9 3.8 1.6
Japan
Full-time 1.7 3.8 2.5 2.2 3.5 1.3
Part-time 1.5 3.7 2.3 1.3 3.4 1.3
Fixed-term 1.6 3.9 2.7 2.2 3.6 1.3
Self-employed 1.6 4.1 2.6 2.1 3.9 2.3
Total 1.6 3.9 2.6 2.1 3.6 1.6
West Germany
Full-time 2.0 4.0 3.0 2.6 4.0 1.5
Part-time 1.7 3.9 2.4 2.0 3.8 1.7
Fixed-term 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.5 4.1 1.4
Self-employed 1.9 3.6 2.8 2.6 4.4 2.5
Total 2.0 3.8 2.8 2.5 4.1 1.6
Great Britain
Full-time 2.0 3.4 2.6 2.7 3.7 1.5
Part-time 1.7 3.6 2.2 2.4 3.7 1.5
(continued)
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Reported level of . . .
Fear of 
losing job
Job 
security Earnings
Opportunity for 
promotion
Interesting
 job
Ability to 
set hours
Fixed-term 2.1 3.2 2.1 2.5 3.7 1.4
Self-employed 1.9 3.0 2.6 2.5 4.0 2.2
Total 2.0 3.3 2.5 2.6 3.7 1.6
Netherlands
Full-time 1.5 3.8 3.0 2.9 3.9 1.6
Part-time 1.5 3.7 2.6 2.5 3.7 1.6
Fixed-term 1.6 3.5 2.7 2.8 3.8 1.5
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total 1.5 3.7 2.8 2.7 3.8 1.6
France
Full-time 1.9 3.4 2.6 2.4 4.0 1.6
Part-time 1.9 3.5 2.3 2.1 3.8 1.6
Fixed-term 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.1 3.9 1.4
Self-employed 2.0 3.0 2.7 2.4 4.3 2.4
Total 2.0 3.3 2.5 2.3 3.9 1.6
Italy
Full-time 1.8 4.0 2.9 2.5 3.7 1.4
Part-time 1.8 2.7 2.4 2.3 3.6 1.8
Fixed-term 2.3 3.2 2.5 2.1 3.4 1.3
Self-employed 1.9 3.3 2.9 2.7 4.2 2.3
Total 1.9 3.6 2.8 2.5 3.8 1.7
Spain
Full-time 2.4 3.8 2.7 2.5 3.7 1.5
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Part-time 2.6 3.4 2.0 1.6 3.3 1.6
Fixed-term 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.4 3.4 1.2
Self-employed 2.8 3.1 2.5 2.0 4.1 2.5
Total 2.6 3.5 2.5 2.4 3.6 1.5
Denmark
Full-time 1.5 4.2 3.2 2.5 4.4 1.6
Part-time 1.5 4.4 2.8 2.3 4.3 1.5
Fixed-term 1.6 3.5 2.6 2.4 4.4 1.6
Self-employed 1.6 4.3 3.4 2.5 4.8 2.6
Total 1.5 4.2 3.1 2.5 4.4 1.7
Sweden
Full-time 1.8 3.7 2.7 2.7 3.9 1.7
Part-time 1.9 3.5 2.1 2.3 3.7 1.7
Fixed-term 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 3.8 1.7
Self-employed 1.6 3.1 2.6 2.9 4.2 2.5
Total 1.8 3.5 2.5 2.7 3.9 1.8
Norway
Full-time 1.4 3.9 2.6 2.5 3.9 1.5
Part-time 1.5 3.8 2.1 2.0 3.6 1.4
Fixed-term 1.7 3.3 2.3 2.5 3.9 1.4
Self-employed 1.5 3.5 2.6 2.3 4.1 2.4
Total 1.5 3.8 2.5 2.5 3.9 1.6
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 441  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
442 Kalleberg and Reynolds
pational differences (Table 12.5). Part-time workers are significantly
more likely than full-time workers in Great Britain and Denmark to per-
ceive that their job security is good (at p ≤ 0.10; Table 12.5). Part-time
workers are significantly less likely than full-time employees in the
United States, West Germany, and Great Britain to worry about the pos-
sibility of losing their jobs (Table 12.5).
Fixed-term employees perceive that they have significantly less job
security than regular full-time workers in the United States, West Ger-
many, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway (Table 12.5). In Japan, the mean of perceived job security is
slightly higher for fixed-term relative to full-time employees (Table
12.4), but this difference is not statistically significant (Table 12.5).
Fixed-term employees are also significantly more likely than regular
full-time workers in West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and
Norway to worry about the possibility of losing their jobs (Table 12.5).
Self-employed persons perceive that they have significantly less job
security than full-time workers in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, and Norway. In Japan, self-employed persons perceive
that they have more job security—and are less likely to worry about los-
ing their jobs—than full-time workers (Table 12.5). 
Opportunities for promotion
Part-time workers are significantly less likely than full-time work-
ers in the United States, Japan, West Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, and Norway to perceive that they have good opportunities for
advancement within their organizations (Table 12.5). Fixed-term
employees perceive that they have lower promotion possibilities than
full-time employees in West Germany, France, Italy, and Sweden
(Table 12.5). Self-employed persons perceive that they have signifi-
cantly better opportunities for promotion than full-time workers only in
the United States and Sweden, and they report lower opportunities for
promotion in Japan, Spain, and Norway (Table 12.5), though the mean-
ing of promotion is somewhat ambiguous for self-employed persons.
Interesting work
In all countries except Spain, self-employed persons are more likely
than regular full-time workers to believe that their jobs are interesting
(Table 12.5). This undoubtedly reflects the greater control over work
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Dependent variable = 
Self-reported . . .
Fear of 
losing job
Job 
security Earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interesting 
job
Ability to 
set hours
United States
Part-time –0.17* –0.03 –0.16 –0.19* –0.03 0.14**
Fixed-term 0.17 –0.34*** –0.37*** –0.16 –0.11 –0.13*
Self-employed –0.14 0.01 0.08 0.28*** 0.43*** 0.78***
Valuation of reward 0.03 0.10* 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.00 
N = 792 780 780 772 782 782
Adj. R2 = 0.007 0.010 0.078 0.079 0.083 0.233
Japan
Part-time –0.10 –0.20 –0.31 –0.47*** 0.05 0.28***
Fixed-term –0.06 0.06 0.10 –0.01 0.05 0.04 
Self-employed –0.26** 0.42** –0.50*** –0.28** 0.40** 1.21***
Valuation of reward –0.03 0.14** 0.03 0.25*** 0.43*** 0.10***
N = 714 685 661 669 715 713
Adj. R2 = 0.040 0.027 0.045 0.181 0.112 0.383
West Germany
Part-time –0.29** 0.03 –0.32** –0.26* 0.12 0.21***
Fixed-term 0.72*** –1.35*** –0.52*** –0.31* 0.12 –0.08 
Self-employed –0.14 –0.35** –0.31** 0.02 0.11* 0.83***
Valuation of reward 0.04 0.10 0.14*** 0.38*** 0.06*** 0.09***
N = 600 602 604 586 615 601
Adj. R2 = 0.062 0.133 0.193 0.207 0.149 0.286
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Great Britain
Part-time –0.34** 0.30* –0.08 0.02 0.03 0.10 
Fixed-term 0.07 –0.17 –0.43*** –0.05 –0.02 –0.01 
Self-employed –0.13 –0.40*** 0.02 –0.02 0.35*** 0.73***
Valuation of reward 0.03 0.11 0.10* 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.10***
N = 520 531 527 516 527 528
Adj. R2 = 0.006 0.044 0.090 0.114 0.096 0.228
Netherlands
Part-time –0.06 –0.09 –0.26*** –0.24*** –0.14** 0.03 
Fixed-term 0.09 –0.18** –0.15* –0.10 –0.06 –0.12**
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA
Valuation of reward –0.01 0.01 0.06 0.12*** 0.30*** 0.05***
N = 1056 1026 1034 1034 1049 1058
Adj. R2 = 0.003 0.006 0.070 0.069 0.064 0.047
France
Part-time –0.14 0.04 –0.14 –0.06 –0.14 0.07 
Fixed-term 0.54*** –1.05*** –0.43*** –0.26** –0.03 –0.12 
Self-employed –0.03 –0.18 0.10 0.10 0.42*** 0.76***
Valuation of reward 0.01 0.16** –0.06 0.09** 0.27*** 0.02 
N = 670 677 669 656 679 667
Adj. R2 = 0.099 0.120 0.152 0.115 0.113 0.178
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Dependent variable = 
Self-reported . . .
Fear of 
losing job
Job 
security Earnings
Oppty. for 
promotion
Interesting 
job
Ability to 
set hours
Italy
Part-time 0.05 –1.11*** –0.22 –0.12 0.02 0.39***
Fixed-term 0.44** –0.77*** –0.28* –0.34* –0.32* –0.07 
Self-employed 0.01 –0.64*** 0.08 0.17 0.60*** 0.96***
Valuation of reward –0.01 0.24*** 0.08 0.16** 0.19** 0.05*
N = 459 471 474 468 476 472
Adj. R2 = 0.055 0.145 0.068 0.076 0.141 0.416
Spain
Part-time 0.18 0.02 –0.50*** –0.56*** –0.09 0.16 
Fixed-term 0.49*** –0.77*** –0.30** –0.04 –0.23* –0.25***
Self-employed 0.43 –0.85** –0.18 –0.49* 0.39 0.84***
Valuation of reward 0.00 0.08 0.03 –0.07 0.10 0.10***
N = 378 388 388 382 389 386
Adj. R2 = 0.064 0.186 0.102 0.110 0.122 0.162
Denmark
Part-time 0.07 0.23* –0.06 –0.17 0.00 –0.07  
Fixed-term 0.08 –0.80*** –0.46*** –0.11 0.10 0.02  
Self-employed 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.30 0.29** 0.77***
Valuation of reward –0.01 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.13***
N = 622 617 625 622 625 623
Adj. R2 = 0.005 0.063 0.115 0.183 0.189 0.249
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Sweden
Part-time 0.04 –0.14 –0.30*** –0.25** –0.18** –0.01 
Fixed-term 0.42*** –1.46*** –0.50*** –0.25** –0.08 –0.08 
Self-employed –0.16 –0.68*** –0.20* 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.77***
Valuation of reward 0.02 –0.03 –0.07 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.08***
N = 748 751 760 741 766 765
Adj. R2 = 0.034 0.137 0.174 0.132 0.148 0.234
Norway
Part-time 0.07 –0.07 –0.15 –0.22* –0.21*** 0.03 
Fixed-term 0.29*** –0.67*** –0.11 0.01 0.04 –0.03 
Self-employed –0.04 –0.23** –0.08 –0.15* 0.28*** 0.79***
Valuation of reward 0.04** 0.19*** 0.07** 0.19*** 0.31*** 0.11***
N = 1363 1399 1419 1379 1416 1413
Adj. R2 = 0.043 0.089 0.117 0.153 0.143 0.287
*p ≤ 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; * **p ≤ 0.01.
a The data are unstandardized coefficients from equations that control for sex, age, education, and occupation.  The models for the Neth-
erlands do not control for occupation.
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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and “being the boss” that accompanies self-employment. Only in the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway are part-time workers significantly
less likely than full-time workers to perceive that their jobs are interest-
ing (Table 12.5). Only in Italy and Spain are fixed-term employees less
likely than regular full-time workers to believe that their jobs are inter-
esting (at p ≤ 0.10; Table 12.5).
Control over work schedule
Part-time workers are significantly more likely than full-time
workers in the United States, Japan, West Germany, and Italy to
believe that they can decide when they start and finish work (Table
12.5).5 In contrast, fixed-term employees believe that they have signifi-
cantly less control over their schedule than full-time workers (Table
12.4), but this gap is statistically significant only in the United States,
the Netherlands, and Spain (Table 12.5). Self-employed persons per-
ceive that they have significantly more control over their work sched-
ules than full-time workers in all the countries, again reflecting the
greater control over work in general that is enjoyed by the self-
employed (Table 12.5).
The regression analyses reported in Table 12.5 included as a
regressor the degree of importance the respondent placed on the
reward. Thus, any differences between full-time workers and the vari-
ous categories of nonstandard work are not because of differences in
the valuation of these job rewards.6 Valuation of a particular reward
was significantly (positively) related to the job reward in 41 of 66
regressions. This suggests that workers tend to have jobs that corre-
spond to their values, although the exact mechanism by which this
occurs is ambiguous; this could occur, for example, if people select (or
are otherwise sorted into) jobs that have characteristics that they
believe are important, or if people tend to value what they are already
receiving. 
WORK ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS
We examine two kinds of outcomes. First, we study work attitudes
that reflect the worker’s overall affective evaluation of the job (job sat-
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isfaction) and the degree of perceived stress in the job. A large research
literature has established that both of these work-related attitudes are
linked to a wide variety of nonwork outcomes, such as psychological
and physical well-being. Second, we examine work attitudes and
behaviors that are important for the organization and its performance:
the degree to which the worker is committed to the organization
(defined as identifying with the organization’s goals, intending to
remain with the organization, and willingness to work hard in the orga-
nization’s behalf); and the extent to which the worker is absent from
work (self-reported). Table 12.6 presents the means of each of these
dependent variables, separately by work arrangement and country.
To examine differences among work arrangements in these out-
comes, we estimate two models. First, we estimate a slightly modified
version of Equation 1 that also controls for involuntary status (Equa-
tion 2). This determines whether there are differences in these worker
outcomes among the various types of nonstandard work arrangements
after controlling for 1) whether the person works in the particular work
status involuntarily, and 2) demographic background and occupational
variables. Second, we estimate Equation 3, which determines the
extent to which there are net differences among work arrangements,
controlling for work values and job rewards.7
(2) Y = a + b1PT + b2FIXED-TERM + b3SELF-EMPLOYED 
+ b4INVOL + b5CONTROLS + e  
(3) Y = a + b1PT + b2 FIXED-TERM + b3SELF-EMPLOYED 
+ b4INVOL + b5WORK VALUES + b6JOB REWARDS 
+ b7CONTROLS + e
Job Satisfaction
The results for job satisfaction are presented in the first set of col-
umns in Table 12.7. The first set of columns in Table 12.6 presents
estimates of overall mean differences in job satisfaction among the var-
ious work arrangements. Part-time workers are more satisfied with
their jobs than are full-time workers in the United States, Japan, West
Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, but part-time workers are
less satisfied than full-time workers in Italy, Spain, and Sweden (Table
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Table 12.6 Mean Reported Levels of Worker Outcomes, Organizational Commitment, and Absenteeism by Job 
Status and Country
Reported . . .
Job 
satisfaction
Work-related 
stress
Organizational 
commitment Effort
Days absent in 
last 6 months
United States
Full-time 5.3 3.3 3.5 3.9 0.8
Part-time 5.5 2.9 3.4 3.9 1.1
Fixed-term 5.3 3.4 3.4 4.0 0.9
Self-employed 5.6 3.3 3.9 4.1 0.7
Total 5.4 3.3 3.5 3.9 0.9
Japan
Full-time 4.7 3.3 3.3 3.5 1.2
Part-time 5.0 2.8 3.3 3.1 1.5
Fixed-term 4.8 3.4 3.4 3.6 1.4
Self-employed 5.2 3.0 3.8 4.0 1.1
Total 4.9 3.2 3.5 3.6 1.3
West Germany
Full-time 5.1 3.3 3.2 3.5 0.8
Part-time 5.3 2.9 3.2 3.2 0.8
Fixed-term 5.3 3.1 3.0 3.4 1.0
Self-employed 5.6 3.1 3.5 3.8 0.6
Total 5.2 3.2 3.2 3.5 0.8
Great Britain
Full-time 5.0 3.3 3.2 3.6 0.8
(continued)
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Reported . . .
Job 
satisfaction
Work-related 
stress
Organizational 
commitment Effort
Days absent in 
last 6 months
Part-time 5.4 2.6 3.4 3.6 0.6
Fixed-term 5.1 3.2 3.2 3.6 0.8
Self-employed 5.4 3.1 3.4 3.8 0.5
Total 5.1 3.2 3.3 3.6 0.7
Netherlands
Full-time 5.4 3.2 3.4 3.7 0.9
Part-time 5.5 2.6 3.2 3.5 0.9
Fixed-term 5.4 2.9 3.3 3.6 1.0
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA
Total 5.4 2.9 3.3 3.6 0.9
France
Full-time 5.1 3.5 2.9 2.8 0.5
Part-time 5.1 3.3 2.8 2.8 0.5
Fixed-term 5.0 3.1 2.9 2.7 0.5
Self-employed 5.5 3.5 3.4 3.1 0.2
Total 5.1 3.4 2.9 2.8 0.5
Italy
Full-time 5.1 3.2 2.9 2.8 0.7
Part-time 4.6 2.7 3.1 3.2 0.8
Fixed-term 4.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 0.5
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Self-employed 5.5 3.2 3.5 3.3 0.6
Total 5.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 0.7
Spain
Full-time 5.5 3.1 3.3 3.4 0.6
Part-time 5.1 2.6 3.0 3.1 0.3
Fixed-term 5.2 2.7 3.0 3.1 0.5
Self-employed 5.7 3.5 4.0 4.5 0.5
Total 5.4 2.9 3.2 3.3 0.5
Denmark
Full-time 5.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 0.8
Part-time 5.7 2.9 3.5 3.7 1.1
Fixed-term 5.7 2.9 3.4 3.6 0.7
Self-employed 5.8 2.7 4.3 4.5 0.4
Total 5.7 3.1 3.4 3.6 0.8
Sweden
Full-time 5.3 3.4 3.2 3.4 0.8
Part-time 5.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 1.3
Fixed-term 5.1 3.4 2.9 3.1 0.9
Self-employed 5.7 3.3 3.9 4.1 0.7
Total 5.3 3.4 3.2 3.4 0.9
Norway
Full-time 5.2 3.3 3.3 3.6 0.7
Part-time 5.2 3.3 3.2 3.5 0.8
(continued)
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Reported . . .
Job 
satisfaction
Work-related 
stress
Organizational 
commitment Effort
Days absent in 
last 6 months
Fixed-term 5.3 3.2 3.3 3.5 0.6
Self-employed 5.4 3.2 3.7 3.9 0.6
Total 5.2 3.3 3.3 3.6 0.7
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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12.6). Only part-time workers in the United States are more satisfied
with their jobs than full-time workers after controlling for the demo-
graphic and occupational variables and measures of involuntary
employment (Table 12.7, column 1), as well as for all measures of
work values and job rewards (Table 12.7, column 2). Part-time workers
in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway are significantly more
satisfied than full-time workers once we control for work values and
job rewards (column 2). Part-time workers in West Germany and the
Netherlands tend to have jobs that respondents perceive as paying less
and having fewer opportunities for promotion (see Table 12.5), and
part-time workers in Norway perceive fewer opportunities for promo-
tion and fewer intrinsic rewards (as do part-time workers in the Nether-
lands). Thus, controlling for job rewards in these countries reveals the
positive direct effects of part-time work on satisfaction. By contrast,
part-time workers in Italy and Sweden remain more dissatisfied than
full-time workers after controlling for our measures of work values and
job rewards.
Self-employed persons are more satisfied with their jobs than regu-
lar full-time workers in all countries (Table 12.6). This appears to be
mainly due to the job rewards associated with self-employment (espe-
cially intrinsic rewards; see Tables 12.4 and 12.5), because controlling
for values and rewards explains the gap between self-employed and
full-time workers in all countries except Sweden and West Germany
(where the gap does not disappear but is reduced substantially and is
significant only at p ≤ 0.10). 
Fixed-term temporaries generally do not differ from full-time
workers in their job satisfaction (Table 12.7, column 1). This is consis-
tent with data from studies comparing contingent workers and more
secure employees (Pearce 1998; see also Futagami 1999). The only
countries in which the differences are significant when all the other
variables are controlled for are West Germany and Norway (Table
12.7, column 2). In part, this reflects the disadvantages associated with
fixed-term employment in these countries (especially in West Ger-
many; see Table 12.5). Controlling for job rewards reveals the positive
direct effect of fixed-term employment on job satisfaction.
Respondents who indicated that they were in their particular work
arrangement involuntarily were significantly more dissatisfied in all
countries,8 except Spain and the Netherlands (where the negative coef-
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Dependent variable = 
Self reported . . . Job satisfaction Work-related stress
1 2 1 2
United States
Part-time 0.23* 0.24** –0.39*** –0.36***
Fixed-term –0.02 0.16 0.01 –0.06 
Self-employed 0.31** –0.09 –0.06 0.05
Involuntary –0.27*** –0.12 0.10 0.10
N = 804 724 799 731
Adj. R2 = 0.025 0.357 0.041 0.049
Japan
Part-time 0.13 0.03 –0.62*** –0.49**
Fixed-term 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Self-employed 0.38** 0.22 –0.44*** –0.29 
Involuntary –0.21* 0.00 0.05 0.00 
N = 665 573 799 573
Adj. R2 = 0.084 0.339 0.066 0.086
West Germany
Part-time 0.14 0.38*** –0.40*** –0.31**
Fixed-term 0.11 0.34** –0.24* –0.34**
Self-employed 0.40*** 0.26* –0.42*** –0.28**
Involuntary –0.26*** –0.11 0.02 0.12 
N = 621 521 620 522
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Adj. R2 = 0.038 0.314 0.041 0.111
Great Britain
Part-time 0.21 –0.05 –0.67*** –0.64***
Fixed-term 0.03 0.02 –0.12 –0.12 
Self-employed 0.36** 0.02 –0.14 –0.09
Involuntary –0.25** –0.24** 0.03 –0.04
N = 535 480 533 480
Adj. R2 = 0.037 0.398 0.099 0.126
Netherlands
Part-time 0.06 0.16** –0.47*** –0.39***
Fixed-term –0.06 0.01 –0.24*** –0.30***
Self-employed NA NA NA NA
Involuntary –0.08 –0.08 0.09 0.06
N = 1058 945 1058 944
Adj. R 2= 0.014 0.283 0.065 0.109
France
Part-time –0.10 0.10 –0.20 –0.07 
Fixed-term –0.09 0.21 –0.40*** –0.49***
Self-employed 0.54** 0.15 0.02 0.02 
Involuntary –0.28*** –0.10 –0.01 0.05 
N = 688 588 690 589
Adj. R2 = 0.033 0.416 0.020 0.061
(continued)
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Dependent variable = 
Self reported . . . Job satisfaction Work-related stress
1 2 1 2
Italy
Part-time –0.62** –0.67*** –0.48** –0.39 
Fixed-term –0.23 –0.02 –0.38** –0.45**
Self-employed 0.37*** –0.04 –0.06 –0.09 
Involuntary –0.51*** –0.35*** 0.31*** 0.32***
N = 473 440 474 441
Adj. R2 = 0.094 0.325 0.022 0.044
Spain
Part-time –0.23 –0.13 –0.28 –0.27 
Fixed-term –0.18 –0.08 –0.26* –0.19 
Self-employed 0.18 0.11 0.44 0.35 
Involuntary –0.05 0.02 –0.10 –0.09 
N = 389 364 390 365
Adj. R2 = 0.033 0.188 0.015 –0.005
Denmark
Part-time –0.03 0.01 –0.22** –0.21**
Fixed-term 0.01 0.05 –0.11 –0.17 
Self-employed 0.10 –0.14 –0.36** –0.27*
Involuntary –0.24** –0.13 0.13 0.11 
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N = 625 610 625 610
Adj. R2 = 0.015 0.244 0.084 0.117
Sweden
Part-time –0.39*** –0.23** –0.08 –0.09 
Fixed-term –0.18 0.07 –0.10 –0.06 
Self-employed 0.43*** 0.23* –0.04 0.05 
Involuntary –0.31*** –0.11 0.01 0.00 
N = 784 685 780 684
Adj. R2 = 0.056 0.348 0.019 0.023
Norway
Part-time 0.03 0.22** –0.04 –0.05 
Fixed-term 0.12 0.21*** –0.16*** –0.13*
Self-employed 0.31*** 0.15 –0.17*** –0.05 
Involuntary –0.25*** –0.09 0.19*** 0.20***
N = 1425 1258 1419 1257
Adj. R2 = 0.033 0.307 0.029 0.053
*p ≤ 0.10;**p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
a Unstandardized coefficients are presented. The first equation for each dependent variable controls for sex, age, education, occupation,
and involuntary status.  The second equation includes the controls in the first model as well as the work values and job rewards listed in
Tables 12.2 and 12.4.  (Note: None of the models for the Netherlands includes variables for occupation.)
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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ficients for involuntary status were not significant). This pervasive
negative effect of involuntary work status appears linked in most coun-
tries to the mediating role of work values and job rewards (compare
columns 1 and 2, Table 12.7); only in Great Britain and Italy does the
coefficient of “involuntary” remain significant after we control for val-
ues and rewards (column 2), and this coefficient is markedly reduced in
column 2 in all countries except Great Britain.
Work-Related Stress
Our results for stress are reported in the second set of columns in
Table 12.7. We find that part-time workers report they have signifi-
cantly less stress than full-time workers in all countries except France,
Spain, Sweden, and Norway (see column 1). Adding measures of work
values and job rewards to the equations (see column 2) generally
reduces these differences only slightly, and the gaps in the United
States, Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Den-
mark remain statistically significant. The direct, negative effect of part-
time work on stress may reflect that part-time workers are simply
working fewer hours and have fewer responsibilities than full-time
workers. It may also reflect, in part, the greater control that part-time
workers in some countries say they have over the scheduling (see
Table 12.5).
Self-employed persons report lower levels of work-related stress in
Japan, West Germany, Denmark, and Norway, although this difference
appears to be due largely to work values and job rewards (columns 1
and 2, Table 12.7). Fixed-term employees report lower levels of stress
than full-time workers in West Germany, the Netherlands, France,
Italy, and Norway. The lower stress levels reported by fixed-term
employees in these countries do not appear to be explained by our mea-
sures of work values and job rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table 12.7).
Finally, respondents who indicate that they worked involuntarily in
their work arrangement reported significantly higher levels of stress
only in Italy and Norway (Table 12.7).
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Organizational Commitment and Effort
The results for organizational commitment are presented in the
first two columns in Table 12.8. Although “effort” is one of the three
items in the organizational commitment scale, we examine this vari-
able separately because this is the dimension of commitment that is
most strongly related to job performance (Kalleberg and Marsden
1995).
Part-time workers appear to be less committed overall to their
organizations than full-time workers only in Sweden and France, and
this gap is explained by differences in work values and job rewards
(columns 1 and 2; Table 12.8). Part-time workers appear to be more
committed than full-time workers in Great Britain to their organiza-
tions, although this difference also becomes nonsignificant when we
control for values and rewards.9 The finding of no difference in com-
mitment between part-time and full-time employees in the United
States is consistent with analyses of data from the early 1990s (Kalle-
berg 1995).10 With regard to the measure of whether the employee is
willing to work harder to help the company succeed, part-time workers
are less likely than full-time workers in West Germany and Sweden to
say they are willing to work harder, and these differences are only par-
tially explained by work values and job rewards. Part-time workers in
Italy say they are willing to work harder than full-time workers,
although this difference becomes nonsignificant when we control for
values and rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table 12.8).
Self-employed persons are more committed to their organizations
than regular full-time workers in all 10 of the countries for which we
have data on self-employment, and this gap remains significant except
in Great Britain, Japan, and West Germany once we control for work
values and job rewards. Self-employed persons are significantly more
likely than regular full-time workers in the United States, Japan, West
Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway to say that they
are willing to work harder than they have to; a substantial portion of
this difference is accounted for by work values and job rewards,
although only in the United States, West Germany, and Italy does the
effect of self-employment on effort become nonsignificant.
Fixed-term employees are less committed to their organizations
than full-time workers only in West Germany, Spain, and Sweden,
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Dependent variable = 
Self- reported . . .  
Organizational
commitment Effort Days absent in  last  6 months
1 2 1 2 1 2
United States
Part-time 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.18* 0.20*
Fixed-term –0.05 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.05 –0.08 
Self-employed 0.36*** 0.23*** 0.15* 0.14 –0.13 –0.09 
Involuntary 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.11* 0.30*** 0.27***
N = 788 719 781 712 780 713
Adj. R2 = 0.055 0.295 0.026 0.135 0.031 0.049
Japan
Part-time –0.02 0.13 -0.05 –0.01 0.23 0.28
Fixed-term 0.03 0.00 –0.02 –0.01 0.14 0.16
Self-employed 0.23* 0.21 0.41** 0.40** 0.01 –0.02
Involuntary –0.24*** –0.16* –0.27** –0.16 0.01 0.12
N = 662 570 781 564 452 405
Adj. R2 = 0.125 0.310 0.098 0.183 0.015 0.034
West Germany
Part-time –0.05 0.12 –0.43*** –0.25* –0.32 0.04
Fixed-term –0.21* –0.12 –0.25* –0.12 –0.12 –0.05
Self-employed 0.27*** 0.11 0.22* 0.21 –0.26 0.02
Involuntary –0.23*** –0.11 –0.46*** –0.32*** –0.03 0.08
N = 616 519 589 504 614 513
Adj. R2 = 0.077 0.276 0.082 0.222 0.013 0.036
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Great Britain
Part-time 0.22** 0.10 –0.07 –0.19 –0.32** –0.31*
Fixed-term 0.08 0.08 –0.06 –0.02 –0.12 –0.11 
Self-employed 0.23** 0.10 0.14 –0.04 –0.26** –0.32**
Involuntary 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 –0.03 –0.01
N = 519 467 506 456 523 467
Adj. R2 = 0.077 0.360 0.049 0.207 0.040 0.050
Netherlands
Part-time –0.08 –0.04 –0.05 0.00 –0.14 –0.10
Fixed-term –0.05 0.04 –0.01 0.05 –0.02 –0.03
Self-employed NA NA NA NA NA NA
Involuntary –0.03 –0.01 –0.05 –0.03 0.01 –0.03
N = 1055 941 1041 936 1033 926
Adj. R2 = 0.007 0.247 0.008 0.103 0.003 0.029
France
Part-time –0.17* –0.03 –0.03 0.09 0.05 –0.01
Fixed-term –0.02 0.08 0.01 –0.01 –0.03 –0.05
Self-employed 0.49*** 0.33** 0.27 0.15 –0.19 –0.18
Involuntary –0.23*** –0.07 –0.22** –0.01 0.09 0.11
N = 671 579 644 560 681 585
Adj. R2 = 0.066 0.297 0.029 0.113 –0.003 –0.001
Italy
Part-time 0.23 0.19 0.49** 0.37 –0.10 –0.02
Fixed-term 0.02 0.17 0.24 0.30 –0.24 –0.22
(continued)
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Dependent variable = Self 
reported ...  
Organizational
commitment Effort Days absent in last 6 months
1 2 1 2 1 2
Self-employed 0.53*** 0.21* 0.52*** 0.19 –0.13 0.06
Involuntary –0.22*** –0.07 –0.10 –0.02 0.01 0.00
N = 473 440 468 436 468 436
Adj. R2 = 0.112 0.289 0.071 0.165 0.009 0.007
Spain
Part-time –0.13 0.06 –0.03 0.16 –0.12  –0.20  
Fixed-term –0.22** –0.08 –0.20 –0.03 –0.02  –0.17  
Self-employed 0.67*** 0.60** 0.99*** 0.74** –0.06  –0.09  
Involuntary –0.03 –0.01 0.01 –0.01 –0.21  –0.21  
N = 387 363 376 354 384 361
Adj. R2 = 0.069 0.217 0.073 0.176 –0.006 0.013
Denmark
Part-time 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.35*** 0.34***
Fixed-term 0.06 0.06 –0.14 –0.16 –0.21 –0.23
Self-employed 1.01*** 0.65*** 0.95*** 0.58** –0.16 0.01
Involuntary –0.26*** –0.15** –0.42*** –0.30*** 0.28*** 0.31***
N = 624 609 617 604 622 607
Adj. R2 = 0.096 0.273 0.060 0.144 0.085 0.092
Sweden
Part-time –0.18** –0.09 –0.31*** –0.23** 0.39*** 0.40***
Fixed-term –0.29*** –0.17* –0.29** –0.24* –0.07 –0.01 
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Self-employed 0.72*** 0.50*** 0.66*** 0.47*** –0.16 0.10 
Involuntary –0.21*** –0.09* –0.23*** –0.12* 0.24*** 0.23***
N = 773 677 757 665 772 677
Adj. R 2 = 0.153 0.354 0.139 0.232 0.083 0.084
Norway
Part-time –0.09 0.02 –0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 
Fixed-term 0.03 0.09* –0.04 –0.01 –0.10 –0.07 
Self-employed 0.40*** 0.27*** 0.36*** 0.21** –0.25*** –0.13 
Involuntary –0.11** 0.01 –0.22*** –0.13** 0.21*** 0.22***
N = 1415 1253 1382 1226 1412 1247
Adj. R2 = 0.068 0.332 0.055 0.151 0.026 0.022
*p ≤ 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.
a Unstandardized coefficients are presented.  The first equation for each dependent variable controls for sex, age, education, occupation,
and involuntary status.  The second equation includes the controls in the first model as well as the work values and job rewards listed in
Tables 12.2 and 12.4.  (None of the models for the Netherlands includes variables for occupation.)
SOURCE: 1997 ISSP data.
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although only in Sweden does this gap remain significant (at p ≤ 0.10)
after controlling for work values and job rewards. The lack of differ-
ence in commitment (and other organizational citizenship behaviors)
between fixed-term and full-time employees reinforces studies dis-
cussed by Pearce (1998).11 In addition, fixed-term employees are less
likely than full-time workers only in West Germany and Sweden to say
that they are willing to work hard, but this gap is largely explained by
differences in work values and job rewards (columns 1 and 2, Table
12.8). 
Respondents in Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, Denmark,
Sweden, and Norway who were in their work arrangement involun-
tarily were significantly less committed to their organizations. In each
country except Japan, Denmark, and Sweden, these differences in
involuntary status appeared to be due to work values and job rewards
(columns 2 and 3). 
Persons who said they were working involuntarily in their work
arrangement were less likely to say that they would work harder than
they had to in Japan, West Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway. Controlling for work values and job rewards did not explain
these differences in West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, or Norway
(although values and rewards reduced the effects of involuntary status
in these countries also). In the United States, persons who said they
were working involuntarily were willing to work harder after control-
ling for work values and job rewards.
Absenteeism
Part-time workers were more likely than full-time workers to
report that they were absent in the last six months only in the United
States, Denmark, and Sweden (Table 12.8, column 1), and these differ-
ences remained strong and significant even after we controlled for
work values and job rewards (column 2). In contrast, part-time workers
in Great Britain were less likely than full-time workers to report that
they were absent, even controlling for involuntary status and the work
values and job rewards. 
Self-employed persons were less likely than full-time workers in
Great Britain and Norway to report absences, although this difference
remains significant only in Great Britain after controlling for values
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 464  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
Work Attitudes and Nonstandard Work Arrangements 465
and rewards. Respondents in their work arrangement involuntarily
reported that they were more often absent only in the United States,
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. These differences remained, more-
over, even after we controlled for work values and job rewards (column
2). 
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have examined differences between full-time,
open-ended employment relations and three types of nonstandard work
arrangements—part-time, fixed-term temporary, and self-employ-
ment—in work values, job rewards, and work attitudes. The types of
work arrangements, attitudes, and job rewards, and the countries that
we have analyzed are extremely varied. Accordingly, our results are
complex and belie easy generalizations; nevertheless, they suggest
three main conclusions.
First, part-time workers appear generally to have work attitudes
and behaviors that are at least as positive, if not more so, than full-time
workers. Part-time workers are equally or more satisfied with their jobs
than full-time employees in most countries. Part-time workers tend also
to be no less committed to their organizations than full-time workers
and equally likely to say that they are willing to work harder than they
have to in order to help their companies succeed. Moreover, part-time
workers generally say that they experience less stress at work and do
not report being absent from their jobs more often than full-time work-
ers. 
One reason for why part-time workers have generally positive
work attitudes relative to full-time employees is that, in many coun-
tries, their work values appear to correspond fairly well to their job
rewards. Although part-time workers and full-time workers may differ
in the rewards they obtain from their jobs, these differences correspond
to variations in what these two groups want from their jobs. Thus, part-
time workers are generally less likely than full-time workers to per-
ceive that their pay is high, but part-time workers are also less likely
than full-time workers to value a high income. The differences between
part-time workers and full-time workers in perceived job security are
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not that large, but in the countries in which full-time workers have
greater perceived job security, the part-time workers also tend to value
security less. Part-time workers are less likely than full-time workers to
feel that they have good opportunities for advancement, but part-time
workers also generally place less importance on such opportunities. On
the other hand, part-time workers value flexible hours more than full-
time workers in a number of countries, and part-time workers are as or
more likely to believe that they can control their schedules. These
results are consistent with our finding that individuals in most coun-
tries tend to work part-time voluntarily: more full-time workers desire
part-time work than vice versa.
Sweden appears to be an exception to this pattern. Part-time work-
ers in Sweden are less satisfied with their jobs than full-time workers.
Swedish part-time workers are also less committed to their organiza-
tions overall and less likely to say that they would work harder than
they have to in order to help their companies succeed. In Sweden, part-
time workers also reported that they were absent from their jobs more
often than full-time workers. Economic conditions in Sweden may
explain some of these results. Sweden went through a very deep reces-
sion in the mid-1990s, and a considerable number of part-time workers
worked involuntarily, preferring more hours. Their inability to secure
full-time employment may have contributed to their unhappiness with
their part-time status. The negative attitudes displayed by part-time
workers in Sweden may also reflect the higher expectations that
Swedes have with regard to part-time work. For example, Sweden is
the only country in which part-time workers were significantly more
likely than full-time workers to regard work as a central life interest.
These gaps between part-time workers and full-time workers in Swe-
den may also reflect, in part, differences in job rewards. Swedish part-
time workers are less likely than full-time workers to believe that their
jobs are interesting, offer good opportunities for promotion, are secure,
or pay well. 
A second conclusion is that fixed-term employees generally do not
display more negative work attitudes and behaviors than full-time
employees. Consistent with most prior research, fixed-term temporar-
ies do not differ much from full-time workers in their job satisfaction,
organizational commitment, reported effort, and absenteeism. Some of
these similarities may reflect the desire of fixed-term employees to dis-
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play positive work attitudes and behaviors in the hope of obtaining per-
manent positions with the employer. It may also reflect the perception
in some countries that fixed-term employment is a normal step on a
career progression toward full-time employment. Hence, fixed-term
employees may not display more negative attitudes despite being less
likely than full-time workers to perceive that their pay is high and that
they have good job security, to worry more about losing their jobs, and
to believe that they have less control over their schedules. 
Despite these differences in perceived job rewards, fixed-term and
full-time employees generally do not differ much in their work values
among the various countries (with the possible exceptions of the valua-
tion of job security and high earnings, on which fixed-term employees
place lower importance than full-time workers in four and three coun-
tries, respectively). The lack of differences in the importance placed on
various aspects of jobs between full-time and fixed-term employees is
consistent with the view that the growth in nonstandard work in some
countries, especially with regard to temporary employment, is not pri-
marily due to shifts in workers’ preferences for temporary work but
rather reflects a demand-side phenomenon accompanying employers’
search for flexibility in employment relations.
Third, self-employed persons generally display more positive work
attitudes and reported behaviors than persons who are employed full-
time. The self-employed are more satisfied with their jobs and are usu-
ally more committed to their organizations. Self-employed workers
report lower levels of stress and fewer absences in some countries, but
generally do not differ from full-time employees once work values and
job rewards are controlled for. The more positive work attitudes on the
part of self-employed persons largely reflect the greater control over
their work; self-employed persons in every country were more likely
than full-time employees to believe that they had more control over
their schedules, and in almost all countries they were more likely to
report that their jobs were interesting (a job reward that is closely
related to the amount of autonomy that one has). Moreover, self-
employed persons were more likely than full-time employees to report
that they valued flexible work, which they are able to attain by virtue of
their greater control over schedules. Otherwise, there were few system-
atic and significant differences in the work motivations between self-
employed persons and full-time employees.
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Our analyses of the relationships between types of work arrange-
ments and work values, job rewards, and worker attitudes and reported
behaviors were not ideal. We would have liked to distinguish between
fixed-term temporaries and those who are employed by a temporary
help agency, as well as to differentiate between groups such as inde-
pendent contractors and the self-employed. By emphasizing differ-
ences between regular full-time employees and the various
nonstandard work arrangements, we have also glossed over differences
within part-time (a particularly heterogeneous category), temporary,
and self-employed persons (as well as differences among full-time
employees). We could also have introduced much more complexity
into our analyses of worker attitudes. For example, we did not examine
potential interactions by gender, age, education, or occupation, in an
effort to focus on the overall patterns within each country. Nor did we
assess the likely simultaneous relationships between variables such as
work status and effort. These matters constitute important topics on the
agenda for future research on the correlates and consequences of non-
standard work arrangements within and among countries.
Our results, finally, suggest a number of country differences in the
relationships between nonstandard work arrangements, on one hand,
and work values, job rewards, and work attitudes, on the other. We
have speculated about some possible explanations of these country dif-
ferences but have not sought to account for them systematically. How-
ever, accounting for these country differences constitutes another
important agenda item for research on nonstandard work arrangements.
Future cross-national research should use more refined measures of
nonstandard work arrangements to better differentiate between types of
part-time workers (i.e., fixed-term temporaries, on-call workers, and
temporary help agency employees) and independent contractors and
other self-employed persons. Accounting for cross-national sources of
variation in nonstandard work arrangements and work attitudes is
important for understanding institutional and cultural differences in
employment relations and their consequences for workers.
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Notes
1. These data do not permit us to distinguish direct-hire temporaries from employees
of temporary help agencies. We also cannot differentiate between independent
contractors and other self-employed persons.
2. For simplicity and because of sample size restrictions, we constructed our mea-
sures of the four work arrangements to be mutually exclusive. In reality, combina-
tions of the work statuses may occur (e.g., fixed-term or self-employed persons
can work either full-time or part-time). 
3. We present unweighted results in all tables. Approximately half of the countries
do not supply weights: the data from France, Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, Spain,
and Sweden come with weights, but the data from the United States, Japan, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and Norway do not. 
4. We can obtain a sense of whether fixed-term workers are working in this arrange-
ment involuntarily from responses to the question about the importance of job
security. We find that 88 percent of fixed-term temporaries in Japan, 95 percent in
the United States, 90 percent in France, 95 percent in Great Britain, 97 percent in
West Germany, 83 percent in Sweden, and 100 percent in Italy report that having
job security is “important” or “very important” to them. This suggests that the
vast majority of fixed-term temporaries are working in this arrangement involun-
tarily.
5. The results for part-time workers versus full-time workers in the United States are
consistent with those obtained by Golden (2001) in his analysis of the May 1997
Current Population Survey data. 
6. We also estimated the models reported in Table 12.5 with measures of work val-
ues omitted. The results were nearly identical to those presented in Table 12.5. In
only 9 of 192 cases did the coefficient of a job status variable change from nonsig-
nificant to significant (or vice versa), and in 7 of 9 of these cases, this involved a
change from p ≤ 0.10 to nonsignificance (or vice versa). The results of this sup-
plemental analysis are available on request from the authors.
7. Equation 3 estimates the impact of work values and job rewards separately. This
model produces the same estimates of the job status parameters as one that con-
trols for each job reward as well as the difference between the job reward and the
respondent’s valuation of the reward. 
8. See the discussion of “volition” as an important determinant of work-related atti-
tudes in Krausz, Brandwein, and Fox (1995). Feldman, Doerpinghaus, and Turn-
ley’s (1995) survey of 186 temporary agency employees in the southeast region of
the United States also found that involuntary temporary workers are less satisfied
on a variety of dimensions (and less committed) than temporary workers who
work voluntarily. See also Aeppel (1997) and Ellingson, Gruys, and Sackett
(1998).
9. Similarly, Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (1999) found a great deal of similarity
between part-time workers and full-time workers with regard to organizational
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commitment and organizational citizenship behaviors in a number of public ser-
vice occupations in Britain. 
10. See also the review by Van Dyne and Ang (1998), which cites a number of studies
that found no evidence that contingent workers in the United States had less posi-
tive work attitudes than regular employees. They did, however, find that contin-
gent (temporary or on-call) workers in Singapore were less committed and
engaged in fewer organizational citizenship behaviors than regular employees in
Singapore. They explain this by arguing that contingent workers in Singapore
work in these jobs voluntarily (due to very tight labor markets) and so expect less
of their employers (and vice versa). By contrast, contingent workers in the United
States often work in temporary jobs involuntarily, and so may display positive
attitudes in their attempts to obtain regular employment.
11. Futagami (1999) found that, in Japan, temporary agency employees (not fixed-
term temporaries, as analyzed here) were less committed to their organizations
than regular full-time employees, although temporary workers were also found to
have a relatively high level of organizational commitment.
Houseman Osawa book.book  Page 470  Tuesday, October 14, 2003  1:07 PM
Work Attitudes and Nonstandard Work Arrangements 471
Appendix A
ISSP Data
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is an annual program of
cross-national collaboration among mostly academic survey organizations that
compile comparable cross-national data on social attitudes and values (see
Davis and Jowell 1989). Founded in 1984, the ISSP has grown to include 37
nations. In 1997, 27 countries participated in collecting data on “work orienta-
tions” (ASEP 1999). The merging of the data into a cross-national data set was
performed by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, University of
Cologne, in collaboration with the Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políti-
cos in Spain.
In the ISSP, efforts are made to ask questions in the same way in each
country, thus producing a high-quality, cross-culturally comparable data set.
The annual topics for ISSP are developed over several years by a subcommittee
and pretested in various countries. The annual plenary meeting of ISSP adopts
the final questionnaire. The ISSP researchers concentrate on developing ques-
tions that are 1) meaningful and relevant to all countries, and 2) can be ex-
pressed in an equivalent manner in all relevant languages. The questionnaire is
originally drafted in British English and translated to other languages using
standard back-translation procedures. The collaboration between organizations
in the ISSP is not special or intermittent, but routine and continual. 
ISSP rules require that all surveys be representative probability samples of
the adult population of each country. Checks are made against census and other
gold standards in each country to ensure that the samples obtained are repre-
sentative. Descriptions of the samples are included in the codebook for each
country. In some countries (e.g., United States, Great Britain, and sometimes
Germany), the ISSP is a module on a larger survey (General Social Survey;
British Social Attitudes Survey; and the Allgemeinen Bevolkerungsumfragen
der Socialwissenschaften [ALLBUS]), but in most countries, it is either part of
a larger omnibus survey or a stand-alone survey. Further information on the
ISSP is available on two Web sites: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialfor-
schung, University of Cologne: http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/en/issp/ and ISSP
Secretariat: http://www.issp.org/.
Additional information on the ISSP is available from the ISSP secretari-
at: Tom W. Smith, NORC, 1155 East 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637; phone:
(773) 256-6288; fax: (773) 753-7866; e-mail: smitht@norcmail.uchica-
go.edu. See also Smith 2000. 
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Table 12B.1  Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable name Description Coding
 Work values
Work Please tick one box for each statement 
below to show how much you agree or 
disagree with it, thinking of work in 
general: work is a person's most 
important activity.
1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
From the following list, please tick one box for each item to show 
how important you personally think it is in a job:
Job security Job security 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
High earnings High income 1 = strongly disagree to
5 = strongly agree
Opportunity for  
promotion
Good opportunities for advancement 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Interesting work An interesting job 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Flexible hours A job that allows someone to decide 
their times or days of work
1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Involuntary For persons who are not self-employed, 
this variable is coded “1” if the person 
works full-time but would rather work 
part-time and vice versa.  For self-
employed persons, this variable is 
coded as “1”if the person says that he/
she would rather work for someone 
else.
1 = Involuntary; 
0 = Voluntary
Job rewards
Fear of losing job To what extent, if at all, do you worry 
about the possibility of losing your job?
1 = I do not worry at all to 
4 = I worry a great deal
For each of these statements about your (main) job, please tick one 
box to show how much you agree or disagree that it applies to your 
job.
High earnings My income is high 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Job security My job is secure 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
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Opportunity for  
promotion
My opportunities for advancement are 
high
1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Interesting 
work
My job is interesting 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Flexible hours Which of the following statements best 
describes how your working hours are 
decided?  (By working hours, we mean 
the times you start and finish work and 
not the total hours you work per week 
or month.)
1 = starting and finishing 
times are decided by my 
employer and I cannot 
change them on my own.
2 = I can decide the time I 
start and finish work, 
within limits.
3 = I am entirely free to 
decide when I start and 
finish work.
Worker outcomes
Job satisfaction How satisfied are you in your (main) 
job?
1 = completely dissatisfied 
to 7 = completely satisfied
Stress at work How often do you find your work 
stressful?
1 = never to 5 = always
Organizational commitment
 and absenteeism
Organizational
commitment
scale
Scale computed as the average score on 
three variables:
hlporg1r: I am willing to work harder 
than I have to in order to help the firm 
or organization succeed.
pridorgr: I am proud to be working for 
my firm or organization.
styorg3r: I would turn down another 
job that offered quite a bit more pay in 
order to stay with this organization.
For each of the three items 
and the scale
1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree
Cronbach's alpha = 0.63
Effort To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statement: 
I am willing to work harder than I have 
to in order to help the firm or 
organization succeed.
1 = strongly disagree to
 5 = strongly agree
Days absent in 
last 6 months
About how many days have you been 
absent from work in the last 6 months 
(not counting vacation)?
0 = none         1 = 1–5
2 = 6–10         3 = 11–20
4 > 20
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Japanese mothers, 280, 281t
nonstandard employees, American 
women, 315–316, 317t–318t
part-time employees
France and United States, 147
Italy and Spain, 106t–107t, 108
short-term employment
France and United States, 137
temporary agency employees
France, 142, 146
United States, 142
temporary employees
France and United States, 139
Italy and Spain, 103t–104t, 105
United States, 143
Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(United States), 406
Occupational shifts, part time and 
temporary work, Netherlands and 
United Kingdom, 74–76
OECD countries, part-time employment, 
57
OECD indicators of employment 
protection regulations, 29
Old age pensions. See Social security 
systems
On-call employees
attitudes toward being, American 
women, 320, 321t
definition, 135, 309, 346n2
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demand-side factors, Japan, 
197t–198t
demographic and family 
characteristics, American women, 
311t–313t, 315
employee benefits, United States, 
186, 188t
Netherlands, 220–221
occupational groupings, American 
women, 316, 317t–318t
percentages of, United States, 136t
reasons for being, American women, 
322, 323, 324t
skill levels, American women,
317t–318t, 319
women overrepresented among, 139
One-person businesses. See Self-
employment
Opportunities for promotion, importance 
of, by work arrangement and 
country, 427t–430t, 432t–434t, 
435
Organizational commitment and effort, 
by work arrangement and country, 
459, 460–464, 474
Overtime
avoiding, with nonstandard work, 
165
part-time employees, Italy, 371
Parity laws and regulations, 12–13
See also Comparable worth in Japan
Part-time employees
absenteeism, by country, 460t–463t, 
464–465
age groups
Denmark and Germany, 38, 45t
Japan, 181, 182t
Netherlands and United 
Kingdom, 73
United States, 181, 182t, 201–202
attitudes, 13–14, 465–466
American women, 320, 321t
availability of child care, United 
States, 344–345
Britain, 244, 246
definition, 425
United States, 310, 346n3
demographic and family 
characteristics
American women, 310–314
Italy and Spain, 102–103, 
105–108
Japan and United States, 181, 
182t
Denmark, 21, 37–42
East Germany, 42, 244
employee benefits
Japan, 186, 187t
United States, 186, 188t
employment and labor policy,
394–395
European Union countries, 17–19, 37
France, 144–148
gender
Italy, 99t, 101, 103t–104t
Japan, 202
Netherlands and United 
Kingdom, 73
Spain, 99t, 101, 103t–104t
United States, 201–202, 202–203
Germany, 20, 37–42
health insurance benefits, United 
States, 151
hours usually worked Denmark and 
Germany, 48
importance of earnings, by country, 
427t–430t, 432t–434t, 435
importance of flexible hours work, 
by country, 427t–430t, 432t–434t, 
436
importance of interesting work, by 
country, 427t–430t, 432t–434t, 
435
importance of job security, by 
country, 427t–430t, 431, 
432t–434t, 435
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 427t–430t, 432t–434t, 435
institutional incentives, Denmark and 
Germany, 40
involuntary vs. voluntary, by country, 
427t–430t, 432t–434t, 437
job satisfaction levels, 465
Italy and Spain, 115t
Sweden, 465–466
job security
by country, 427–430t, 431–435
Japan, 189–190
job stability, American women, 
329–331, 332, 334, 336
job status satisfaction, Italy and 
Spain, 118t
mothers of young children, European 
Union countries, 69, 71
with multiple jobs, France, 150–151
Netherlands, 223, 224–225, 244, 245, 
246
occupational groupings, American 
women, 316, 317t–318t
organizational commitment and 
effort, by country, 459, 460–464
pension plans, United States, 151
perceived control over work 
schedule, by country, 439t–441t, 
443–446t, 447
perceived degree of interesting work, 
by country, 439t–441t, 442–447
perceived earnings, by country, 438, 
439t–441t, 443t–446t
perceived job satisfaction, by 
country, 448–458
perceived job security, by country, 
438, 439t–441t, 442, 443t–446t
perceived opportunities for 
promotion, by country, 
439t–441t, 442, 443t–446t
percentage, Japan, 394
poverty indicators, Italy and Spain, 
112t, 113
reasons for being, American women, 
322, 323, 324t
skill levels, American women, 316, 
317t–318t, 319
Sweden, 225–226, 244–246
trends
American women, 310, 326t
European Union countries, 19, 58, 
59–60, 59t
France, 145–148
Italy, 102
Italy, 1987–1999, 101f
Japan, 177, 178t, 191–192, 269t
Netherlands, 60–61, 73
Spain, 102
Spain, 1987–1999, 101f
United Kingdom, 60–61
United States, 145, 177, 178t, 
199–203
United States, 144–148
wages
Britain, 249–250
Germany, 249–250
Italy, 112t, 113
Japan, 199, 394–395
Netherland and United Kingdom, 
77
Netherlands, 249–250
Spain, 112t, 113
Sweden, 249–250
West Germany, 244–245, 246
who start own businesses, Sweden, 
229
women, 10–11
Denmark and Germany, 38, 39f, 
40
European Union countries, 68, 69t
France and United States, 
154–155
Italy, 116, 119
work involvement, by country, 426–
431, 432t–434t
work-related stress, by country, 448, 
449t–452t, 454t–457t, 458
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association with temporary 
employment, 34
connection with fixed-term 
employment, 356
as cost-cutting measure, France and 
United States, 164–165
definition, 3, 231, 254
European countries, 54, 100
France, 168n16
Japan, 176, 268
United States, 5t, 176
demand-side factors, Japan, 
194–196, 197t–198t
education as factor, Denmark and 
Germany, 38, 41t
European Union directives, 63f, 358
firm size as a factor, 38, 40
government encouragement of, 
Netherlands, 64–65
impact of wages on, 57
impact of workload variations on, 
OECD countries, 57
impact on income, Japanese mothers, 
288–289
legal definition, European Union 
countries, 355–356
legal framework
France, 363–364
Germany, 365
Italy, 371
Netherlands, 377–378
Spain, 368
United Kingdom, 379–380
United States, 410
levels of and trends in, 4–6
men’s choice of, European Union 
countries, 69, 70t
occupational and industrial 
composition, Netherlands and 
United Kingdom, 74–76
OECD definition, 144
overlap with fixed-term contracts, 58
probability by gender
Britain, 235t–237t
East Germany, 235t–237t
Netherlands, 235t–237t
Sweden, 235t–237t
West Germany, 235t–237t
regulations
European Union countries, 
382–383
France and United States, 164
Spain, 98
as route to standard employment, 
European Union countries, 60
seasonal work as form of, European 
Union countries, 357
self-employed in, Italy and Spain, 
110t
in service sectors, France and United 
States, 159–160
and social security system, France, 
164
supply-side factors, European Union 
countries, 56–57, 61, 72t, 73
tax policies, Japan, 199
terms and conditions, United 
kingdom, 65–66
and underemployment in France, 
155–156
as way for mothers to continue 
working, 294
See also Nonstandard employment; 
Part-time employees
Pay. See Earnings; Wages
Pension plans
circumventing with employee 
leasing, 409
France, 133–134
Japan, 186, 187t
nonstandard employees, Japan, 391
temporary agency employees, United 
States, 406–407
United States, 133–134, 151, 186, 
188t, 189
women, Japan, 276
See also Social security systems
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Permanent employees
Italy and Spain, 103t–104t
job satisfaction, 114, 115t, 116
job status satisfaction, 118t
satisfaction with aspects of life, 
117t
wages and poverty indicators, 
112t
women working part-time in Italy, 
116, 119
Persistent poverty, 113
Portugal, nonstandard work 
arrangements, 1988 and 1998, 18t
Poverty levels, Italy and Spain, 112t, 
113–114
Productivity of workers in nonstandard 
employment, 3
effect of attitudes on, 14
Promotion opportunities, perceptions 
about, by work arrangement and 
country, 439t–441t, 442, 
443–446t
Race and ethnicity
nonstandard employment, American 
women, 310–314
occupational characteristics, United 
States, 142
part-time employment, United States, 
148
temporary employment, 167n9
American women, 314
United States, 140
Recession of 1990’s effects in Japan
on labor market, 272
on part-time employment, 192
on temporary employment, 206
Regulations
and cross-country shifts in 
nonstandard employment, 7
employee benefits, 8, 12–13
employee leasing, 409
European Union countries, 53
fixed-term contracts, 8–9
Netherlands, 61–68, 76–78
part-time employment, France and 
United States, 164
temporary agency employment
Denmark and Germany, 36–37
France, 162
France and United States, 
165–166
that affect work arrangements, 25
that encourage marginal 
employment, 26
United Kingdom, 61–68, 76–78
See also Labor laws
Research methods
controlling for effect of work values 
and job rewards, 448
cross-country analyses, 1–2, 468
on decision to work part-time, 
210n12
on effect of tax policies on wages, 
207–208
influence of social context on, 134
longitudinal studies, 325–327
restricting sample to employed 
persons, 229
sample selection bias and wage 
differentials, 210n8
shift-share analysis, 59
on work arrangement transitions, 
American women, 329
on work attitudes, 468
See also Variables
Retail trade
hours of work, France and United 
States, 164
part-time employment, France and 
United States, 159–160
Retired workers, Japan and United 
States, 185
Retirement plans. See Pension plans; 
Social security systems
Royal Decree-Law 15/1998 (Spain), 368
Seasonal employees
legal definition, European Union 
countries, 357–358
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United States, 159
See also Casual workers
Sectoral bargaining for nonstandard 
employment in European Union 
countries, 367, 370, 374
Self-employed
absenteeism, by country, 460t–463t, 
464–465
attitudes, 467
Britain, 234, 247, 248
demographic characteristics, Italy 
and Spain, 102–103
Denmark, 21
East Germany, 247, 248
employee benefits, Italy, 94
European Union countries, 17, 18t
gender
Britain, 230t
East Germany, 230t
Italy, 99t
Netherlands, 230t
Spain, 99t
Sweden, 230t
West Germany, 230t
Germany, 20, 234
importance of earnings, by country, 
427t–430t, 432t–434t, 435
importance of flexible hours work, 
by country, 427t–430t, 432t–434t, 
436
importance of interesting work, by 
country, 427t–430t, 432t–434t, 
435
importance of job security, by 
country, 427t–430t, 431, 
432t–434t, 435
importance of opportunities for 
promotion, by work, 427t–430t, 
432t–434t, 435
involuntary vs. voluntary, by country, 
427t–430t, 432t–434t, 436, 437
Italy, 101
job satisfaction levels, 467
Italy and Spain, 115t, 116
job status satisfaction, Italy and 
Spain, 118t
men, Sweden and Germany, 230t, 
231, 249
Netherlands, 228–229, 247, 248
organizational commitment and 
effort, by country, 459, 460–464
perceived control over work 
schedules, by country, 439t–441t, 
443t–446t, 447
perceived earnings, by country, 438, 
439t–441t, 443t–446t
perceived job satisfaction, by 
country, 448–458
perceived job security, by country, 
438, 439t–441t, 442, 443t–446t
perceived opportunities for 
promotion, by country, 439t–441t, 
442, 443t–446t
percentages, European Union 
countries, 30
perception of work as interesting, by 
country, 439t–441t, 442–447
poverty indicators, Italy and Spain, 
114
rates, Japan, 269t
rates, with and without employees, 
Denmark and Germany, 32–33
satisfaction with aspects of life, Italy 
and Spain, 117t
“second generation,” 100
Spain, 101
Sweden, 247, 248
wages and poverty indicators, Italy 
and Spain, 112t
West Germany, 247, 248
work involvement, by country, 
427t–430t, 431, 432t–434t
work-related stress, by country, 449t–
452t, 454t–457t, 458
work values, by country, 427t–430t, 
431–435
Self-employment
age as a factor, Denmark and 
Germany, 44t
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as a bridge to employment
European Union countries, 357
Sweden, 374–375
definition, 3, 253t, 425
differences among countries, 
14n2
ELFS, 49
European countries, 5t, 55
Japan, 268, 269t
determinants, 30
as hidden dependent employment, 
227–229, 365–366
legal definition, European Union 
countries, 356–357
legal framework
Denmark, 373
Germany, 365–366
Italy, 371–372
Netherlands, 378
Spain, 369
Sweden, 374–375
United Kingdom, 380
levels of and trends in, 4–6
probability by gender
Britain, 235t–237t
East Germany, 235t–237t
Netherlands, 235t–237t
Sweden, 235t–237t
West Germany, 235t–237t
relation with unemployment, 
Germany, 43
types, 81n5
as way to circumvent social security 
taxes, European Union countries, 
357, 360–361
See also Dependent employment; 
Nonstandard employment; Self-
employed
Service sector, part-time employment, 
France and United States, 159–
160
Shokukaku, 180t
Short-term arrangements, 134
France and United States, 135–139
United States, 135
Single mothers, 339–342
United States, 345–346
Skill levels
impact on part-time wages, Japan, 
183
and job stability across work 
arrangements, American women, 
331–332, 333t
of occupations and nonstandard 
employment, 13
part-time employment, Britain, 250
upgrading, nonstandard workers, 
France and United States, 166
See also Educational levels
Social partners, European, 361
Social protection benefits, France and 
United States, 133–134, 165
Social security systems
benefits for part-time employees, 
Italy, 371
Germany and Denmark, 25–26
impact on married women’s labor 
supply, 211n19
Japan, 397
Netherlands and United Kingdom, 77
part-time employees
France, 164
Japanese women, 274
self-employment as way to 
circumvent, European Union 
countries, 357, 360–361
See also Pension plans
Spain
absenteeism, by work arrangement, 
462t, 464–465
employees’ organizational 
commitment and effort, by work 
arrangement, 459, 462t, 464
employment rates, 90–91, 91f, 92
institutional framework for standard 
work arrangements, 94–95
involuntary vs. voluntary work 
arrangements, 427t–430t, 
432t–434t, 436–437
job satisfaction, 114–116, 117t
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Spain (cont.)
labor force participation rates, 90–91
labor market, 89, 90–92, 121–122
labor mobility by gender, 92, 93f
nonstandard employment
legal framework, 366–369
percentages, 426t
trends, 95–98, 101–102
work arrangements, 1996, 99t
part-time employment
trends, 1987–1999, 101t
of women, 102
perceived job rewards, by work 
arrangement, 438, 440t–441t, 
442, 445t, 447
perceived job satisfaction, by work 
arrangement, 448, 451t, 453, 
456t, 458
political factors, 94
temporary employees
trends, 60
trends, 1987–1999, 101t
wages, 111–113
unemployment rate, 91–92
work transitions, 115, 118t, 119
work values, by work arrangement, 
425–426, 429t, 431, 433t, 
436–437
worker satisfaction with aspects of 
life, 117t
Standard employment relationship, 
352–353
Standard of living, impact on self-
employment rates, 31
Standard work arrangement, 15
Denmark, 42
ELFS definition, 48
Germany, 20, 42
Statistics. See Data sources
Stress at work, by work arrangement and 
country, 449t–452t, 454t–457t, 
458, 474
Subcontracting, 55
Supply-side factors in nonstandard 
employment trends
European Union countries, 55, 56–57
France, 152–153, 153–156
Italy, 122–123
part-time employment of married 
women
Japan, 269
United States, 202–203
temporary agency employment
Japan, 205
United States, 203–205
United States, 152–153, 153–156
See also Employees
Sweden
absenteeism, by work arrangement, 
462t–463t, 464–465
demographic variables, 256
employees
descriptive statistics by gender, 
260t–263t
organizational commitment and 
effort, by work arrangement, 
459, 462t–463t, 464
fixed-term contracts, 222
gender differences, 247
hourly wages, gender differences, 
238t–243t, 244
independent contractors, 227
involuntary vs. voluntary work 
arrangements, 427t–430t, 
432t–434t, 436–437
labor market deregulation, 221–222
nonstandard employment
definitions, 253t–254t, 254–256
gender differences, 230t, 
235t–237t
government regulation, 218
legal framework, 373–375
percentages, 426t
work arrangements, 1988 and 
1998, 18t
part-time employees, 217, 225–226, 
244–246
definition, 5t
job satisfaction, 466–467
rates, 37, 60
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perceived job rewards, by work 
arrangement, 438, 441t, 442, 
446t, 447
perceived job satisfaction, by work 
arrangement, 448, 451t, 453, 
457t, 458
self-employment, 227–228, 247, 248
rates for men, 249
temporary agency employment, 218
work values, by work arrangement, 
425–426, 429t, 431, 434t, 
436–437
See also European Union countries
Tax and Social Insurance Law (Japan), 
276
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
of 1982 (United States), 420n50
Tax policies
affecting women, Japan, 276
and cross-country shifts in 
nonstandard employment, 7
impact on part-time employment, 10
Japan, 199
impact on wage arrangements
Denmark, 26
Germany, 26
Japan, 207–208
United States, 207–208
impact on women’s choice of part-
time employment, 11
Japan, 290–291
Japan, 185–186, 397
that promote self-employment, 
Netherlands, 229
United States, 185–186
See also Income tax policies
Technology, effect in Japan, 192–193
Temporary agency employees
age groups, Japan and United States, 
181, 182t
Britain, 222
demographic and family 
characteristics
American women, 311t–313t
Japan and United States, 181, 
182t
employee benefits
Japan, 186, 187t
United States, 186, 188t, 403
France, 134–135, 135
by gender, France, 140t
hiring permanently, Japan, 411–414
by industry, France, 141t
Japanese term for, 209n2
Netherlands, 76t, 220–221
occupational groupings, American 
women, 316, 317t–318t
proportion of, Japan, 394
reasons for being, American women, 
322, 323, 324t
self-reporting by, 179, 180t
skill levels, American women, 316, 
317t–318t, 319
trends
European Union countries, 58, 59
Japan, 177, 178t, 205–206
United States, 177, 178t, 203–205
United Kingdom, 60–61, 74, 76t
United States, 134–135, 136t
Temporary agency employment
definition, 3
European countries, 55, 55f
United States, 309
demand-side factors, Japan, 
197t–198t
employer legal responsibilities, 
Japan, 392, 393–394
European Union directives, 359
growth
Japan, 178
United States, 178–179
impact on job stability rates in the 
United States, 190
laws and regulations
Denmark, 36–37
Germany, 36–37
Japan, 9
laws restricting, Japan, 390
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Temporary agency employment (cont.)
legal definition, European Union 
countries, 356
legal framework
Denmark, 372–373
France, 362–363
Germany, 364–365
Italy, 369–370
Netherlands, 376–377
Spain, 367–368
Sweden, 374
United Kingdom, 378–379
legal framework,
United States, 404–408
multi-employer agreements, 
Germany, 365
primary employer, United States, 
405–406
regulations
European Union countries, 
380–381
France, 162–163, 165–166
Japan, 397, 398–399
United States, 165–166, 211n23
supply-side factors, European Union 
countries, 61
terms and conditions
Netherlands, 67
United Kingdom, 68
See also Temporary agency 
employees
Temporary employees
age groups
Japan and United States, 181, 
182t
Netherlands and United 
Kingdom, 73
attitudes toward being, American 
women, 320, 321t
characteristics and preferences
France, 153
Japan, 400, 401t
United States, 153
demographic and family 
characteristics
American women, 314–315
Italy and Spain, 102–103
Japan and United States, 181, 
182t
Denmark, 21, 33–37
employee benefits, Japan, 186, 187t
European Union countries, 17–19
France, 139–144
gender differences, Netherlands and 
United Kingdom, 73
Germany, 20, 33–37
health benefits, United States, 151
inefficient use of, Spain, 121–122
involuntary vs. voluntary, by country, 
436
job satisfaction, Italy and Spain, 114
job security, 13
Japan, 189–190
job stability, American women, 
329–331, 332, 334, 336
part-time employment, Italy and 
Spain, 107t
pension plans, United States, 151
single mothers, United States, 342
trends
American women, 309, 326t
European Union, 19
European Union countries, 58, 
59–60
Italy, 102
Italy, 1987–1999, 101f
Japan, 177, 178t, 179, 180t
Netherlands, 60–61
Spain, 102
Spain, 1987–1999, 101f
United Kingdom, 60–61
United States, 177, 178t, 179, 
180t
United States, 139–144
using for work reorganization, 
France, 157
voluntary, Denmark and Germany, 35
wages and poverty indicators, Italy 
and Spain, 111–113
See also Fixed-term temporaries; 
Temporary agency employees
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contracts, Spain, 97, 98
definition, 3
European Union countries, 54–55, 
55f, 81n3, 100
Japan, 176–177
United States, 176–177, 309
variations among countries, 5t
demand-side factors, Japan, 
197–198t
disadvantages to employers, 58
effect of business cycles on, 36
effect of German deregulation on, 29
employer uses for, 37
growth in, during 1990s, 6
levels
Japan vs. United States, 179–181
and trends, 4–6
occupational and industrial 
composition, Netherlands and 
United Kingdom, 74–76
probability by gender
Britain, 235t–237t
East Germany, 235t–237t
Netherlands, 235t–237t
Sweden, 235t–237t
West Germany, 235t–237t
regulatory practices, Netherlands, 
66–67
relation with part-time employment, 
34
as route to standard employment, 119
European Union countries, 60
Women’s choice, in different 
countries, 11–12
See also Nonstandard employment; 
Temporary agency employees; 
Temporary employees
Temporary Help Business Act (Japan), 
390, 397–399, 411, 412
Temporary work agencies
definition, European Union 
countries, 55f
as employee recruiting tool, France, 
149
two types in Japan, 397–398
See also Employee leasing; 
Temporary agency employment
Terms and conditions
disparities in nonstandard 
employment contracts, Italy, 123
fixed-term contracts, United 
Kingdom, 68
part-time employment, United 
Kingdom, 65–66
temporary agency employment
Netherlands, 67
United Kingdom, 68
temporary employment, Netherlands, 
66
Trade Union Act (Japan), 415n3
Training of nonstandard workers
France and United States, 166
See also Apprentices
Underemployment
Denmark, 23–24
France, 155–156
Germany, 23–24
Underground economy
Germany, 25
Italy and Spain, 95, 121
relation to nonstandard employment 
regulation, 384
Unemployment
definition, 253t
fixed-term employment as remedy, 
European Union countries, 382
impact on self-employment rates, 31, 
43
impact on temporary employment 
rates, 36
Italy and Spain, 115, 118t, 119
nonstandard employment as remedy, 
Italy, 369
part-time work as remedy, Italy, 371
relation to growth of nonstandard 
employment, 7
See also Underemployment
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entrepreneurship grants, Sweden, 228
Italy, 94
part-time employees, Sweden, 226
Spain, 95
vs. mobility benefits, 124n5
Unemployment rates
within demographic groups, France 
and United States, 132
Denmark compared with Germany, 
23, 43
France, 149–150
implications for Spain, 120
Italy and Spain, 91–92
from labor market deregulation, 
European Union countries, 219
Unions
acceptance of labor market flexibility 
by, Netherlands, 219, 220
collective bargaining, Japan, 
390–391
collective bargaining of part-time 
work, European Union countries, 
354, 371
collective bargaining of temporary 
agency work
European Union countries, 
367–368, 370, 380–381
United States, 407–408
for self-employed workers
Netherlands, 228, 378
Spain, 369
and temp-to-hire arrangements in 
Japan, 413–414
See also Sectoral bargaining for 
nonstandard employment in 
European Union countries
United Kingdom
fixed-term contracts, 60–61, 73
terms and conditions, 68
trends, 60
trends, 1985–1999, 59t
labor market deregulation, 63–64
men in involuntary part-time 
employment, 71
nonstandard employment
legal framework, 378–380
work arrangements, 74–78
work arrangements, 1988 and 
1998, 18t
part-time employment
age factors, 73
gender differences, 73
mothers with children, 69, 70t
rates, 37, 60–61
rates, 1985–1999, 59t
terms and conditions, 65–66
wages, 77
political influences, 78–79
regulations on employment 
conditions, 61–68, 76–78
social security system, 77–78
temporary agency employees, 60–61
terms and conditions, 68
trends, 74
temporary employment trends, 60–61
See also Britain; European Union 
countries; Great Britain
United States
absenteeism, by work arrangement, 
460t, 464–465
compared with France, 131
demand-side factors in nonstandard 
employment trends, 152
employee benefits, 151, 185–186, 
188t, 189
employee leasing, 408–410
employees’ organizational 
commitment and effort, by work 
arrangement, 459, 460t, 464
fixed-term employees
characteristics and preferences, 
153
trends, 205, 206
independent contractors, 400–404
institutional framework
employment contracts, 132–134
use of nonstandard employment, 
160–165
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involuntary vs. voluntary work 
arrangements, 427t–430t, 
432t–434t, 436–437
involuntary part-time 
employment, 155
laws protecting nonstandard 
employees, 12
nonstandard employees
definitions, 176–177
demographic characteristics, 181, 
182t
growth in numbers, 175
job security, 150, 189–190
legal framework, 400–411
percentages, 426t
trends, 177–181
wage parity, 183–185
part-time employees, 144–148
definition, 5t
demographic characteristics, 181, 
182t
legal framework, 410
trends, 145–148, 199–203
women, 154–155
pension plans, 151
perceived job rewards, by work 
arrangement, 438, 439t, 442, 
443t, 447
perceived job satisfaction, by work 
arrangement, 448, 449t, 453, 
454t, 458
short-term arrangements, 135–139
supply-side factors in nonstandard 
employment trends, 152–153
temporary agency employment
legal framework, 404–408
trends, 203–205
temporary employees, 139–144, 180t
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